PAN-ISLAM IN BRITISH INDIAN POLITICS

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA

(S.E.P.S.M.E.A.)

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VOLUME 66

Mohamed Ali's Khilafat Delegation to Europe with Indian and British sympathizers, *circa* **1920.**

PAN-ISLAM IN BRITISH INDIAN POLITICS

A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924

BY

M. NAEEM QURESHI

BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
1999

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pan- Islam in British Indian politics : a study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924 / by M. Naeem Qureshi.
p. cm. — (Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East and Asia, ISSN 1385-3376 ; v. 66)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 9004113711 (cloth : alk. paper)
1.India—Social conditions. 2. Fula (African people)—Politics and goverment—1919-1947. 2. Khilafat Movement.
DS480.45.Q75 1999
954.03'5'0882971—dc21 99-196668
CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Qureshi, M. Naeem :
Pan-Islam in British Indian politics : a study of the Khilafat movement, 1918 - 1924 / by M. Naeem Qureshi. - Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 1999
(Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East ; Vol 66)
ISBN 90-04-11371-1

ISSN 1385-3376
ISBN 90 04 11371 1

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Dedicated to
my parents and family

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PREFACE

From the planning stage of this book to its final publication I have accumulated debts to many people for their help. I owe a great deal to Prof. Robin Moore, then at the School of Oriental and African Studies (later Dean of Social Sciences at the Flinders University of South Australia), for introducing me to the wonderful world of historical research while I was doing my doctoral work at the University of London in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thanks are also due to Dr Z. H. Zaidi of the same School (presently, Editor-in-Chief of the *Jinnah Papers*, a project of the Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan) with whom I completed my work. His stimulating advice, encouragement and friendship have been of tremendous value. Dr P. G. Robb of the SOAS read a preliminary draft and made useful comments. I am obliged to him for this. I must also acknowledge my obligation to the late Prof. Aziz Ahmad of the University of Toronto who offered valuable suggestions for improvement. Since then I have been doing considerable rethinking on the basis of a variety of new source material, continuously adding and subtracting in the process. A later draft was read by Dr Qasim Zaman (now at Brown University) who made helpful observations. Prof. A. Z. Butt, my colleague at the GIK Institute, saved me from many a pitfall by his incisive criticism of the manuscript at its final stage. Prof. Khalid Masud of the Islamic Research Institute and Dr Sikandar Hayat of the Quaid-i-Azam University advised on some theoretical issues. Dr David Page (formerly of the BBC) provided material from the National Archives of India (New Delhi) while Dr Azmi Özcan of Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi and Dr Mehmet Saray of the Istanbul University helped with the Turkish sources. To all of them I am greatly indebted. Appreciation is also recorded for the assistance of another colleague, Mr Arif Khattak, who carefully checked the revised text. He and my son Sheharyar helped in the preparation of the index. However, I am alone responsible for the facts stated and opinions expressed in these pages.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Maulana Jamal Mian (b. 1920), the son of the late Maulana Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal (Lucknow), and belatedly to the late Malik Lal Khan (1889–1976),

former secretary of the Punjab Khilafat Committee, for kindly giving me interviews which helped me immensely. I would also like to thank for their courteous help the custodians and staff of the India Office Library & Records (London), Public Records Office (London), British (Museum) Library (London), Senate House Library of the University of London, SOAS Library (London), The Royal Archives (Windsor Castle), University of Cambridge Library, Bodleian Library of the University of Oxford, Library of the Congress (Washington DC), University of Pennsylvania Library (Philadelphia), Makerere University Library (Kampala), National Diet Library (Tokyo), Institute of Oriental Culture Library of the University of Tokyo, National Archives of India (New Delhi), Freedom Movement Archives of the University of Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam Academy Library (Karachi), Punjab Provincial Archives (Lahore), Lahore Museum Library (Lahore), Punjab Public Library (Lahore), University of the Punjab Library (Lahore), NWFP Provincial Archives (Peshawar), National Archives of Pakistan (Islamabad), National Documentation Centre (Islamabad), National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research Library (Islamabad), Islamic Research Institute Library (Islamabad), Quaid-i-Azam University Library (Islamabad), and GIK Institute Central Library (Topi).

Some portions of the work were originally published in *Modern Asian Studies, Journal of Asian History, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* and a few other journals. I am indebted to their editors/publishers for allowing me to draw on them and also to the Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, and Atatürk Research Centre, Ankara, for permitting me to incorporate material from my articles published by them.

I am thankful to my publishers, Brill of Leiden, for accepting the manuscript for publication, especially to Mrs Trudy Kamperveen, Desk Editor, Middle East and Islamic Studies, who was always helpful and never tired of my frequent e-mails. Thanks are also due to Ms Julie Plokker, who looked after the desk during the former's absence, and to Mr Jan Fehrmann, Desk Editor Islamic and Asian Studies Department, for seeing the publication through in a truly professional manner.

The manuscript was partly typed on microcomputer by Mr Mohsin Khan. Prof. Ahmad Saeed of MAO College, Lahore, allowed me access to his unpublished history of the Islamia College, Lahore, and

also supplied biographical information on various personalities. Mr Khalid Ali, a grandson of Shaukat Ali, provided the frontispiece from his family collection. Mrs Nilofar Khan and Mr Afaq Zaidi of the Survey of Pakistan prepared the map of British India and Engineer Sohaib Khan of the GIK Institute helped in redrawing the chart and the tables originally prepared by my friend Eşref Aydin of Turkey. To all of them I offer my special thanks.

The academic atmosphere at the GIK Institute in Topi (NWFP), where I am working at present, has been quite conducive to completing my work. Apart from the exchange of ideas with colleagues, one could spend hours working late into the night without any interruption. I must register my gratitude to the Institute, especially to its Rector, Prof. A. Raouf, and the Pro-Rector, Mr Samiullah Marwat, for providing facilities that enabled me to accomplish the task.

Lastly, my wife, Ghazala, and children, Shehwar, Sheharyar and Noveen, had to suffer intermittent spells of unintended separation while this book was taking shape. My parents did not even live to see the fruition of my labours. To them all I have dedicated this book with deep affection.

Topi/ Islamabad MNQ
January 1999

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFM	Archives of Freedom Movement (Karachi)
AIML	All India Muslim League
AIMLR	All India Muslim League Records (Karachi/Islamabad)
BOA	Başbakanlik Osmanli Arşivi (Istanbul)
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CP	Central Provinces
DC	Deputy Commissioner
FO	Foreign Office
ICH(P)P	India Confidential Home (Political) Proceedings
IG	Inspector General
IO	India Office
IOL&R	India Office Library & Records (London)
NAI	National Archives of India (Delhi)
NAP	National Archives of Pakistan (Islamabad)
NDC	National Documentation Centre (Islamabad)
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
NWFPA	North West Frontier Province Archives (Peshawar)
PRO	Public Records Office (London)
SBR	Special Branch Records (Lahore)
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Ankara)
UCL	University of Cambridge Library (Cambridge)
UP	United Provinces



Courtesy, Survey of Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

The impending dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire following an embarrassing defeat in the First World War threw the larger portion of the Sunni world of Islam into confusion and dismay.[1] Its impact on the seventy million Muslims of British India, fragmented and dispersed though they were, was particularly disturbing. Turkey, as the only surviving Muslim empire, ruling large Christian populations and seemingly capable of resisting Europe, had been the pride of the Muslims, especially those under foreign domination.[2] As a symbol of the worldly power of Islam and the seat of its 'universal' caliphate, Turkey had provided them with a rallying-point. In British India she had also given them a feeling of security in the midst of the Hindu majority.[3] But since the latter half of the nineteenth century, a fear had haunted the Indian Muslims that if Turkey was to disappear they 'would become like unto Jews—a mere religious sect whose kingdom was gone'.[4] Thus, Turkey was to them 'the last hope of Islam'.[5] Naturally, the threatened spoliation of its empire at the end of the war in November 1918, combined with other factors, engulfed the greater part of British India in an intense agitation for the preservation of Turkey's integrity and sovereignty. It took an anti-British character because, of all the Allied Powers, Britain was held to be chiefly responsible for Turkey's as well as India's misfortunes.

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[1] Since the Shi'as do not subscribe to the Sunni theory of the caliphate this study essentially deals with the Sunni world which is generally taken to be synonymous with the Muslim world. The varying degrees of reaction among Muslims (other than those of British India) over the Turkish question can be traced in Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, *Dunya-i Islam aur mas'ala-i Khilafat* (Bombay, 1922).

[2] Even the contemporary British administrators in the East acknowledged this fact. See Mark Sykes, 'Asiatic Turkey and the New Regime', *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society* (London, Dec. 1908), 2–5.

[3] 'Memorandum on Indian Moslems', IOL&R, L/P&S/10/524/1915. Also see H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), *Whither Islam?* (London, 1932), 73; and Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan* (London, 1967), 123.

[4] V. Chirol, 'Pan-Islamism', *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society* (London), 14 Nov. 1906, 14. As late as the 1890s even a staunch pro-British like Syed Ahmed Khan held the same view. See Theodore Morison, 'Muhammadan Movements', in Sir John Cumming (ed.), *Political India, 1832–1932* (London, 1932), 95–6.

[5] See the views of Tasadduq Husain Khan, DSP, CID, in IOL&R, PSD, 2765/18.

The present study is an attempt to examine in detail this very ferment which gripped the Sub-continent for almost six long years. But though the focus has been on the events between 1918 and 1924, it was impossible not to wander across these arbitrary boundaries, especially when pursuing their historical antecedents or following up their culmination. In the process it became necessary to redraw the contours of the study so as to resolve the tangled issues of the origins of pan-Islam in British India, determine its impact on nascent nationalism in a colonial milieu, and analyse the forces operating within the ambit of the non-concentric worlds of India and Islam. The objective has been to understand the interaction of religion and politics in the Indian environment more thoroughly than hitherto attempted.

The story revolves around the actions and reactions of Muslims of British India (now spread over India, Pakistan and Bangladesh)[6] who are a conglomeration of different races and cultures evolved over a period of several centuries. Some trace their descent from Arab and Central Asian traders, invaders and immigrants while others are the offspring of indigenous converts. As a whole they come from different stocks—Arabs, Turks, Mughals, Afghans, Persians and a variety of foreign and local hybrids. From the conquest of Sind in AD 712 to the formal end of the Mughal sovereignty in 1857, several Muslim dynasties ruled India with varying fortunes. But throughout those eleven hundred years the Muslim rulers and their Hindu subjects remained nations separate and apart. Of course, the Muslims were themselves divided but the bond of a common religion and a sense of shared history had helped them to overcome, in some ways at least, all sub-cultural, linguistic and doctrinal barriers as against the more numerous and highly stratified Hindu compatriots. Yet the minority syndrome continued to haunt the Muslims of India which created complex tensions in their relations with the Hindus and the Europeans who had lately appeared on the scene.

When the British supplanted the Muslims as rulers of India in the second half of the nineteenth century, they found the latter constituting a fifth of the country's population and a minority most unevenly distributed.[7] Though the position varied from province to province[8]

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[6] See Tables I and II on page 3 and the Diagram on page 4.

[7] Peter Hardy, *Muslims of British India* (London, 1972), 2.

[8] Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1970), 299 ff.

Table I

Proportional strength of Muslims in each Province and in the States and Agencies

	Number per 10,000 of the population				
	1921	1911	1901	1891	1881
Ajmer-Merwara	2,055	1,616	1,510	1,369	1,255
Andamans & Nicobars	1,515	1,731	1,707	—	—
Assam	2,896	2,810	2,689	2,710	2,698
Baluchistan	8,731	9,106	9,150	—	—
Bengal	5,399	5,274	5,158	5,108	5,009
Bihar & Orissa	1,085	1,063	1,061	1,076	1,089
Bombay	1,974	2,046	2,026	1,871	1,836
Burma	380	347	323	333	—
CP & Berar	405	406	421	385	386
Coorg	795	751	756	732	703
Delhi	2,904	—	—	—	—
Punjab	5,533	5,485	5,325	5,136	5,173
Madras	671	662	643	631	623
NWFP	9,162	9,286	9,221	9,230	9,212
UP	1,428	1,411	1,411	1,353	1,343
States & Agencies	1,343	1,331	1,376	1,176	946

Totals for India (1921 figures):
Total population = 318,942,480 * Muslims = 68,735,233

Sources: *Census of India, 1921*, i, Part 1, 6, 40–3 and 122–3.

Table II

Total Muslim population of the world (1906 Figures)

Asia (including Russia)	170,623,181
Africa	58,864,587
Europe	3,410,402
Australia and America	68,000
Total:	232,966,170

Sources: S. M. Zwemer, *et al.*, *The Mohammedan World of Today* (New York, 1906).

Diagram

Diagram showing the proportion of the population of India following each religion, 1921



Per 10,000 of the Population

Hindu	6856	Tribal Religions	309	Others	42
Muslim	2714	Christian	150		
Buddhist	366	Sikh	103		

Source: *Census of India, 1921*, i, part I

the political decline and loss of economic privileges, together with the creeping British interference with the *shari'at*, had generally left the Muslims badly mauled.[9] The resultant discontent gave rise to different forms of responses ranging from political pan-Islam to armed

[9] See e.g. M. Y. Abbasi, *Muslim Politics and Leadership in South Asia, 1876 92* (Islamabad, 1981), esp. ch. i–ii.

resistance to adjustment and collaboration with the new rulers. What made pan-Islam more intelligible to Indian Muslims was the growing consciousness among them that they were the members of a world-wide ecumenical community, stretching from the shores of the Atlantic to the Straits of Malacca in one unbroken chain. Thus, in the political turmoil of the early twentieth century India, renewed challenges to the *daru'l-Islam* from strident imperialism was enough to spark Indo-Muslim enthusiasm for the Ottomans. The Khilafat movement was the natural result.

The Khilafat movement attracted considerable notice from contemporary writers both in India and abroad, notably from Syed Mahmud,[10] a writer who published under the pseudonym of 'A Student of History',[11] M. H. Abbas,[12] P. C. Bamford,[13] E. Sell,[14] and A. J. Toynbee.[15] But most contemporary writings, though interesting, tended to be either partisan or polemical in nature and in any case were not free from prepossessions. Collectively, they represent two different sets of views with some variations. The Indian pan-Islamic writers treated the whole issue from the standpoint of religion. Their argument revolved around the contention that the institution of the caliphate being central to the Islamic faith it was incumbent upon the entire *ummat*, including the Muslims of India, to rally round the sultan-caliph and save his empire from the threatened dismemberment. The British writers and their supporters, on the other hand, maintained that the Ottomans had no rightful claim to the caliphate and it was wrong to suggest that the British had a hand in the break up of their empire. They generally viewed the Khilafat movement with suspicion, thinking that it was a political ploy in religious garb to whip up anti-British sentiment to save the Ottomans from a just retribution. The official verdict was no different. The British and Indian governments drew the same conclusions and approached the movement from the same perspective.

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[10] Syed Mahmud, *Khilafat aur Inglistan*, 3rd edn. (Patna, [1921]).

[11] A Student of History (Christian Literary Society of India), *The Khalifate Agitation in India* (Madras, 1922).

[12] M. H. Abbas, *All About Khilafat* (Calcutta, 1923).

[13] P. C. Bamford, *The Histories of the Non-co-operation and Khilafat Movements* (Delhi, 1925).

[14] E. Sell, *The Khilafat Movement in India* (Calcutta, 1932).

[15] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923* (London, 1925); and *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, i (London, 1927).

With the throwing open of relevant archival material and collections of private and official papers in India, Pakistan, Britain and elsewhere, a renewed interest in the events and personalities was stimulated. New works were added to earlier publications, including two full-length studies by A. C. Niemeijer[16] and Gail Minault.[17] Both writers have dealt with the Khilafat movement from specific angles and in consequence the scopes of their works have been considerably narrowed. Niemeijer, for instance, looks at the Khilafat movement from the standpoint of a solid Muslim community struggling to save the caliphate without noticing their divisive thinking. The British, for their part, are shown treating it as a colonial problem. Minault, on the other hand, concentrates on the distinctly nationalistic moorings of the movement and the deliberate parading of religious symbols for political mobilization. To her, individual motivations of the leaders rather than their pan-Islamic connections appear to be more important.

The present work covers a much wider field and deals with the Khilafat movement on an all-India canvas as a discourse in political ebb and flow even though religion remains the pivotal motif until the end. In trying to examine the interplay of complex socio-political forces that determined the contours of pan-Islam in India, the book looks afresh at the contemporary scene without taking refuge in a neatly tailored hypothesis or an abstract paradigm. As a religious concept pan-Islam, of course, had a universal appeal but its impact as a political force needs to be measured with caution. Moreover, since political events cannot be divorced from their socio-economic context, it is in a variety of aspirations and motivations that its relevance has to be defined and assessed. Considerable debate has gone on whether or not political pan-Islam aroused a monolithic response. Assuming it did not, the argument would follow that there are several variants in play, each with distinct dialectics and dynamics. A comparison is outside the scope of this study but one has to place the Indian variant in proper perspective. What was the nature and characteristics of this Indian variant? What did motivate and energize it and what impact did it have on the contemporary situation? With equal justification, one might also look into the impact of pan-

[16] A. C. Niemeijer, *The Indian Khilafat Movement* (The Hague, 1970).

[17] Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York, 1982).

Islam on nationalism and its gradual transition to Muslim nationalism. The compatibility of Islam and nationalism is conclusive[18] but more relevant is how the two merged to become a dominant factor in British Indian politics. For this purpose, the book takes a hard look at the Indian response to specific issues arising from this complicated situation and examines the mobilization of the Muslim masses on the platform of the Khilafat Committee for a united political role. Paradoxically, this was the time when nationalism, 'Indian' or 'Muslim', still lacked a cohesive expression and had little role in the British political system, not at least until after the 1920s. Riding the crest of the pan-Islamic waves were the ardent young radicals who counted among them some of the most outstanding men in Muslim India—politicians, lawyers, journalists, businessmen, and *'ulama*—covering almost the entire spectrum of the society from liberal modernists to religious conservatives. It was these diversely motivated people that imparted to the Indian political scene certain dynamism, which epitomized the cumulated aspirations of the Muslim community. The intention here is to study the impact of pan-Islam on politics in the peculiar sub-continental environment where Muslims were but a minority in the midst of a vast Hindu majority.

For this book both the unpublished and the published sources have been utilized. Of particular importance have been the records of the British and Indian governments and the collections of the private and official papers of various important personalities. Of late, the India Office Library & Records (IOL&R) have been redesignated the Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC), British Library. But for convenience and easy identification I have retained the old title. The records of the All India Muslim League and the rich collections of private papers at the Freedom Movement Archives at Karachi and the National Archives of Pakistan in Islamabad have been equally useful. Newspapers and vernacular tracts have also been indispensable for an understanding of the contemporary events in the local settings. No less valuable have been the published works in English and Urdu and a few in Turkish, such as the collections of correspondence, documents, writings and speeches. These have definitely helped in understanding the issues that lay behind the politics of the early twentieth century India.

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[18] Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton, 1996), 138.

In a work of this nature that draws heavily upon literature in Urdu and other eastern languages one is inevitably confronted with the problem of transliteration. Reference tools such as John Platt's *A Dictionary of Urdu Classical Hindi and English*[19] and the *Urdu-English Dictionary* published by Ferozsons[20] do help but they offer no standard scheme that can be adopted as a system. To resolve the issue, I have generally preferred the Urdu form of spellings to the Perso-Arabic one as used in the Indian context. Therefore, *hijrat*, *shariʿat*, and *ummat* replace *sharīʿa*, *umma*, and *hijra*. Similarly, *sahafat* has been used instead of *sihafat*. The same formula applies while dealing with the aspirated 't' and 'd' (transcribed in Arabic by 'th' and 'dh') simply by using 's' and 'z' instead to denote 'se' and 'zal'. Therefore, '*hadith*' appears as '*hadis*' (which spares 'th' for 'Thanawi') and '*muhadhab*' as '*muhazzab*'. For the sake of simplicity no diacritical marks have been used anywhere in the book. Only two symbols, i.e. ʿ *[ʿain]* (as in *ʿulama*) and ʾ *[hamza]* (as in Qur'an), have been retained to heighten the effect. So far as plurals are concerned the transliterated words occur as they do in the original language (as in *ʿulama*), but in case of familiar words an 's' (in roman, not italic) has been added (as in *sajjada nashins*) to remove confusion. In personal names the spellings and forms used by the persons themselves have been preferred to any other e.g. Syed Ahmed Khan (not Sayyid Ahmad Khan), Mohamed Ali (not Muhammad Ali) and Haji Ismail Khan (not Hajji Ismail Khan). Transliteration in such cases has been adopted only in titles of works where necessary. The Arabic names, however, appear with the definite article 'al-' which, in Urdu, becomes 'u'l' as in 'Abdu'l-Halim. The Turkish names appear in the modern Turkish form. In the case of place names the current usage has been given with the older name in parenthesis where it occurs for the first time. Titles of non-English books and articles appear in transliterated form in bibliography and in references. Abbreviations and stylistic forms generally follow the pattern of *The Oxford Writers' Dictionary*.[21]

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[19] 3rd edn., New Delhi, 1993.
[20] Lahore, n.d.
[21] Oxford, 1991.

CHAPTER ONE

PAN-ISLAM IN THE INDIAN ENVIRONMENT

To Muslims the concept of the universality of the Islamic polity, in spite of the apparent contradiction between the ideal and the real, is inherent in the faith. 'The Believers are but a single Brotherhood',[1] is invariably cited by them as the Qur'anic endorsement for the inevitable sense of belonging that they have for their community. But an appeal for the political union of the widely dispersed Muslims of the world, especially after Islam had lost its former power and prestige, was found to be much more attractive. Though its impact was not felt until later, the genesis of the movement for Islamic union (known variously as *ittihad-i Islami* in Turkish and Urdu or *wahda* in Arabic) can be traced to the earlier waves of internal disruption and external aggression against segments of the *daru'l-Islam*. With every fresh encroachment there was a corresponding call for rallying round the Ottoman caliphate, the symbol of Islam's splendour and glory. This activity for a supranational *pax Islamica*, spurred as it was by psychological compulsions to readjust to the loss of power, was labelled in the West 'pan-Islam'. Styled probably after the term 'pan-Slavism' which was current in the nineteenth century on the Continent and in Britain, it may have been the result of the impact of nascent nationalism upon the world of Islam. The hybrid jargon itself appears to have been coined in the 1870s by a German and popularized during the next decade by a Frenchman.[2] From then on the contemporary western literature was full of debate on the origins and character of pan-Islam with widely divergent and often contradictory views on the subject.[3] Feared and exploited as the situation

[1] al-Qur'an, xlix: 10.

[2] The first use of the term thus far discovered is that by Franz von Werner (pseud. Murad Efendi) in *Türkische Skizzen* (Leipzig, 1877) written sometime before July 1876. Later, in 1881, Gabriel Charmes borrowed the term in an article in *Revue de deux Mondes*. See Dwight E. Lee, 'The Origins of Pan-Islamism', *American Historical Review*, 67/2, (1942), 280. Also see IOL&R, L/P&S/20, G. 77, *The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement*, handbook prepared by the British FO (London, 1919), 54.

[3] For a fuller examination of the source material on the divergent theories about

demanded, it was interpreted sometimes as a reactionary and aggressive combine against Christendom and at others as a mere phantasm.[4] These perceptions, however, tended to obscure the fact that in its pervasive sweep, it combined in itself a variety of ideological aspirations of disparate elements in the Muslim world.[5] At best, it was more of an ideal than an organized movement but since it had erupted in response to western imperialism, the religio-political aspect of the movement appears naturally to be a more intelligible explanation, especially in the context of the Indian environment.

The Indian Muslim involvement in the ideal of pan-Islam and the Ottoman caliphate was never an unusual phenomenon; both these sentiments existed side by side, balancing and nurturing each other in the chequered history of the Subcontinent. Conceptually, it represented the familiar yearnings for that ideal universal socio-political order under one leader which had been inaugurated by Prophet Muhammad (*sal'am*) by breaching barriers of race, language, environment and custom. To sustain the spiritual and political solidarity of this community after his demise in 632, the concept of the institution of the *khilafat* or caliphate was evolved. The Sunni jurists have interpreted the *shari'at* as the basis of the institution and, with some exceptions, agree as to its religious necessity.[6] The recognition of and

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the origin and character of pan-Islam see M. Naeem Qureshi, 'Bibliographic Soundings in Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in South Asia', *Islamic Quarterly*, 24/1-2 (1980), 22-34. Also see Naimur Rahman Farooqi, 'Pan-Islamism in the Nineteenth Century', *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad), 57/4 (1983), 283-96. More recently, Jacob M. Landau has dealt with the question of pan-Islamic ideology and organization meticulously and at length from another angle. See his *The Politics of Pan-Islam* (Oxford, 1990).

[4] See D. S. Margoliouth, 'Pan-Islamism', *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society*, (London), 12 Jan. 1912; Armenius Vambéry, 'Pan-Islamism', *Nineteenth Century and After*, 60 (July-Dec. 1906), 547-58; and Chirol, 'Pan-Islamism', *passim*.

[5] These included not only the socio-economic grievances of the lower classes but also the populist aspirations of the traditionalists as well as those of the westernized modernists. See Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York, 1982), 91. The expression *'pax Islamica'* has been borrowed from Khushwant Singh. See his 'Pax Islamica (A Study of Pan-Islamic Movements)', *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society*, 9 (Apr. 1946), 27-42.

[6] For a scholarly discussion of the Islamic caliphate see Maulana Abul Hasanat Nadwi, *Khilafat-i Islamiyya aur Turk* (Delhi, 1920); id., *Khilafat-i Islam aur mas'ala-i Khilafat* (Bombay, 1922); T. W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (London, 1924); id., 'Khalifa', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ii, 881-5; A. K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford, 1981); H. A. R. Gibb, 'Al-Mawardi's Theory of the Khalifa', *Islamic Culture*, 11 (1937), 291-302; id., 'Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate', *Archives d'histoire du droit oriental*, iii (1948), 401-10; Javid Iqbal, 'The Development of Muslim Political Philosophy in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent',

submission to the caliph or the *ulu'l-amr* was considered binding on the faithful except when the former deliberately flouted the *shari'at*. The caliph, as the *khalifat rasul-Allah* (and not *khalifat-Allah* which connotes prophethood) was the centre of gravity in the Islamic system and combined in his person religious as well as political authority. He was the defender of the faith, the protector of the *daru'l-Islam* and the enforcer of the *shari'at*.[7] The esoteric aspect, as the Shi'as believe, was embodied in the 'apostolic' *imam* who was inseparable from the 'pontific' *khalifa*.[8] It is, however, another matter that the ideal Islamic state had only a brushing contact with reality. Just two decades after the Prophet its basis was being questioned by the Shi'as as well as by the Khawarij. With the fall of the Umayyads in 749, there was no longer any one universally recognized caliphate. Independent rulers in the 'core' and on the 'fringe' of the Islamic empire appropriated to themselves the titles specifically meant for the caliph. So much so that at one time there were as many as three overlapping caliphates in the Muslim world—the Abbasids in Baghdad (749–1258), the Umayads in Spain (756–1492), and the Shi'ite Fatimids in Egypt (909–1171)—each claiming the allegiance of the faithful through the prerogative of legitimacy.[9] Yet in spite of the Shi'a schism and the impotence of the 'central' caliphate, the fiction of its authority, under an hieratic cloak and exalted for political and religious considerations by jurists like al-Mawardi (974–1058) and al-Ghazali (1058–1111), still survived and lingered on after the disappearance of

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Ph.D. thesis (Cambridge, 1954), 1–49; L. Binder, 'Al-Ghazali's Theory of Islamic Government', *Moslem World*, 45/3 (1955), 229–41; E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge, 1958), 21–61 and 84–109; Abul A'la Maududi, *Khilafat wa malukiyyat* (Lahore, 1966); A. H. Lybyer, 'Caliphate', *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, iii, 145–9; W. Montgomery Watt, 'God's Caliph: Qur'anic Interpretation and Umayyad Claims', in C. E. Bosworth (ed.), *Iran and Islam: in Memory of the Late Vladimir Minorsky* (Edinburgh, 1971), 565–74; and Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, *God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam* (Cambridge, 1986).

[7] Ibid. As *amiru'l-mu'minin* (commander of the faithful) the caliph was conferred the honorific title of *zillallah f'il ard* (shadow of God on earth). See N. R. Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations* (Delhi, 1989), 174.

[8] The Shi'a point of view is represented by Ameer Ali, 'The Caliphate, a Historical and Juridical Sketch', *Contemporary Review*, 107 (1915), 681 94; Sayyid Asad Ali, *Shi'a pamflet* (Bijnor, 1916); Sayyid Nasim Hasan, *Istikhlaf* (Amroha, 1919); Sayyid Najmul-Hasan, *an-Nabuwwat wa'l-Khilafat*. Eng. tr. L. A. Haidari (Lucknow, 1924); *Shamsu'l-'Ulama* Allama Hairi, *Khilafat-i Qur'ani* (Lahore, 1927); A. A. Sachedina, *The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam* (New York, 1988), 101, 169 and 219; and J. N. Hollister, *Islam and Shia's Faith in India* (Delhi, 1988, 1st edn., 1943), 25 and 32–8. For the Khariji opinion, see Arnold, *Caliphate*, app. A, 184–9.

[9] See Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations*, 180.

the Abbasids at the hands of the Mongols in 1258. Large portions of the Sunni Muslim world continued to submit to the shadow Cairene caliphate under the protection of the Mamluks of Egypt and still later to the Ottomans at Istanbul (Constantinople), at least from Murad I (1362–89) onwards.[10]

India became accustomed to the fiction of the 'central' caliphate from the time of the Arab conquest of Sind in 712.[11] This was not surprising because the region had been an integral part of first the Umayyad and then the Abbasid caliphates. Practically, throughout the pre-Mughal period the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, and later their *fainéant* successors in Cairo, were regarded as the source and sanction of the sultans' legal authority.[12] Thus the Mamluks of northern India (1210–90), the Khaljis (1290–1320), the Tughlaqs (1320–1414), the Sayyids (1414–51) and the Lodhi Afghans (1451–1526) were all followers of this tradition.[13] Some of the sultans—Mahmud of Ghazna (998–1030), Shams-ud-din Iltutmish (1211–36), Muhammad Tughluq (1325–51)—had especially sought and obtained the caliphal investiture to keep their orthodox subjects contented.[14] Even the few Sunni provincial dynasties which assumed independence from Delhi did so in the name of the Abbasid caliphs, and as a mark of respect displayed their caliphal titles on the coins.[15] After the rise of the Ottomans, the first 'Indians' to establish political relations with them were the Bahmani rulers Muhammad Shah III (1453–82) and Mahmud Shah (1482–1518) when their vizier, Khwaja Imad-ud-din Mahmud Gawan (1410–88), dispatched messages of felicitations and gifts to Sultans Mehmed the Conqueror (1451–82) and Beyazit II (1482–1512).[16] Since

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[10] Ibid., 180. In the case of the Ottomans, the requirement of a Quraishi descent was conveniently waived by the jurists to validate their claim on the ground that they were powerful enough to defend Islam. See H. A. R. Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (eds.), Stanford Shaw and William Polk (London, 1962), 141–50.

[11] For Indo-Arab relations see Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, *Khilafat aur Hindustan* (Azamgarh, 1921), *passim*. According to Nadwi, Sind was the sixth centre of the Islamic East. The others were: Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Maldip, Malabar, Coromandel and Gujarat. See Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, *Indo-Arab Relations*. Tr. M. Salahuddin (Hyderabad, 1962), 142–70.

[12] Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (Oxford, 1964), 10; and Nadwi, *Khilafat aur Hindustan*, 32–45.

[13] Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations*, 186–7.

[14] Nadwi, *Khilafat aur Hindustan*, 9–24; Arnold, *Caliphate*, 82–105; and I. H. Ghauri, 'The Sunni Theory of Caliphate and its Impact on the Muslim History of India', *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society*, 13 (1961), 98.

[15] Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations*, 186–7; and Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture*, 10.

[16] Govt. of Pakistan, *Turkey and Pakistan: Relations Between Turkey and Muslims of*

the coastal areas of south India were open to maritime contacts with the outside world, it was natural for the Muslims to demonstrate their devotion to Selim I (1512–20) when he laid claim to the caliphate after his conquest of Syria and Egypt.[17] Malik Ayaz, the ruler of Diu, for instance, extended his fealty to the sultan with such exalting epithets as 'the shadow of God on earth', 'the pillar of Islam' and 'perfection in Sultanate, and Caliphate and Religion'.[18] Later, the Ottoman attempts to free the pilgrim and commercial traffic at sea from the Portuguese control, especially those undertaken at the request of Bahadur Shah (1526–37) of Gujarat by Süleyman the Magnificent (1520–66), raised the Ottoman stature in the eyes of the Indian Muslims.[19] But in view of the limited contact and the menacing presence

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Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent (Karachi, n.d.), 5–6; and G. M. Nizamuddin Maghrabi, 'The Ottoman-Gujarat Relations', in *Studies in the Foreign Relations of India—Prof. H. K. Sherwani Felicitation Volume* (Hyderabad, n.d.), 185, cited in N. Akmal Ayyubi, 'A Proposal for Research on Indo-Turkish Relations', *Belleten*, Turk Tarikh Kurumu (Ankara), 46/181 (1982), 69.

[17] Sultan Selim's claim to the caliphate was based, apart from the *ghazi* tradition of his predecessors, on the more solid grounds of his being the *Khadimu'l-Haramain ish-Sharifain* ('Servant of the Holy Places') after the acquisition of Makkah and Medina. However, the story that the last of the Abbasid caliphs, al-Muttawakkil, transferred the caliphal office to him following his conquest of Egypt in 1517 by a formal deed of assignment has no corroboration from any contemporary source. The first mention of the 'transfer', according to George Stripling, was made by Georgius Fabricius and Joannes Rosinus in the late seventeenth century. Later, the Swedish scholar, Mouradega d'Ohsson, in his monumental work, *Tableau général de l'Empire Othoman* (Paris, 1784), enunciated a similar story. The contention was readily accepted by many western, Turkish and Indian writers without realizing that al-Mutawakkil continued to retain the caliphal office until his death in 1543. The argument, such as advanced by T. W. Arnold, that the Ottomans did not lay claim to the universal caliphate until 1774 has been effectively dismissed by N. R. Farooqi with the help of Ottoman State documents. It is interesting that modern Turkish historians, especially Halil Inalcik, though reject the 'transfer' theory, erroneously maintain that Sultan Selim did not claim the title to the caliphate. To them even his successor, Süleyman the Magnificent, had in his mind merely the primacy over his contemporary rulers. In their view, it was only in the eighteenth century that expediency drove the Ottomans to push their claim to the office. See G. W. P. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511–1574* (Philadelphia, 1942), 56–7; Ameer Ali, 'The Caliphate', 693–4; Arnold, *Caliphate*, 139–58; N. Ahmet Asrar, 'The Myth About the Transfer of the Caliphate to the Ottomans', *Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute* (Tehran), 5/2–3, (1972), 111–20; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age, 1300–1600*. Eng. tr. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (London, 1973), 56–8; Naeem Qureshi, 'Bibliographic Soundings', 24; and Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations*, esp. 181–3.

[18] Feridun Bey, *Munseat-u Selatin* (Istanbul, 1848), 397, quoted in Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans & Britain (1877–1924)* (Leiden, 1997), 4.

[19] Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, 'Khilafat-i 'Usmaniyya aur dunya-i Islam', *Ma'arif*, 9/4 (1922), 256–7; and M. Y. Mughal, 'Turco-Pakistan Relations in Historical Perspective', *Grassroots*, 13–14 (1988), 1.

of the Portuguese, the relations between the Deccan/Gujarat sultans and the Ottomans could not grow beyond commercial and diplomatic interests.[20] The advent of the Mughals in India in 1526 did not alter the situation much, especially in view of the wedge driven by Shi'a Iran between the two Sunni empires. And though the diplomatic exchanges continued upto the late eighteenth century, the Mughals refused to concede the Ottoman claim to 'universal' caliphate as they regarded themselves caliphs within their own realms in line with Jalal al-Din al-Dawwani's (1427–1501) ruling legitimizing the existence simultaneously of more than one caliphs.[21]

If pan-Islam did not endure as a political concept it still survived as a socio-cultural sentiment. Islam in India had not been an isolated development; its growth was an integrated phenomenon due largely to the uninterrupted contact between India and the central lands of the sprawling *daru'l-Islam*. The Arabs in India had implanted their own cultural traditions which flourished until the early eleventh century. Then, for the next eight hundred years, the entire cultural pattern of Muslim India was dominated by the Turkish (Central Asian) traditions.[22] The Delhi sultans (with the exception of the Suris and the Lodhis) and the Mughals who came after them were all Turks. Even the Barid-Shahis and the Qutb-Shahis essentially shared the same origin. The result was that the lifestyle of the Muslim élite in Lahore, Delhi or in other towns of India was no different from that of their Turkish and Iranian counterparts.[23] They introduced Turkish traditions in government and law, language and literature, arts and architecture and dress and diet.[24] The interaction helped evolve a new language called Urdu which was born of contact between the local and Turkish elements in the royal *ordu*, i.e. 'camp'

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[20] Bernard Lewis, 'The Mughals and the Ottomans', *Pakistan Quarterly*, 8/2 (1968), 4–5; and Sh[eikh] Abdur Rashid, 'Ottoman-Mughal Relations During the 17th Century', *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society*, 14 (June 1962), esp. 68.

[21] Farooqi, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations*, 179 and 188–97; F. W. Buckler, 'The Historical Antecedents of the Khilafat Movement', *Contemporary Review*, 121/677 (1922), 606. Also see Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture*, 22–47; and Sheikh Abdur Rashid, 'The Mughal Imperial State', in R. J. Moore (ed.), *Tradition and Politics in South Asia* (New Delhi, 1979), 146.

[22] K. M. Karim, 'Pakistan's Historical and Cultural Ties with Iran and Turkey Through the Ages', *Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute* (Tehran), 2/2 (1969), 93–4.

[23] S. M. Ikram, *History of Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan*, 3rd edn. (Lahore, 1982), 265–9; and Shakoor Ahsan, 'Turkish Impact on the History and Culture of Pakistan', *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 27/2 (1990), 17–24.

[24] Karim, 'Pakistan's Historical and Cultural Ties', 91–5.

or 'army'. This new language with loan words from Turkish, Persian and Arabic and displaying common inter-Islamic imagery in literary expressions, ultimately became the lingua franca of India.[25] These cultural bonds, preserved and invigorated through fresh waves of immigrations, commercial contacts, networks of sufi orders and annual pilgrimage to the holy places, paved the way for deeper Indian involvement with Istanbul. However, these feelings crystallized more clearly after the Mughal rule began to totter and the Empire shrunk to a limited area around Delhi.[26] The resultant breakdown of the traditional social model under the impact of the British conquest and the religio-ethical disintegration that followed the political decline, encouraged even further the pan-Islamic orientations of Muslim India.

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Indian attachment to Ottoman Turkey was an accepted reality. This became evident in the 1760s when the Porte projected an alliance with France. The British ambassador in Istanbul, James Porter (1710–76), at once endeavoured to oppose the treaty lest it should affect British interests among the Indian Muslims as rivals of the French in India.[27] The fact that Shah Waliullah (1703–62), the famous divine of Delhi who apparently showed disconcern for the Ottoman caliphate, twice referred to the Turkish sultan as *amir'l-mu'minin* in his *Tafhimat-i Ilahiyya* indicates that the title had some recognition in India.[28] Later, in the 1770s and the 1780s, the rulers of Malabar on the western coast, when

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[25] For the evolution and development of Urdu, see Hafiz Mahmud Shirani, *Panjab men Urdu* (Lahore, 1928), 21–43; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, 252–3; and Muhammad Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 2nd edn. (Karachi, 1985), esp. ch. i. Also see Ghulam Husain Zulfikar, 'Urdu Language in the Background of Pak-Turkish Cultural Relations', *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 23/4, (1986), 1. For Turkish influence on Urdu, see Otto Spies, 'Turkisches Sprachgut im Hindustani', *Studia Indologica* (1955), 321–43; M. Akmal Ayyubi, 'Urdu men Turki zaban ke alfaz', *Ma'arif*, 104/6 (1969), 460–5; F. Halide Dolu, 'Some Similarities in the Turkish and Urdu Languages', *Peshawar University Review*, 1/1 (1974–75), 78–110; and Erkan Turkmen, 'Turkish Elements in Urdu', *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 6 (1986), 1–30.

[26] The illusions of grandeur, however, took time to disappear. As late as the latter half of the 18th century, Shah Alam, believed that Robert Clive (1725–74) and John Carnac (1716–1800) were his 'loyal servants' who would 'conduct us to the Capital of our Kingdom Shah-Jehan-abad, and fix us on the Throne of Hindostan' in return for the *diwani* rights of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to the Company. See his letter to George III in Sir John Fortescue (ed.), *The Correspondence of King George The Third from 1760 to December 1783*, i (London, 1927), 445–6.

[27] This happened during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III (1757–74) and the man behind it was Grand Vizier Koja Raghib. See A. A. Adnan, G. L. Lewis and E. Z. Karal, 'Turkey', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, xxii, (1970), 377.

[28] Aziz Ahmad, 'An Eighteenth-Century Theory of Caliphate', *Studia Islamica*, 28, (1968), 143–4; and Azad, *Mas'ala-i Khilafat wa Jazira-i 'Arab* (Calcutta, 1920), 83.

threatened by the East India Company, appealed for help to the caliph in Istanbul.[29] In 1789, under similar circumstances, Tipu Sultan (1749–99) endeavoured to obtain an investiture from the Ottoman caliph, Abdülhamid I (1774–89).[30] The embassy to Istanbul was able to secure for him the title to the throne of Mysore but the much-desired military and commercial alliance with Ottoman Turkey did not materialize.[31] Then gradually, when the House of Taimur lost its former glory following the lack-luster rule of the nominal Mughal emperor, Jalal-ud-din Shah Alam II (1759–1806), the name of the Ottoman sultan definitely came to be mentioned in the Friday *khutba* in some Indian mosques.[32] This coincided with the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39) who is remembered chiefly for curbing the power of overbearing *'ulama* and unruly Janissaries. By the late 1820s, when Shah Alam's son, Muin-ud-din Akbar II (1806–37), sat on the throne of Delhi, these pro-Turkish orientations had taken firm roots—a fact which was acknowledged by the directors of the East India Company in Leadenhall and their superiors in the government at the India Board of Control in Common Row in London.[33] The presence of the Hindiler Tekkesi or the Indian *takya* in Istanbul since the time of Tipu's mission is another indication but it was not until the 1840s that the position of the Indian Muslims with regard to the Ottoman caliphate was fully crystallized. Shah Muhammad Ishaq (1778–1846), the grandson of Shah Waliullah, was probably the first Indian *'alim* who supported the Ottoman political policies from around 1841 when he migrated to Makkah (Mecca).[34] From then on, the inclination of the *'ulama*, at least of the Waliullahi stamp, was to rec-

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[29] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 11, citing Ottoman records.

[30] M. H. Khan, *History of Tipu Sultan* (Calcutta, 1951), 132 8. Also see I. H. Qureshi, 'The Purpose of Tipu Sultan's Embassy to Constantinople', *Journal of Indian History*, 24/70 72 (1945), 77–84.

[31] Ibid. The embassy returned in Dec. 1789 after the absence of 3 years and 9 months. See Dennys Forrest, *Tiger of Mysore: The Life and Death of Tipu Sultan* (London, 1970), 116 18.

[32] Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Syed Ahmed Khan), 'Khutba men badshah ka nam', *Tahzibu'l-Akhlaq*, 7/11 (1876), 155.

[33] Both recognized that the dismemberment and division of European Turkey would affect the British in India, especially 'if the [Turkish] cause is taken up as is not unlikely by the whole Mussulman race'. See J. G. Ravenshaw to Lord William Bentinck, 3 Mar. 1828, in C. H. Philips (ed.), *The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor General of India, 1825 1835*, i (London, 1977), 16 17.

[34] Ubaidullah Sindhi, *Shah Waliu'llah aur unki siyasi tahrik* (Lahore, 1952), 110; and Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, 63.

ognize and proclaim the Ottoman title to the 'universal' caliphate.[35] This, in turn, paved the way for deeper Indian involvement with the Ottomans. The Urdu newspapers of the time clearly reflect these attitudes.[36]

By the early 1850s, there were distinct signs of pan-Islamic fervour in India in favour of Sultan Abdülmecid I (1839–61). It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1854 the Marquess of Dalhousie (1812–69), the governor-general of the Company's Indian possessions, found among Muslims considerable sympathy for the 'Sultan of Room', the 'Commander of the Faithful'.[37] When war broke out that year between Turkey and Russia over the Ottoman Khanate of the Crimea, 'great interest and excitement' was reported to have been felt 'by all the Mussulman population of India, especially on the western frontier'.[38] Links with Istanbul became more intimate when in 1857–58, the Muslim rule in India ended after the defeat and banishment to Rangoon of Siraj-ud-din Bahadur Shah II (1775–1862), the last of the Mughal kings.[39] The dynasty had already lost power and much of its aura before the end came but still it was painful for the Muslims of India to witness the decline and devastation caused by the British. And though they displayed no monolithic response towards the new rulers,[40] they certainly seemed to reach out to the Ottoman caliph in search for an alternative psychological and spiritual 'centre'.[41] Those who believed that India after its conquest by the British had become *daru'l-harb* and no longer a congenial place to live—whether or not this interpretation corresponded with Shah Abdul Aziz's (1746–1824) *fatwa* on the subject[42]—chose to migrate to Makkah and

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[35] Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 124, citing Sayyid Mahmud, *Khilafat aur Inglistan* (Badaun, 1921), 80.

[36] I. H. Qureshi, 'Two Newspapers of pre-Mutiny Delhi', *Indian Historical Records Commission. Proceedings of Meetings*, 18 (Jan. 1942), 258–60.

[37] J. G. A. Baird (ed.), *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie* (London, 1910), 300.

[38] Ibid., 295.

[39] The fall of the last of the Mughals can be graphically followed in Mahdi Husain, *Bahadur Shah II and the War of 1857 in Delhi with its Unforgettable Scenes* (Delhi, 1958), esp. chs. iii–iv and apps.

[40] The gradual shift of power to the British can be seen in Percival Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals*, repr. (Karachi, 1980), *passim*. For the Muslim response see Mujeeb Ashraf, *Muslim Attitudes Towards British Rule and Western Culture in India* (Delhi, 1982), esp. chs. vi–ix.

[41] Here my findings set aside the information given by Aziz Ahmad (*Studies*, 63) and Özcan (*Pan-Islamism*, 19) that Abdülaziz was the first sultan whose name was included in the *khutba* in Indian mosques.

[42] For details of the Delhi *'alim*'s *fatwa* of 1803 and its import see ch. iii, 176–7.

some even ventured as far as Istanbul where they were personally honoured by the sultan.[43] Prominent among them were the *'ulama* like Rahmatullah Kairanawi (1818–91), Haji Imdadullah (1817–99), Abdul Ghani (d. 1878), Muhammad Yaqub (1832–86) and Khair-ud-din (1831–1908). Others who thought India was still *daru'l-Islam* preferred to stay back. But even they, notably Karamat Ali Jaunpuri (1800–73), Fazl Ali, Muhammad Abdur Rauf, and others, when pleading loyalty to the British did so on the basis of the 'friendship that exists between the British Nation and the acknowledged Head of our Religion, the Sultan of Turkey'.[44] Yet others adopted an ambivalent attitude and hovered between various positions.[45]

To some extent the Indian feelings for the Ottomans were deliberately encouraged by the European Powers, especially Britain. Their purpose in creating the illusion of Ottoman grandeur was to invoke Muslim support against all potential and perceived threats in the name of the fabled figure of the caliph of Islam. In 1798, for instance, the British secured from Sultan Selim III (1789–1807) a document for Tipu Sultan to the effect that since the French, by their incursion in Egypt, had become the opponents of the Sublime Porte, it was his (Tipu's) duty to protect India from the 'enemies of Islam'.[46] From this time on, especially after the Crimean War, the British began to exploit even more fervently the sultan's image as caliph in order to check Russian expansionist designs curving towards India.[47] During

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[43] See Rahmatullah Kairanawi, *Bible se Qur'an tak*, i (eds.), Akbar Ali and M. T. Usmani (Karachi, 1968), 198–208; Tufail Ahmad Manglori, *Musalmanon ka raushan mustaqbil* (Delhi, 1945), 122; Mufti Intizamullah Shahabi, *Ist Indya kampni aur baghi 'ulama* (Delhi, n.d.), 45 and 71–2; Muhammad Miyan, *'Ulama-i Hind ka shandar mazi*, iv (Delhi, 1960), 185, n. 1, 317–18 and 340–1; W. C. Smith, 'The "Ulama" in Indian Politics', in C. H. Philips (ed.), *Politics and Society in India* (London, 1963), 50; A. B. Rajput, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 2nd edn. (Lahore, 1957), 12–13; and M. U. Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India* (Meerut, 1970), 62–4. Khair-ud-din was the father of Abul Kalam Azad. Some like Sayyid Fazl, one of the Mambram Tannals of Malabar, had settled in the Hijaz before the Revolt and had received decorations from Sultan Abdülhamid. See S. F. Dale, *Islamic Society of the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar, 1498–1922* (Oxford, 1980), 134–5.

[44] See *Abstract of Proceedings of the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta. Lecture by Moulvie Karamat Ali (of Jounpore) on a question of Mahomedan Law Involving the Duty of Mahomedans in British India towards the Ruling Power* (Calcutta, 1871), 14.

[45] See ch. iii.

[46] Copy of Sultan Selim's letter to Tipu, dated 20 Sept. 1798, in [R.] M. Martin, *The Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence, of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G., During his Administration in India*, i (London, 1836), 414–17, n. Tipu, however, was unable to honour the caliph's 'command' in this case.

[47] See Lord Dalhousie's proclamation dated Bangalore, 5 Nov. 1855, announc-

the fateful days of the Revolt of 1857, they reportedly procured from Sultan Abdülmecid a proclamation advising Indian Muslims to remain loyal to his British allies.[48] It was a clever move on their part to offset the *fatwa* of *jihad* which is said to have been given against them in Delhi.[49] On his side, the sultan was paying off the debt for help received from the British during war in the Crimea, little realizing that it had been fought 'not to sustain the *religion* of the Prophet', as Dalhousie later admitted, but rather 'to thwart the *policy* of the Czar' and gain economic advantages.[50] The sultan was also convinced that the Indian Revolt was not a war between Islam and Christianity and refused to entertain any doubts about it despite the efforts of the Russian ambassador to the contrary.[51] Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe (1786–1880), the British ambassador to Istanbul, gratefully thanked the sultan for his help, especially for allowing free passage to British reinforcements to India through Egypt.[52] In his expressions, Lord

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ing that the British and French intervention on behalf of the sultan of Turkey had secured a speedy ejection of the Russians from his dominions, esp. Sebastopol. The Queen was gratified that the Indians had remained loyal during the war. Punjab Archives (Lahore), Exhibit no. 90; and Home (General) Dept. Proc., 1856, nos. 36–7. Also see Birdwood's communication to *The Times*, 9 July 1877; and V. Chirol, *India* (London, 1926), 217–18.

[48] There is no contemporary evidence either in the British or Ottoman archives to confirm this. The earliest reference is by Salar Jung that according to his late father 'the whole influence of the Caliphate was used most unremittingly from Constantinople to check the spread of the Mutiny, to rally to the English standards the Mussulman races of India'. See his, 'Europe Revisited II', *Nineteenth Century*, 22/128 (1887), 503; and Mustafa Kamil Paşa, *Mas'ala-i Sharqiyya* (Cairo, 1898). Urdu tr. Niyaz Fatehpuri (Pindi Bahawuddin, n.d.), 10. It is certain, however, that when the British finally defeated the 'mutineers' in Delhi in Sept. 1857, the Porte complimented them and as a further gesture of good-will the sultan contributed a thousand pounds towards the Mutiny Relief Fund. See PRO, FO 78/1271, 78/1272, 78/1274, 78/1288 and 78/1331.

[49] The *fatwa* was originally published in the *Urdu Akhbar* of Delhi from where the *Sadiqu'l-Akhbar* (Delhi) copied it in its issue of 26 July 1857. It was signed by thirty-four *'ulama*, including Fazl-i Haq Khairabadi (1797–1861), in the *jum'a* mosque of Delhi after the arrival of Bakht Khan from Meerut. But Syed Ahmed Khan, in an attempt perhaps to exonerate the Muslims from the stigma of having conducted a religious war, termed the *fatwa* a forgery, suggesting that Khairabadi was not even present in Delhi at the time. See his *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*. Eng. tr. of the original 1858 Urdu edn. (London, 1873), 11–13. The text of the *fatwa* is available in Aziz Malik, *Sahafat aur tahrik-i azadi* (Lahore, 1984), 18–19.

[50] See Dalhousie to George Couper, 28 May 1854, Baird, *Private Letters*, 301. For the objectives of the war and the British public opinion generally, see Kamil Aydin, 'Western Images of the Muslim Turks Prior to the 20th Century: A Short Outline', *Hamdard Islamicus*, 16/4 (1993), esp. 119–20.

[51] PRO, FO 78/1271, 78/1272, 78/1274, 78/1288 and 78/1331.

[52] Ibid.

Palmerston (1807–65), the British prime minister from 1855 until his death, was hopeful that the sultan's action would have a salutary effect on the Indo-Muslim public opinion 'which regards His Majesty as the highest leader in their sect (*mezheb*)'.[53]

This cordiality between the Ottomans and the British continued to grow and reached its climax in 1867, when Queen Victoria (1819–1901) invited the new sultan, Abdülaziz (1861–76), on a state visit to Britain. The sultan was given a most enthusiastic welcome and the India Office made it a point to *fête* him with considerable pomp and publicity.[54] Later, the Anglo-Russian rivalry and the fear of the tsarist forces descending on India prompted the British to dispatch several missions to Central Asia, on the lines of the one sent in 1865 with Muhammad Husain Azad (1834–1910), a well-known figure of Urdu literature, for the purpose of reviewing the political situation there.[55] The advantages of posing as the caliph's friends were such that the British played this card again in the 1870s in order to block the Russian expansion in Central Asia which was threatening their Indian Empire. First they tried to organize an alliance of Bukhara, Kashgharia and Ottoman Turkey under the aegis of the sultan and when that failed they attempted to incite the Central Asian populations against the Russians through appeals from such religious dignitaries as the *Shaikhu'l-Islam* and the Sharif of Makkah.[56] Still later, by playing upon the Ottoman fears of the tsar's expansionist designs, the British tried to use his name with the Akhund Sahib Abdul Ghafur (1794–1877) of Swat and Amir Sher Ali (1863–1879) of Afghanistan to win their support and thwart the Russian advance towards India.[57] But though

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[53] Irade Hariciye 7894, quoted in Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 17.

[54] For details see Cassell and Company, Ltd., *The Life and Times of Queen Victoria*, iii (London, 1901), 293–4; and *The Times*, 13 to 24 July 1867.

[55] For information on Azad's mission see Agha Muhammad Ashraf (ed.), *Unnisuvin sadi men wast Eshya ki siyahat* (Karachi, [1959]), esp. 38–124; and Aslam Farukhi, *Muhammad Husain Azad: hayat aur tasanif* (Karachi, 1965), 164–90.

[56] See R. L. Shukla, *Britain, India and the Turkish Empire, 1853–1882* (Delhi, 1973), 125–9.

[57] In the summer of 1877, the British manoeuvred the sultan to send a mission under Ahmed Hulusi, with Ahmed Hamdi, a reputed scholar of Islam and a member of the Ottoman education council, to Swat and Afghanistan with the express purpose of making an appeal for Muslim solidarity against Russia and friendly relations with Britain. Sultan Abdülhamid himself was anxious to create 'a real unity between the Muslims' but the key figures in this pan-Islamic design were Layard in Istanbul and Lytton in Calcutta, who wanted Britain to support Turkey against Russia. At one point Lytton wanted Syed Ahmed Khan to accompany the mission to keep watch on its activities but this did not materialize. The mission, however,

the real intentions were well-cloaked the mission had the unintended result of increasing Indian attachment with Turkey.[58]

Indian pan-Islam had also coincided with similar waves among the Muslims of Central Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia,[59] but it did not become a conscious movement until the early 1870s. It was in this period that the Ottomans themselves, under various pressures (chiefly military, political and economic), began to promote more strongly the sultan's ecumenical jurisdiction over Muslims under the political suzerainty of other governments. Its initiation, however, can be traced to the eighteenth century when Sultans Ahmed III in 1727 and Mustafa III in 1774, had each pushed his claim to be 'Caliph of all Muslims' in their treaties with the Iranians and the Russians (Küçük Kaynarca), respectively.[60] Then, from the 1780s, the sultans started

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was a failure. There were strong suspicions that it had been sent only to serve British interests. The Amir of Afghanistan, who knew that Turkey was in no position to render any assistance, refused to play their game. The Akhund Sahib, unknown to the Turkish envoy, had already died and his sons, Abdul Hannan (1855–87) and Abdul Khaliq (1857–92), did not respond favourably. See report by Ahmed Hulusi Efendi, 1 Apr. 1878, BOA, Irade 1294, Hariciye 16873. The confidential instructions to Ahmed Hulusi are also available in ibid., Irade 1294, Hariciye 16642. Ref. courtesy Dr Mehmet Saray. Also see Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan (ed.), *The life of Abdur Rahman Amir of Afghanistan*, ii (London, 1900), 267; Dwight E. Lee, 'A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877', *Journal of Modern History*, 13 (1941), 335–6; Edmund Ollier, *Cassell's Illustrated History of the Russo-Turkish War*, ii (London, 1879), 430–1; and Lytton to Cavanagri, 30 June 1877, IOL&R, Lytton Papers. For Akhund Sahib, see Captain A. H. Malcolm and Lieutenant A. D. G. Ramsay, *Report on the Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajour together with the Utman-Khel and Sam Ranizai* (ed.), R. O. Christensen, repr. (Peshawar, 1981, orig., pub. [Calcutta], 1901), 77; and Miangul Abdul Wudud Badshah Sahib, *The Story of Swat*. Eng. tr. Ashruf Altaf Husain (Peshawar, 1962), lxiv–lxix.

[58] The Indian enthusiasm for the mission can be followed in the columns of the journals like the *Akhbar Qaisaru'l-Hind* of Allahabad, esp. dated 21 and 28 Oct. and 18 Nov. 1877. The British took extra care to prevent the mission from having free access to Indians lest this should fan their pro-Turkish enthusiasm beyond control. See BOA, Irade 1294, Hariciye 16642.

[59] In each of these cases, however, the movement took shape and proportion according to the specific socio-political conditions prevalent at the time. For pan-Islam in Central Asia and the Far East, see S. A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge [Mass.], 1960), 27 8; S. A. M. Adshead, *Central Asia in World History* (Houndsmill, 1993), 240–1; Alexandre Bennigsen, 'Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in History and Today', *Central Asian Survey*, 3/3 (1984), 40–1; J. W. Redhouse, *A Vindication of the Ottoman Sultan's Title of 'Caliph'; Shewing its Antiquity, Validity, and Universal Acceptance* (London, 1877), 7; Anthony Reid, 'Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 27/2 (1967), 267–83; and Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1973), 27–9.

[60] Halil Inalcik, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Empire', *The Cambridge History of Islam*, i (eds.), M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis (Cambridge, 1970), 320.

invoking the notion of *ittihad-i Islam* through religious dignitaries, especially in the Central Asian Khanates. In practical terms, however, the Ottomans could achieve little until the nineteenth century when the structural weakness of the empire forced them to pursue their pan-Islamic designs more vigorously.[61] A visitor to Istanbul during the time of Sultan Abdülmecid testifies to the presence of distinct signs of pan-Islamic activity.[62] It fell to the lot of the Young Ottoman intellectuals, particularly Namik Kemal (1840–88), to inspire union under Ottoman leadership.[63] The Young Ottoman philosophy had been culled from the western ideal of liberalism but its genesis lay in the pervading dissatisfaction with the Porte's policies, especially with regard to the *Tanzimat* doctrine (1826–80) of Muslim-non-Muslim fusion, which had given a blow not only to the traditional Ottoman social structure but also to the *millet* system of administration.[64] The result was an aggressive programme of pan-Islamic ideology disseminated through such publications as the *Ibret* and the *Besiret* and the equally emotive treatise, *Ittihad-i Islam* (1873) by Esad Efendi.[65] An additional stimulus to the twin ideals of pan-Islam and pan-Turkism came from the influx of thousands of Muslim refugees, especially intellectuals, from Central Asia in the wake of the Russian onslaught and the movements of unification among the Germans and the Italians in the 1860s and 70s.[66] The government of Sultan Abdülaziz, in

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In the case of the treaty with the Russians it was more in response to the tsarina's efforts to lay claim to the Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire and perhaps less to the sultan's own designs to assert his right to the universal caliphate.

[61] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 25 ff. A British consular report hints at such an activity as early as 1835/36. See PRO, FO 78/1316.

[62] Vambéry was the visitor. See L. Stoddard, *The New World of Islam* (London, 1921), 65.

[63] For Namik Kemal and the Young Ottomans, see Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962), *passim*; Werner Caskel, 'Western Impact and Islamic Civilization', in G. E. von Grunebaum (ed.), *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago, 1955), 337; Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (London, 1963 4), 101 2; id., 'The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1/3 (1965), 293; and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), 267 8.

[64] Ibid.; and Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 24. Also see Niyazi Berkes, 'Historical Background of Turkish Secularism', in Richard N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West* (The Hague, 1957), esp. 60 8; and R. H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), *passim*. The Young Ottomans, however, failed to strike roots in the Turkish society and soon became irrelevant to their own environment. This opened the door for an autocrat like Abdülhamid II. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, 'Reflections on the Myth and Reality of Islamic Modernism', *Hamdard Islamicus*, 13/1 (1990), 72 3.

[65] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 35 7.

[66] Alexendre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet*

the strict tradition of Sultan Ahmed III, began now to push this sentiment though its thrust remained largely socio-cultural and religious in nature and only marginally political.[67] It was carried to perfection by his successor, Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842–1918), who, in spite of his autocratic disposition at home between 1876 and 1909, chose to play the role of a 'green' sultan-caliph.[68] Pressure from populist-traditionalist Islamic groups had forced him to take refuge in pan-Islam, especially with an eye to exerting influence on the European Powers.[69] But there is no evidence from Ottoman sources to suggest that he accomplished this through an elaborate system of consulates, missions and emissaries by patronizing and funding directly from the Yeldiz kösk in Istanbul.[70]

The primary aim in mobilizing the forces of Islam was to strengthen the position of the Ottoman Empire which had been reduced almost to the status of 'a tributary State' by the European Powers through direct intervention, manipulations and Capitulations.[71] With the history of anti-Turk belligerency dating from the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul in the fifteenth century, the western offensive could not have been but perceived in popular mind as an attempt to destroy Islam.[72]

Union (London, 1967), 34, 40 and 76; Kemal H. Karpat, 'The *hijra* from Russia and the Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman state', in Dale F. Eikelman and James Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination* (London, 1990), 131–52; Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, 101; and id., 'The Ottoman Empire', 292–4; and Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled* (New York, 1986), 5.

[67] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 40.

[68] Cezmi Eraslan, *II. Abdülhamid ve Islam Birligi* (Istanbul, 1992), 198.

[69] Karpat, 'The *hijra*', 145; and Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 36–9.

[70] The traditional view of Abdülhamid can be followed in W. S. Blunt, 'The Future of Islam—II', *Fortnightly Review*, 30, (1881), 328–9 and 331; Anon., 'Abdülhamid, Sultan and Khalif, and the Pan-Islamic Movement', *Blackwood's Magazine*, 180/1091, (1906), esp. 302–5; Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 40–1; Vambéry, 'Pan-Islamism', 548; Arnold, *Caliphate*, 173; and Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (London, 1929), 45. In 1877, a large number of Turkish emissaries were said to be travelling about in India and contacts were reportedly established with such far-flung countries as Japan. See Lytton to Sir Erskin Percy, 29 May 1877, IOL&R, Lytton Papers; Tadazumi Iida, 'Islam and Japan', *Islam-Bunka* (Tokyo), 1/1 (1932), ii–iii; and Abu Bakr Morimoto, 'Two New Facts Regarding History of Islam in Japan', *Islamic Culture Forum* (Tokyo), 2/2 (1979), 20–1.

[71] Feroz Ahmad, 'The Late Ottoman Empire', in Marian Kent (ed.), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1989), 6. Feroz Ahmad, in fact, has borrowed the expression 'a tributary State' from Samir Amin, *The Arab Nation* (London, 1978).

[72] For an historical survey of western attitudes see Sinclair Atkins, 'Charles V and the Turks', *History Today*, 30/12 (1980), 13 ff.; and Max Kortepeter, 'The Turkish Question in the Era of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517)', in Donald

Partly, pan-Islam was intended to divert the attention of the Turkish people from internal unrest and that of the subject nationalities from entertaining any political aspirations.[73] The pan-Islamic orientations were also encouraged by the Germans, and to a lesser degree by the Russians and the French, particularly in the 1880s and 1890s, in an attempt to advance their political and economic interests at each other's expense.[74] Thrice during his reign, Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859–1941), the German Emperor from 1888 to 1918, came to Turkey on state visits to pursue his imperialistic designs.[75] Though a weak and unsteady ruler and a pawn in the hands of his army, he alone among the European sovereigns dared to do public homage to Abdülhamid. Especially in 1898, after his visit to Syria, he made an extraordinary speech assuring 300 million Muslims dispersed throughout the East that they would find him their eternal friend.[76] Thus he cemented a friendship which though brought some political and military assistance and economic co-operation, eventually dragged Turkey into the Great War on the side of the Central Powers.[77] Sultan Abdülhamid, who hated Russia, spurned France and feared Britain, considered Germany a more faithful ally.[78] And political and economic subservience notwithstanding, the 'Sick man of Europe' was able to get another lease of life and its sultan, somewhat unobtrusively, came to be regarded as a kind of Muslim 'Pope' having 'spiritual' authority over all Muslims. His claim was duly acknowledged in the subsequent treaties by Austria-Hungary (1908), Italy (1912) and Greece and Bulgaria (1913)—an error which the Allies later strove to undo in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and the definitive Treaty of Lausanne (1923).[79]

P. Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden, 1976), 155–78.

[73] Ahmed Emin, *Turkey in the World War* (New Haven, 1930), 26 7 and 34; Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, 95–6; and C. K. Zurayk, 'The National and International Relations of the Arab State', in T. Cuyler Young (ed.), *Near Eastern Culture and Society* (Princeton, 1951), 207.

[74] J. Holland Rose, '1815 and 1915', *Contemporary Review*, 107 (1915), 15; W. W. Cash, *The Moslem World in Revolution* (London, 1925), 26; and Vambéry, 'Pan-Islamism', 553.

[75] Emin, *Turkey in the World War*, 38–9.

[76] Anon., 'Abdülhamid, Sultan and Khalif', 307.

[77] Feroz Ahmad, 'The Late Ottoman Empire', 14.

[78] This was the opinion of the sultan's personal physician. See ibid., 11.

[79] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 307, 'Mohamedanism: The Supposed Spiritual Authority of the Caliph. Note by Dr. T. W. Arnold, C.I.E., with footnote and appendix by Sir A. Hirtzel', 28 Dec. 1918.

The cumulative effect of the foregoing factors on Indian Muslims was that during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the caliphal claim of the Ottoman sultan, in spite of its juridical vulnerability on the point of Quraishi descent, was widely accepted. Some of the middle-class intelligentsia actively encouraged the popular pan-Islamic notions.[80] Even Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–98), a scion of a noble family of the United Provinces (UP) whose ideas later changed with the turn in the British policy towards Turkey, eulogized the sultan as caliph. He also popularized the Turkish *fez* by making it a part of the Aligarh students uniform along with the Turkish coat.[81] The diligent encouragement of the pro-Turkish sentiment by both the Muslim intellectuals and British administrators had been so effective that when in the summer of 1876 public opinion in Britain turned hostile towards the Turks owing to a rather forcible suppression of the Russian-instigated Bulgarian insurrection by the Ottoman irregulars, the Indian Muslims began to bring pressure to bear upon the British government to remain friendly with the sultan.[82] In September of that year, the Earl of Lytton (1831–91), viceroy of India from 1876 to 1880, frankly told Queen Victoria that Muslim loyalty 'would be rudely shaken' if Britain was forced into war against Turkey by such British statesmen as William Gladstone (1809–98) and his supporters.[83] A week later he reported again:

> I watch with some anxiety the growing agitation of your Majesty's Mohammedan subjects in this country, in reference to our latest news both from England and Constantinople. There has been an immense

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[80] Blunt, 'The Future of Islam—II', 331; and id., *India Under Ripon* (London, 1909), 64 and 112.

[81] G. F. I. Graham, *The life and Work of Syed Ahmed Khan, C.S.I.* (Edinburgh, 1885), 114–15; Aziz Ahmad, 'Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Muslim India', *Studia Islamica*, 13 (1960), 68; Mirza Hairat, *Khilafat-i 'Usmani*, (Delhi 1901), 42; A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India* (Lahore, 1950), 57; and Qurratu'l-'Ain Haidar, *Intikhab Sayyid Haidar Yildirim* (Lahore, 1990), 36.

[82] The first alarm was raised by the *Spectator* of 3 June from where it was picked up by the *Daily News* and turned into a full-fledged 'crusade'. Anon., *'Suum Cuique', 'The First Alarm' Respecting the Bulgarian Outrages* (London, 1876), esp. i–iii. The outcry, however, was the logical outcome of the policy of opposition to the continuance of a Muslim Power in Europe initiated by the British Liberal Party in the early nineteenth century. See e.g. Cobden's pamphlet *Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer* (Edinburgh, 1836).

[83] Lytton to Victoria, 28 Sept. 1876, IOL&R, Lytton Papers. Also see Lytton to Disraeli, 18 Sept. 1876, in ibid. Gladstone served as PM on four occasions: 1868–74, 1880–5, 1886, and 1892–4.

> and most influential gathering in Bombay, for the purpose of expressing sympathy with the Sultan, and drawing up, for presentation to your Majesty, a petition on this subject.
>
> Similar meetings are being held at Peshawur and elsewhere throughout the Mohammedan portions of India; and the Mohammedan States on our frontier are also beginning to evince a corresponding agitation. As, up to the present moment, these meetings have been perfectly orderly in their proceedings, and loyal in their utterances of devotion to the throne and person of your Majesty, I have not deemed it justifiable or expedient to interfere with them. But if, either by the pressure of public opinion at home, or political difficulties abroad, your Majesty's Government should be forced into a policy of prominent aggression upon Turkey, I am inclined to think that a Mohammedan rising in India is among the contingencies we may have to face. I do not doubt what would be the result of it; for I am confident of our ability to put it down effectively and speedily. But we could only put it down by 'blood and iron'. And if the Turks should eventually be driven out of Europe into Arabia, their proximity, in that case, to Bombay, where we have a large and sensitive Mussulman population, would no doubt greatly increase the difficulties of your Majesty's Indian administration.
>
> I hope your Majesty will not think me an *Uccello di cattivo augurio*. But your Majesty will see . . . that Lord Northbrook was under an erroneous impression when he stated in a recent speech that your Majesty's Mussulman subjects in India are indifferent to what is happening in Turkey.[84]

Lytton's analysis of the situation, designed to pressure the cabinet to squeeze Russia out of the 'Great Game', was correct on both occasions. The anti-Turk crusade in Britain, which was causing anguish among Indian Muslims, had been set in motion by high Churchmen, Nonconformists, Radicals, intellectuals and philanthropists.[85] For a long time a section of the British press assailed the Turkish race, Islamic faith and its Prophet.[86] One of the questions asked was how, on the

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[84] Lytton to Victoria, 4 Oct. 1876, in ibid.

[85] They included such names as Canon H. P. Liddon, Lord Acton, Lord Bute, Ambrose de L'Isle, Bishop Clifford, E. A. Freeman, W. T. Stead, Lord Northbrook, Duke of Westminster and Lord Shaftesbury. Most of them were closest to Gladstone and they drew him into the agitation. However, Roman Catholics, the Church of England, the English Jewry, with some notable exceptions, remained largely unaffected by the agitation. For details see R. T. Shanon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876* (London, 1963), *passim*. Also see G. C. Thompson, *Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 1875–1880* (London, 1986); David Harris, *Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876* (Chicago, 1939); and R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question* (London, 1935).

[86] Rafiuddin Ahmad, 'A Moslem's View of the Pan-Islamic Revival', *Nineteenth Century*, 42/248 (1897), 517–18.

collapse of Turkey, were the goods of the 'Sick Man' to be divided?[87] However, it was Gladstone who, with his ferocious religious zeal, paraded the Ottoman 'atrocities' on their non-Muslim subjects in a pamphlet entitled *The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* to demand the expulsion of the Turks 'one and all, bag and baggage' from 'the Province they have desolated and profaned'.[88] The other end of the stick was jabbed into the side of his arch rival, the ailing old Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield from August 1876), for supposedly countenancing the 'wicked Sultan', Abdülhamid II.[89] Disraeli may have been a strong admirer of the Turks and the Turkish way of life, but he had no intention of fighting a war for them.[90] His solicitude for Turkey was a measured pretence—just 'a formula for British interests'.[91] The real issue, whether England or Russia should dominate the East, was 'sedulously concealed'.[92] Therefore, when in April 1877, Russia invaded Turkey, Britain did nothing. A furiously partisan Victoria (now the Empress of India) wanted the Russians stopped and pestered Disraeli almost by the hour, demanding a vigorous action.[93] A divided Cabinet was

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[87] Rev. J. Long, *The Eastern Question in its Anglo-Indian Aspect* (London, 1877), 5.

[88] This was published from London in 1876. Disraeli on the other hand dismissed the 'atrocities' as 'coffee-house babble'. See Elizabeth Longford, *Victoria R.I.* (London, 1964), 407.

[89] Some of Gladstone's followers in this movement were openly anti-Semitic in their attacks. Historian Freeman habitually referred to Disraeli as 'that lying Jew' and Hughenden, his estate, as 'the ghetto'. Gladstone also suspected that Disraeli's 'crypto-Judaism' had made him indifferent to the fate of Christians. See Sarah Bradford, *Disraeli* (London, 1982), 336–7; and R. J. Evans, *The Victorian Age, 1815–1914* (London, 1968), 200.

[90] Disraeli developed his pro-Turkish attitude during his eastern odyssey between May 1830 and Oct. 1831. At one point he even considered volunteering for the Turkish army against the Albanian rebels. See Bradford, *Disraeli*, 33–4, 36 and 39–40.

[91] George J. Kowry, 'British Imperial Interests and the Maintenance of the Ottoman Empire', *Studies in Islam*, 16/4, (1979), 199–213. Even Masurus Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to London, later complained to Gladstone that Disraeli had done nothing for the Turks. See John Brook and Mar Sorensen (eds.), *W. E. Gladstone*, iii (London, 1978), 56.

[92] Charles Whibley, *Lord John Manners and His Friends*, ii (Edinburgh, 1975), 183. Even Victoria admitted that the 'much abused policy of *upholding* the Turkish Empire was merely to prevent Russia having Constantinople!' See memo by Victoria, 17 Oct. 1876, G. E. Buckle, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 2nd ser., ii (London, 1926), 488.

[93] Victoria was so full of hatred for the Russians and those who encouraged them (like 'half madman' Gladstone) that she declared that if she 'were a man, she would like to go and give those Russians . . . such a beating!' She also indicated that she would much rather abdicate than suffer the humiliation of seeing the Russians

bound hand and foot and Disraeli could not move his fleet to the Straits until a storm of anti-Russian feelings swept across Britain.[94] And it was not until the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) that he called in a 7,000 strong Indian force to Malta in the Mediterranean to threaten the Russians.[95] Britain had been a villain no less than Russia and the Turks had little chance of success either in war or in peace.

Naturally, Turkey's Eastern Question and its ramifications generated considerable excitement among the Muslims of India. Rev. J. Long's gibe that Indian Muslims had behaved ungratefully by staging a 'Mutiny' shortly after the British sustenance to the Ottomans in the Crimean War, could not have gone well with them.[96] The Anglo-Indian civilians added salt to injury by questioning the Ottoman title to the caliphate.[97] The Indian Muslims were particularly indignant at the anti-Turk crusade by such religious dignitaries as Bishop Mylne of Bombay.[98] In fact, religious antagonism had been one of the major causes of friction in India among the Muslims and the British. The result was an open expression of sympathy for the Turks. This was

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before the gates of Istanbul. The Russians, for their part, imputed her anti-Russian attitude to Disraeli's influence. The Russian ambassador to London thought that the whole thing was the result of a conspiracy between 'a half-mad woman' and a 'political clown'. The Prince of Wales also appeared to him as 'the most Turkish of all Englishmen'. For Victoria see Buckle's introductory note to ch. xv in *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 437; Lytton Strachey, *Queen Victoria* (London, 1988), 177–8; Frank Hardie, *The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861–1901* (London, 1935), 160–3; and Longford, *Victoria*, 407–13. For the Prince of Wales see Giles St. Aubyn, *Edward VII: Prince and King* (London, 1979), 292–3.

[94] Whibley, *Lord John Manners*, ii, 183–9; Lady Victoria Hicks-Beach, *Life of Sir Michael Hicks Beach (Earl St. Aldwyn)*, i (London, 1932), 60; and Buckle, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, ii, 455.

[95] Robert Blake, *Disraeli* (London, 1966), 641 ff.; and E. Neill Raymond, *Victorian Viceroy: The Life of Robert, the First Earl of Lytton* (London, 1980), 177. *Punch* of London jokingly called the Indian contingent 'the Dark Horse'. See *Punch*, 74 (July–Dec. 1878), 258–9.

[96] Long, *Eastern Question*, 15–16.

[97] For this controversy see S., *Turkey and India or Our Indian Moslems: A Question of the Present Crisis* (London, 1876), esp. 3–7; George Birdwood's letters to *The Times*, 12 June, 9 July, and 10, 15 and 18 Oct. 1877; G. P. Badger, 'The Precedents and Usages Regulating the Muslim Khalifate', *Nineteenth Century*, 2/9 (1877), 274–82; and letter to *The Times*, 12 Oct. 1877; Redhouse, *A Vindication*, *passim*; and Parl. Papers, 1877, *Hansard*, H.L., cccxxxiii, col. 1443.

[98] Hussain B. Tyabji, *Badruddin Tyabji: A Biography* (Bombay, 1951), 49–50. One of Mylne's clergy had informed Bishop Liddon in Oct. 1876 that because of Mylne's crusade against the Turks 'the Mussalman population are indignant'. Lytton conveyed his displeasure to Mylne through the Bishop of Madras. See Shanon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation*, 190; and Lytton to Salisbury, 12 Oct. 1876, IOL&R, Lytton Papers.

the first occasion after 1857 that the Indian Muslims had displayed such political awareness publicly. There was an all-out effort to generate pan-Islamic feelings. The thrust was on reiterating that the sultan of Turkey was their caliph and the British had better side with him or else resign their interests in the East.[99] But since the tsar appeared to be the main aggressor in the latest crisis the public opinion was wildly anti-Russia.[100] Large public rallies were held to demonstrate solidarity with Turkey at places as separately situated as Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Ghazipur, Meerut, Patna, Amritsar, Chiniot, Lahore and Peshawar.[101] Anjumans and committees were set up all over India to pressure the British and Indian governments to side with the Ottomans and to help raise funds for them.[102] The rich and the poor contributed generously and Muslim women parted with their jewellery to swell the subscriptions. Where gold or money was not available wearing apparels were donated.[103] Exact figures are not possible to determine but according to the official Ottoman registers around lirae 124,843 or well above rupees ten lakh (one million) were collected and dispatched to Istanbul mainly through the Ottoman consulate in Bombay.[104] The Anjuman-i Islam and some newspapers took a leading part in the campaign, as did the *daru'l-'ulum* at Deoband, the premier religious seminary of traditional Islam in India which sought to broaden the influence of the *'ulama*. The efforts of the *'ulama* like Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi (1832–80), later the senior co-founder of the Deoband *madrasa*, Muhammad Rafi-ud-din, Muhammad Yaqub and Muhammad Ahmad were particularly appreciated by the Ottomans.[105] The anxiety about Turkey also spread to the army. It was reported that an official document had gone to London from the army headquarters at Simla (also the summer capital of the British central administration after 1864) stating that the Muslim

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[99] Redhouse, *A Vindication*, 5; and Abd-us-Salam Khurshid, *Sahafat: Pakistan wa Hindustan men* (Lahore, 1963), 189 and 284.

[100] Abbasi, *Muslim Politics*, 113.

[101] Ibid., 48; and *Turkey and Pakistan*, 19. Also see *Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 and 26 May, 7, 11, 13 and 21 June and 6 July 1877.

[102] *Ahsanu'l-Akhbar* of Jan. 1878, cited in Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 275. Also see Muhammad Ismail Panipati (ed.), *Maqalat-i sar Sayyid*, xiii (Lahore, 1963), 458–63.

[103] See *Mukhbir-i Sarwar* (Bombay), 9 Nov. 1876 in Rais Ahmad Jafri, 'Bambai ki Urdu sahafat', *Urdu*, 25/4 (Oct. 1945), 386–7. Also see a report from Amritsar in *Civil and Military Gazette*, 11 June 1877.

[104] BOA, Defteri Iane-i Hindiyye, 108, cited in Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 68–9; and IOL&R, L/R/5/55.

[105] Ibid., 125. For Deoband see below, 52.

soldiers were considerably disturbed by the events and that the anti-Turk movement in England would increase the disaffection further.[106] A Muslim correspondent to an Anglo-Indian paper declared that the Indian sympathy towards their brethren in Turkey had reached 'the height of mania'.[107] Naturally, there were calls to volunteer for Turkey.[108] The upshot of the pro-Turkish commotion was that, as a journal of opinion remarked, every Indian Muslim had become 'an unarmed Turk'.[109] Irresistibly, some Indians were driven to visit Istanbul and establish direct contacts with the Turkish government.[110] Others just contended themselves to sending letters of personal support and loyalty.[111] In turn the sultan, who was banking on Indian support both in terms of financial help and in influencing British policy,[112] responded gratefully to these gestures and bestowed on several Indian Muslims honorific titles and decorations in recognition of their services to the Ottoman cause.[113]

The enthusiasm for the Ottomans was reflected nowhere more accurately than in the vernacular press, which had steadily grown into an effective medium, especially since the introduction of lithography.[114] There had been instances of pro-Turkish feelings among the Urdu newspapers of Delhi as early as the 1840s and then in the 1860s (particularly in Syed Ahmed Khan's *Aligarh Institute Gazette*),[115]

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[106] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 June 1877.

[107] He informed that the Muslims of Amritsar were so involved with Turkey that nearly three hundred of them would go to the railway station every day to wait for the mail train to arrive with newspapers. They would all hurry and hustle to listen to the news read out to them and heartily cheered whenever there was any report of a Turkish victory. Ibid., 12 July 1877.

[108] *Nusratu'l-Akhbar*, 1 June 1877, IOL&R, L/R/5/54; and *Nuru'l-Anwar*, 19 Sept. 1877, IOL&R, L/R/7/15.

[109] *Ahsanu'l-Akhbar*, 13 Jan. 1878.

[110] *Awadh Punch* (Allahabad), Jan. 1848 [*sic* for 1878], cited in Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 246–7.

[111] They included Nawab Abdul Latif of Bengal and some *'ulama* of Deoband. See Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 76.

[112] Ibid., 78.

[113] Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 275 and 284. Also see *Civil and Military Gazette*, 22 June 1877.

[114] In 1835, there were only six vernacular papers. By 1850, their number had increased to 28 though most of them avoided politics. In 1878, however, in northern India alone there were as many as 97 vernacular papers with a total circulation of 150,000. By 1880, the vernacular press had expanded to 330 journals. See Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 197–8.

[115] See above, 17. Also see Rafiq Zakaria, *Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics* (Bombay 1970), 211–12; and Panipati, *Maqalat-i sar Sayyid*, xiii, 419–24, 441–6 and 450–63.

but the real impact of the Urdu press was demonstrated for the first time during the Russo-Turkish War. In the forefront were journals like the *Shamsu'l-Akhbar* and the *Jarida-i Rozgar* of Madras, the *Awadh Punch* of Lucknow and the *Qaisaru'l-Akhbar Hind* and the *Ahsanu'l-Akhbar* of Allahabad.[116] Even the journals owned and edited by Hindus, such as the *Awadh Akhbar* (Lucknow) of Munshi Nawal Kishor and the *Akhbar-i 'Am* (Lahore) of Pandit Gopi Nath, vied with the Muslim papers in their support for Turkey.[117] Only Syed Ahmed Khan's *Tahzibu'l-Akhlaq*, in spite of its open praise for Sultan Abdülaziz's *Tanzimat* and the Turk's adoption of European ways, struck a discordant note on pan-Islam.[118] A connected strand appeared in Urdu literature—prose, poetry, plays and novels. Romantic idealism being an essential element in national resurgence, the Urdu literature helped in stimulating pan-Islamic sentiment. A typical example was Ismail Meeruthi's (1844–1917) poem extolling the Ottoman *ghazis* fighting against the invading Russians.[119] He was followed by Altaf Husain Hali (1837–1914) whose epic poem, *Madd-o Jazr-i Islam* (1879), better known as the *Musaddas-i Hali*, took Muslim India by storm and created a widespread pan-Islamic fervour.[120] Pandit Ratan Nath Sarshar (1845–1903), the editor of the *Awadh Akhbar*, though a Hindu, wrote his *Fasana-i Azad*, a novel spun about characters out of the Russo-Turkish War.[121] Abdul Halim Sharar (1860–1926), his successor at the *Akhbar*, produced novels and plays on themes drawn from Ottoman history. His historical romances, first serialized in *Dil-Gudaz*

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[116] Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 273–6, 283–4 and 316 ff. For more information on Munshi Sayyid Sajjad Husain's *Awadh Punch*, see Shafqat Rizwi, *Awadh Punch aur Punch nigar* (Karachi, 1996), *passim*.

[117] Ibid., 179–200, 233–51, and 307–16.

[118] The very object of publishing the journal, explained Syed Ahmed Khan in the first issue, was to introduce reform in the Indian Muslim society as was being done in Turkey. See Ghulam Husain Zulfikar, 'Urdu Literature and the Turks', *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 24/1 (1987), 43; Panipati, *Maqalat-i sar Sayyid*, xiii, 405–18, 425–40, 447–9 and 464–6; and Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 222.

[119] *Turkey and Pakistan*, 20–1.

[120] Muhammad Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 347–51; and S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, 2nd edn. (Lahore, 1970), 62 ff. Syed Ahmed Khan was full of praise for Hali's *Musaddas* and published it in his *Tahzibu'l-Akhlaq* to give it the maximum publicity. He even wished that the *imams* would recite parts of the poem in prayers and *khutbas*. See Syed Ahmed Khan to Altaf Husain Hali, 10 June 1879, in Shaikh Ismail Panipati (ed.), *Maktubat-i sar Sayyid*, i (Lahore, 1976), 48–9.

[121] Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 417–24 and 427–8.

(founded 1887) and later published in book form, were inspired by a romantic love for Islam's glorious past. *Hasan aur Angelina*, in particular, was set in the background of the Russo-Turkish War.[122] This tradition was continued by later writers such as *Shamsu'l-'Ulama* Shibli Nu'mani (1857–1914), Agha Hashr Kashmiri (1879–1935), Shaikh Abdul Qadir (1874–1950), Haji Muhammad Ismail Khan (1852–1922) of Datavli, Sajjad Haidar Yildirim (1880–1943), and several others.[123] They either translated Turkish works in Urdu or produced adaptations from Turkish literature or wrote travelogues after visiting Istanbul.

Lytton could ill-afford to disregard the pro-Turkish proclivities of his Indian Muslims, especially when the Russian expansionist designs in Central Asia were threatening the Empire. He, therefore, opted for a policy which might manipulate British support for Turkey against the Russians.[124] An affirmation of this policy came from Sir Austen Layard, the British ambassador in Istanbul from 1877 to 1880, who wanted his superiors in London to patronize the pan-Islamic crest.[125] But the British government, especially Foreign Secretary Earl of Salisbury (1895–1902), who had become 'unreasonably anti-Turkish and unmindful of the Mohammedan aspect of India',[126] found it inadvisable to budge from the declared policy of neutrality. Lytton was annoyed for having been ditched when he was just about to take on the Russians through the Khyber via Balkh.[127] Fortunately for Lytton, the pan-Islamic commotion, enhanced to some extent by the passage of the Turkish mission to Afghanistan,[128] did not erupt in any violence and the section of the vernacular press which was

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[122] Ibid., 339–44, and 431–5. Also see M. M. K. Shihab Malirkotli, 'Maulana 'Abdu'l-Halim Sharar ke nawal', *Humayun*, 44/6, (Dec. 1943), 466–7.

[123] Ram Babu Saksena, *A History of Urdu Literature* (Lahore, 1927), 287–8; Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 358–60; Muhammad Shafi, *Agha Hashr aur unke dramon ka tanqidi mutala'a* (Burhanpur, 1988), 375–80; Abdul Shukur, '*Makhzan* 1901 ta 1920: bist sala isha'at ka tajziyyati mutala'a', MA thesis (Punjab/Lahore, 1967), esp. 21–40; Qudsiya Karim, '*Makhzan* (ek tahqiqi ja'iza): ibtada'i das salon ki talkhis', MA thesis (Punjab/Lahore, 1970), esp. 1–16; Miskin Ali Hijazi, *Punjab men Urdu sahafat* (Lahore, 1995), 259–60; and Haidar, *Intikhab*, esp. 12–16.

[124] See e.g. Lytton to Salisbury, 21 May, 10 and 23 June and 23 July 1877, IOL&R, Lytton Papers.

[125] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 82.

[126] Raymond, *Victorian Viceroy*, 175.

[127] M. Anwar Khan, *England, Russia and Central Asia (A Study in Diplomacy), 1857–1878* (Peshawar, 1963), 232–40.

[128] See report by Ahmed Hulusi Efendi, 1 Apr. 1878. BOA, Irade 1294, Hariciye 16873.

getting out of hand was quickly brought back in line through the coercive clauses of the Press Act.[129] But it became a difficult proposition for him when the British and Anglo-Indian journals also started questioning the soundness of a policy which, they thought, was pushing even the loyal among the Indian Muslims to a situation reminiscent of 1857.[130] The contradiction in British policy was puzzling to Muslims as to how relations with Turkey, considered so sacrosanct in the 1850s, were not so any more in the 1870s.[131] Sound or not the imperial policy towards Turkey had undergone an obvious change. The British government was in no mood to tolerate any interference, least of all by a subject people.[132] The warning that Armenius Vambéry (the Hungarian orientalist) had sounded, that 'the Moslem population of India, amongst whom *Pan-Islamistic* ideas are spreading from day today, will not remain inactive in the future should the Christian west continue to indulge in the sport of modern crusade',[133] remained virtually unheeded.

After the Russo-Turkish crisis the Muslim society of India assumed a definite political role. It had rediscovered its identity through pan-Islam. Even a moderate Anglo-Indian journal like the *Civil and Military Gazette* admitted that the feelings were more widely spread than had generally been supposed to be the case.[134] The new leadership of the aristocratic élite—Nawab Abdul Latif (1828–93) in Bengal, Syed Ahmed Khan in the UP, and Badruddin Tayabji (1844–1906) in Bombay—though loyal to the British was pro-Turkish nevertheless and it muddled through this paradox with obvious unease. Therefore, there were, along with the demonstration of sympathy for the Turks, embarrassing denials that British India was *daru'l-harb* or that *jihad* was their aim or that it could lawfully be undertaken even if it were *daru'l-Islam*.[135] The *'ulama*, who had been shut out of the educational

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[129] Abbasi, *Muslim Politics*, 114 and 120.

[130] In the forefront were the *Vanity Fair* and the *Pall Mall Gazette*. See exts. in *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16, and 23 and 26 June 1877.

[131] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 June 1877.

[132] Salisbury to Lytton, 20 June 1877, IOL&R, Lytton Papers.

[133] Letter dated 31 Dec. 1877, in *Daily Telegraph*, 12 Jan. 1878.

[134] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 7 June 1877.

[135] *Abstract of Proceedings of the Mahomedan Literary Society, passim*. Also see Maulvi Cheragh Ali, *A Critical Exposition of the Popular Jihad* (Calcutta, 1885), esp. 114 ff., 163, 169 ff. and 192; and Rev. Edward Sell, *The Faith of Islam*, 2nd edn. (London, 1896), 359–66. The controversy about *daru'l-Islam* and *daru'l-harb* has been dealt with in detail in ch. iii, 174 ff.

and judicial set-up, suddenly found themselves pushed to the forefront at a time when only those survived who were willing to compromise. And since they were far from regaining their lost ascendancy they strongly resented any encroachment upon their power base.[136] An interesting feature of the situation, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, was that the Shi'as, in spite of their doctrinal differences with the Sunnis, joined the latter in supporting the Ottomans. This, however, was not an ideological compromise but rather the outcome of the belief that the caliphate was capable of unifying the Muslim community.[137] Nevertheless, the lead given in this direction by the Bohra leaders Badruddin Tyabji and Nakhoda Mohammed Ali Rogay of Bombay, and Barrister Syed Ameer Ali (1849–1928) of Bengal,[138] was later sustained by Maulawi Cheragh Ali (1844–95) of Hyderabad (Deccan),[139] and still later by Sultan Sir Mohamed Shah Aga Khan III (1877–1957), the hereditary leader of the Ismailis, Mirza Hashim Ispahani, an Indian Muslim settled in Britain, Barrister Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the future founder of Pakistan, and others.[140]

The war had also shattered the Indo-Muslim illusions that the Ottomans were as powerful as their European rivals. They now realized for the first time how weak the Ottoman State had been. This awareness was more disturbing as the fall of a Muslim Empire was bound to affect them adversely *vis-à-vis* the hostile Hindu majority which had always generated in them a feeling of insecurity. The fact that the communal tensions had attained dangerous proportions pushed the Indian Muslims further to identify themselves with the Ottomans.[141] They began to perceive that their prestige in India was dependent on the maintenance of the Ottoman Turkey and 'if that

[136] For a detailed analysis of the *'ulama* and their position in the Indian Muslim society see I. H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics* (Karachi, 1972), 1–98; and Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 12 ff.

[137] Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 130.

[138] H. B. Tyabji, *Badruddin Tyabji* (Bombay, 1952), 49–52 and 82–8; and M. Y. Abbasi, *The Political Biography of Syed Ameer Ali* (Lahore, 1989), *passim*.

[139] For Cheragh Ali's (real name, Nawab Azam Yar Jang) views see his *The Proposed Political, legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammaden States* (Bombay, 1883), *passim*.

[140] See chs. ii–vi. The Aga Khan was the head of the 'Seven Imam' branch of the Shi'a and Ispahani was a businessman.

[141] For the causes and nature of the Hindu-Muslim riots in the nineteenth century Punjab, see Ikram Ali Malik, *Hindu-Muslim Riots in the British Punjab (1849–1900)* (Lahore, 1984), *passim*. It would not be fair to assume, as Özcan infers, that in the weakness of the Ottoman state after the Russo-Turkish War the Indian Muslims 'found some degree of consolation for their own loss of power and prestige in India'. See his *Pan-Islamism*, 64.

Empire ceased to exist', as a Muslim journal had feared almost a year before the war, 'the Muhammedans will at once fall into insignificance'.[142] And though the Empire did not cease to exist, it certainly had shrunk in size. By the Treaty of Berlin (1878), it was forced to give up almost a third of its territory and a fifth of its population of which half were Muslims.[143] Naturally, in the years that followed the Russo-Turkish War, the pro-Ottoman feelings of the Indian Muslims registered a rapid increase in intensity. Historians of Islam have been prone to credit this growth to Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani' (1838–97), the legendary Iranian philosopher-statesman.[144] Recent research, however, has negated this popular myth.[145] Charismatic al-Afghani was, no doubt, one of the most remarkable personalities of his time under whose influence the movement for the political, social and intellectual rejuvenation of Islam received a certain momentum. But his Islamic response to imperialism was a double-edged sword, as it affected both the Christian West as well as the Muslim despots.[146] His contradictions notwithstanding,[147] al-Afghani's contribution lies in the fact that he tried to bridge the gap between the traditionalists and the westernized modernists, and politicized Islam with a pan-Islamic context.[148] But as is the case with

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[142] *Urdu Akhbar*, 17 Aug. 1876, IOL&R, L/R/5/53.

[143] Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, ii (Cambridge, 1977), 191.

[144] See E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (Cambridge, 1910), *passim*; Blunt's note in ibid., 401–4; I. Goldziher, 'Djamal al-Din al-Afghani', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1009; W. S. Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (London, 1970), 550–1; Margoliouth, 'Pan-Islamism', 7–11; Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, *Asar-i Jamalu'd-Din Afghani* (Delhi, 1940); and A. Hottinger, *The Arabs* (London, 1963), 193. For the contemporary British official assessment see IOL&R, L/P&S/3/349. The controversy whether al-Afghani was an Iranian or an Afghan still continues. See e.g. Shahid Husain Razzaqi, *Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din Afghani: Hayat-o Afkar* (Lahore, 1979), 6–15.

[145] See e.g. Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 269–70; Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1968), 22–58; id., *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani': A Political Biography* (Berkeley, 1972), 59–60, 129–42 and 421–2; Aziz Ahmad, 'Afghani's Indian Contacts', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 89/3, (1969), 476–504; and Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 13 ff.

[146] G. E. von Grunebaum, *Islam*, 2nd edn. (London, 1961), 187; and Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din*, 140.

[147] First there was an overemphasis of religious as against national bonds, then recognition of nationalities as homogeneous structures, and, finally, their acceptance as cultural communities. But all these stages were in the nature of progression of ideas. See Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism* (ed. & Eng. tr.), Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett (London, 1981), 142–3.

[148] Seyyed Nasr, 'Reflection on the Myth and Reality of Islamic Modernism', 73; and Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 21.

such ideologues, al-Afghani simultaneously drew admiration of his devotees, suspicion of his royal patrons and consternation of his western discoverers. Even the traditionalists among the *'ulama* disliked some aspects of his reform though they dared not oppose his anti-imperialism.[149] Yet when shorn of all the mythical aura that surrounds him, al-Afghani would still emerge as the most zealous proponent of a kind of Muslim bloc against colonialism, not as a world-wide caliphate but rather as a loose commonwealth of Muslim states, Shi'a as well as Sunni, 'united by faith, geography and the Quran'.[150]

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's impact on contemporary India (or even contemporary Turkey), however, was limited. He visited India twice definitely—from 1856 to 1858 and then from 1879 to 1882—and perhaps on two other occasions, once in 1859 and again in 1869, unless those appearances were just the extensions of his earlier sojourns.[151] On his first visit al-Afghani was only eighteen and was hardly in a position to exercise any influence. On his later visits, though more experienced and articulate in ideas, he failed to make an impression. His writings and lectures, mostly in Farsi, made no mention of pan-Islam or a union of Indian Muslims with those of other countries.[152] His Indian contacts were either indifferent or were men of no consequence.[153] And those like Syed Ahmed Khan who mattered held views diametrically opposed to his conception of religion and politics.[154] Besides, al-Afghani's movements were fairly restricted as he was constantly under British surveillance which eventually forced him to leave India.[155] Far from influencing India, al-Afghani developed his own anti-British feelings and pan-Islamic tendencies as a result of his Indian experience: the first because of the dreadful events of 1857 and the second owing to the pro-Turkish proclivities of his Indian

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[149] Manochehr Dorraj, *From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran* (Boulder, 1990), 97 and 171.

[150] *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa* (Cairo, 1957), 72, quoted in Rashid Ahmad (Jallundhri), 'Pan-Islamism and Pakistan: Afghani and Nasser', *Scrutiny*, 1/2 (1975), 29.

[151] Aziz Ahmad, 'Afghani's Indian Contacts', 476 8; and Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din*, 22–32 and 143 81. The confusion about al-Afghani's work and impact was possibly caused by the existence of another itinerant *'alim* of the same name who went about preaching in Afghanistan and India during the 1890s. See *Muhazzab* (Lucknow), 1/17, 1 Dec. 1890.

[152] K. K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*, i (Lahore, 1987), 25 ff. In 1884, some of these were published from Calcutta as *Maqalat-i Jamaliyya*.

[153] See Ahmad, 'Afghani's Indian Contacts', 476 504.

[154] Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 127.

[155] *Turkey and Pakistan*, 27.

co-religionists. In fact, pan-Islam had developed in India long before al-Afghani's arrival. The myth of his being the originator was a later invention. During his own lifetime and until several years later, al-Afghani remained largely ignored or unknown in India. Even Shibli Nu'mani, who visited Istanbul in 1892, fails to mention him in his *Safarnama*, the record of his sentimental journey to the *daru'l-Khilafat*.[156] Similarly, Maulawi Mahbub Alam (1865–1933), editor of the *Paisa Akhbar* of Lahore, in his travelogue of visit undertaken in 1900, is silent on this matter.[157] Shaikh Abdul Qadir, in his *Maqam-i Khilafat*, written after his sojourns in the Ottoman capital in 1906, also does not refer to al-Afghani[158] though both he and his companion, Barrister Mushir Hosain Kidwai (1878–1938) of Gadia (UP), were active members of the Pan-Islamic Society of London.[159] Thus Syed Ameer Ali was not exaggerating when he maintained in 1912 that the name of al-Afghani was scarcely known to Indian Muslims.[160] Poet-philosopher and Barrister Mohammed Iqbal's (1876–1938) earlier writings are also silent about al-Afghani and it is only from 1913 onwards that he seems to take any notice of the Iranian's existence.[161] The solitary exception was Mohiy-ud-din Ahmad, pseudonym Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), a young journalist settled in Calcutta, who displayed some knowledge about al-Afghani but that was due to his contacts with the latter's Egyptian followers, especially Rashid Rida (1865–1935), the well-known pan-Islamist editor of *al-Manar*.[162] Otherwise, even in his monumental work, the *Tazkira*, Azad makes no mention of al-Afghani. In fact, it was much later, precisely from the 1920s onwards, that the al-Afghani myth took hold of the Indian Muslims and became the catchword of the Khilafat movement. In his own life-time al-Afghani's pan-Islamic dream remained largely unfulfilled and he was forced to spend the rest of his life in 'honourable confinement' for

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[156] Shibli Nu'mani, *Safarnama-i Rum-o Sham* (Agra, 1894).

[157] Haji Maulana Mahbub Alam, *Safarnama: yurup bilad-i Rum Sham wa Misr* (n.p., 1908).

[158] Abdul Qadir, *Maqam-i Khilafat* (Lahore, 1907).

[159] See below, 50–1.

[160] See the discussion portion of Margoliouth's, 'Pan-Islamism', 20.

[161] See Ghulam Hussain Zulfikar, 'Iqbal aur Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din Afghani', in id., *Iqbal: ek mutala'a* (Lahore, 1987), 135 ff. Also see below, 66–7.

[162] When Rashid Rida visited India in 1912 on Shibli Nu'mani's invitation, the very first issue of Azad's *al-Hilal* carried a sympathetic review of 'al-Afghani' and published his picture. See *al-Hilal*, 13 July 1912, esp. 4–6. For relations between Egyptian and Indian pan-Islamists see L/P&S/11/62, file 3682/1913.

he knew too much of Abdülhamid's plans and was suspected of conspiring with the latter's enemies who favoured an Arab caliphate.[163]

The 1880s witnessed a rapid growth of Indian pan-Islamic sentiment. With Gladstone as the British prime minister for the second time, it was not at all surprising. But a major factor in this regard was the fresh wave of military and economic pressure on the *daru'l-Islam* from Christian Europe. The pattern of their push and the consequent shrinking of the Islamic frontiers were reminiscent of the *Reconquista*, completed in the late fifteenth century with the fall of Granada, the last of the Muslim strongholds in Spain.[164] The spoliation of the Muslim territories was such that, apart from India and the Central Asian Khanates which had already been devoured by Britain, Russia and China between the 1850s and 1870s, there remained not a Muslim state on the 'fringe' of the Islamic meridian—from Algeria in the west to the Malaysian Archipelago in the east—which did not pass under European domination. The only segments of the *daru'l-Islam* left seemingly independent were the territories in the 'core' and they, too, were threatened. Between 1878 and 1882 a number of Ottoman territories and dependencies—including Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tunisia and Egypt—either became independent or were devoured by various European Powers. A complete picture of the western encroachments of over a century is available in Table III. This continuous pressure of Christendom, exerted under one pretext or other, gave rise to a feeling among Indian Muslims that though their own shortcomings had partly resulted in their subjugation the maintenance of the power and independence of the last great Muslim Power was not only the most pressing problem but also the concern for the entire Muslim world. This was bound to arouse apprehensions among the British, especially if the Ottomans were to choose to settle the old score.

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[163] Azmi Özcan, 'Jamaladdin Afghani's Honorable Confinement in Istanbul and Iran's Demands for his Extradition', *Osmanli Arastirmalari*, 15 (1995), esp. 289–91.

[164] The pattern, according to Aziz Ahmad, flows from internal strife which leads to fragmentation and then gives way to external conquest and annexation. The Muslim élite takes recourse to *hijrat* and abandons the masses to face expulsion or conversion. Islam thus ceases to exit or is in danger of extinction. See Aziz Ahmad, 'Shrinking Frontiers of Dar al-Islam', *Quaid-i-Azam Memorial Lectures*, (limited circulation), (Islamabad, 1975), 1 32.

Table III

Territories passed from Muslim rule to non-Muslim control between 1799–1914

Date	Country or Province	To whom ceded
	I. Caucasus and Transcaucasus	
1800	Georgia from Persia	Russia
1813	Darband, Shirwan, Baku, Karadagh from Persia	"
1813	Sovereignty of Caspian Sea from Persia	"
1828	Erivan, Nakhejevan, etc., from Persia	"
1829	Poti, Anapa, and Circassian Coast from Turkey	"
1878	Batum, Kars, Ardahan from Turkey	"
	II. Central Asia	
1844	Kirghis	Russia
1864	Samarkand	"
1868	Khokand and Bukhara	"
1873	Khiva	"
1881	Merv	"
1891	Part of Khorasan from Persia	"
	III. Southern Asia	
1799	Nizam's Dominions, India	Britain
1803	Mughal Empire, India	"
1824	Straits Settlements	"
1830	Dutch Rule consolidated	Holland
1839	Aden and Arabian Coast	Britain
1843	Sind, India	"
1849	Punjab and Kashmir	"
1856	Oudh	"
1876	Baluchistan Protectorate	"
	IV. Europe	
1829	Greece and Serbia granted independence	
1858	Wallachia and Moldavia from Turkey	Rumania
1878	Bessarabia from Turkey	Russia
1878	Cyprus	Britain
1878	Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed 1908)	Austria
1878	Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania enlarged	
1878	Bulgaria formed from Turkey	
1885	East Rumelia from Turkey	Bulgaria
1898	Crete autonomous from Turkey	
1912	Crete annexed	Greece
1912	Aegian Islands from Turkey	Italy
1913	Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Islands	Greece
1913	Parts of Macedonia, Albania	Serbia
1913	Parts of Macedonia and Thrace	Bulgaria
1913	Parts of Albania	Montenegro
1913	Albania made independent	

(Table III cont.)

Date	Country or Province	To whom ceded
	V. Africa	
1830	Algeria	France
1882	Tunis	"
1882	Egypt (annexed 1914)	Britain
1884–89	British East Africa	"
1884–89	German East Africa	Germany
1880–90	Eritrea, Somali Coast	Italy
1884–98	Sahara and Western Sudan	France
1898	Eastern Sudan	Britain
1909	Zanzibar	"
1910	Wadai	France
1912	Morocco	"
1912	Morocco, part to	Spain
1912	Tripoli and Cyranaica	Italy

Source: S. G. Wilson, *Modern Movements Among Moslems* (New York, 1916), 219.

Already, there had been reports to the effect that the Muslims, especially those who had escaped from India after the Revolt of 1857 and were residing in Ottoman territories under state protection, were involved in anti-British intrigues.[165] Layard, in particular, suspected the sultan of endeavouring to organize them for 'another rebellion' against the British in India but the Porte strongly denied this.[166] Careful inquiries later revealed that there was no evidence of any Indo-Ottoman intrigue. And though the Indian government still suspected some conspiracy the Ottoman involvement could not be established.[167] Conveniently, it overlooked that the activities of men like W. S. Blunt (1840–1922), who were openly working for the transfer of caliphate from Istanbul to Makkah under an Arabic-speaking Quraishi, could not but have produced a disquiet among the Ottomans and their Indian well-wishers.[168] As such, far from being a 'peripheral'

[165] They included Shahzada Sultan Ibrahim, who claimed to be a member of the deposed Mughal dynasty, Feroz Shah and Mirza Mahmud Beg of Lucknow. See Captain Hunter's report in NAI, FD, Sept. 1875, nos. 90–4, cited in Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 89 ff.

[166] Layard to Grenville, 25 May 1880, IOL&R, L/P&S/3/226; and Goschen to Grenville, 31 Aug. 1880, IOL&R, L/P&S/3/228.

[167] NAI, FD, Mar. 1881, nos. 45–90, and June 1881, nos. 279–311, in Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 92–3.

[168] For Blunt's activities see PRO, FO 539/18, no. 19, 'Memoir by W. S. Blunt on the Position of the Ottoman Sultans Towards Islam', 24 July 1880; and W. S. Blunt, *The Future of Islam* (London, 1882), *passim*.

issue or a mere euro-centric 'fashionable bogey',[169] pan-Islam was a potent instrument of Ottoman foreign policy, both to reach out to the Muslim world as well as to ward off European pressure. Little wonder that there was a constant friction between Islam and the West.

The crescendo of the pan-Islamic movement was reached in the 1890s when the anti-Turk campaign was renewed with even greater ferocity over the Ottoman treatment of their rebellious non-Muslim subject nationalities. In a way it was the re-enactment of the drama staged earlier in the 1870s: the main cast and the plot remained the same; only the actors changed. This time the Armenians occupied the centre stage instead of the Bulgarians. Starting from Sassoon in 1894, the Armenian rebellion spread to the whole of Anatolia, culminating in the massacre of Muslims in the province of Van in 1896 with some connected events in the Ottoman capital as well.[170] The gory two-year inter-racial war claimed thousands of lives on both sides but the gullible, Turcophobe British press and the partisan European Powers presented the whole thing as if it were a one-sided affair, deliberately perpetrated by the Ottoman authorities.[171] Naturally, the public opinion in Europe, especially in Britain and France, was deeply affected by the propaganda. The Anglo-Armenian and Evangelic organizations played upon the religious sentiments of the people and pleaded with the Liberal government of Earl of Rosebery (1894–95) for immediate action.[172] Thus, the so-called humanitarian protest, with the support of the ecclesiastics and others, assumed an anti-Islamic character which, even Victoria admitted, was 'most injudicious'.[173] The controversy as to whether the sultan had any rightful title to the caliphate, originally launched in the 1870s, was revived and his claim rejected.[174]

In turn, the encroachments on the *daru'l-Islam* and the religious fervour among the Europeans against the Ottomans and the Muslims generally, touched a sensitive chord in India. The Muslim press, led by Munshi Mahbub Alam's *Paisa Akhbar* (Lahore), Hakim Muhammad

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[169] My contention here is different from that of Özcan. See his *Pan-Islamism*, 126.
[170] See S. R. Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians* (London, 1987), esp. 159 ff. and 205 ff.
[171] Ibid., 168.
[172] Ibid., 164.
[173] Victoria to Elgin, 19 Mar. 1897, IOL&R, Elgin papers.
[174] See e.g. H. A. Salmoné, 'Is the Sultan of Turkey the True Caliph of Islam', *Nineteenth Century*, 39/227 (1896), 173 80; and Malcolm MacColl, 'The Musalmans of India and the Sultan' *Contemporary Review*, 71/374 (1897), 280–94.

Khan's *Akmalu'l-Akhbar* (Delhi), Shaikh Ghulam Muhammad's *Vakil* (Amritsar), and several other papers reflected these sentiments and prominently displayed news from the Islamic countries, with strongly worded editorials and articles on issues confronting the Ottoman Empire.[175] Already, since the preceding decade, Indian journals had been regularly publishing material culled and translated from several Turkish and Arabic newspapers, such as *al-Jawaib*, the *Tercuman-i Rum*, the *Akhbar dar al-Khilafat* and the *Tercuman-i Mashriq*.[176] But no Turkish journal had an impact on India like that of the *Paik-i Islam*, an Istanbul journal in Urdu and Turkish edited by an Indian Muslim.[177] The *Paik-i Islam*, like other contemporary Turkish newspapers, was designed by the Porte specifically to extend the influence of the sultan as caliph and promote closer relations between the Ottomans and the Indian Muslims.[178] To counter its impact the British and the Indian governments had begun to publish *al-Khilafa* from London which questioned the Ottoman claim to the caliphate.[179] In turn, the Ottomans got an Indian Muslim, Abdul Rasul of Delhi, to start *al-Ghairat* from the same city to counter *al-Khilafa* with the usual line though the sultan was careful not to annoy the European Powers too much.[180] The major thrust in this propaganda war during the 1990s, however, remained with the Indian papers and they never hesitated to express themselves. A typical example is the following extract from the *Kaisari* of 20 July 1895:

> The European nations are so prejudiced against the Muhammadans that they would like to see them swept off the face of the earth. They are taught to hate Islam and its followers. There are thousands of books written in the European languages in which the Muhammadans are represented as a wild and bloodthirsty people and Islam as the religion of the sword. The outcry raised against the Sultan in connection with the Armenian affair is a proof of the bigotry of the Europeans. Russia has annexed Bokhara and half of Persia; the British have seized India, and the French, North Africa from the Muhammadans

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[175] See Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 338–41, 346 73 and 385–97; Aziz Malik, *Sahafat aur tahrik-i azadi*, 65; and Ikram Ali Malik (ed.), *Punjab Muslim Press and the Muslim World, 1888–1911* (Lahore, 1974), esp. 9–11.

[176] Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 291–3; and Aziz Malik, *Sahafat aur tahrik-i azadi*, 28.

[177] Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 117 ff.

[178] Azmi Özcan, 'The Press and Anglo-Ottoman Relations, 1876 1909', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 29/1 (1993), 111–12.

[179] Ibid., 112–14.

[180] Ibid., 114–15.

> and reduced the people inhabiting those countries to the position of slaves. But the Sultan has never interfered with these powers.[181]

The Government of India, all along, had been concerned about the possible effects of the Armenian affair on the Muslim mind.[182] But back home, Prime Minister Rosebery—and after him his successor Salisbury—had different views on the Eastern Question.[183] Only Victoria was consistent in reminding the viceroy, Lord Elgin (1894–99), that he must dispel any feeling among Muslims that 'in consequence of the dreadful events in Turkey' the government was ill-disposed towards them.[184] Whether her consideration for Muslim susceptibilities was due to their enormous numbers in the Empire[185] or to the influence of the two Indians closest to her at the time—Hafiz Munshi Abdul Karim (1863–1909) and Rafiuddin Ahmad (1865–1954)[186]—the Indian administration was kept under constant pressure in the year of her Golden Jubilee. Elgin, as always, was quick to assure the

[181] Quoted in Malik, *Punjab Muslim Press*, 23.

[182] See e.g. Elgin to Victoria, 23 Sept. 1896, Royal Archives, Windsor.

[183] Though Rosebery had difference of opinion with the Liberal Party on the Eastern Question and was also in conflict with Gladstone, the Earl of Salisbury, his predecessor and later his successor, adopted a more aggressive stance towards the Turks. See The Marquess of Crewe, *Lord Rosebery*, i (London, 1931), 523 4. Salisbury was premier during 1895, 1886–95 and 1895–1902.

[184] Victoria to Elgin, 19 Mar. 1897, IOL&R, Elgin Papers.

[185] This had been in evidence for quite some time. See e.g. Victoria to Elgin, 15 Oct. 1896, IOL&R, Elgin Papers.

[186] The Munshi started his life on the royal household as the groom of chamber but then quickly rose to gain the queen's confidence to the extent that he was consulted on highly confidential matters concerning India. He was given the honorific title of the 'Indian Secretary' and bestowed other royal favours, including a CIE. Through the Munshi, his friend Rafiuddin Ahmad also obtained the queen's ear. The senior household staff did not like the Munshi's proximity to the throne and tried their utmost to dislodge him from the queen's favour. Such intrigues notwithstanding, the Munshi continued to hold his own during the lifetime of Victoria. Her son and successor, King Edward VII, who was unlike her mother, quickly got rid of the Munshi and ordered the burning of the letters which had passed between him and the late queen. In 1901, the Munshi retired to his native town of Agra and died eight years later. Rafiuddin Ahmad (later Sir), on the other hand, was an educated man of distinction, having been called to the Bar in 1892 (Middle Temple). He was the founder-president of the Muslim Patriotic League of London and later practised at the Privy Council. He came from Poone and served as member, legislative council (1909) and minister (1928–30) in the Bombay govt. For details about the Munshi see E. E. P. Tisdall, *Queen Victoria's Private Life, 1837–1901* (London, 1961), 172–83; Longford, *Victoria*, 502–3, 508–9, 518–19, 535–43, 550–1 and 574; John Matson, *Dear Osborne* (London, 1978), 101–4; and Michaela Reid, *Ask Sir James* (London, 1991), 102, 118, 128–57 and 217. For Rafiuddin Ahmad, see ibid., and his 'Kaiser-i Hind and Hindustani', *Nineteenth Century*, 29/171 (1891), 747–53; and id., 'The Queen's Hindustani Diary', *Strand Magazine*, 4 (July–Dec. 1892), 550–7.

queen that though there were some feelings of unrest among Indian Muslims over the Turkish question and the stoppage of pilgrimage to Makkah due to plague in India, his government was committed to avoiding unnecessary aggravation.[187] But complications arose in April 1897 when war broke out between Greece and Turkey over the crisis in Crete.[188] The unexpected Turkish victory over the pan-Hellenist warriors, however, altered the situation so far as the Indian Muslims were concerned. The exhilaration over the Turkish success resulted in considerable unrest among them.[189] This, coupled with the alarm over the British 'forward policy' in the North West frontier of India, contributed to a serious uprising among the tribes—the Waziris, the Swatis, the Mohmands, the Afridis and the Orakzais[190]—as well as among the *mujahidin*, the remnants of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi's (1786–1831) religio-political Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya.[191] An even greater concern was engendered in India when the Powers intervened to deprive Turkey of the fruits of victory. The issue came to be presented as one of the Crescent *versus* the Cross and the reaction was conspicuously reflected in the press.[192] A Muslim paper gleefully declared after the Turkish victory that 'Once again on the soil of Christian Europe the sword of Islam has smitten the Unbelievers and has been sheathed in victory.'[193]

[187] Elgin to Victoria, 20 Apr. 1897, Royal Archives, Windsor.

[188] Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians*, 235.

[189] Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Syed Ahmed Khan), *Akhiri mazamin* (Lahore, 1898), 59; and Rafiq Zakaria, *Rise of Muslims*, 90–1.

[190] The rising was so strong that the Govt. of India had to undertake as many as seven arduous and costly military operations against the tribesmen, involving 70,000 troops before it was finally suppressed. See Lal Baha, *N.W.F.P. Administration Under British Rule, 1901–1919* (Islamabad, 1978), 8. Also see J. R. McLane, *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress* (Princeton, 1977), 29; and Arthur Swinson, *North-West Frontier* (London, 1967), 233.

[191] For details about the *mujahidin* (the 'Hindustani Fanatics' or the 'Wahhabis', as the British called them), see IOL&R, L/P&S/18, D. 209, 'Brief History of Hindustani Fanatics', June 1915; W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (London, 1871), *passim*; Masud Alam Nadwi, *Hindustan ki pehli Islami tahrik* (Rawalpindi, 1948), *passim*; Ghulam Rasul Mihr, *Jama'at-i mujahidin* (Lahore, [1955]), *passim*; id., *Sarguzasht-i mujahidin* (Lahore, 1956); Mahmud Husain, 'The Successors of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid', *History of Freedom Movement*, ii/1-2 (Karachi, 1957), 145-69 and 366–89. G. R. G. Hambly, 'Unrest in Northern India During the Viceroyalty of Lord Mayo, 1869-72', *Royal Central Asian Journal*, 48/1 (1961), 37-55; S. M. Ikram, *Mauj-i Kausar*, 5th edn. (Lahore, 1963), 13-72; Q. Ahmad, *The Wahabi Movement in India*, (Calcutta, 1966), *passim*; I. H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, 140-78; and Lal Baha, 'The Activities of the *Mujahidin*, 1900-1936', *Islamic Studies*, 18/2 (1979), 97–168.

[192] 'Memo on the Pan-Islamic Movement', encl., Viceroy to Sec. of State, no. 110, 15 June 1899, IOL&R, L/P&S/7/114.

[193] Quoted in Anon., 'Abdülhamid, Sultan and Khalif', 296.

Numerous addresses of support were sent to Sultan Abdülhamid besides liberal contributions to the Turkish Patriotic Fund.[194] One such address was arranged and signed by Abdul Bari (1878–1926), the influential pan-Islamist *'alim* of the Farangi Mahal *madrasa* in Lucknow who, with Mushir Kidwai, played an important role in consolidating the prestige of the Ottomans in India.[195] These manifestations disturbed Victoria and Elgin had to reassure her that in their expressions of sympathy for the sultan, the Indian Muslims had no intention of disloyalty to her personally or to her Indian government.[196] But confidentially, he had already on 6 July written to all provincial administrations asking them to report whether there was in existence a general movement against the British.[197] Reports from the provinces indicated a widely divergent situation. However, the conclusion drawn was that though there was much sympathy with the sultan and exultation at his victory over Greece, antagonism to the government was not likely to manifest itself unless there were other causes of hostility.[198] Sir Anthony MacDonald (1844–1925), lieutenant-governor of the North Western Provinces and Oudh, seems to have monitored the situation correctly. 'Let theorists say what they will', he stated, 'it seems to me to be certain [that] the Sunni Mahomedans in India do owe a double allegiance. They do, practically speaking, regard the Sultan of Turkey as the head of Islam.'[199] A month later, he reported again:

> There is no doubt that there is great sympathy with Turkey, and that the prevalent feeling partakes of the nature of an Islamic revival. It is, I believe, partly due to incitements from outside India and partly spontaneous, and I think it has been growing for some time, and is fostered in Mahomedan schools. The Commissioner of Agra tells me that many more people than formerly have taken to wearing the Turkish Fez: and this is perhaps a straw indicating how the wind is beginning to blow.[200]

Naturally, Victoria wanted everything done to conciliate and reassure the Indian Muslims[201] and Elgin, knowing that they were less

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[194] Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 455, 18 Aug. 1897, IOL&R, Elgin Papers.
[195] Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, 136–7.
[196] Elgin to Victoria, 13 July 1897, Royal Archives, Windsor.
[197] Ref. in MacDonnell to Elgin, 16 July 1897, IOL&R, Elgin Papers.
[198] C. S. Baylay to H. Babington Smith, 12 July 1897, ibid.
[199] MacDonnell to Elgin, 16 July 1897, ibid.
[200] MacDonnell to Elgin, 22 Aug. 1897, ibid.
[201] Victoria to Elgin, 20 Aug. 1897, ibid.

contented than before, had to promise her that he would not fail to carry out her command.[202] Already, the Government of India had taken action against those suspected of spreading disaffection and had convicted or deported the editors of a number of Muslim papers and banned Turkish and Cairene journals.[203]

Mingled with the Turkish issue was the reaction stemming from the West's acrimonious attitude towards Islam and Islamic civilization generally. For centuries Islam had been perceived in Europe as 'a lasting trauma' and indeed an eternal foe.[204] From as early as the Middle Ages, Christian scholarship had judged Islam as 'a fraudulent new version' of Christianity and its Prophet 'an impostor' whose 'pseudoprophecy' needed to be exposed.[205] Such stereotype perceptions of Islam, which had persisted to modern times from William Muir (1819–1905) to D. S. Margoliouth (1850–1940) and spanned literature and art, were the result of a variety of reasons from a feeling of cultural and intellectual superiority to a latent fear of political and military resurgence in the Muslim world.[206] These views, with which the educated élite in the Muslim world was quite familiar, exerted considerable influence in shaping the West's attitudes towards Islam and Islamic territories. An array of inter-related consular and trade offices, educational and scientific funds and missionary organizations was developed to further religious interests.[207] This activity had been

[202] Hamilton to Elgin, 19 Aug. 1897; and Elgin to Victoria, 7 Sept. 1897, ibid. Lord George Hamilton was the sec. of state for India from 1895 to 1903.

[203] McLane, *Indian Nationalism*, 31–2.

[204] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978), 59; and Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West* (Edinburgh, 1980), 1–7.

[205] Daniel, *Islam and the West*, 5–6 and 47–78; and Said, *Orientalism*, 59–60.

[206] For instance, William Muir (1819–1905) and Reinhart Dozy (1813–83) punctuated their works with an aversion for the Orient and Islam. Caussin de Perceval (1795–1871) and Aloys Sprenger (1813–93) drew one-dimensional portrait of Prophet Muhammad and Thomas Carlyle dubbed the Qur'an as a 'crude' and 'insupportable stupidity'. General historians such as Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) and Jacob Burkhardt (1818–97), assailed Islam in their writings as did Ernest Renan (1823–92), Theodore Nöldeke (1836–1930) and Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918). Writers as widely located as Carl Becker (?1777–1806), Ignaz Goldziher (1850–1921), Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) and Louis Massignon (1883–1962) seemed to manifest a consensus on Islam's 'latent inferiority' while D. S. Margoliouth thought that the Gospel was 'the only cure' against Islamic 'fanaticism'. See Said, *Orientalism*, 151–2 and 209; Hardy, *Muslims of British India*, 175; Daniel, *Islam and the West*, 287, 292–3, 297, and 305–6; D. S. Margoliouth, 'The Failure of Islam', *The Missionary Review of the World*, 23/7 (1900), 541–2; and Aydin, 'Western Images of the Muslim Turks', 103–25.

[207] Among these, a mention may be made of the Baptist Missionary Society

particularly pronounced in India, especially during the 1840s and the 1850s, when the *munazaras* between Carl Pfander (1803–68) and Rahmatullah Kairanawi turned into open conflicts among the missionaries and the *'ulama*.[208] The hostility reached its climax in 1855 when a Calcutta missionary, E. Edmond, circulated a letter to all government employees suggesting that since India had come under the British rule it was desirable that there was a single religion, namely Christianity, in that country.[209] The crisis of 1857 provided yet another spur for missionary activity in India and the polemics against Islam became extremely antagonistic.[210] Even the better known British journals like the *Nineteenth Century*, the *Quarterly Review* and the *Fortnightly Review*, were full of religious controversies by Church dignitaries.[211] Angered perhaps at the successful spread of Islam in Africa, the Balkans and Asia, the missionaries launched an appeal to help 'win Mecca' and eventually the whole Muslim world for Christ.[212]

This religious and cultural onslaught from the West produced a genuine concern in India. The refutations and apologetics came from both the modernist élite and the *'ulama*. In answering the challenge they were helped by the spread of education, improved printing facilities and the growth of newspapers. As early as 1858, Syed Ahmed Khan, in his *Asbab-i baghawat-i Hind*, had denounced the activities of

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(1792), the Church Missionary Society (1799) and the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804). In 1900, a 'Mohammedan Missionary Society' was also proposed as a kind of a 'mission to the Moslem world'. See Said, *Orientalism*, 100; and *The Missionary Review of the World*, 23/5 (1900), 381–2.

[208] For details of the controversies see Avril A. Powell, *Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India* (London, 1993), esp. 132–262. The spread of the Christian missions in India can also be followed in A. N. Porter (ed.), *Atlas of British Overseas Expansion* (London, 1991), esp. 127.

[209] See Syed Ahmed Khan, *The Causes of the Indian Revolt* (London, 1873), 28–9 and apps. i and ii, 72–8. The lieut.-gov. of Bengal had to deny that the Company's govt. was involved. See ibid., app. ii, 79–83.

[210] A poem on the Revolt of 1857 began in these words: *'So fell the Prophet's pow'r, and English rule/Curb'd the rough tyrant and his cruelties.'* See A Graduate of Oxford, *The Moslem and the Hindoo: A Poem on the Sepoy Revolt* (London, 1858), 25. For other details see R. K. Renford, *The Non-Official British in India to 1920* (Delhi, 1987), 172 ff.; and Govt. of India, *Report on Publications Issued and Registered in the Several Provinces of British India During the Year 1898*, 370/28 (Calcutta, 1899), *passim*.

[211] See e.g. Malcolm MacColl, 'Some Fallacies About Islam', *Fortnightly Review*, 59/352 (1896), 613–23; and James Mew, 'The Muslim Hell', *Nineteenth Century*, 31/171 (1892), 433–54.

[212] See L. Stoddard, *The New World of Islam*, 49 and 52; A. R. Colquhoun, 'Pan-Islam', *North American Review*, 182 (1906), 906–18; and G. W. Bury, *Pan-Islam* (London, 1919), 203.

Christian missionaries in directing abuse against the Prophet of Islam.[213] Then in 1870, he had brought out his *Essays on the Life of Mohammad* primarily to refute Muir's *Life of Mahomet* (1858), that had hurt him deeply.[214] Karamat Ali Jaunpuri, in his *Ma'akhizu'l-'Ulama* (1865) maintained that modern scientific discoveries had emanated from the Qur'an and *hadis*.[215] Similarly, the exegetical apologetics of Cheragh Ali were meant to repudiate the arguments of western orientalism and showed that Islam is conducive to progress and socio-political change.[216] *Taubatu'n-Nasuh* (1877) of Dipti Nazir Ahmad (1833–1912) also gave a glimpse of the commotion caused in Indian mind by the activities of the Christian missionaries.[217] Shibli Nu'mani criticized the anti-Islamic bias of western scholarship and produced works to counter it.[218] When in 1884, Blunt's pro-Arab *Future of Islam* (1882) was translated into Urdu by Sayyid Akbar Husain Allahabadi as *Mustaqbil-i Islam* it generated a heated debate in India.[219] However, it was Barrister Ameer Ali, later to rise as the member of the Privy Council and a judge of the High Court of Appeal, who offered a re-statement of Islamic history for the consumption of the West with considerable impact. His *Short History of the Saracens* (1889) and *The Spirit of Islam* (1892) glorified the Islamic rule and his articles in the *Nineteenth Century* and other British journals defended Islam and its Prophet against western calumnies, especially by such critics as Canon Malcolm MacColl.[220] He was joined by Rafiuddin Ahmad who took up the challenge and wrote several articles defending Islam and Indian Muslims.[221] The result of these attempts was that it not only created a certain pride among Indian Muslims of their glorious past but also helped in strengthening the feelings of pan-Islam.

But if the growing effervescence of the Muslims had moved the

[213] Syed Ahmed Khan, *The Causes of the Indian Revolt*, 21–5.

[214] Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, 34.

[215] Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 22.

[216] Ibid., 60 ff.

[217] Haidar, *Intikhab*, 31. For Muslim reaction to Christian missionary activity also see F. Rahman, 'Internal Religious Developments in the Present Century Islam', *Journal of World History*, 2/1 (1954), 862–79.

[218] Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, 124 ff.

[219] See Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, 'Khilafat-i 'Usmaniyya aur dunya-i Islam wa masihiyyat ka i'tiraf', *Ma'arif*, 9/6 (1922), 411.

[220] Most of Ameer Ali's writings (other than books) have been collected and edited by K. K. Aziz in his *Ameer Ali: His Life and Work* (Lahore, [1967]), esp. part 2, and 665 ff.

[221] Rafiuddin Ahmad, 'In Defence of Islam', *Fortnightly Review*, 59/349 (1896), 165–76.

Government of India to action, it also caused anxiety to some Muslim leaders themselves, notably Rafiuddin Ahmad, Syed Ahmed Khan and Haji Ismail Khan, lest this enthusiasm should damage the community's position without effectively helping the Turks. Probably, this feeling was the outcome of a realization that Muslim interests were bound up with the goodwill of the British. Therefore, ever since the Russo-Turkish War they had been taking pains to prove that pan-Islam was not a movement for conquest or aggression. It was rather, as Rafiuddin Ahmad suggested, 'an assertion of the natural feeling of self-preservation and self-respect'. As the 'greatest Mahomedan Power', he argued, Britain should acquire and retain the confidence of the Muslims whose political importance owing to their numbers in the army could not be overrated. But the British had no cause for concern as their Raj was in no danger.[222] Syed Ahmed Khan deprecated the Indian Muslims' 'extraterritorial romance' saying that the sultan of Turkey was not their ruler and could claim no temporal or spiritual allegiance from them. Their religious duty was plain: 'to obey our rulers and remain quite loyal to them'; the most they could do was to pray for friendly relations between the British government and the rest of the Muslim world.[223] Syed Ahmed Khan also suggested that religiously it was not incumbent upon Indian Muslims to mention the name of the Ottoman caliph in the *khutba*.[224] He was supported by Haji Ismail Khan who advised his co-religionists to be obedient to the queen empress and not to the sultan of Turkey who was not their caliph.[225] A more overt effort was that of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839–1908) of Qadian, the head of the Ahmadiyya community. While trying to disseminate feelings of loyalty he attempted to uproot the very idea of the *jihad*[226] and in turn was dubbed by his opponents a renegade *kafir* and an agent of the British.[227] Most

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[222] Rafiuddin Ahmad, 'England in Relation to Mahomedan States', *National Review*, 21/122 (1893), 187–92; id., 'A Moslem's View of the Pan-Islamic Revival', esp. 517–18; and id., 'Is the British 'Raj' in Danger?', *Nineteenth Century*, 42/247 (1897), 32 3 and 54 5.

[223] Panipati, *Maqalat-i sar Sayyid*, xiii, 425–33; and Sayyid Ahmad Khan, *Akhiri mazamin*, 32 3 and 54–5.

[224] Id., 'Khutba men Badshah ka nam', 154 5.

[225] *Ma'arif*, Jan. 1900, cited in Haidar, *Intikhab*, 36.

[226] A list of 44 works, containing prohibition of *jihad* and supporting the govt., by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is appended in his *Jehad and the British Government* (Qadian, 1900).

[227] In 1888, Mufti Muhammad Abdullah and Shah Muhammad issued *fatawa* to this effect. See Aziz-ur-Rahman Jami'i Ludhiyanawi, *Ra'isu'l-Ahrar Maulana Habibu'r-Rahman Ludhiyanawi aur Hindustan ki jang-i azadi* (Delhi, 1961), 44.

surprisingly of all, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828–1905), the co-founder of the Deoband school who had taken some part in the Revolt of 1857, also issued a *fatwa* (1898) that 'Indian Muslims were bound by their religion to be loyal to the British Government even if it were engaged in war with the Sultan of Turkey'.[228]

Such endeavours though seldom left unchallenged,[229] seem to have had no effect on Indian enthusiasm for the Ottomans. During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Indian Muslim involvement with Turkey, in spite of the contradictory stances of the Hamidian despotism at home and abroad, became even deeper.[230] In this connection, a prominent part was played by the Indian Muslims residing abroad, especially in Britain, who did everything in their power to combat anti-Islamic anti-Turk propaganda. As early as 1886, a pan-Islamic society called the Anjuman-i Islam had been established in London with branches in India and several Muslim countries.[231] In 1903, an Indian barrister, Abdulla al-Mamun Suhrawardy (1875–1935), revived this almost defunct society under the new name of 'The Pan-Islamic Society of London'.[232] Later, its name was changed to the 'Islamic Society' and Ameer Ali succeeded Suhrawardy as president.[233] Mushir Kidwai became its secretary and Hafiz Mahmud Shirani (1880–1946), an Indian scholar, was elected joint secretary.[234] The Society, apart from establishing direct contact with Turkey, rendered

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[228] IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1919, Proc. no. 206. Refers to the period under review.

[229] See e.g. Donald Wallace to Lord Rea, 30 Oct. 1887, IOL&R, Dufferin Papers.

[230] See e.g. *Nizamu'l-Mulk* (Moradabad), 16 Jan. 1901, IOL&R, L/R/5/78.

[231] A. Vembéry, *Western Culture in Eastern Lands* (London, 1906), 351–2.

[232] Kidwai, *Pan-Islamism*, 1.

[233] Ibid., The Society was located at 158, Fleet St., London, EC 4. Its aims and objectives were: (1) The Society shall be called the Central Islamic Society; and (2) The objects of the Society shall be: (a) to promote the religious, moral, social, and intellectual advancement of the Muslim world; (b) to promote brotherly feelings between Muslims, and to facilitate intercourse between them; (c) to afford a centre of social union to Muslims from all parts of the world; (d) to provide facilities for conducting religious ceremonies in non-Muslim countries; (e) to remove misconceptions among non-Muslims regarding Islam and Muslims; (f) to hold debates and lectures, and to read papers likely to further the interests of Islam; (g) to maintain a library of Islamic books that may be useful for religious research; (h) to publish papers, articles, and books likely to further the interests of Islam; and (i) to collect subscriptions from all parts of the world, in order to build a mosque in London, and to endow it; and to extend the burial ground for the Muslims in London. See the inside cover of the Society's publication, *Muslim Protest* (London, 1919).

[234] *Theosophist* (Madras), Nov. 1907, 98–9; Mazhar M. Shirani (ed.), *Maqalat-i Hafiz Mahmud Shirani*, i (Lahore, 1966), 49; and *Majalla-i tahqiq*, x–xi (1980), 135.

valuable service in focusing, especially through its journal *Pan-Islam*, Muslim feelings on questions effecting Turkey and Islam.[235] No wonder that when in the summer of 1906 renewed excitement was witnessed in India over the British ultimatum to Turkey following the Turco-Egyptian border dispute and Earl Cromer's (1841–1917) repression of Egyptian nationalists, the India Office deprecated the suggestion to question the validity of the sultan's title to the caliphate.[236] The opposition to the Ottoman pretensions, as in Syed Ahmed's days, came from within. Nawab Haji Ismail Khan and Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1837–1907) of Aligarh attempted to dispute the Ottoman claim with arguments borrowed from Syed Ahmed.[237] But their reasoning achieved nothing except sharp rebuke. It was this 'undesirable prospect' of the pan-Islamic movement in India that, among other factors, induced the moderates like Mohsin-ul-Mulk and the Aga Khan to agree to the formation of the All-India Muslim League in December 1906, in order that they might bring their co-religionists to a united political platform and thus channel their anti-British feelings.[238] But even at the founding meeting at Dhaka (Dacca), 'Turkish coats and fezes predominated' the proceedings.[239]

But it would be wrong to ascribe the politicization of Indian Muslims to external factors only. It is pertinent to emphasize also the importance of internal forces in the shaping of their political outlook. The role of Aligarh cannot be discounted in this connection though there were other Muslim institutions in northern India claiming recognition and influence. Founded by Syed Ahmed Khan as a school in 1875, Aligarh had gradually grown into a unifying centre for Muslim India. Designed as an apolitical institution it ended up,

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[235] In 1906, during their visit to Istanbul, Kidwai and Abdul Qadir were honoured by Sultan Abdülhamid II with *Nishan-i 'Usmani*. See Abdul Qadir, *Maqam-i Khilafat*, 228–9. Kidwai, *Pan-Islamism*; and Majid Khadduri, 'Pan-Islamism', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, xvii, 227.

[236] See memo by Sir Alfred Lyall, 'The Sultan and the Khalifate', dated 19 June 1916, and notes thereon by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, Sir William Lee-Warner and Sir Charles Lyall, dated 19–21 June 1916. IOL&R, L/P&S/10/523.

[237] Haji Ismail Khan, *A Short Note on the Khalifa* (Calcutta, 1906), cited in *The Rise of Islam*, FO Handbook, 45. Mohsin-ul-Mulk, however, tried to impress upon the British that the Muslim feelings for Sultan Abdülhamid were genuine and wished to see his realms strengthened. See Muzammil Yasin, *Saltanat-i 'Usmaniyya ki inqilabi tahriken* (Karachi, 1973), 101.

[238] Matiur Rahman, *From Consultation to Confrontation* (London, 1970), 228.

[239] Abdur Rahman Siddiqui's remarks in *Mussalman* (Calcutta) have been quoted by Muhammad Saleem Ahmed, *The All India Muslim League* (Bahawalpur, 1988), 89.

ironically, being just the opposite: it became the vanguard of the politically minded. But then Aligarh was not merely the name of an educational institution; it was a movement that combined western ideas and eastern ethos. Its icon was a sure key to success and respectability.[240] If Aligarh and the kindred institutions attracted the modernist élite, the *madrasa*s offered a viable alternative to the traditionalists. Two names that conjured up in Muslim mind for the best in Islamic education were the seminaries at Farangi Mahal and Deoband. The *madrasa* at Farangi Mahal in Lucknow was established during the Mughal period in 1694 by Mulla Nizamuddin while the *daru'l-'ulum* at Deoband was founded in 1867 by Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi and Rashid Ahmad Ganghohi. The first institution offered instructions in *shari'at* and *fiqh*, and the latter excelled in *hadis, tafsir* and *'ilmu'l-jadal*. The personal, doctrinal and political differences among the *'ulama* apart, these institutions, together with the one at Bareilly under the aegis of Ahmad Raza Khan (1856–1921), had a deep and lasting impact on Muslim India. The alumni of these *madrasa*s matured as celebrated teachers and preachers and some made their mark as *pir*s. Yet others entered the world of journalism.[241] By their very position, the *'ulama* exercised considerable influence over the masses and when they embraced politics they found the newly acquired power even more exhilarating. However, it was not the élitist Muslim League platform that attracted them immediately; the more appealing was the lure of pan-Islamic politics.

For a few years after the formation of the Muslim League the Indian Muslims appeared to take increasing interest in domestic affairs and kept up the clamour for separate representation, in spite of the vacillations of the Viceroy Earl of Minto (1845–1914), and the Secretary of State Viscount Morley (1838–1923).[242] But their pan-

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[240] A fairly digestable information about Aligarh is available in Theodore Morison, *A History of the MAO College, Aligarh* (Allahabad, 1903); and S. K. Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh* (Delhi, 1969). A somewhat subjective view is given by M. S. Jain, *The Aligarh Movement* (Agra, 1965).

[241] See Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims* (Cambridge, 1974), 266 ff. Also see Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900* (New Jersey, 1982), esp. chs. iii vi; and Iik Arifin Mansurnoor, "*Ulama* in Changing Society: A Re-examination of the Deoband Movement (1867–1924)', *Hamdard Islamicus*, 16/2, (Summer 1993), 97–114.

[242] They secured this ultimately through the Indian Councils Act 1909. See S. R. Wasti, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905–1910* (Oxford, 1964), 166–90; and Stanley Wolpert, *Morley and India, 1906–1910* (Berkeley, 1967), 198 ff.

Islamic fervour never dwindled even though certain *'ulama* were ready to remind them of their duties and obligations to the British government of India.[243] This is evident from the hearty manner in which the Indian Muslims contributed towards the expenses of the construction of the Hijaz Railway[244] or expressed their disapproval of Iran's spoliation by Britain and Russia following the Anglo-Persian Convention (1907), the French aggression in Morocco, and the misfortunes of Turkey in the Balkans.[245] Thus when the Young Turk revolution took place in Turkey in 1908, there was an enthusiastic response in India. The constitutional thrust of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was seen in India as an ebullition of Islam's democratic spirit.[246] The Muslim League was quick to endorse the Young Turk action and thanked the British government for adopting a friendly posture towards Turkey.[247] But the ardour turned to despair when in 1909, the Young Turks deposed the meddling old Sultan Abdülhamid II, and put Mehmed V (1909–19) in his place in the Yeldiz kösk.[248] Thus ended the reign of a caliph who had been the high priest of pan-Islam and often boasted that one word from him 'would be enough for starting a jehad.'[249] He had always appreciated the support received from the Indian Muslims and openly acknowledged that it had made 'our affairs a bit easier'.[250] Somehow he faltered

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[243] Early in 1909, several *fatawa* prepared on behalf of the Sunnis by Hakim Razi-ud-din and Maulawi Abdul Haq of Delhi and a similar one by the Shi'as with the signature of Sayyid Agha Husain, Maulawi Said Ahmad and certain other principal *mujtahids* of Lucknow, were in circulation in India. See IOL&R, L/P&J/6/940, 1950/1909.

[244] Muhammad Inshaullah, the editor of the *Vatan* (Amritsar), claimed to have initiated the scheme of the railway and also helped raise funds for it. See his *The History of the Hamidia Hedjaz Railway Project* (Lahore, 1908). Another person whose services were appreciated in this connection was Pir Jama'at Ali Shah of Alipur. See Sayyid Husain Shah, *Tazkira Shah-i jama'at* (Lahore, 1973), 41. For other details see Z. H. Zaidi, 'Hidjaz Railway', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, iii, 1966, 364-5; and Jacob Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda* (Detroit, 1971), *passim*.

[245] *Comrade* (Calcutta), 8 July 1911, Rais Ahmed Jafri (ed.), *Selections from Moulana Mohamed Ali's Comrade* (Lahore, 1965), 225-31; and Ameer Ali, 'Moslem Feeling', in Sir Thomas Barclay, *The Turco-Italian War and its Problems* (London, 1912), 107.

[246] See IOL&R, L/R/5/83.

[247] See resolution no 4, 24 Oct 1908, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, viii.

[248] IOL&R, L/R/5/84.

[249] Abdülhamid, *Siyasi hatiratim*. Tr. S. Can (Istanbul, 1984), 178, quoted in Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 50.

[250] I. Bozdag, *Sultan Abdülhamid'in hatira defteri* (Istanbul, 1985), 74, quoted in ibid., 50.

and foundered on his internal policies and never recovered. Of course, the Indian Muslims had not been altogether unaware of the trend of events in Ottoman Turkey. Several of their leaders had been in touch with the Young Turks either in Turkey or elsewhere in the Middle East or Europe. But popular support for them waned when their attitude towards the caliphate became a little uncertain.[251] For their part, the CUP leaders, notwithstanding the pan-Islamic thrust of the Ottoman intellectuals like Mehmed Âkif (1873–1936), Ahmed Hilmi (1865–1914), Celal Nuri (1877–1939) and Said Halim Paşa (1863–1921), were unable to identify themselves with this ideology which they had chosen to discard.[252] Yet they were soon forced to retrace their steps and in 1910 embraced pan-Islam in addition to their commitment to modernization, Ottomanism and pan-Turkism.[253] When Kidwai visited Istanbul that August, he was specifically assured by the *Shaikhu'l-Islam*, Musa Kazim Efendi, that 'We have, in fact, returned to the Orthodox Caliphate'.[254] Abdul Bari, who followed Kidwai to the Ottoman capital to revive his contacts developed during his stay at Makkah earlier on, was also overwhelmed with what he saw in Turkey.[255] No wonder Abdülhamid's deposition was forgotten and the new leaders accepted as the heroes of Islam. It was business as usual.

Another spurt of pan-Islamic activity was witnessed in September 1911, when Italy, with the connivance of the British and the French, made a buccaneering raid upon Ottoman Tripoli. The Porte, already reduced to inaction, was unable to render any assistance and the Germans were in no position to intervene.[256] Within five weeks, Tripoli and Benghazi were annexed to Italy. The war and its aftermath produced a widespread indignation in Muslim India. Again there were public meetings in all the major towns of the country, condemning the unprovoked Italian aggression[257] and beseeching the Indian and British governments to support 'our sacred Khalifa the

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[251] IOL&R, L/R/5/84.
[252] Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 73–87.
[253] Ibid., 88 ff.
[254] NAI, FD, Extnl, B, Feb. 1911, nos. 127–30, in Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 135.
[255] Minault, *Khilafat Movement*, 34; and Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 137.
[256] Feroz Ahmad, 'The Late Ottoman Empire', 14.
[257] For numerous telegrams and representations to the Govt. of India and the India Office see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/196. Also see Roos-Keppel to H. Wheeler, 6 Sept. 1912. IOL&R, Roos-Keppel Papers.

Sultan of Turkey against the most unrighteous and wicked war'.[258] The London Muslim League, founded by Syed Ameer Ali in 1908, threatened to raise volunteers for the assistance of Turkey.[259] The Muslim press, as usual, was full of denunciations of the 'Italian brigandage'.[260] Like the Italians who dubbed the war a crusade and even implicated the Pope's name,[261] a Muslim journal depicted the Christian Powers as 'individually and collectively' projecting the ruin of Islam.[262] The *Observer*, the only English journal of Lahore, wrote:

> A great outrage has been committed and the first scene of a dark tragedy has been enacted on the stage of the world.... Italy has thus taken an unprecedented step, backing up her insolent ultimatum by an act of piracy in a spirit of the most unblushing effrontery.... Like the barbarian hordes who once descended on Rome and played havoc with her in the past, modern Italy is making her name a byword for revolting rapacity and downright lawlessness.[263]

In order to render financial assistance for the relief of the Tripolitan sufferers a Red Crescent Society was established in Calcutta by Abdullah Suhrawardy, late of the Pan-Islamic Society of London.[264] But the material assistance came mostly from upper India where Muhammad Inshaullah of the *Vatan* (Lahore) and Zafar Ali Khan (1873–1956) of the *Zamindar* (Lahore) remitted large sums of money to Turkey.[265] The donations came from many well-known persons, including Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum (1858–1930) of Bhopal and

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[258] Directors of Juma Mosque, Bombay, to the Prime Minister and the King Emperor, Tel. 7 Oct. 1911, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/196, file 4392/1911.

[259] M. Kazim Hosain to Under Sec. of State, 10 May 1912, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/196, file 1804/1911. The London Muslim League had been formed, in the words of Ameer Ali himself, 'to prevent, so far as possible, the Mussulmans, who come over to England in large numbers, from drifting into the Extremist camp; and to impress on them the fact that their interests, their well-being and their development were bound up with British rule', See encl., Ameer Ali to Lord Chancellor, 7 Mar. 1913, IOL&R, Hardinge Papers. For details about the London ML, see M. Y. Abbasi, *London Muslim League (1908-1928)* (Islamabad, 1988), esp. 1–64 and 252 ff.

[260] See e.g. *Nama-i Muqaddas Hablul Matin* (Calcutta), 2 Oct. 1911, IOL&R, L/R/5/38; *Vatan* (Lahore), 22 Dec. 1911, L/R/5/192; and *Zamindar* (Lahore), 27 Dec. 1911.

[261] R. E. Forrest, 'England and the Moslem World', *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 34 (1912), 343. The Vatican later contradicted the interpretation. See F. McCullaugh, *Italy's War for a Desert* (London, 1912), 386–92.

[262] *Vakil*, 21 Feb. 1912, IOL&R, L/R/5/193.

[263] *Observer*, 4 Oct. 1911, IOL&R, L/R/5/192.

[264] *Pioneer Mail*, 6 Oct. 1911.

[265] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 2 and 25 Apr. 1912.

Pir Mihr Ali Shah (1859–1939) of Golra (Punjab).[266] Ameer Ali organized from Britain a medical mission to Tripoli for the relief of the Ottoman sick and wounded. The funds were again provided by Inshaullah and Zafar Ali Khan, with the Madras Muslims also contributing liberally.[267] In order to bring pressure to bear upon the government some Muslim leaders and journals encouraged the boycott of the Italian goods.[268] Sayyid Fakir Hasan, a *mufti*, issued a '*jihadnama*' exhorting his co-religionists to launch 'a commercial war against unjust Italy'.[269] The Anglo-Indian and the Hindu press had been generally critical of pan-Islam and some of them even tried to discourage the boycott.[270] But with the blessings of the Muslim League and the active support of such prominent businessmen as Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy (b. 1872) and Ibrahim Rahimtoola (1862–1942), the boycott was able to gain some measure of success, particularly in Bombay, the UP, the Punjab and Bengal.[271] With the Tripolitan issue was merged the Iranian question, and Sunnis joined Shi'as in condemning the Russian occupation of northern Iran and the bombardment of the shrine of Imam Ali Raza in Meshed.[272] A Persian Red Crescent Society was formed in Calcutta to which the Aga Khan alone subscribed five thousand rupees.[273] The British government was called upon to persuade Russia to stop oppression and remove troops from Iran.[274]

These representations to the British government, however, had no effect except that the Foreign Office secured from the Italian government an assurance of non-interference with the *hajj* pilgrim traffic.[275]

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[266] *Zamindar*, 4 Sept. and 3 Dec. 1912. Also see Faiz Ahmad, *Mihr-i Munir* (Golra, 1973), 144.

[267] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 12, 20, 24, and 25 Jan., 10, 14 and 20 Feb., 10 Mar. and 2 and 25 Apr. 1912.

[268] See *Observer*, 11 and 28 Oct. 1911, in Malik, *Punjab Muslim Press*, 48 and 50–1.

[269] *Zamindar*, 8 Oct. 1911.

[270] See e.g. *Tribune*, 7 and 11 Oct. 1911, IOL&R, L/R/5/192.

[271] M. Aziz Mirza to Sec., Home Dept., Govt. of India, no. 1234, 15 Feb. 1912, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/285, file 1143/1912. Also see Ameer Ali, 'Moslem Feeling', 106; and Rahman, *From Consultation to Confrontation*, 230 1.

[272] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 6, 16 and 31 Jan. 1912.

[273] Ibid., 4 Jan. 1912.

[274] Ibid., 30 Mar. 1912.

[275] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. 7 Oct. 1911; Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 20 Oct. 1911, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/196, file 4426/1911; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. 1 Mar. 1912, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/196, file 770/1911; Marquis di San Guiliano to Sir R. Rodd, 4 Mar. 1912, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/285, file 1237/1912; and Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 12 Mar. 1912, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/196, file 872/1911.

Opinion prevailed in Whitehall that 'we do not intend to let our policy be influenced by Moslem agitation'.[276] Such an attitude was bound to affect the British prestige in India. But from the Indian Muslim point of view the significance of the crisis had been the rallying together of the Muslims from all parts of the country. From this time on the western educated élite and the *madrasa* oriented *'ulama*, who had been gradually coming closer since the turn of the century, were now fully conscious of their shared role. Thus, when in October 1912, the Balkan States launched a combined attack on Turkey, the Indian Muslim response was spontaneous and bitter. In spite of the efforts of the loyalists like the Aga Khan 'to stem the flow from within',[277] there were numerous demonstrations.[278] A section of the Muslim press was extremely outspoken.[279] The *'ulama* of the principal religious seminaries of the country, with the exception of those from the Bareilly School of Ahmad Raza Khan,[280] patched up their differences in order to concentrate on the issue.[281] Funds were again collected for the help of the Turks in which the Anjuman-i Islamia of Amritsar took a leading part.[282] A poor Quetta woman donated all her worldly possessions to the proceeds of the fund.[283] The Deoband *'ulama*, by a *fatwa*, made it incumbent on Muslims to give money to the Red Crescent Society and even declared that the diversion of the *zakat* money was permissible.[284] Shibli Nu'mani, now the leading light of the Nadwatu'l 'Ulama (established 1891), repudiating his earlier stance on the Ottoman caliphate, raised the warning of 'Islam in Danger' through his heart-warming elegiac renderings[285]

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[276] See Sir A. Hirtzel's note of 21 May 1912, in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/196, file 1804/1911.

[277] Aga Khan to Hardinge, 11 Dec. 1915, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/588. This refers to the Balkan War events.

[278] See various telegrams and copies of resolutions in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/306.

[279] *Afghan*, 19 Sept. 1912, IOL&R, L/R/5/193; and *Zamindar*, 11 Oct. 1912.

[280] The differences had led Ahmad Raza Khan, as back as 1905, to pronounce the Deobandis 'infidels'. See *al-Mizan*, 6 (Mar. 1976), 254–5. Also see Syed Jamaluddin, 'The Barelvis and the Khilafat Movement', in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, (New Delhi, 1985), 400 ff.

[281] Murtaza Hasan to Ahmad Raza Khan, 31 Oct. 1912, *Nuqush* (Lahore), 109 (Apr.–May, 1968), 113–14. Also see M. Ahmad to Abdul Bari, 10 Nov. 1912, ibid., 119.

[282] Ahmad Saeed, *Anjuman-i Islamiyya Amritsar* (Lahore, 1986), 190–2.

[283] *Paisa Akhbar*, 28 Nov. 1912.

[284] Ibid., 5 Nov. 1912.

[285] See *Kulliyat-i Shibli*, 4th edn. (Azamgarh, 1954), 53–60; K. A. Khan (ed.), *Maqalat-i yaum-i Shibli* (Lahore, 1961), 7–17, 27–45 and 122–9; and S. M. Ikram,

and his young protégé, Abul Kalam Azad, went a step further and proclaimed that the time for *jihad* had arrived.[286] Following Shibli, Iqbal wrote exciting poems on Turkey and recited one of them, *'Jawab-i Shikwa'*, at a congregation in the Badshahi Mosque at Lahore in November 1912 in order to raise funds for the Turks wounded in the war.[287] Shaukat Ali (1873–1938), the young UP journalist, issued an appeal to organize a volunteer corps 'to fight against the filibustering gang of dacoits in the Balkans'.[288] His younger brother Mohamed Ali (1878–1931), the editor of the *Comrade* (Calcutta/Delhi), advocated that the funds collected for the Aligarh University should be handed over to Turkey on loan.[289] Though this was eventually prevented by the Aga Khan's intervention,[290] the Indian government did not voice its objection to the raising of the loan.[291]

As a practical proof of sympathy Mohamed Ali organized an all-India medical mission under Dr Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880–1936), a former resident medical officer to the Charing Cross Hospital in London.[292] The mission, which consisted of several qualified doctors but only raw male nurses, enjoyed the full support of the Government of India.[293] It remained in Turkey for about eight months (December

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Yadgar-i Shibli (Lahore, 1971), 355 6. Earlier Shibli had held that only a Quraishi could be the rightful caliph of Islam. See *Maqalat-i Shibli*, i (Azamgarh, 1930), 184.

[286] *Zamindar*, 5 Nov. 1912.

[287] See Javid Iqbal, 'The Image of Turkey and Turkish Democracy in Iqbal's Thought and his Concept of a Modern Islamic State', *Islamic Review*, 28/3, (1987), 27; and F. M. Malik, 'Islam as a Social and Political Ideal: The Role of Mohammed Iqbal in Muslim Reawakening', in Andre Wink (ed.), *Islam, Politics and Society in South Asia* (Delhi, 1991), 9. The text of the *'Jawab-i Shikwa'* is available in Mohammed Iqbal, *Bang-i Dara* (Lahore, n.d.) 222 4.

[288] *Comrade* (Delhi), 12 Oct. 1912. The *Comrade* (1911 14), like its paired Urdu journal the *Hamdard* (1913-15 & 1924-29), was well-regarded among Indians. For details, together with a select index, see Abu Salman Shahjahanpuri, *Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur unki Sahafat* (Karachi, 1983), 10–128 and 131–95.

[289] Ibid., 2 Nov. 1912.

[290] Aga Khan to Hardinge, 11 Dec. 1915, CUL, Hardinge Papers.

[291] Mohamed Ali to Pte. Sec. to Hardinge, Tel. 1 Nov. 1912; and Pte. Sec. to Viceroy to Mohamed Ali, 1 Nov. 1912, CUL, Hardinge Papers. Hardinge and several officials expediently contributed to the funds raised for Turkey, but the C-in-C instructed his officers to discourage such collections. See General Sir O'Moore Creagh, *The Autobiography of General Sir O'Moore Creagh* (London, 1924), 287.

[292] Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore, 1961), 20 6. For Ansari's biographical sketch see Halidé Edib, *Inside India* (London, 1937), 30.

[293] Originally, the mission started with 22 members. Later, the number increased to 28—seven doctors and twenty-one male nurses. The prominent among its members were: Dr Naeem Ansari, Dr Abdur Rahman, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Shoaib Qureshi and Abdur Rahman Peshawari. For details see

1912 to July 1913) and like the other half-dozen mercy missions from abroad—including the one from London sent by Ameer Ali's Red Crescent Society—rendered valuable service to the Ottoman sick and wounded.[294] This was deeply appreciated by the Turks and the sultan invited them to his palace personally to thank them for a job well done.[295] Dr Ansari was more than satisfied with the outcome of his mission. But 'the most important result', he emphasized, 'was the formation of a bond of union between the Turkish nation and the Indians'.[296] Indeed during their sojourns in Turkey the mission was able to establish contacts not only with Enver Paşa (1881–1922) and other Young Turk leaders, but also with the Egyptian nationalists, notably Abdul Aziz Shawish (?1872–1929).[297] Early in 1913, in collaboration with Shawish, Ansari and Zafar Ali Khan (who was then visiting Istanbul to deliver funds collected by him) put forward a scheme for a rehabilitation colony in Anatolia for Muslim refugees from Macedonia, a university in Medina, an Islamic bank and a co-operative society which were to be financed solely by the Indian Muslims.[298] The projects were actively supported by the *Comrade* which also encouraged the Indian Muslims to purchase Turkish security bonds issued by the Ottoman Treasury.[299] But, unfortunately, after some initial planning, the schemes fizzled out.[300] Yet the Balkan crisis,

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Ext., Bombay Abstract, 21 Dec. 1912, para. 1957 (iii), Bombay, 17.12.12, in Special Branch Records (SBR), Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 35/1, 4 Jan. 1913, para. 83; Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 20–7; and Abu Salman Shahjahanpuri, *Ghazi 'Abdu'r-Rahman shahid Peshawari* (Karachi, 1979), 119–63.

[294] See Ansari's letter to *Comrade* 25 June 1913. For details of Ameer Ali's mission and the efforts of the Turcophile British see 'Memoirs of the late Rt. Hon'ble Syed Ameer Ali', *Islamic Culture*, 6/4, (1932), 508–15.

[295] Shahjahanpuri, *Ghazi 'Abdu'r-Rahman*, 159.

[296] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 267, 'Turkey: The Intellectual and Political Forces at Present Predominant in the Ottoman Empire, including [a] Note on German Agents and their Misdeeds and Turkish Intrigues among Indian Muhammedans. Memo prepared at the request of the Prime Minister', Dec. 1917.

[297] For details see Rais Ahmad Jafri (ed.), *'Ali baradaran* (Lahore, 1963), 274–320.

[298] See Ansari's letter to *Comrade*, 6 and 18 June 1913, and Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk's article in the same journal, 29 June 1913, ibid., 274–6, and 318–20. Also see Zafar Ali Khan's autobiographical account in Sadiq Husain (ed.), *Anmol moti*, ii (Lahore, 1968), 59–61 and 72–5; and Ghulam Husain Zulfikar, *Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan: hayat, khidmat-o asar* (Lahore, 1993), 106–112.

[299] Ext., Bombay Abstract, 17 May 1913, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 35/20, 24 May 1913, para. 1221: and P. C. Bamford, *The Histories of the Non-Co-operation and Khilafat Movements* (Delhi, 1925), 113.

[300] Sadiq Husain, *Anmol moti*, ii, 72–5.

especially the loss and re-capture of Adrianople, were the events which created such pro-Turkish furore that had not been seen before.[301] Henceforward, Enver Paşa, Talat Paşa (1874–1921), Niyazi Bey (1873–1912) and Mahmud Şevket Paşa (1856–1913), became household names in India and their pictures adorned almost every house and shop owned by a Muslim.[302]

But perhaps the most important development of pan-Islam in India after the trauma of the Balkan disaster was the foundation in May 1913, of a society called the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba.[303] Abdul Bari was its president and Mushir Hosain Kidwai and the Ali brothers its other promoters. The ostensible object of the Anjuman was religious, i.e. the protection of Makkah and other holy places of Islam from non-Muslim encroachment. But there is reason to believe that the real object of the promoters, despite their strong denial, was to further the political programme of pan-Islam. Evidence suggests that the Anjuman derived its inspiration from Ottoman sources. The factor which moved the promoters to action was the realization that Turkey was weak and no longer in a position to ward off effectively the dangers threatening the *daru'l-Islam*. Thus, as a remedy they decided on a two-fold plan: first, to organize the Muslims so that they could oppose any non-Muslim invasion, and, secondly, to strengthen Turkey to such an extent that it was capable of maintaining 'an independent and effective Muslim sovereignty' over the sacred places of Islam. For this purpose the Anjuman undertook to divide its income three ways: one-third was to go to the country in control of the holy places; the other one-third was to be spent on the education and propagation of Islam and the remainder was to be reserved for the general uplift of the Muslim world. The members were bound

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[301] See e.g. SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 35/30–32, 2, 9 and 16 Aug. 1913, paras. 1888–92, 1936 and 2039–41; and Shahjahanpuri, *Ghazi 'Abdu'r-Rahman*, 138–41 and 164–70, citing contemporary evidence.

[302] Interview with Malik Lal Khan, former Sec. of the Punjab Khilafat Committee, at Lahore in Sept. 1966. I have myself, as a child, seen these pictures as late as the 1940s in homes and shops in various towns of the Punjab.

[303] The idea, in fact, had been conceived in December 1912. The account of the Anjuman and its aims and objectives is based on: 'Note by the Special Branch', SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 35/27, 12 July 1913, para. 1693; Ext., UP Abstract, 19 July 1913, ibid., 35/29, 26 July 1913, para. 1825; IOL&R, L/P&S/20, H. 137, 'The Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, 1913–1914', note by CID, India 1914; IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1919, Proc. no. 206; IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 267; and Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 221–2.

by oath to protect the *ka'ba* and other holy places, absolving them of any obligation to temporal allegiance to the Government of India. The rules of procedure of the Anjuman directly appealed to the Muslim communities under non-Muslim rule to unite for the purpose of maintaining the 'effective sovereignty' of a Muslim Power.[304]

Soon the Anjuman acquired a reputation and, despite lack of co-operation from Deoband and Bareilly,[305] achieved the remarkable feat of bringing the *'ulama* into the field of practical politics. This was the bonding of a union that later helped in launching the Khilafat movement. Within a year or two of its establishment the Anjuman's branches were set up in London, Istanbul, Cairo and Singapore. The Society's membership rose to unexpected figures and handsome donations were collected. But in several towns it was unable to open its branches.[306] Its emissaries, apart from streamlining and managing the *hajj* affairs, actively encouraged solidarity between Indian Muslims and Turks through such measures as commercial links, an Indo-Turco-Arabian steamship company and exchange of language instructors. They also promoted Turco-Arab solidarity and proposed a special force for the defence of the holy places, part of whose expenses were to be paid by the Anjuman.[307] Later, it tried to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian troops stationed in the Middle East but was compelled to suspend its activities until after the war.[308] Naturally, if the British were circumspect and wished to see the Anjuman collapse, the Ottomans displayed considerable interest in it. Talat Paşa, in particular, kept himself informed about the Anjuman through the Ali brothers.[309]

With the latest phase of pan-Islam began a reorientation of Muslim politics. In spite of Britain's declared neutrality in the trials and tribulations of Turkey, a belief had gained credence that the British were

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[304] Ibid.

[305] See Mahmud Hasan to Abdul Bari, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 113; and Mustafa Raza (son of Ahmad Raza) to Abdul Bari, n.d., ibid., 219. The letters were in response to Abdul Bari's communications.

[306] Nawab Maulawi Bashir-ud-din Khan of Delhi to Abdul Bari, 21 Jan. 1917, ibid., 210–11.

[307] See e.g. Shaukat Ali's letter to *Comrade*, (?) July 1914, in Shan Muhammad (ed.), *Unpublished Letters of Ali Brothers* (Lahore, 1986), 47–52; and Ali brothers to Talat Paşa, 8 July 1914, Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: Select Writings*, i (Delhi, 1985), 64–9.

[308] See above, n. 303.

[309] NAI, Home Poll. AD, July 1914, no. 7; Home Poll. A, Nov. 1914, nos. 33–38; and Ali brothers to Talat Paşa, 8 July 1914, in Mushirul Hasan, *Mohamed Ali*, 64–9.

no longer the safe custodians of Muslim interests. The suspicion was strengthened by the revocation in December 1911 of the partition of Bengal, brought about in 1905 by the then viceroy, the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1899–1905), and persistently proclaimed that it was a 'settled fact'.[310] The resentment felt at this 'betrayal', together with the non-fulfilment of the demand for an affiliating Muslim university at Aligarh, led to the conviction among Muslim leaders, even of loyal stamp, that to protect their rights they must depend upon themselves.[311] Thus, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk (1841–1917), one of the founders of the Muslim League, began to impress on the Muslims the necessity of relying on their own strength instead of having blind faith in the promises of the government.[312] Abdul Halim Sharar decried the 'policy of mendicancy' of the League leaders.[313] And Shibli Nu'mani, supported by Zafar Ali Khan, advised the community to shun the 'old-guards' and resort to political agitation.[314] The same trend was reflected in the Muslim press. The *Vakil* of Amritsar, in particular, urged the community to emulate the Hindu methods of agitation which had borne such solid results as the unsettling of the partition of Bengal.[315] They should even join the Hindus and make a common cause with them. The 'extremist' Hindu press also seemed to reciprocate these feelings, though somewhat suspiciously, and taunted the Muslims that the government had abandoned them.[316] The Muslims had themselves tasted the fruits of agitation in the summer of 1913, when they launched a massive protest over the demolition by the Kanpur (Cawnpore) Municipality of an annexe of a

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[310] For the partition and related information see Z. H. Zaidi, 'The Partition of Bengal and its Annulment: A Survey of the Schemes of Territorial Redistribution of Bengal, 1902-1911', Ph.D. thesis (London, 1964), 202 3. For Muslim reaction and support for the partition see Sufia Ahmad, 'Some Aspects of the History of the Muslim Community in Bengal, 1884-1912', Ph.D. thesis (London, 1961), 320–429; and A. R. Mallik, 'The Muslims and the Partition of Bengal, 1905', *A History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, 1–28.

[311] See Petrie's report of Feb. 1912, and the addendum of July 1912, cited in Bamford, *Histories*, 110–12. Also see *Observer*, 20 Jan. 1912; and *Zamindar*, 2 Feb. 1912.

[312] *Zamindar*, 2 Feb. 1912.

[313] *Moslem* (Poone), IOL&R, L/R/5/167.

[314] *Chaudhawin Sadi* (Lahore), 1 May 1912, IOL&R, L/R/5/193; and *Zamindar*, 9 Apr. 1912.

[315] *Vakil*, 6 Jan. 1912, L/R/5/193.

[316] *Rajput Gazette* (Lahore), 6 Jan. 1912; *Tribune* (Lahore), 8 Jan. 1912, IOL&R, L/R/5/193; *Indu Prakash* (Bombay), 9 Jan. 1912; *Dayan Prakash* (Poone), 10 Jan. 1912; *Gujarat* (Bombay), 26 May 1912; *Sind Journal* (Hyderabad), 18 July 1912; *Rast Guftar* (Bombay), 11 Aug. 1912; and *Millat*, 11 Oct. 1912, ibid., L/R/5/167.

mosque.[317] Indeed some died in the police firing and some went to jail but thanks to an incompetent administration the Indian leadership was able to turn a local incident into a serious all-India affair. Khwaja Hasan Nizami (1878–1957) of Delhi, who later turned a fervent British supporter,[318] went to the extent of proclaiming India *daru'l-harb*.[319] The *'ulama* and the politicians arrayed themselves against the government—Abdul Bari in Lucknow, Mohamed Ali in Delhi, Azad in Calcutta, Mazhar-ul-Haq (1886–1930) in Patna, Zafar Ali Khan in Lahore and even the cautions Pir Jama'at Ali Shah (1841–1951) of Ali Pur—and compelled it to come to some arrangement.[320] Sir James Meston (1865–1943), the lieutenant-governor of the UP, was adamant but an impetuous viceroy like Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858–1944), who had started doing 'jumpy things occasionally' after an attempt on his life at State entry into Delhi in December 1912,[321] chose to play to the Indian gallery and rushed to Kanpur to settle the dispute. The demolished portion of the mosque was later restored at government expense.[322]

The strength of Muslim agitational prowess was thus discovered at Kanpur. The expansion of what has been called the Muslim 'ideologico-dynamic' political consciousness,[323] magnified by Islam's humiliation abroad and plights within, had transformed the Indian

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[317] For details see Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 328–412; and vols. 58, 59 and 86 of Hardinge Papers.

[318] Abu Salman Shahjahanpuri (ed.), *Maktubat-i ra'isu'l-ahrar* (Karachi, 1978), 215–16.

[319] See Hasan Nizami, *Kaho takbir* (Meerut, 1913); id., *Kanpur ki khuni dastan* (Meerut, 1913); and Bamford, *Histories*, 114.

[320] Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 328–412; and Mohamed Ali's letter to Meston and the editor of the *Empire* of (?) July and 6 Aug. 1913, in Shan Muhammad, *Unpublished Letters*, 17–22, 30–4 and 43–4. Also see Syed Reza Ali's memoirs in *Nuqush*, 100, part 1 (June 1964), 319–21; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, *Speeches*, ii (Madras, n.d.), 30–5; and Ahmad Raza Khan and M. Amjad Ali, *Masjid Kanpur ke muta'alliq ek nihayat zaruri fatwa* (Bareilly, 1914). For Shibli's reaction see *Kulliyat-i Shibli*, 77–84. For Pir Jama'at Ali Shah see Sayyid Husain Shah, *Tazkira Shah-i jama'at*, 52–3. When agitation did not seem to work, Mohamed Ali, accompanied by his friend Syed Wazir Hasan, quietly left for London and unsuccessfully tried to put pressure on the Indian govt. from there. But Lord Crewe (1858–1945), sec. of state for India (1910–15), did not even see them. Ref. in Wazir Hasan and Mohamed Ali to Lord Crewe, 20 Nov. 1913, in Shan Muhammad, *Unpublished Letters*, 43–4. Also see Muhammad Sarwar (ed.), *Maulana Muhammad 'Ali ke yurup ke safar* (Lahore, 1941), 32–40; and Mohamed Ali, *My Life: A Fragment* (ed.), Afzal Iqbal (Lahore, 1942), 39.

[321] Mark Bence-Jones, *The Viceroys of India* (New York, 1982), 216–18, quoting Butler.

[322] The India Office sanctioned an amount of Rs 4,000. See IOL&R, P/Conf./41, ICH(P)P, Feb. 1918, Proc., nos. 33–4.

[323] F. Rahman, 'Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent', *Bulletin*

Muslims from a body of petitioners into assertive agitators. Self-government 'suitable to India' became the plank of their politics, and conservatism and ultra-loyalism stood condemned.[324] The Hindu-Muslim *rapprochement*, towards which the leaders had been gradually moving since the 1890s,[325] was struck and finally sealed at Lucknow in December 1916, in a 'pact' in which Jinnah played a leading role.[326] Some *'ulama*, especially Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly, did oppose these developments[327] but they were unable to stop the popular trend.

During the post-Kanpur period the unrest seemed to subside a little. But the pan-Islamic sentiment endured, thanks to the efforts of popular journals like the *Comrade*, *al-Hilal* and the *Zamindar*.[328] Injudicious remarks about Turkey, such as those made the preceding winter by the British Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith (1852–1928), and the Aga Khan's brazen support of the British policy, were enough to draw flak.[329] The anti-British sentiment was also encouraged by the CUP leaders who, failing to win over the Entente Powers in the wake of the Balkan disaster, had fallen into Germany's snare in the form of a secret treaty.[330] Subsequently, a number of Turkish emissaries descended on India in the early part of 1914, ostensibly to thank the Indian Muslims on behalf of the Turkish government for their help in the Tripolitan and Balkan wars and to obtain funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent Society.[331] Among these the most

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School of Oriental and African Studies, 21 (1958), 82 99. On this point also see M. L. Ferrar in Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, 194; and Murray Titus, *Indian Islam* (Oxford, 1930), ch. ix.

[324] Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League* (Agra, 1954), 90–2.

[325] Ibid., 83–6.

[326] Mahmud Hussain, 'The Lucknow Pact', *A History of the Freedom Movement*, ii, part 1, 118–39.

[327] Jamaluddin, 'The Barelvis and the Khilafat Movement', 346.

[328] Memo by the Director, Criminal Intelligence, dated 15 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[329] Asquith had declared in his Guildhall speech that the recasting of the map of Europe after the Balkan crisis was a fact that must be recognized. And The Aga Khan had suggested withdrawal of Turkey to its Asiatic provinces in order to avoid inviting European aggression. For Asquith see *The Times*, 11 Nov. 1912; *Comrade*, 16 and 23 Nov. 1912; and AFM/NAP, AIMLR, resolution of 27 Nov. 1912, NAI, FD (Ext.) B, Apr. 1913, nos. 342–428, cited in Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 164; For Aga Khan see *Times of India*, 14 Feb. 1913; SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 35/11, 15 Mar. 1913, para. 626; and *Comrade*, 12 Apr. 1913.

[330] This was signed on 2 Aug. 1914. See J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, ii (Princeton, 1956), 1–3.

[331] Memo by the Director, Criminal Intelligence, dated 3 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

important were Tevfik Bey, a journalist, Drs Adnan Bey and Kemal Ömer Bey of the Ottoman Red Crescent, and army officers, Sami Bey and Muhammad Sadik Bey.[332] During their sojourns these Turks made contacts with Dr Ansari, the Ali brothers and other well-known pan-Islamists.[333] There were also many other suspicious Turkish visitors, well-supplied with cash, who were reportedly sent to stir up trouble in India.[334] It was also observed about this time that the Turkish government was negotiating with a German firm in Hamburg to purchase rifles for arming the Indian Muslims.[335] Turkey was also known to be spreading pro-Turkish sentiment through press and Ottoman officials in India, notably Halil Halid Bey (d. 1931), the newly appointed Ottoman Consul, and through such Indian contacts as Barrister Abdul Qadir, formerly of Suhrawardy's Pan-Islamic society of London.[336] The *Jihan-i Islam*, a journal in Arabic and Urdu, was started from Istanbul specificly for propaganda outside Turkey with Abdul Razzaq Malihabadi (1875–1959?), a well-known pan-Islamist, as one of the staff.[337]

It was during this time that the pan-Islamic thought of its principal ideologues—Mohammed Iqbal, Abul Kalam Azad, Abdul Bari, Syed Ameer Ali, Mushir Kidwai and the Ali brothers—was defined and articulated in tangible terms. Socially, they came from different backgrounds but were generally from the educated middle class rooted firmly in north Indian Muslim cultural traditions. Iqbal had a humble origin in the Punjab but went up the ladder through his genius and hard work. A graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, he attended Heidelberg, got his doctorate in Philosophy from Munich and was called to the Bar from Lincoln's Inn. Azad came from a long line of religious scholars and became one himself eventually. However, he adopted journalism as his profession and in that he excelled as a sharp pen. Originally from Agra, he grew up in Calcutta (Bengal) where his father had settled after a long stint in the Hijaz. Abdul Bari had an impeccable lineage of religious scholars to boast about.

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[332] Ibid. Also see Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, 170 ff.

[333] Ibid. Also see IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1919, Proc. no. 206.

[334] Some of them were arrested or deported by the Govt. of India. For details of Turco-German activities see L/P&S/10/472 and 473.

[335] Memo prepared in the Foreign and Political Dept., Govt. of India, 17 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518, file 4265/1914. Also see L/P&S/10/472 and 473.

[336] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 267.

[337] Govt. of India, *Sedition Committee Report* (Calcutta, 1918), 169. For Malihabadi see *Nuqush* (Lahore), 2/59-60 (Oct. 1958), 972.

A descendent of Mulla Nizam-ud-din, the founder of Farangi Mahal *madrasa* in Lucknow (UP), he commanded considerable influence and following all over India. Ameer Ali belonged to a Cuttack Orissa family in the service of the Nawab of Awadh. He obtained an MA degree before being called to the Bar in England. Eventually, he became an eminent lawyer-jurist and a distinguished historian of Islam. Mushir Kidwai was the son of a *taluqdar* of Gadia in Bara Banki district of UP with a substantial annual income. He was called to the Bar from Lincoln's Inn. The Aligarh bred Ali brothers were the offspring of wealthy landowning family of UP fallen on hard times. Mohamed Ali, who went to Oxford for Modern History, adopted journalism as his profession and became known for his ready wit and caustic style. His elder brother, Shaukat Ali, shared his life with paternal sensibility and outlived him by several years.

Each of them had, however, arrived at his conceptual maturity through a different path. Iqbal's pan-Islamic response, for instance, had been 'a recoil from politics to religion'.[338] The change had occurred during his stay in Europe (1905–1908) primarily as a result of his deep study of problems confronting Islam and the influence of the Anjuman-i Islam.[339] Pan-Islam, embedded as it was in the Qur'anic ideology, became the natural theme of his prose and poetry.[340] In his earlier writings he appears to have been visibly moved by the events of 1908 in Turkey[341] and poetry became the predominant vehicle of his religio-political philosophy. His Urdu poems like *'Shikwa'* (1909), *'Sham'a-o Sha'ir'* (1912), *'Jawab-i Shikwa'* (1912), and his Persian works such as *'Asrar-i Khudi'* (1915), *'Rumuz-i Bekhudi'* (1918) and *'Payam-i Mashriq'* (1922) as well as his letters, speeches and statements, are all full of pan-Islamic fervour.[342] If Iqbal was aware of the philosophical postulations of al-Afghani at this time, he does not give any hint. It is with *'Javidnama'* (1922), his *magnum opus*, that the extent of Iqbal's

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[338] Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 463.

[339] Zulfikar, 'Iqbal aur Sayyid Jamalu'd-Din Afghani', 135–7.

[340] Manzooruddin Ahmad, 'Iqbal's Theory of Muslim Community and Islamic Universalism', in Waheed Quraishi (ed.), *Selections from the Iqbal Review* (Lahore, 1983), esp. 134–46.

[341] See his 'Political Thought in Islam', *The Sociological Review* (Manchester), I (1908), repr. in Latif Ahmed Sherwani (ed.), *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal*, 4th edn. (Lahore, 1995), 138–54.

[342] Esp. in *'Rumuz'*, he talks about the possibility of bringing together the billion Muslims of the world under a revived caliphate. See A. J. Arberry, *The Mysteries of Self* (London, 1953), xii. Some of his other poems extolling the Turks are *'Ghulamon ki namaz'*, *'Mahasara-i Edirne'*, *'Khitab ba Mustafa Kamal Pasha'* and *'Turk-i 'Usmani'*.

fascination for the Iranian's ideas is revealed, especially with regard to adopting Islam as the basis for unity and for resisting the West.[343] From then on his writings and letters are full of praise for al-Afghani to the extent that he accepted him as a *mujaddid*.[344] That pan-Islam was a 'pure moonshine, [or] an iridescent bubble'[345] is hardly acceptable but it is a fact that towards the end of his life, Iqbal had changed his views when the idea of Pakistan was floating around. His contribution lies in the fact that he brought the two contradictory forces of Islamic universalism and territorial nationalism closer together.[346]

Abul Kalam Azad's intellectual drift towards pan-Islam is understood more clearly in the background of his early influences. He was born and bred in orthodox environment but Syed Ahmed Khan and later Shibli Nu'mani helped him to outgrow the inherited traditions.[347] Whether his ideas were tempered by his supposed sojourns in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Turkey (1908), or were influenced by the revolutionary ideas of al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and their followers, is not confirmed.[348] It is certain, however, that the problems besetting the world of Islam had brought home to young Azad the urgency of organizing the Muslims of India.[349] The principal vehicles of his pan-Islam were his journals *al-Hilal* (1912) and later *al-Balagh* (1915) which carried articles on the plight of the Muslim world and the need to forge unity. Like Iqbal, the dialectics of Azad's political pan-Islam are also steeped in Islam. And it was through Islam that he sought the regeneration of the Indian Muslims.[350] His cravings for

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[343] Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Glory of Iqbal*. Eng. tr. Mohammad Arif Kidwai (Lahore, 1977), 191–8; and *Iqbalnama*, ii, 231.

[344] See his letter to Chaudhry Muhammad Ahsan, 7 Apr. 1932, *Iqbalnama*, 231–2.

[345] Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 371.

[346] S. Q. Fatimi, 'Islamic Universalism and Territorial Nationalism in Iqbal's Thought', in Waheed Quraishi, *Selections*, esp. 195–9.

[347] Moin Shakir, *Khilafat to Partition*, 2nd edn. (Delhi, 1970), 134–8; Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, 140; and V. N. Datta, *Maulana Azad* (Lahore, 1990), 36–8. Recently, a more involved study of Azad has come from Syeda Saiyidain, *Islamic Seal on India's Independence: Abul Kalam Azad—A Fresh Look* (Karachi, 1998).

[348] Khaliq Anjum, *Maulana Abu'l-Kalam Azad: shakhsiyyat aur karname* (Karachi, 1988), 86. Though no corroboration from any contemporary source is available Azad claimed that he visited the Middle and the Near East and met the Iranian dissidents, the followers of Mustafa Kamil Paşa and the leaders of the Young Turks. See Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Lahore, 1989), 6–7.

[349] Ibid.

[350] Khwaja Hasan Nizami, *Ataliq-i khutut nawisi*, 4th edn., 34, quoted in Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, 141.

the establishment of a 'Divine Kingdom', was also the outcome of this Islamic factor.[351] Azad believed that the bonds of pan-Islam were created fourteen hundred years ago and the only thing required was to revive them.[352] The foundations of the pan-Islamic society, he thought, rested primarily on the institution of the caliphate, the symbol of Islamic unity. Obedience to its authority, therefore, was a juridical obligation and could be withheld only if the dictates of *shari'at* were flouted.[353] Azad called upon his co-religionists to unite and defend this institution and denounced openly those 'heretics' and 'hypocrites' who, he thought, were co-operating with the 'satans of Europe' to weaken Islam.[354] For the organization of the Indo-Muslim segment of the Islamic polity, Azad advocated the appointment of a regional *imam*, a position to which he aspired.[355] But though his bid for the religious primacy found no adherents, his pan-Islamic stance was accepted widely. Later, Azad shifted his position to anti-British channels and still later towards secular nationalism though these ideas were perceived in religious parameters.[356]

The pan-Islamic fervour of the Ali brothers—Shaukat and Mohamed—passed through familiar conceptual loops before maturing. For both of them the journey began at Aligarh though the younger man had also a short detour of England where he had a first hand taste of Gladstonian tirades against Turkey.[357] They gradually drifted towards pan-Islam. In politics and otherwise they were inseparable almost to become 'like two eyes—physically separate but looking at things together'.[358] Religion was their source of inspiration, journalism

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[351] Shakir, *Khilafat to Partition*, 140.

[352] *al-Hilal*, 6 Nov. 1912.

[353] Abul Kalam Azad, *Khutbat-i Azad* (ed.), Shorish Kashmiri, 3rd edn. (Lahore, 1944), 207 8; id., *Mas'ala-i Khilafat*, 19 25; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, 67; id., *Islamic Modernism*, 136–7; and Malik Ram, *Kuchh Abu'l-Kalam ke bare men* (Lahore, 1990), 113–14.

[354] Cited in Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* (Karachi, 1960), 44–5.

[355] Malihabadi, *Zikr-i Azad*, cited in Anjum, *Azad*, 377; and Shakir, *Khilafat to Partition*, 139.

[356] Malik Ram, *Kuchh Abu'l-Kalam ke bare men*, 165; Also see Badr-ul-Hasan (ed.), *Mazamin-i Abu'l-Kalam Azad*, ii (Delhi, 1944), 132–3, quoted in Sayeed, *Pakistan*, 44–5.

[357] See Dr Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali Jauhar aur misses [*sic*] Gandhi', *Jang* (Rawalpindi), 14 Apr. 1980; and M. Naeem Qureshi, 'The Ali Brothers: A Study in Political Partnership', in A. H. Dani (ed.), *Founding Fathers of Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1981), 110.

[358] Maulana Sibghatullah Shahid Farangi Mahalli, 'Khadim-i Ka'ba Maulana Shaukat 'Ali', in Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 88. Later, commenting on their team-work, one of the brothers wrote: 'Whatever we undertake, we do it after full consultation

their medium and agitation their *modus operandi*. An editor of substance that he was, the *Comrade* and the *Hamdard* provided Mohamed Ali his much-needed battleground. The events of 1911–1913 proved to be the catalyst of their political thought but the years of *'jabria ta'til'*, as Mohamed Ali jokingly dubbed his political incarceration from 1915 to 1919,[359] proved to be the turning point. Islam acquired a new meaning and, like Iqbal and Azad, the Ali brothers began to draw heavily on the Qur'an, which became, especially for Mohamed Ali, the 'perennial fountain of truth'.[360] But he did not separate religion from politics; his approach remained one of traditional romanticism.[361] For the Ali brothers, Islam and pan-Islam were synonymous.[362] The caliphate, being the symbolic centre of the Islamic polity and incorporating both the temporal and spiritual elements, had to be maintained for the preservation of Islam's power and glory. Hence its relevance to the Indian Muslims.[363] Though the Ali brothers shrugged off the basic contradiction of living in the two non-concentric circles of India and the world of Islam,[364] their contribution lies not so much in sustaining the pan-Islamic ideology as in developing it into an effective instrument of political mobilization.[365] And it is for this that they are chiefly remembered, especially when politics to them was both a passion and a profession.

In July 1914, when war broke out between Serbia and Austria, the sympathies of the Indian Muslims went with the latter, because Serbia had been one of the Balkan confederates in the recent hostilities with Turkey. Subsequently, when Germany and Russia also became embroiled, they championed Germany's cause on account

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and discussion between ourselves. In case of a difference of opinion we simply refrain from doing it. Though each of us gives expression to his opinion, no one tries to impose his views on the other. Action follows only after full satisfaction and complete accord between us. . . . Both of us are united on our objectives *though our ways of action are different*. Sometimes we have serious differences but by the Grace of God we proceed to act after mutual consultation and understanding. To think that one overawes the other is absolutely incorrect.' Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 18 May 1919, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 511. Emphasis added. Eng. tr. mine.

[359] Abdul Majid Daryabadi (ed.), *Khutut-i mashahir*, i (Lahore, 1944), 238.

[360] Mohamed Ali, *My Life*, 81.

[361] Shakir, *Khilafat to Partition*, 68 9.

[362] Afzal Iqbal (ed.), *Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali* (Lahore, 1944), 61.

[363] See ch. ii, 145.

[364] Afzal Iqbal, *Select Writings and Speeches*, 465.

[365] See Naeem Qureshi, 'The Ali Brothers', esp. 128 30.

of the memories of the Russo-Turkish War.[366] But generally the Indian Muslims were jubilant at the sight of the Christian Powers fighting among themselves and believed it to be a punishment from the Almighty for their ill-treatment of Turkey.[367] Many thought that the war would lead to the downfall of Christendom and the revival of the Islamic power.[368] And yet, paradoxically, when in August 1914, England, too, joined on the side of Serbia and Russia, the Muslim sympathies veered round to its side. Mass meetings of Muslims were held throughout the country offering prayers for the success of British arms and pledging their services as a mark of 'unswerving allegiance and unflinching devotion to the British Crown'.[369] At some places over-enthusiastic *maulawis* went so far as to declare that those who fell in the war for Britain would be *shahids*.[370] Efforts were also made to organize a Red Crescent mission of Muslim volunteers to assist the British troops and the equipment of Ansari's Balkan medical mission was handed over to the government. Huge subscriptions were made towards the War Relief Fund.[371]

Except for the *Comrade* of Mohamed Ali and *al-Hilal* of Abul Kalam Azad, the tone of the Muslim press, too, was on the whole pro-British. Even the traditionally anti-British papers like the *Zamindar* and the *Muhammadi* (Calcutta) urged loyalty and assistance to the government.[372] The reason for this unexpected pro-British outburst seems to have been the result primarily of the declaration of neutrality by Turkey. Partly, it was due to the successful propaganda by Britain that its cause was righteous and that it had been forced into the war.[373] But with the educated Muslims the expression of loyalty was generally a political expedient bound up with the expectation of the fulfilment of India's 'natural rights' after the war, and its need of Britain's tutelage 'in her present stage of national and communal growth'.[374] Thus, the Muslim loyalty was at best conditional on

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[366] Bamford, *Histories*, 116.

[367] Memo dated 15 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[368] Ibid.

[369] See Fortnightly Reports on several provinces in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[370] Report on Internal Political Situation in the NWFP, 26 Sept. 1914, in ibid.

[371] Govt. of India, *India's Contribution to the Great War*, (Calcutta, 1923), *passim*. Also see Anon., *Muhammad Ali: His Life, Services and Trial* (Madras, 1922), 43; Bamford, *Histories*, 117; and IOI&R, L/P&S/10/518, file 4455/1914.

[372] Memo dated 15 Sept. 1914, IOI&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[373] See e.g. Nawab Fateh Ali Quizilbash to Pte. Sec. to Viceroy, Tel. 16 Sept. 1941, in ibid.

[374] See Mazhar-ul-Haq's speech at Bankipore in Sept. 1914. *Behare*, 8 Sept. 1914,

Turkish neutrality, except on the part of a few who thought that Indian Muslims had no concern with Turkey.[375] In general, Muslim opinion was deeply anxious about the possibility of Turkey ranging itself on the side of Germany and Austria. More than anything, the failure of the Allies to respond to Turkish overtures for friendship following the Balkan crisis had thrown Turkey into the lap of Germany.[376] And quite erroneously Berlin had begun to believe that by winning over the Ottomans it had also obtained the support of the entire Muslim world.[377] Ahmed Tevfik Paşa's (1845–1936) communications to Mazhar-ul-Haq and Shibli Nu'mani, sent from Istanbul in August 1914, betrayed Turkey's intention of joining the Central Powers.[378] Similar indications came from the letters written by Indian pilgrims in Makkah to their relatives in India, which described big troop mobilization by the Turks.[379] Already, certain *jihad* leaflets of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society appealing for funds had started circulating in India.[380] The Indian Muslims, therefore, were extremely worried at the delicate situation. Their predicament was that if Turkey did join the war against Britain how were they to reconcile their pan-Islamic sentiments with their declared loyalty to the British Crown. Mazhar-al-Haq tried to resolve this difficulty when he stated at a public meeting at Bankipore in September 1914: 'We are Musalmans and we are Indians and we have to perform our duty in this double capacity. I am happy to believe that these two interests do not clash, but are entirely identical'.[381] Clash, indeed, they did, as would be seen later, but presently the educated class had come to realize that Turkey would gain nothing by joining the war and might lose much.[382] The *'ulama* were also conscious of this fact, especially since the Turkish involvement would have meant a threat to the

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memo dated 15, Sept. 1914, in ibid.; *Zamindar*, 16 Oct. 1914; and *Comrade*, 12 Aug. 1914.

[375] *Hablul Matin*, 3 Aug. 1914, in memo dated 15 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518; *Paisa Akhbar*, 30 Aug. and 6 Sept. 1914; *Behar Standard* (Muzaffarpur), 14 Sept. 1914; and *Sind Journal*, 17 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[376] M. A. Aziz, *The Crescent in the Land of the Rising Sun* (London, 1941), 94.

[377] Feroz Ahmad, 'The Late Ottoman Empire', 15 ff.

[378] Memo by Director, Criminal Intelligence, 23 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518. Also see IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1919, Proc. no. 206.

[379] Report on the Internal Political Situation in Bengal, 26 Oct. 1914; and note dated 27 Oct. 1914 by Director, Criminal Intelligence, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[380] Memo by Director, Criminal Intelligence, 23 Sept. 1914, in ibid.

[381] *Beharee*, 8 Sept. 1914, memo dated 15, Sept. 1914, ibid.

[382] See Mushir Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 2 Sept. 1914, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 83–4.

holy places.[383] As such, there was among Indian Muslims a genuine desire that Turkey should remain neutral. Accordingly, Mohamed Ali and Dr Ansari, like the Russian Muslim leaders in their own country,[384] sent a joint telegram to Talat Paşa, pleading with him to keep Turkey neutral.[385] Abdul Bari in his telegram to the sultan begged him either to remain neutral or side with Britain.[386] At the same time he urged upon Hardinge that Britain should adopt such attitude towards Turkey as might help maintain neutrality.[387] The Ottoman Consulate in Bombay, which was approached on the subject, also conveyed to Istanbul the deep anxiety of the Indian Muslims and their sincere desire for Turkey's neutrality, frankly confiding that 'all the Mohammadans are for the British'.[388]

The Government of India, nevertheless, was uneasy. Reports from some provinces had indicated that in the event of a rupture with Turkey, they would find the Muslim community passively hostile.[389] Yet, the government, assured by the loyalists and the ruling chiefs, convinced itself that 'nowhere in India is there any sign that a Turkish *jihad* would induce Indian Mahomedans to give really serious trouble'.[390] In order to deal with the anti-British section of the pan-Islamists, the government brought out its long arm and set the Press Act in motion to gag some of the Muslim papers and ban those imported from Turkey.[391] Abul Kalam Azad was harassed daily by the press censor to 'improve' the tone of *al-Hilal*,[392] Zafar Ali Khan was interned in his native village[393] and soon Mohamed Ali forfeited security of

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[383] See Abdul Bari to Hardinge, Tel. 1 Oct. 1914, UCL, Hardinge Papers.

[384] Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam*, 125.

[385] Anon., *Muhammad Ali*, 74.

[386] Report on the internal political situation in the UP dated 14 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[387] Abdul Bari to Hardinge, Tel. 1 Oct. 1914, UCL, Hardinge Papers.

[388] H. M. D. Abdülaziz Badsha, Imperial Ottoman Consulate, Bombay, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, 29 Oct. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[389] Memo dated 15 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518. For Hardinge's anxiety see his letters to Bayley, Carmichael, Willingdon and Pentland, dated 18, 24 Aug. and 10 Sept. 1914, respectively, in UCL, Hardinge Papers. For the views of provincial governors see vol. 88 in ibid. For the British efforts to secure Turkey's neutrality through the Aga Khan see his *Memoirs* (London, 1954), 132-3.

[390] Memo dated 15 Sept. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518.

[391] *Islamic Mail*, 27 Sept. 1914, in ibid.

[392] Report on Bengal, 12 Oct. 1914, in ibid.

[393] Memo by Sec., Home Dept., Govt. of India, 22 Oct. 1914, in ibid. Later in summer 1916, Zafar Ali Khan was compelled to tender an apology to the govt. For details see Zafar Ali Khan to Abdul Bari, 16 July 1916, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 38-42.

the *Comrade* for spelling out grievances against the Allies in a rejoinder to *The Times'* leading article 'The Choice of the Turks'.[394] There was nothing anti-British in Mohamed Ali's article except that, as Sir Charles Cleveland (1866–1929) of the Indian CID put it, he had 'made the wounds of Moslem India green by referring to the past incidents'.[395] But the government was bent on ending Mohamed Ali's irritating interference. Their methods were successful, and, by the end of October 1914, though excitement still prevailed, it was obvious that little, if any, active sympathy would be displayed with Turkey should she take the field against Britain.

Thus, when on 1 November 1914, Turkey did join the war against the Allies, it caused no sensation.[396] The little excitement that there was, was soothed by the government's assurance about the immunity of the holy places in Arabia and Iraq from Allied attack.[397] Not surprisingly, when the news of the proclamation of *jihad* by Sultan Mehmed V against the Allies reached India early in December, it failed to create much flutter in the Sub-continent, as in the rest of the Muslim world.[398] It was a clever move to turn the war into a holy war but it did not work. The moderates—Nawab Sir Salimulla (1884–

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[394] Mohamed Ali, *My Life*, 62–4. The article was published in the *Comrade* of 26 Sept. 1914.

[395] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1561, file 3915/1919. Cleveland joined civil service in 1887. He was IG Police before his appointment as Director, Central Intelligence Dept., in 1910.

[396] See reports for several provinces in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518. Also see letters to Hardinge from Craddock, Meston, Willingdon, Bailey and O'Dwyer, dated 2, 6, 10 and 30 Nov. and 6 Dec. 1914, respectively, UCL, Hardinge Papers. For Turkey's reasons to enter the war see Y. T. Kurat, 'How Turkey Drifted into World War I', in K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eds.), *Studies in International History* (London, 1967), 291–315. Also see 'Posthumous Memoirs of Talat Pasha', *Current History*, 15/2 (1921); and Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919* (London, n.d.), 117–33. For German influence on Turkey see U. Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918* (Princeton, 1968); and F. G. Weber, *Eagle on the Crescent* (Ithaca, 1970).

[397] See reports from several provinces in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518. Also see Abdul Bari to Hardinge, 4 Nov. 1914, UCL, Hardinge Papers. For Govt. of India's proclamation with regard to the holy places see *Times of India*, 3 Nov. 1914.

[398] See reports from several provinces in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518. For the distribution of Sultan's pictures declaring *jihad* see Sardar Ali Shirazi, 'Barr-i saghir men Musalmanon ki pehli hijrat', *Jang*, 11 July 1974. The text of the sultan's declaration is available in Emin, *Turkey in the World War*, 174–7; and Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism* (The Hague, 1979), 90–2. The *Jihan-i Islam* was extensively used to convey the *fatwa* to Muslim India. See T. R. Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad (1905–1921)* (New Delhi, 1979), 166. For the effects of the *fatwa* on the Muslim world see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, 1952), 50–2; and Geoffery Lewis, 'The Ottoman Proclamation of *Jihad* in 1914', *Islamic Quarterly*, 19/3–4, (1975), 157–63.

1915) of Dhaka, A. K. Fazlul Haq (1873–1962) and Abul Kasem (1871–1936) in Bengal, Rafiuddin Ahmad in Bombay, Raja Mohammed Ali (1877–1931) of Mahmudabad in the UP, and (Sir) Muhammad Shafi (1869–1932) and Mian (Sir) Fazl-i-Husain (1877–1936) in the Punjab—moved first and by their overt expression of loyalty made it difficult for the 'extremists' to take an opposite line effectively. Subsequently, for reasons of expediency and tamed by government repression, they, too, seemed to realize that the Muslim interests were bound up with the British government. Perhaps they also knew that a revolt or *jihad* was out of question. Thus, men of every class and shade of opinion—Sunnis, Shi'as and Ahmadis—came forward to attest their unswerving loyalty to the Crown.[399] The Muslim League, like the Congress, hastened to assure Hardinge that the participation of Turkey in the war in no way affected their loyalty.[400] The Nizam, Mir Usman Ali (1886–1967) of Hyderabad, the Begum of Bhopal, Nawab Sayyid Hamid Ali Khan (1875–1930) of Rampur and other Muslim ruling Chiefs, vied with one another in reaffirming their allegiance.[401] The most important, however, was the expression of fealty issued under the signatures of sixty-nine leading Delhi Muslims, including the Ali brothers, Dr Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan (1864–1927), Ubaidullah Sindhi (1872–1944) and Hasan Nizami, advising Muslims to remain compliant to the government and do nothing which might cause their loyalty to be suspected.[402] The *'ulama* of Nadwa and Deoband and various *anjumans* in the country followed suit.[403] Even Abdul Bari, after some hesitation, demanded from the Muslims the sacrifice of their lives for the British Raj.[404] Similar declarations of loyalty in

[399] The situation had a remarkable similarity with what was happening among Muslims in Russia. See Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam*, 125–6.

[400] Wazir Hasan to Hardinge, Tel. 3 Nov. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518, file 4762/1914. Also see telegrams from the provincial branches in ibid. For the Congress attitude during the war, see C. F. Andrews and G. Mukerji, *The Rise and Growth of the Congress in India* (London, 1938), 241–52.

[401] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518 and 519. Also see vol. 88, UCL, Hardinge Papers.

[402] Eng. tr. of the notice in W. M. Hailey, Chief Com. Delhi, to H. Wheeler, Sec., Home Dept., Govt. of India, no. 8273—Home, Nov. 22, 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/519.

[403] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/519, esp. files 4265, 4947 and 945/1915. Also see Habibur Rahman Deobandi's article in *Mashriq* (Gorakhpur), 22 Aug. 1916, in which he advised loyalty to the British and maintained that only a Quraishi was suitable for the caliphate. See Muhammad Yasin Chiryakoti, *at-Tanqid ala'l-Khilafah* (Gorakhpur, [1922]), app., 44–8.

[404] *Islamic Mail*, 8 Nov. 1914.

unequivocal terms were issued by the chief *mujtahid* of the Shi'as[405] and by Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad (1889–1965), the head of the Qadiani wing of the Ahmadiyya community.[406]

The Muslim press though bitter and sullen at the 'calamity', nevertheless, accepted the position that Muslim India would render unto Caesar that which was Caesar's.[407] The four leading pan-Islamic journals, the *Comrade*, *al-Hilal*, the *Islamic Mail* and the *Mussalman*, also shared this opinion, though they did not hesitate to point out to the government that the Indian Muslims were deeply concerned about the sultan-caliph and that it should avoid any action which might offend them.[408] It was also suggested that in order to remove apprehension, Britain should declare that even if the Allies succeeded in vanquishing Turkey, its integrity would be maintained after the war.[409] Here were sown the seeds of the Khilafat movement. The enthusiasm for loyalty, however, varied from province to province (depending on the influence of the moderate men)—from an expression of intense spontaneity in Poone to lukewarm response in the UP and its total absence in Assam. In Bengal there was actual difference of opinion and *al-Hilal* argued for suspension of judgement of Turkey's action.[410] But behind this manifestation of loyalty there was more than a mere gratitude regarding the promised protection of the holy places. It was the political expediency so truthfully characterized by the *Aligarh Institute Gazette* (4 November 1914) that 'with the stability of the British Government our welfare and prosperity are bound up, in its weakness and destruction we see our own weakness and ruin'.[411] No doubt, therefore, that in advising loyalty Mazhar-ul-Haq reminded the Muslims that 'on our present attitude depends our future destiny';[412] the Raja of Mahmudabad equated the achievement of Muslim political rights in future with their attitude 'at this critical juncture';[413]

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[405] See tr. of a leaflet produced by *mujtahid* Agha Sayyid Hasan of Lucknow, in ibid., file 4947.

[406] See Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad to O'Dwyer, n.d., IOL&R, L/P&S/10/519, file 5061.

[407] *Hablul Matin*, 4 Nov. 1914; and *Observer*, 4 Nov. 1914, IOL&R, ibid., files 4947 and 4763.

[408] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/519.

[409] *Akhbar-i Islam* (Bombay), 11 Nov. 1914; and *Islamic Mail*, 1 Dec. 1914, in ibid.

[410] IOL&R, ibid., esp. files 5057 and 4945/1914.

[411] IOL&R, ibid., file 5058/1914.

[412] *Englishman*, 5 Nov. 1914.

[413] *Indian Daily Telegraph* (Lucknow), 6 Nov. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518, file 4918/1914.

and Fazlul Haq harped on the peace and security that the Muslims were enjoying under the British rule.[414] It was perhaps this expedient which led Dr Suhrawardy, the pan-Islamist, and Professor Khuda Bakhsh (1877–1931), the historian, to change their views and deny that the sultan of Turkey was the rightful caliph.[415]

The Government of India wisely refrained from rushing the Muslim community into condemning Turkey and let the excitement take its own course. However, it obtained its end through a two-way stratagem: first by suppressing the 'extremists', as it did later with the Ali brothers by restricting them to Rampur and then interning them in Mahrauli near Delhi,[416] and, secondly, by encouraging the moderates to be more vocal.[417] In addition, it whipped up support from a section of the *'ulama* which was traditionally opposed to Abdul Bari and Mahmud Hasan (1851–1920), the head of Deoband, and thus too willing to help. *Fatawa* to the effect that the war with Turkey was political and not religious and that the *jihad* against the British was religiously unlawful, were secured from Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly, Abdul Haq of Calcutta, the brothers Abdul Hamid (d. 1932) and Abdul Majid (d. 1922) of Farangi Mahal, Pir Mihr Ali Shah of Golra and Maulawi Syed Muhammad Razwi, the self-proclaimed 'sincere well-wisher of the Government and the country'.[418] Another one declaring that Indian Muslims had nothing to do with the sultan of Turkey was circulated by one Khalilur Rahman for attestation by the *'ulama*.[419] The pro-British *fatawa*, however, lost their value when one of the sponsors disclosed that the government had engineered the move.[420] At some places the officials attempted to get the

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[414] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 4 Nov. 1914, ibid.

[415] *Dainik Chandrika* (Calcutta), 15 Nov. 1914, ibid.; and *Statesman*, 7 Nov. 1914.

[416] For details of their internment see Mohamed Ali to Anon., (?) 1915, in Shahjahanpuri, *Maktubat*, 231–41; Mohamed Ali to Ramsay MacDonald, 18 Feb. 1916, in Shan Muhammad, *Unpublished Letters*, 56–65; Mohamed Ali, *My Life*, 64–5; and Mushirul Hasan, *Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics*, 203–307 and 1–333, respectively.

[417] The moderates, with the consent of the govt., established vigilance committees for pro-British propaganda. See reports on Bengal and Bombay, 23 Nov. 1914, in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518. Also see memo by Muhammad Shafi, 7 July 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[418] Interview with Malik Lal Khan. Also see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518, file 4265/1914; Bamford, *Histories*, 120; Husain Ahmad Madani, *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii (Deoband, 1953), 211–12. The pro-govt. stance of the Bahru'l-'Ulum party of Farangi Mahal and the rewards obtained by them has been well described in Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*, 270 2.

[419] See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 24 Dec. 1914, in Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 440.

[420] Bamford, *Histories*, 120.

sultan's name omitted from the Friday *khutba*.[421] Khan Bahadur Qazi Aziz-ud-din, a deputy collector of the UP, even brought out a pamphlet entitled *Turkon ki himaqat*, suggesting that the Muslims should collectively request the government to become the *Khadim-i Haramain-ish Sharifain* and establish its direct control over the Hijaz.[422] Such attempts, however, were strongly resisted. In Bengal, for instance, when Nawab Salimulla of Dhaka and his group attempted to delete the sultan's name from the *khutba*, they got a thorough trouncing from the press.[423]

As the war progressed Indian Muslims began increasingly to apprehend the probable disappearance of the last independent Muslim Power.[424] Abul Kalam Azad's warning of October 1914 was still ringing in their ears: that Europe was merely using pan-Islam as 'a devilish tactic' to deprive Islam of its political force and to counter this, they must establish the union of forty crore of Muslims of the world under the aegis of the Ottoman caliphate.[425] Shaukat Ali expressed his disapproval of 'the foolish and wrong' policy of the British towards Turkey. 'The catastrophe has happened' he lamented, 'and I am afraid still more may happen. May God help Islam!'[426] Already, inflammatory leaflets had made their appearance, including an updated version of a well-known *qasida* originally composed about the time of the Revolt of 1857, purporting to prophesy exact events leading to the final triumph of Islam.[427] In certain pan-Islamic circles the prospect of *jihad* was discussed in private meetings.[428] The encouragement had perhaps come from the activities of several hundred Indian pilgrims in the Hijaz who had stayed back under the influence of two members of the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba to fight for Turkey.[429] A controversy also arose whether it was obligatory for true

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[421] Report on UP, 16 Dec. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518, file 227/1915; and *Mussalman*, 1 Nov. 1914, ibid.

[422] Mohamed Ali to Abdul Bari, 21 Dec. 1914, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 16.

[423] *Islamic Mail*, 1 Dec. 1914; and *Musawat*, 3 Dec. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/518 and 519.

[424] M. S. Sulaiman Ashraf, *al-Balagh* (Aligarh, n.d.), *passim*. Also see Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 19 Dec. 1914, in Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 439.

[425] Azad's speech of 27 Oct. 1914 (delivered at Calcutta) is available in Malik Ram (ed.), *Khutbat-i Azad*, 3rd edn. (New Delhi, 1985), 13–36.

[426] Shaukat Ali to Raja Mir Muhammad, 9 June 1915 in Shan Muhammad, *Unpublished Letters*, 54–5.

[427] Report on UP for Nov. 1914, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/519, file, 5057/1914.

[428] Bamford, *Histories* , 120.

[429] IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1919, Proc. no. 206.

Muslims to perform *hijrat*. Mahmud Hasan of Deoband was reported to have given a *fatwa* to the effect that *hijrat* was incumbent on Muslims 'who could free themselves from family and other ties'.[430]

Meanwhile, the first practical result of this propaganda had appeared in February 1915, when, instigated by the *mujahidin* agents, a group of Lahore students (later joined by some from the Frontier) crossed into Afghanistan, with the object of proceeding to Turkey and fighting for the caliph.[431] Some of these students, particularly Zafar Hasan Aybek (1895–1989), later played a significant role in the Turco-German and pan-Islamic revolutionary schemes. The 'extremists' among the pan-Islamists aligned themselves with the German-assisted Indian revolutionaries in Batavia and the Ghadr party based in San Francisco, and stretched the plot to the tribal belt, Afghanistan and several other parts of Asia and Europe.[432] The propaganda also penetrated the Indian army.[433] First, there was trouble at Bombay with the men of the 10th Baluch Regiment who shot some British officers when they were embarking the ship for active duties overseas. Later, the Indian units at Rawalpindi and Lahore, too, were involved and there were defections of Muslim soldiers from the Indian expeditionary force which had landed in France. But a much more serious incident took place in February 1915 among the Muslim infantry posted at Singapore. Thinking that they were going to be sent to fight the Turks, they mutinied, shot eight officers, gave a pitched battle and escaped into the hinterland.[434] Again, early in 1916, several

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[430] 'Third Note on the Silk Letter Case' by Cleveland, 26 Sept. 1916, and the statement of Maulawi Muhammad Masud of Deoband in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/633, file 4260/1916. This refers to earlier events.

[431] For details see the autobiography of one of the runaways, Zafar Hasan Aybek, *Ap biti*, i (Lahore, 1964).

[432] Parl. Papers, 1918, Cd. 9190, *Report of Committee Appointed to Investigate Revolutionary Conspiracies in India*, 51–2, 61–2 and 72–5; Sir Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I knew it, 1885–1925* (London, 1925), 168–70; and Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement*, 162–92. For the Ghadr Party see Parl. Papers, 1918, Cd. 9190, 61; 'Transcript of the Ghadr Party Trial, California, 1917–18', i–xl & lxi–lxxv, IOL&R, MSS Eur. C. 138; M. Naidis, 'Propaganda of the Gadar Party', *Pacific Historical Review*, 20/3 (1951), 251–60; Sohan Singh Josh, *Hindustani Gadar Party: A Short History*, i (New Delhi, 1977), esp. 187–95; and Satya M. Rai, *Punjabi Heroic Tradition* (Patiala, 1978), 31–75.

[433] 'Russia: the Bolshevik Blue Book on India', encl. no. 29, IOL&R, L/P&S/11/136, file 3784/1919 with P. 2888/1918.

[434] See e.g. Evelyn Howell's reports as Censor of Indian Mail attached to the Expeditionary Force in France, 21 Aug., 11 Sept. and 27 Nov. 1915, IOL&R, Howell Papers; G. N. Molesworth, *Curfew on Olympus* (London, 1965), 21–2; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, *My Indian Years, 1910–1916* (London, 1948), 117; and Butler to Earl Richards, 23 Feb. 1915, IOL&R, Butler Papers.

killings and desertions were reported from among the Afridi units.[435] In fact, a large number of Indian prisoners of war, especially after the fall of Kut al-Amara (April 1916), fought alongside the Turkish forces on various fronts.[436]

More ambitious was the clandestine bid of the pan-Islamists, spearheaded by the *'ulama* of Deoband, to overthrow the British rule in India by force in league with the Frontier tribesmen and help from Turkey and Afghanistan.[437] Mahmud Hasan, who was reported to have been developing his anti-British scheme since 1905 in collusion with the educated element and the *mujahidin*, had secretly promoted it in India and then spread it to Central Asia, the Hijaz, and Iraq, through emissaries and cipher letters.[438] At the outbreak of the war he became convinced that success was out of question unless the action was supported by a Muslim Power.[439] Therefore, in the autumn of 1915, he dispatched Ubaidullah Sindhi, his former colleague then heading Jami'a Nazaratu'l-Ma'arif Qur'aniyya in Delhi, to Kabul, and himself proceeded to Istanbul via the Hijaz with a view to arriving finally in the tribal areas on the Indian frontier.[440] In Kabul, Sindhi, with the connivance of the Afghan government, brought into his sphere the runaway students, the *mujahidin* agents and other Indian residents such as Muhammad Ali Kasuri (1891–1956), principal of the Habibia College, who had arrived in Kabul a few months earlier.[441] He also established contacts with the Turco-German mission in Kabul and the German-supported Indian revolutionaries Raja Mahindra Pratap (1886–1979) and Professor Muhammad Barakatullah (1859–1927), and eventually joined their shadow 'Provisional Government of India'.[442] What Sindhi proposed was the establishment of a pan-Islamic society based on military principles by contriving an alliance

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[435] Butler to Kitchener, 18 Feb. 1916, IOL&R, Butler Papers.

[436] A large number of them had been sent from camps in Berlin to form the nucleus of an 'Indian Legion'. See Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement*, 169.

[437] Parl. Papers, 1918, Cd. 9190, 72–5.

[438] Madani, *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii, 137–43. Also see O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew it*, 178.

[439] Madani, *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii, 145, n. 1.

[440] Ibid., 145–9 and 211–13. Sindhi's Qur'anic academy was located in Delhi's famous Fatehpuri Mosque.

[441] For details see Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 92–109; Madani, *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii, 153–65; and Maulana Muhammad Ali Kasuri, *Mushahidat-i Kabul wa Yagastan* (Karachi, n.d.), 11 and 32–3. Later, Kasuri and Sindhi developed differences over political issues. See 34.

[442] Ibid.; Mahendra Pratap, *My Life Story of Fifty Five Years* (Dehra Dun, 1947), 51–2 and 113; Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900–1923* (Berkeley, 1967), 83–107; and Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement*, 170 ff.

among the three principal Muslim rulers, namely the sultan of Turkey, the shah of Iran and the amir of Afghanistan. An important part of his plan was the organization of a *'Jand-Allah'* or *'Junudu'l-Rabbaniyya'*—the 'Army of God' as the British dubbed it—with headquarters at Medina and subordinate commands at Istanbul, Tehran and Kabul.[443] In the Hijaz, Mahmud Hasan established contacts with the Turks and was said to have obtained from Ghalib Paşa, the Ottoman governor of the Hijaz, a declaration of *jihad* against the British for circulation in India. The document, known as the *'Ghalibnama'*, was reportedly smuggled into India by a trusted follower of Mahmud Hasan, photographed and distributed.[444]

But the 'plot' was unravelled by the Punjab CID with the accidental discovery and capture of the 'Silk Letters'—the letters written on yellow silk cloth-piece by Ubaidullah and Maulawi Ansari of Deoband from Kabul to Mahmud Hasan, containing reports of their progress in Afghanistan and India.[445] As a result, a number of arrests were made in India. Mahmud Hasan was arrested along with his four associates by the orders of Sharif Husain ibn Ali (1856–1931) of Makkah and handed over to the British. He was first taken to Egypt and then interned at Malta where he strongly denied any part in the conspiracy maintaining that someone out of spite had fabricated stories about them.[446] For a time the *mujahidin* and the Frontier tribesmen, continued their raids on British India under Haji Fazl Wahid (1856–1937) of Turangzai, an *'alim* associate of Mahmud Hasan and Muhammad Ali Kasuri, but soon the plot fizzled out as a result of the government's punitive measures.[447] The uncovering of the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy' enabled the government to take precautionary

[443] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/633, file 4260/1916.

[444] Madani, *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii, 214–27; O'Dwyer, *India as I Knew it*, 180; Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 109–110; and Parl. Papers, 1918, Cd. 9190, 74–5.

[445] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/633, file 4260.

[446] Mahmud Hasan (POW no. 2219) was interned at St Clement's Barracks, Malta, then under the command of a British military governor. His four associates were: Uzair Gul (b. 1893) (POW no. 2215), Nusrat Hussein (POW no. 2216), Husain Ahmad (POW no. 2217), and Wahid Ahmed (POW no. 2218). For details see IOL&R, P/Conf./51, ICH(P)P, July–Dec. 1919, Proc. no. 422. For the circumstances of their arrest and other connected events also see Husain Ahmad Madani, *Safarnama-i asir-i Malta* (Deoband, [1923]), esp. 14–16, 47–9, and 64–126; and id., *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii, 231–4. Also see ch. ii, 171.

[447] Madani, *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii, 181–85. Also see Sir Percy Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, ii (London, 1940), 263; Molesworth, *Curfew on Olympus*, 26–7; Ejaz-ul-Haq Quddusi, *Tazkirah-i sufya-i sarhad* (Lahore, 1966), 618–19; and Kasuri, *Mushahidat*, 83 ff.

measures. Shortly afterwards, Abul Kalam Azad, considered a principal conspirator, was externed by the UP and the Punjab governments and in April 1916, he took up residence at Ranchi under police surveillance.[448] Hasrat Mohani (1878–1951), editor of the pan-Islamic anti-British *Urdu-i Mu'alla* of Aligarh, was interned by the UP government at Lalitpur in Jhansi and, on refusing to comply with restrictions, he was imprisoned for two years.[449] And though the activities of the Kabul wing of the pan-Islamists continued the fanciful plan remained pinned to the drawing board. Amir Habibullah (1872–1919) of Afghanistan refused to play their game and chose to remain neutral.[450] The Turco-German plots to subvert the Indian masses and the ruling chiefs also failed.[451] The Indian revolutionaries, too, were unable to achieve anything. Barakatullah, who had a chequered career in Britain, the US, Germany, Japan, and Afghanistan ever since his departure from India in 1890, was not disappointed and decided to stay in Kabul.[452] However, what made a more serious dent in the ideal of pan-Islam and the concept of the 'universal' caliphate was the June 1916 Arab revolt against the Ottoman government under Sharif Husain which resulted in his seizure of Makkah, Jeddah and Taif.[453]

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[448] Bamford, *Histories*, 125.

[449] Ibid., 125–26. Also see the letters of Hasrat Mohani and his wife to Abdul Bari in *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 124–50. After his internment, Mohani quickly lost weight from lb. 155 to lb. 112. See Begum Mohani to Abdul Bari, 30 May [1916], in ibid., 132.

[450] Adamec, *Afghanistan*, 83–107; Hardinge of Penshurst, *My Indian Years*, 131–2; and W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan* (London, 1950), 194.

[451] The Turco-German-Indian mission under Werner Otto von Hentig and Oskar von Niedermayer, which also included Barakatullah and Kazim Bey, reached Kabul about the middle of 1915, and brought with it letters signed by the German Chancellor, von Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–1921), for the Nizam of Hyderabad and other Indian Chiefs. But most of these letters, inviting the addressees to rise against the British, fell into the latter's hands. Only one of these reached its destination—the Maharaja of Nepal. See IOL&R, Mss. Eur. E. 204, 209, 247 and Photo. Eur. 33. Also see Barakatullah to M. Briand, 'An Open Letter', dated St Gall (Switzerland), 10 Nov. 1925, NAP, Shaidai Papers. For the newspapers and pamphlets designed to foment trouble in India and other Eastern dependencies, see the list prepared by MI 5 of the War Office, in IOL&R, Mss. Eur. E. 288/1, 1–220.

[452] See Abdur Rahman Siddiqi, 'Maulana Barakatu'llah marhum', *Urdu*, 22/83 (1941), 391–403.

[453] For details see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/523 7; and L/P&S/18, B. 236, 'Statement on the Expedition to Mesopotamia by Sir F. A. Hirtzel', 30 Aug. 1916; B. 250*a*, 'Treaty with the Idrisi Saiyid', Govt. of India, Foreign & Pol. Dept., no. 33A of 1915; B. 251, 'Relations with Ibn Saud', Arab Section, 12 July 1917; and B. 287,

The Hijaz revolt was the highest watermark of the Arab political consciousness, but it had come about very reluctantly and when launched was far less effective than expected.[454] The ethnic and religious differences between the Arabs and the Turks had existed for centuries but only from the second half of the nineteenth century they had taken a political meaning and by the early twentieth century had become the basis for conflicting political loyalties and identities.[455] The spirit of nationalism in the Middle East arose first among Christian Arabs and then fanned by the Russian Orthodox and the Armenian Protestant missions, it spread among the Muslims who sought to harmonize the idea of nation with Islam.[456] An important influence on Arab nationalism came from Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902), a follower of al-Afghani and Abduh, but it was Rashid Rida, another of their devotee, who popularized it.[457] The split with the Turks, however, came about in spite of the fact that there were no deliberate 'lines of exclusion' to keep out the Arabs from the Ottoman state apparatus, and when the break did occur pan-Arab nationalism became the anti-thesis of pan-Islam.[458] Since the revolt, at least in the beginning, was unaccompanied by any general Arab uprising in other territories due to the tight Turkish control, it appeared as if it was completely devoid of any popular feelings.[459] Though the discerning among the Indian Muslims had realized since long that the old Ottoman empire was dying and a new one was

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'Eastern Committee. Summary of the Hedjaz Revolt', General Staff memo, War Office, 31 Aug. 1918. Also see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938); S. Mousa, *T. E. Lawrence: An Arab View* (London, 1966); Phillip Knightly and C. Simpson, *Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia* (London, 1969); H. Z. Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1956); Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut, 1958); and Kemal H. Karpat 'Arab-Turkish Relations', *Scrutiny*, 1-2 (1975), 23 ff.

[454] Karpat, 'Arab-Turkish Relations', 23.

[455] Ibid., 19–20. Also see C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origin of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana, 1973), esp. 122-47.

[456] Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, 136-7.

[457] Ibid., 144-51; N. Z. Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, 129 ff.; and Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 30–5. al-Afghani's influence is also discernible in his support of territorial nationalism. See Seyyed Nasr, 'Reflections on the Myth and Reality of Islamic Modernism', 76. For Rashid Rida also see Elizer Tauber, 'Rashid Rida as Pan-Arabist before World War I', *Muslim World*, 79/2 (1989), 102-12; and id., 'Rashid Rida's Attitudes during World War I', ibid., 85/1-2 (1995), 107-21.

[458] Albert Hourani, 'The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East', in id. (ed.), *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford, 1981), 2-12; and Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, 150-1.

[459] Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, 201-7.

taking shape,[460] the rebellion seemed to be a British-engineered stab in the back of the Islamic polity.[461] They were particularly alarmed at the non-Muslim threat to the holy places.[462] A great indignation was, therefore, caused when the British and Anglo-Indian papers alleged that the Indian Muslims had welcomed the revolt.[463] Demonstrations were held all over the country in order to express abhorrence at the Sharif's action.[464] On 26 June 1916, the Council of the All-India Muslim League met at Lucknow and passed a resolution condemning the 'outrageous conduct' of Husain which it thought had jeopardized the safety of the holy places.[465] From their internment in Chhindwara the Ali brothers enquired from their *pir*, Abdul Bari, whether such 'interference in religious matters' had not made *hijrat* incumbent upon them.[466] The latter did not respond but dubbed Husain, his old friend and class-mate of Makkah days, and those who sympathized with him, as the 'enemies of Islam'.[467] Hakim Ajmal Khan frankly told Hardinge that the British policy of aiding Husain was a serious blunder and ought to be revised.[468]

Little did the Indian Muslims realize that the spirit of Arab nationalism was very deep, that the revolt had been initiated by the Arabs themselves, that Husain was working in his own and not British interests, and that the latter were only using him against their enemy.[469]

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[460] As early as January 1913, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui had predicted that 'The Arab is advancing [while] the Turk is retreating'. See Abdur Rahman Siddiqui to Syed Mahmud, 10 Jan. 1913, in V. N. Datta and B. E. Cleghorn (eds.), *A Nationalist Muslim and Indian Politics: Being the Selected Correspondence of the late Dr Syed Mahmud* (Delhi, 1974), 16.

[461] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 235, 'The Arab Revolt. Views of an Indian Moslem' [received in a private letter from Mr E. E. Long, former editor of the *Indian Daily Telegraph*]', July 1916.

[462] Ajmal Khan to Hardinge, 7 July 1916, encl., Hardinge to Chelmsford, 23 Aug. 1916, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[463] *Statesman*, 25 June 1916.

[464] Undated Intelligence Bureau report, cited in Bamford, *Histories*, 126–7.

[465] *Times of India*, 29 June 1916. The Govt. of India took steps to counter the propaganda. See memo by Sir James Meston, encl., Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 July 1916, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[466] See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 30 June 1916, in Shan Muhammad, *Unpublished Letters*, 74.

[467] Bamford, *Histories*, 127.

[468] Ajmal Khan to Hardinge, 7 July 1916, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[469] The views of Husain and his son Abdullah will be found in C. Ernest Dawn, 'Ideological Influences in the Arab Revolt', James Kritzack and R. Bayly Winder (eds.), *The World of Islam: Studies in Honour of Philip K. Hitti* (London, 1960), 233–48. For the British attitude, see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/523–7; 'Politics in Mecca', memo

Husain and the Arabs generally were as suspicious of the Allied designs on Arabia as were the Indians.[470] The British, too, despite the temptation and clamour in certain quarters to support an Arab caliphate, refused to be involved in the caliphate question at least for fear of its repercussions in India.[471] Initially, far from establishing a direct influence in Arabia, which they knew was dangerous and impossible, the British endeavoured to prevent any other non-Muslim Power from obtaining control over the holy places.[472] But even by their help to the Arabs, the British had been able to abolish, as T. E. Lawrence (1888–1935) had once desired, 'the threat of Islam, by dividing it against itself, in its very heart'.[473]

For the Government of India the Arab revolt and its effect on Muslim India was the chief worry.[474] Therefore, its policy as a whole was conciliatory. In August 1916, Baron Chelmsford (1868–1933), who unexpectedly found himself to be the new viceroy,[475] explained thus to Austen Chamberlain (1863–1937), his constitutional superior in London:

> We in India have no sympathy whatsoever with the Turk and have no desire to see him let down lightly. At the same time, as administrators of an enormous Muslim community, we cannot but sympathise with the predicament in which they are placed by this war between their temporal and spiritual leaders, and for this reason we desire to deal gently with their feelings, while subscribing in the fullest and most loyal manner to the policy of His Majesty's Government.[476]

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prepared by T. E. Lawrence for the Director of Intelligence, Cairo. PRO, FO 141/461; and D. Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, iv (London, 1930–36), 1802–3.

[470] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 287.

[471] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/523, file 4786/1914, esp. Crewe to Massingham (editor of *Nation*), 5 Jan. 1916. For Crew's declaration on non-interference in the caliphate question, see *The Times*, 24 Apr. 1915. Earl Kitchener (1850–1916), who was the first to contact Sharif Husain for a revolt against the Turks, was a staunch supporter of an Arab caliphate. See J. Nevakivi, 'Lord Kitchener and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire—1915–1916', Bourne and Watt, *Studies in International History*, 319–20. In any case W. S. Blunt was not the precursor of the idea of an Arab caliphate. See Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, esp. 145 and nn. 49–51.

[472] Lawrence's memo, PRO, FO 141/461. For fuller details of British policy towards the Arabs, see B. C. Busch, *Britain, India, and Arabs, 1914–1921* (Berkeley, 1971), *passim*. Also see Lord Birdwood, *Nuri as-Said* (London, 1959), 24.

[473] Lawrence's memo, PRO, FO 141/461.

[474] Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 July 1916, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[475] Asquith had appointed him mainly because he was a Liberal from All Souls and also happened to be in India at the time. See Bence-Jones, *The Viceroys of India*, 222–3.

[476] Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 Aug. 1916, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

Meanwhile, sustained by the *mujahidin* activity and the Turco-German intrigues, the pan-Islamic propaganda continued.[477] The Muslims felt pain and sorrow at the conquest of Jerusalem by a Christian Power and criticized the Balfour Declaration (November 1917) which promised a Jewish state in Palestine.[478] Indeed, the holy city with the first *qibla* of Islam in its precincts had a special significance for the Muslims of India whose hearts, as a Lucknow paper opined, 'stirred to the very depths at each stage of General Allenby's march on Jerusalem'.[479] Such a situation evidently necessitated the government to tie up a good many troops, some of them European.[480] Yet, the bulk of the community not only remained loyal to the British Crown, it contributed materially to the defeat of their caliph. Indian Muslim soldiers, despite some desertions,[481] fought and died in different theatres of the war, and without their aid, Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1863–1945) later admitted, 'we should not have conquered Turkey at all'.[482] But all through the war the community was confronted with the dilemma of reconciling the conflicting demands upon its loyalty, as was highlighted by Mazhar-ul-Haq in December 1915 and Jinnah in December 1916 at the eighth and the ninth sessions of the Muslim

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[477] For details see Lal Baha, *NWFP Administration*, 81–107; and Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad*, 165–70.

[478] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 40/2, 12 Jan. 1918, paras. 58 and 59. For literature on Balfour Declaration see below, ch. ii. Years later, Winston Churchill proudly claimed that he was 'one of the authors' of the Zionist policy to which he was still 'strongly wedded'. See Churchill to Roosevelt, most secret cipher Tel. n. 51, 9 Aug. 1942, IOL&R, L/PO/6, file 6712/1942. Also see miscellaneous letters and papers at the Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford. For the early goals of the Zionists see Neil Caplan, 'Zionist Visions of Palestine, 1917–1936', *Muslim World*, 84/1–2 (1994), esp. 18–28.

[479] *New Era* (Lucknow), 8 Dec. 1917, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 40/2, para. 59.

[480] M. Larcher, *Commandant, La guerre turque dans la guerre mondiale* (Paris, 1926), 528, cited by Emin, *Turkey in the World War*, 177. Also see Stoddard, *The New World of Islam*, 61.

[481] Edward Thompson, *The Reconstruction of India* (London, 1931), 121; Molesworth, *Curfew on Olympus*, 21; and M. L. Ferrer in Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, 220.

[482] Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 125 HC Deb. 5S, col. 1964. India's material contribution had been colossal. Apart from a very large number of troops (total up to the end of Nov. 1918 was 739,938, including 241,224, Muslims) and huge financial contributions, India supplied vast quantities of foodstuffs and other material for the purpose of the war. Total number of Indian casualties up to the end of Dec. 1919, were 121,598. Out of the 700 Indian Officers killed 242 were Muslims. See Govt. of India, *India's Contribution to the Great War, passim*; IOL&R, L/P&S/18, D. 235, 'Events in India (Internal & External), 1917 18', memo Circulated to Imperial War Cabinet', June 1918; and IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1670, file 2437/1920.

League, respectively.[483] Thus, whilst the Indian Muslim soldiers were fighting the troops of their caliph in the Near and the Middle East, prayers were being offered for his welfare in the mosques of India.[484] At times, owing to the vulnerability of the British position in India and the perceived danger of pan-Islam,[485] there had been reassuring pronouncements from the government. On 12 January 1915, Viceroy Hardinge had given an assurance for the independence and integrity of Turkey.[486] Edwin Montagu (1879–1924), who succeeded Chamberlain at the India Office, had made a pronouncement on 17 August 1917, for the 'progressive realization of responsible government of India'.[487] And Lloyd George, on 5 January 1918, had pledged the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty once the war was over.[488] The last pronouncement had been rendered particularly necessary as the Bolsheviks, after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and a separate peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), had started to expose the secret Allied treaties aiming at Ottoman dismemberment.[489] On 5 January 1918, Lloyd George, with the full consent of the British political parties, unequivocally declared in his famous war-aims speech that they were not fighting 'to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race'.[490] The Indian Muslims took this as an unalterable pledge and tenaciously clung to it. They

[483] See e.g. Mazhar-ul-Haq's presidential address to the eighth sessions of the AIML at Bombay on 30 Dec. 1915, and Jinnah's address to the ninth sessions at Lucknow on 30 Dec. 1916, in Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents: 1906–1947*, i (Karachi, [1969]), 332 ff. and 347; and M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), *Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (Lahore, 1966), 61–2, respectively. The despondency of the Muslims increased as the war progressed. See e.g. report dated 22 May 1915, IOL&R, Howell Papers.

[484] The Indian Peace Delegation memo dated 5 Feb. 1919, encl., Montagu to Chelmsford, 31 Mar. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[485] See e.g. memo by T. W. Holderness, 13 June 1916, IOR, L/P&S/18, B. 231.

[486] IOL&R, *Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General*, LIII (1914–15), 232.

[487] Actually these were Curzon's words which were inserted in the draft and adopted by Montagu. Later, Curzon completely retracted from this stand. See Leonard Mosley, *Curzon: The End of an Epoch* (London, 1960), 171–2. Also see S. R. Mehrotra, 'The Politics Behind the Montagu Declaration of 1917', in Philips, *Politics and Society in India*, 71–96; and Hugh Tinker, 'India in the First World War and After', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 3/4 (1968), 89–91.

[488] *The Times*, 7 Jan. 1918.

[489] For the secret treaties see ch. ii. Also see L/P&S/18, D. 235; and W. W. Gottlieb, *Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World War* (London, 1957).

[490] *The Times*, 7 Jan. 1918.

overlooked the fact that nowhere had the premier indicated a willingness to restore to Turkey any of the territories in which Britain was interested. Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia could not be exposed once again to the 'tyranny of the Sultan and his pashas', he had declared very clearly.[491]

Yet, the unbearable strain occasionally erupted in sporadic violence as in the case of the Calcutta riots of September 1918, sparked off by the publication of insulting remarks about the Prophet in an Anglo-Indian paper.[492] Such outbursts were indicative of the disturbed state of the Muslim body politic and the presence of a strong pan-Islamic sentiment—though some of their leaders were prone to dismiss it as a mere western shibboleth.[493] These tensions were heightened by the Turkish reverses in the war and set the stage for the inception and growth of the Khilafat movement.

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[491] Ibid. For fuller details of British policy towards Turkey, see V. H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914–1918* (Oxford, 1971), 25–30 and 61–5.

[492] Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 11 Sept. 1918, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Ronaldshay's report to King George V, dated 18 Oct. 1918, IOL&R, Zetland Papers. Also see J. H. Broomfield, *Élite Conflict in a Plural Society* (Berkeley, 1968), part 2, ch. iii; id., 'The Forgotten Majority: The Bengal Muslims and September 1918', in D. H. Low (ed.), *Soundings in Modern South Asian History* (London, 1968), 196–220; and Marquess of Zetland, *'Essayez'* (London, 1956), 108–16.

[493] See Ameer Ali's views in *The Times*, 11 Jan. 1912; Saiyid Wazir Hasan's 'Islam and the Empire', in *Round Table* (1913), 6–105; Zafar Ali Khan's article 'Indian Mussalmans and Pan-Islamism' (as appeared in Celal Nuri's book, *Ittehad-i Islam*), in Jafri, *Selections*, 297–9; and Mohamed Ali's views in Afzal Iqbal, *Select Writings*, 53 and 61.

CHAPTER TWO

INCEPTION AND GROWTH OF THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

On 30 October 1918, following its defeat by the Entente Powers, Turkey was forced to sign an armistice at Mudros.[1] This had come about after three days of hard negotiations by Hüseyin Rauf Bey on board the British carrier HMS *Agamemnon* moored on the island of Lemnos. The armistice envisaged, *inter alia*, a partial demobilization of the Turkish armed forces, their withdrawal from Transcaucasia to pre-war borders, and the Allied occupation of the Straits, the capital city of Istanbul and other strategic points. The unconditional surrender of Turkey, followed on 11 November by a quick German capitulation, brought the First World War to a close. But before the Allies could occupy Istanbul the triumvirate of the old regime and many important members of the CUP had been evacuated by the German ship *Lorelei* to Berlin by way of Odessa.[2] In the changed circumstances, Sultan Vahideddin Mehmed VI (r. 1918–1922), who had ascended the throne only a few months earlier, thought it prudent to revert to a policy of a total dependence on Britain in the hope of salvaging whatever was possible from the mess created by the defeat.[3] The advent of peace was greeted in India with much relief. The future of Turkey, no doubt, caused some anxiety but in view of the repeated pledges of the Indian and the British governments,[4] the Indian Muslims hoped that the sultan-caliph would be presented with a lenient treaty, safeguarding the prestige of the contracting parties.[5] Some even believed that as a reward for Indian Muslim loyalty and services in the war, Britain would treat its fallen foe with commiseration and generosity.[6] They did not understand that in a war the loser always loses.

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[1] For the terms of the Armistice of Mudros see Parl. Papers, 1919, Cmd. 53.

[2] Jacques Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge* (New Brunswick, 1990), 3.

[3] Feroz Ahmad, 'The Late Ottoman Empire', 8 and 18.

[4] See ch. i, 85–6.

[5] See *Bombay Samachar*, 4 Nov. 1918, IOL&R, L/R/5/174. Also see *Mufidi-i Rozgar*, 3 Nov. 1918; *Sanj Vartaman*, 2 and 6 Nov. 1918; *Akhbar-i Islam*, 16 Nov. 1918; *Vakil*, 6 Nov. 1918; *Leader*, 16 Nov. 1918; and *Political Bhomiyo*, 29 Nov. 1918 in ibid.

[6] *Akhbar-i Islam*, 9, 10, 11 and 12 Dec. 1918 in ibid.

To their great disappointment, however, the Indian Muslims soon discovered that whereas the armistice had left the territorial readjustment to the peace conference, the Allies would view any suggestion of the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the 'liberated' territories with the utmost disfavour. From the outset the latter strove to make the Muslim World realize that Turkey had been beaten completely and that the armistice was not a 'mere suspension of hostilities pending amicable negotiations'.[7] In fact, the Ottoman Empire had already fragmented. With remarkable celerity, and in order to outdo each other, the Entente Powers had begun to secure their respective spheres of economic and strategic interests in the defeated Empire. Britain moved in to control the Straits, Iraq and Arabia generally, which, besides strengthening the defence of the rich Indian Empire, was to furnish the possible oil deposits of Mosul and necessary cotton fields of Diara. France was manoeuvring to preserve its privileges in Syria while Italy was intent on holding on to the Dodecanese and the *vilayet* of Adalia. The United States though unwilling to accept any territorial reward, was, nevertheless, advocating the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.[8]

Secret treaties and other wartime arrangements had committed the Allies to 'the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization'.[9] In the main, three secret agreements spelled the death of the Ottoman Empire: first, the Treaty of London between the Entente Powers and Italy, 26 April 1915; secondly, the Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement between Britain, France and Russia, 26 April–23 October 1916; and thirdly, the Treaty of St Jean de Maurienne between Britain, France and Italy, 19 April–26 September 1917.[10] Besides, there were two

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[7] Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 16 Nov. 1918, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[8] Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey* (Norman, 1931), 181–213. Also see J. Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920* (London, 1969), 95; R. L. Buell, 'Oil Interests in the Fight for Mosul', *Current History*, 17/6 (1923), 931–8; and S. H. Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East* (London, 1954), 44.

[9] See the Allied reply to President Wilson's note, dated 10 Jan. 1917, in *The Times*, 12 Jan. 1917. Also see A. J. Balfour's note to Wilson, 18 Dec. 1916, in H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vi (London, 1924), 23; Balfour's statement in the Imperial War Council, May 1917, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920*, ii (Washington, 1940), 23; and his memo to Lloyd George, 26 June 1919, PRO, FO 371/4181.

[10] Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 671; E. L. Woodward and R. Butler (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, First Series, iv (London, 1952), 241–51, 638–9

other agreements between the Powers about the Straits, Istanbul and Asia Minor, as well as the pledges given to the Arabs for their complete independence and those to the Zionists for a separate homeland in Palestine.[11] According to these treaties, the Allies contemplated to strip Turkey not only of its European possessions, including Istanbul, but also of its eastern territories of Iraq, Palestine, Arabia and Syria.[12] In this way Turkey was to be left with practically nothing, not even an important access to the sea, and, more importantly, was also to lose sovereignty over much of its Empire.[13] Thus, while a complete dismemberment of Germany, the principal enemy, was not contemplated, Turkey was to be saddled with an excessively harsh peace treaty.

With the history of Western encroachments on the Muslim kingdoms of Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Iran, the impending dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire came as a shock to the Indian Muslims. Turkey's downfall was felt even more deeply 'for with it was closely interwoven the question of the Khalifate and of the guardianship of

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and 640 1; and Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (London, 1956), 29–141. For British proposals on the partition of Turkey as recommended by the Inter-Departmental and the Eastern Committees see IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 234 and B. 276 and PRO, CAB 27/24 and CAB 42/3. The maps indicating the four possible solutions for the settlement in Asiatic Turkey are reproduced in Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East*, 20 1. For the British grand strategy and aims during the war see Paul Guinn, *British Strategy and Politics, 1914–1918* (Oxford, 1965); and V. H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914 1918* (Oxford, 1971).

[11] Howard, *The Partition of Turkey*, 181. For the Istanbul Agreement with Russia see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, ii, 7–11. For the pledges to the Arabs see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/523 527. The political and legal objectives of the Zionists and an appraisal of the Balfour Declaration are available in L. Stein, *The Balfour Declaration* (London, 1961); and W. T. Mallison and S. V. Mallison, *The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order* (Harlow, 1986), esp. 18 78. Their territorial ambitions and diverse claims are outlined in Muhsin D. Yusuf, 'The Zionists and the Process of Defining the Borders of Palestine, 1915 1923', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 15/1, (1991), 18 39; and Mark Levene, 'Nationalism and Alternatives in the International Arena: The Jewish Question at Paris, 1919', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 28/3, (1993), 511 31.

[12] See the British and the French declarations of policy in *Hindu*, 15 Nov. 1918. Also see IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 310 (*a*), 'The Future of Constantinople', memo by Lord Curzon, 2 Jan. 1918, War Cabinet Jan. 1919; B. 310 (*b*), 'Constantinople and Internationalization', by L. Mallet, 25 Dec. 1918, War Cabinet Jan. 1919; and Tamperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vi, 28.

[13] Curzon was willing to leave Turkey as an independent Asiatic state, but Lloyd George, who exercised an unusual degree of control over foreign policy after the armistice, insisted not only on a total destruction of the Ottoman Empire but also desired Turkey's extinction as a sovereign country. See Earl Ronaldshay, *Life of Lord Curzon*, iii (London, 1928), 259 68.

the holy places of Islam'.[14] Related to the sad plight of Islam abroad was the question of its possible effect on India. Being a minority, the Indian Muslims had an unmitigated fear that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would imperil their position in the country.[15] Also, the educated Muslims were possessed with the feeling that in spite of their loyalty to the British during the last war their community had not been treated with sympathy or their views carried any weight with the government.[16] As evidence, they cited the recent outbursts of Secretary of State Edwin Montagu and Viceroy Lord Chelmsford against the separate electorates, 'which is the life and soul of all our political activities of the present day'[17]—an opinion which was shared by all, including the *'ulama*.[18] The latter were particularly exasperated over the omission from the reform scheme of any mention of their representations to Montagu in 1917 wherein they had pleaded for the preservation of Muslim rights and privileges.[19] Added to this was a deep feeling of resentment over the Press Act and the Defence of India Act which had been frequently used to impede the publication of Muslim journals like the *Comrade*, the *Hamdard*, *al-Hilal*, *al-Balagh* and the *Zamindar*.[20] What disturbed them most acutely was the continued detention of some of their top leaders, especially Mahmud Hasan, the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad and Hasrat Mohani.[21]

At such a distressful juncture for the Muslims, the Government of India ineptly gave them another cause for concern. Instead of a

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[14] Fazlul Haq, *All India Muslim League Session, Delhi, Presidential Address* (Calcutta, [1919]), 2.

[15] See below, 98–9.

[16] These views were expressed by leading Muslims to Ronaldshay, Gov. of Bengal. See Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 11 Sept. 1918, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[17] For this ref. to Dr Ansari's speech see below, n. 48.

[18] See Abul Mahasin Muhammad Sajjad (1882–1940) to Abdul Bari, 4 Dec. 1918, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 93.

[19] Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 11 Sept. 1918, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. For the *'ulama*'s representations to Montagu see Parl. Papers, 1918, Cmd. 9178, *Addresses Presented in India to His Excellency the Viceroy and the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India*, 8–10; and E. S. Montagu, *An Indian Diary* (ed.), V. Montagu (London, 1920), 45.

[20] Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 11 Sept. 1918, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[21] *New Times* (Karachi), 29 Dec. 1917; *Punjab* (Lahore), 5 Jan. 1918; *Maharashtra* (Poone), 6 Jan. 1918; and *Sind Moslem* (Sukkur), 6 Apr. 1918, L/R/5/174 and L/R/5/200. For full details of the internments see IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Jan.–June 1919, Proc. nos. 362–525; ch. i, n. 442; and AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i. Mohani had been released in May 1918, but was forced to live in Kithore under Police surveillance. See IOL&R, P/Conf./50, June 1919, Proc. no. 518.

Muslim, it nominated a Hindu, Lord Sinha of Raipur (1864–1928), to represent India at the peace conference. The Muslims feared that a non-Muslim, however able and judicious, could not fully comprehend and represent their views on questions affecting Islam. The nomination was interpreted as a calculated government action to injure Muslim interests.[22] The Muslims were in a predicament. Among the prominent pan-Islamists who had escaped internment during the war only a few—Abdul Bari, Dr Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Mushir Kidwai—were still politically active. Kidwai was based in London while the activities of Ansari and Ajmal Khan were confined to Delhi and some places of upper India. Abdul Bari was the only leader who enjoyed a position of pre-eminence in Muslim India. He was not only revered for his religious scholarship but he had also come to acquire, especially since the Kanpur Mosque affair and the establishment of the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba, great political hold on the Muslim masses. Being a distinguished *'alim* and sufi *pir* of the Qadiriyya hue, Abdul Bari had thousands of followers all over India. Most of the important pan-Islamists—Hasrat Mohani, the Ali brothers, Mushir Kidwai, Seth Jan Muhammad Chotani (1883–1932), Seth Abdoola Haroon (1872–1942), Shah Sulaiman Phulwari (1959–1935), Tasadduk Ahmad Khan Sherwani (1884–1935)—were either his devotees or the disciples of his close fellow-*pirs*.[23] The Anjuman-i Mu'idu'l-Islam of Lucknow, a somewhat informal association founded in 1910 to further the religious and material interests of the Muslim community, provided Abdul Bari the necessary organizational support while the annual *'urs* of the twelfth-century sufi saint Khwaja Muin-ud-din Chishti at Ajmer served to bring together at one place most of the leading *sajjada nashins* of sufi shrines, *'ulama* of religious seminaries and wealthy *seths* from all over India. This personal conclave of the *'ulama* and the educated élite with an intertwined network of *khanqahs*, *madrasas* and *anjumans* was remarkably important in fostering the movement for lenient treatment for Turkey.

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[22] *Paisa Akhbar* (Lahore), 16 Nov. 1918; *Aftab* (Lahore), 22 Nov. 1918; *Nusrat* (Amritsar), 24 Nov. 1918; *Vatan*, 13 Dec. 1918; and *Wafadar* (Navasir), IOL&R, L/R/5/174 and L/R/5/200.

[23] The Ali brothers, for instance, were his favourite disciples. Hasrat Mohani was a devotee of Abdul Bari's father, Abdul Wahab. Kidwai was a follower of Haji Waris Ali Shah, a friend of Abdul Bari. Shah Sulaiman Phulwari was a *murid* of Abdul Hayy of Farangi Mahal and Chotani followed Sayyid Ibrahim Saif al-Din al-Gailani who was known to Abdul Bari from his Baghdad days (1908). Interview with Maulana Jamal Miyan. Also see Anon., *Kulliyat-i Hasrat Mohani*, (Delhi, 1959), 57–8; and Shahid Farangi Mahalli, 'Khadam-i Ka'ba Maulana Shaukat 'Ali', 88.

Abdul Bari had been in constant touch with his associates, including the Ali brothers and Azad who were still in detention.[24] Expecting a change of events in the closing stages of the war he had already resurrected the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba which had been disbanded at the commencement of the hostilities after an assurance by the viceroy that the holy places would be immune from attack.[25] The object was to keep the Anjuman in readiness should an occasion arise for launching a protest about them. For the time being, however, its efforts were confined to obtaining the release of its secretary, Shaukat Ali.[26] Already, since early 1917, a campaign for the release of the Muslim internees, headed nominally by 'Bi Amman' Abadi Bano Begum (1851–1924), the mother of the Ali brothers, had been under way.[27] In addition to this, an organization known as the 'Central Bureau for the Help of the Muslim Internees', had been established at Delhi with the Raja Sahib of Mahmudabad as president and Dr Ansari and Abdur Rahman as secretaries.[28] Its main objectives were to secure an early release of the Muslim internees and to raise sufficient funds for a constitutional agitation.[29] Abdul Bari, Ajmal Khan, Jinnah, Syed Reza Ali (1882–1949) and other Muslim leaders were active in this direction and in the winter of 1917 M. K. Gandhi (1869–1948), the enterprizing Hindu leader, had also been persuaded to support the campaign.[30] The latter, while in Britain, had gauged

[24] See letters to Abdul Bari from Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Mohani, Kidwai, Zafar Ali Khan and others in *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), *passim*. For the Ali brothers see ibid., 18–19 and 56–65, and Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 436–501. In this case the intermediaries were Shoaib Qureshi, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Iqbal Shaidai, Khaliquzzaman and Ghate, the Ali brothers' lawyer. Interview with Jamal Miyan; *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 58; and *Imroze* (Lahore), 12 Jan. 1969. For Azad see *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 36; and IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, June 1919, Proc. no. 490.

[25] Ext., Punjab Abstract, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 40/4, 26 Jan. 1918, para. 116.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., 40/14, 6 Apr. 1918, para. 410. Also see AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i; Central Bureau for Muslim Internees, *Mr. Shaukat Ali and Mr. Mohamed Ali*, Muslim internees Series no.1 (Delhi, 1918); Mohamed Ali, *Freedom of Faith and Its Price* (London, 1920); IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1574, file 1451/1919; *Shubhcaya* (Dharwar), 4 Jan. 1918; *New Times*, 29 Dec. 1917; *Sind Moslem*, 6 Apr. 1918; *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 Nov., 21 Dec. and 19 and 20 Dec. 1918, and *Punjab*, 5 Jan. 1918, IOL&R, L/R/5/174 and L/R/5/200.

[28] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i.

[29] For details about the Bureau and its aims and objectives see SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 40/14, 6 Apr. 1918, para. 410.

[30] This was the result of his meeting with 'Bi Amman' at Calcutta in Dec. 1917. See *Bombay Chronicle*, 1 Jan. 1918. For Gandhi's efforts in this regard see Gandhi to Maffey, 1 and 21 Jan. and 27 Apr. 1918, and Gandhi to Shoaib Qureshi, 27

the depth of Muslim feelings over the Turkish question and quickly perceived an opportunity to foster friendship with the Muslim leaders. He already knew the Ali brothers and after their internment had kept open a 'hot-line' with Chhindwara.[31] Through Dr Ansari the circle of his Muslim friends widened and came to include Abdul Bari,[32] the man he wanted to befriend the most. However, it was not until April 1918 that Gandhi expressed his sympathy for the Muslims publicly when, at the Delhi Imperial War Conference, he forcefully presented their point of view with regard to Turkey.[33] He followed it up by an appeal to Chelmsford, requesting him to issue 'definite assurances' about the Muslim states. 'As a Hindu', he reasoned, 'I cannot be indifferent to their cause. Their sorrows must be our sorrows.'[34] By associating himself with the Muslim cause, Gandhi had earned the gratitude of the Muslim leaders. Their friendship blossomed into an unwritten pact to help each other for the promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity, an amicable solution of the constitutional problems and, most importantly, the Turkish issue.[35] But then nothing tangible emerged and the Muslims were left to themselves to develop their agitation.[36]

The Ali brothers had all along been prodding Abdul Bari to action. When, in December 1918, they were granted parole for three weeks to visit their sick relatives in Rampur,[37] they called on Abdul Bari at Lucknow to discuss with him the Turkish question.[38] Shaukat Ali, with a view to launching a systematic agitation, pressed Abdul Bari

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Feb. 1918, M. K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* [*Collected Works*], xiv (Delhi, 1958–), 141–2, 161–2, 373–4 and 220.

[31] O. S. Ghate and Shoaib Qureshi were the intermediaries. See Gandhi to Ghate, 6 Aug. 1918; Gandhi to Shoaib Qureshi, 24 Sept. 1918, *Collected Works*, xv, 4–5 and 51–2. He also wrote directly to Mohamed Ali. See Gandhi to Mohamed Ali, 18 Nov. 1918, ibid., 63–4. Also see Afzal Iqbal, *The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali* (Lahore, 1974), 130.

[32] *Bombay Chronicle*, 1 Jan. 1918.

[33] Abdul Bari thanked him immediately. See Abdul Bari to Gandhi, [? Apr. 1918], *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 14–15.

[34] Gandhi to Chelmsford, 29 Apr. 1918, *Collected Works*, xiv, 377.

[35] See below, 103–5.

[36] Judith M. Brown, in her *Gandhi's Rise to Power* (Cambridge, 1972), argues that it was Gandhi who spurred the Muslims to action and organized the Khilafat movement when their own leaders were lukewarm about it (see ch. vi). On the contrary, my contention is that there is enough evidence to show that the Muslim leaders initiated and developed the agitation without any inspiration from outside. Indeed they had themselves pulled Gandhi into the Khilafat movement.

[37] IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Poll. · Jan. 1919—189–203—Part 1 B.

[38] Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 26 Jan. 1919, Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 502–3.

to summon Mushir Kidwai to India.[39] Kidwai, who was running the principal pan-Islamic propaganda organization in London called the Islamic Information Bureau, had kept Abdul Bari well-briefed about the political developments in Europe *vis-à-vis* Turkey.[40] Like an experienced observer he had been directing every move from Britain on the basis of information gathered from his own sources or from the Aga Khan who had access to important statesmen of Europe.[41] When the war ended, he himself was anxious to return to India but the government, fearing complications, had refused him permission.[42] His absence, however, was more than compensated by the resourcefulness of Dr Ansari and Ajmal Khan who sought to work up popular sympathy for the Khilafat cause before the peace conference had begun in Paris.[43] One difficulty, however, was that the Muslim League, supposed to be the custodian of Muslim rights, was a conservative body with no worthwhile political programme to work out and no ideal to attain. Its total membership of 712, with only 252 of them having bothered to pay their annual dues, reflects the general apathy of its state of affairs.[44] However, the League's forthcoming session in Delhi in December 1918, provided an excellent opportunity to raise the Khilafat issue. Special invitations were sent out to a number of *'ulama* and other Indian leaders, including many Hindus, to take part in the deliberations. The response was quite encouraging.[45]

Thus, the first public expression of anxiety over the fate of Turkey after the war was made at the Muslim League platform. Held on 30 and 31 December 1918 at the Benarsi Krishna Theatre under the chairmanship of Fazlul Haq of Bengal, the sessions were attended

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[39] Ibid.

[40] See e.g. Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 2 Sept. 1914, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 83–4. Jafri claims that on important political issues Abdul Bari also used to consult Nazir-uddin Hasan, a former judge of the Hyderabad High Court. See his *'Ali baradaran*, 472, n. 1.

[41] See Kidwai to Shaikh Shaukat Ali, 7 June [?1921], AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i. Refers to events of earlier dates.

[42] IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Poll.—Jan. 119—20–23—Part 1 B; Poll.-May 1919—312-15—Part 1 B; and P/Conf./57, Poll.—Feb. 1920—260—Part 1 B.

[43] Ansari to Abdul Bari, n.d., *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 102–3.

[44] This, however, was an improvement on the last year when only 96 members had cleared their dues. See *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1919* (Lucknow, 1919), 3–4 in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i. For the organizational structure of the AIML see Saleem Ahmad, *The All India Muslim League*, 207–22.

[45] Ibid. Also see IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/1919; and AFM/NAP, AIMLR, lxxx.

by many prominent leaders, including a large number of *'ulama* who represented various seminaries and schools of thought in the country. Besides Abdul Bari and his Farangi Mahal group, there were Mufti Kifayatullah (1875–1952), Ahmad Saeed (1886–1959) and Abdul Latif on behalf of the Anjuman-i 'Ulama of Delhi, Abul Wafa Sanaullah (1869–1948) of Amritsar representing the *'ulama* of the Ahl-i Hadis school, and Abdul Kadir Azad Subhani (1882–1957) attending on behalf of the *'ulama* of Kanpur. The *'ulama* of Deoband did not attend, having become cautious since the discovery of the Silk Letter 'conspiracy' and the internment of Mahmud Hasan. They also found it hard to revise their views regarding the Ottoman caliphate or to disown their loyal wartime stance. But in order not to appear entirely aloof, Hafiz Muhammad Ahmad, the son of the senior co-founder of the Deoband school and now its *nazim*, sent a letter supporting the League resolutions.[46] Before coming to the League sessions, the *'ulama* had held their own meeting at the Fatehpuri Mosque in Delhi at which they passed resolutions reminding the British government of their pledges to respect the sanctity of the Muslim holy places and to treat Jerusalem as one of their sacred sanctuaries.[47] This was a peculiar way of heralding their presence and it was duly noticed.

Dr Ansari's address as the chairman of the reception committee, written by Abdul Ghaffar (1894–1956) of the *Jamhur* in consultation with Abdul Bari, was a strongly-worded exposition of the Muslim case. He emphasized that every government, howsoever strong, had responsibility towards its subjects which it could not ignore. The time had come when the ministers of the Crown must do their duty to the Muslims of India: the wartime pledges must be honoured and the temporal power of Islam saved from further dismemberment. All non-Muslim control must be removed from the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* (Arabia, Palestine and Iraq) and the territories restored to the sultan-caliph of Turkey. Ansari maintained that no other person could claim the caliph's 'rightful' authority and that Sharif Husain of Makkah, who had been 'actuated by his personal ambitions and selfish interests' deserved to be killed. Ansari went on to criticize not only the British

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[46] IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Mar. 1919, Proc. no. 251. Also see IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/1919. The text of his letter to Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari, dated 29 Dec. 1918, is available in the Urdu section of the AIML Proc. AFM/NAP, AIMLR, 'Kar rawa'i al Indya Muslim lig ijlas yazdaham, mun'aqda ikattis disambar unnis sau athara [31 Dec. 1918]', 98–100.

[47] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 4 Jan. 1919, para. 29, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/5, 1 Feb. 1919, para. 158.

government for its anti-Turk policy but also lashed at the Indian authorities recounting a long list of grievances against the government, including the internments, gagging of the press, and slow pace of constitutional reforms.[48]

The aggressive spirit of Dr Ansari's address, later proscribed by the government, was reflected in the speeches that followed. Fazlul Haq in his presidential address dwelt on the 'evil effects' of the British rule in India.[49] Abdul Bari, though reluctant to decree India *daru'l-harb*, was so worked up that he objected to the display of Union Jack flags in the hall.[50] Azad Subhani was more explicit as he justified the proclamation of *jihad* positively.[51] Kifayatullah and Khwaja Abdul Majid (1885–1962) declared that if the government wished to retain the loyalty of the Indian Muslims then it must give effect to their demands.[52] The excited tenor of the proceedings, however, was not liked by the moderate League leaders. Of course, they were equally concerned about the fate of Turkey but they held that Ansari and his friends had no right to jeopardize Muslim interests by ventilating grievances in such an aggressive manner.[53] Jinnah was foremost among them. His protest was to methods rather than to motives. He had been a consistent and staunch supporter of Turkey and pan-Islam though his approach was pragmatic and not emotional.[54] In fact, he was one of the first Indian leaders who took up the Khilafat

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[48] *Bombay Chronicle*, 31 Dec. 1918; and IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/19. The address was rendered into English by Shoaib Qureshi. See Ext., Delhi Abstract, 4 Jan. 1919, para. 29, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/5, 1 Feb. 1919, para. 158.

[49] Fazlul Haq, *All India Moslem League 1918 Session, Presidential Address*, above, n. 14.

[50] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, 'Kar rawa'i... [31 December 1918]', 109–110. Interestingly, the proceedings in Urdu in the authorized Muslim League records do not contain the texts of the controversial speeches by Ansari, Abdul Bari or Azad Subhani. Also see AIMLR, lxxx, 21–28 and 52; and IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/19.

[51] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/1919; and AFM/NAP, AIMLR, lxxx, 66–71.

[52] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 4 Jan. 1919, para. 29, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/5, 1 Feb. 1919, para. 158.

[53] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/1919.

[54] At the time of the Balkan War he had taken a leading part in voicing Muslim concern over the fate of Turkey and had helped in organizing relief supplies to the Ottoman sufferers. For details see M. Naeem Qureshi, '(Quaid-i-Azam) Jinnah and the Khilafat Movement (1918–1924)', in A. H. Dani (ed.), *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (Islamabad, 1979), 142–61. Stanley Wolpert's contention that Jinnah 'remained aloof from any semblance of involvement in Pan-Islamic activity', is, therefore, unacceptable. See his 'Congress Leadership in Transition: Jinnah to Gandhi, 1914–1923', in B. N. Pandey (ed.), *Leadership in South Asia* (New Delhi, 1977), 656.

issue from the League platform as early as December 1916. At times he even donned a Turkish *fez* after the popular fashion to demonstrate his Ottoman sympathies. But he was a constitutionalist and did not believe in threats which he knew could not be translated into action.[55] In the subjects committee meeting at Ajmal Khan's house, Jinnah, along with Syed Nabiullah (d. 1925) and Syed Wazir Hasan (1874–1947), unsuccessfully tried to impress upon the delegates that nothing should be done which might compromise their national position at that particular juncture. But he was overruled. Ansari, Ajmal Khan and others by playing upon the religious feelings of the Muslims carried the majority with them.[56] Jinnah staged a walk-out, followed by the Raja of Mahmudabad, the permanent president of the League at the time.[57]

A medley of resolutions was passed though their tone was temperate. One of these emphasized that the question of the Khilafat was purely for the Muslims themselves to decide and any departure from the declared British policy of non-interference would result in 'great resentment and ill-feeling'. Another resolution protested against the occupation of Jerusalem, Najaf and other Muslim sanctuaries by the British forces and urged their immediate evacuation.[58] But the most important resolution from the point of view of the Muslim reaction was the one which categorically stated the essence of the Muslim demands:

> Having regard to the fact that the Indian Musalmans take a deep interest in the fate of their co-religionists outside India, and that the collapse of the Muslim Powers of the world is bound to have an adverse influence on the political importance of the Musalmans in the country, and the annihilation of the military powers of Islam in the world cannot but have a far-reaching effect on the minds of even the loyal Musalmans of India, the All India Muslim League considers it to be its duty to place before the Government of India and His Majesty's Government the true sentiments of the Muslim community, and requests that the British representatives at the Peace Conference will use their influence and see that in the territorial and political redistribution to

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[55] Ibid.

[56] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/1919.

[57] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 4 Jan. 1919, para. 29, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/5, 1 Feb. 1919, para. 158. Also see Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, i, 500.

[58] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/1919. Also see Fazlul Haq to Lloyd George, Tel. 2 Jan. 1918, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 360/1919.

> be made, the fullest consideration should be paid to the requirements of the Islamic law with regard to the full and independent control by the Sultan of Turkey, Khalifa of the Prophet, over the holy places and over the Jazirat-ul-Arab as delimited in the Muslim books. The League further hopes that in determining the political relations of the Empire, for the future, His Majesty's Ministers shall pay the fullest consideration to the universal and deep sentiment of the Musalmans of India, and that resolute attempts should be made to effect a complete reconciliation and lasting concord between the Empire and Muslim states, based on terms of equality and justice, in the interests alike of the British Empire and the Muslim world.[59]

The Muslim League thanked the *'ulama* 'for having extended their co-operation not only by their presence but also by giving public expression to the religious sentiments of the Musalmans'.[60] The resolution also requested the *'ulama* 'to grant the honour of their permanently joining the League'.[61] Copies of the resolutions were then sent to Lloyd George and Montagu.[62]

The Muslim League session was of great political significance. It marked the beginning of the campaign for lenient treatment for Turkey which had been simmering all through the war. It also registered the emergence of young pan-Islamists as the new leaders of Muslim India, who, in concert with the Congress, were out to change the whole perspective of Indian Muslim politics. It was not insignificant that the League, which had been coming closer to the Congress on many issues, decided to confer with the latter on the question of the reforms[63] and the Congress allowed its platform to be used by Ajmal Khan to attack the government's policy on the Khilafat issue.[64] Another significance of the Delhi session was the presence of a group of leading *'ulama* who, in spite of being divided on religious and sectarian issues, were willing to affix their religious seal on the Khilafat demands. Being the members of a religious élite corps exercising considerable influence since the medieval times, their presence

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[59] Resolution xxi, All India Muslim League Session at Delhi, Dec. 1918, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1584, file 2272/1919; and AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Proceedings of the 11th Sessions of the All India Muslim League, held at Delhi on 30th and 31st December 1918* (Lucknow, 1918), 9-10 and 64-5.

[60] Resolution (a) in ibid., 1 and 56.

[61] Resolution (b), in ibid., 1.

[62] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/1919.

[63] Ibid.

[64] *Report of the Thirty-Third Session of the Indian National Congress held at Delhi on the 26th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st Dec. 1918* (Delhi, 1919), 12–14.

had a stimulating effect on the Muslim community. Though they had never been a monolithic entity they still claimed, as the self-appointed interpreters of *shari'at*, primacy in all matters, religious or profane.[65] From the beginning of the century, the *'ulama* had been gradually gravitating towards a common pan-Islamic platform with the western-educated élite though not so much among themselves. Now, they were back in the foray, determined to recapture their lost power. It was also the beginning of an open estrangement from the government and for the first time the session of the League closed without the usual cheers for the King Emperor.[66] The radicals wanted to change the constitution of the Muslim League in order to bring the questions of the Khilafat and the holy places within its objectives but they were defeated. Abul Kasem (1871–1936), in particular, begged them not to play to the gallery as the League would lose moderate support.[67] And it happened exactly like that as the Raja of Mahmudabad and Wazir Hasan, jolted by this sudden change of pace and tenor in Muslim politics, found it impossible to remain in the League any longer and in March 1919, coaxed by Sir Harcourt Butler (1869–1938), the lieutenant-governor of the UP, both of them resigned from the organization.[68]

Despite the divisions in the Muslim camp, the trend of opinion with regard to the Khilafat question was giving anxious moments to the Government of India. On 31 January 1919, Chelmsford frankly warned Montagu that failure to voice Indian views would exacerbate feelings already sore.[69] Three weeks later he reported again:

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[65] A very scintillating, though somewhat scathing, analysis of the *'ulama*, at least of the UP, will be found in Robinson, *Separatism*, 257–88. Also see Mushirul Hasan, 'Religion and Politics in India: The *Ulama* and the Khilafat Movement', in id. (ed.), *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends*, 17–42. For the nature of differences among the *'ulama* see Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, 66–70.

[66] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1573, file 1424/19.

[67] The original clause ran: 'To protect the religious and other rights and interests of Indian Mussalmans'. The three amendments proposed were: (a) 'To protect the political and other rights and interests of Mussalmans'; (b) 'To protect the political, religious and other rights of Indian Mussalmans'; and (c) 'To protect the political, religious and other rights of Mussalmans inside and outside India'. See Ext., Delhi Abstract, 11 Jan. 1919, para. 64 in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/7, 15 Feb. 1919, para. 226.

[68] See Butler to Earl Richards, 5 Mar. 1919, IOL&R, Butler Papers. The council of the AIML, at its meeting on 20 Apr. 1919, appointed Abul Kasem Fazlul Haq as president and Syed Zahur Ahmad as hon. sec. for the interim period. See AFM/NAP, AIML, *Annual Report . . . for the Year 1919*, 6.

[69] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 123, 31 Jan. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

> There is no doubt that Moslems generally are much exercised and anxious as to the future of Turkey and a small irreconcilable section is steadily endeavouring to work up fanatical feelings. The religious aspect of this movement makes it difficult to cope with. It cannot however be ignored that it contains the seed of possible dangerous developments.[70]

With the concurrence of the India Office, the Government of India tried to reassure the Muslim community that the British government still adhered to its pronouncements and pledges and that due consideration would be given to their views at the peace conference.[71] But this had no effect. The discontent spread rapidly.

Since the peace conference had already started its deliberations in Paris in January 1919, Abdul Bari decided to strengthen the Khilafat demands by obtaining a religious decree of the *'ulama* on the issue. Early in the year, he circulated a *fatwa* on behalf of the Anjuman-i Mu'idu'l-Islam. This was designed to amplify a juridical consensus on the question of the Khilafat.[72] Appended to the *istifta* were the opinions of eleven Farangi Mahal *'ulama*, including Abdul Bari himself and his cousins, Salamatullah (d. 1930) and Sibghatullah, to the effect that (a) the appointment of an *imam* or caliph was obligatory irrespective of whether he was a Quraishi or a non-Quraishi; (b) the boundaries of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* were exactly as detailed by Dr Ansari in his address and it was their duty to expel Christians, Jews and idolaters from that land; and (c) it was incumbent upon good Muslims to come to the aid of a Muslim country if it was under attack from non-Muslims.[73] In all, sixty-six *'ulama* affixed their signatures to the *fatwa* but some politically cautious among them, notably Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly, Ashraf Ali Thanawi (1863–1943) of Thana Bhawan, Abdul Hamid of Farangi Mahal, Sayyid Sulaiman Ashraf (1878–1939) of Aligarh, Habibur Rahman Sherwani of Hyderabad, Abdullah Tonki of Calcutta, and those of Deoband, refused to respond.[74] Apart

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[70] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 185, 18 Feb. 1919, IOL&R, ibid.

[71] IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Mar. 1919, Proc. no. 254.

[72] Ext., UP Abstract, 22 Mar. 1919, para. 578, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/14, 5 Apr. 1919, para. 504.

[73] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/9, 1 Mar. 1919, para. 288. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 293, 21 Mar. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Bamford, *Histories*, 137.

[74] Interview with Malik Lal Khan. Also see S. A. A. Soleman, *Anti-Khalif Intrigues in Sind* (Sukkur, 1919), part 1, 3; H. F. Owen, 'Organizing for the Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919', in R. Kumar (ed.), *Essays on Gandhian Politics* (Oxford, 1971), 64; Robinson, *Separatism*, 292–3; Muhammad Abdul Hakim Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak* (Lahore,

from doctrinal disputations and personal recriminations there were differences regarding the Ottoman title to the caliphal office. This was particularly so with Ahmad Raza Khan. He was critical of Abdul Bari and Abul Kalam Azad for allegedly misinterpreting the *shari'at* and deliberately giving a religious colour to a political movement. But in opposing the Khilafat movement he was not just being pro-British; he hated doing something which meant collaboration with the Hindus and submission to Gandhi's leadership.[75] Abdul Bari, however, remained unmoved by these arguments and sent his *fatwa* to Chelmsford, reminding him that though the Muslims were not bound by religion to wage war against Britain, there was a limit to which they could restrain themselves, especially if the requirements of *shari'at* were ignored.[76]

Throughout the month of March 1919, Abdul Bari kept up pressure on the government. The following month, he went to Ajmer to attend the annual *'urs* there and to raise subscriptions for his proposed visit to the Muslim countries to seek a wider support.[77] At Ajmer, he met some eminent religious and business dignitaries from various parts of the country, including Seth Muhammad Afzal Nirmanwala of Surat, Seth Muhammad Zakariya of Calcutta, Seth Jan Muhammad Chotani of Bombay, and Seth Abdoola Haroon of Karachi. The prominent among the *'ulama* and *masha'ikh* were Sayyid Muhammad Fakhir (d. 1930) of Allahabad, Muhammad Shafi of Etawah, Muin-ud-din of Ajmer, Sulaiman Ashraf of Aligarh, and Shah Sulaiman Phulwari of Patna. At the meeting held on the night of 11 April 1919 under the presidency of the *sajjada nashin*, Diwan Sayyid Sharfuddin Ali Khan, eight resolutions were passed. The general purport of these was that Muslim sentiment regarding the caliphate and Islam and the maintenance of the Turkish Empire

1985), 223; and SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/14, 5 Apr. 1919, para. 504.

[75] For this controversy see Ahmad Raza Khan, *Dawamu'l-'aish fi'l a'imma min Quraish* (Bombay, 1922), 14–15, 61 and 69; id., *Rasa'il-i Razwiyya*, ii (Lahore, 1974), 193; Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 149, 158 ff., 237 and 343; and M. Masud Ahmad, 'Imam Ahmad Raza Barelwi aur 'Abdu'l-Bari Farangi Mahalli', *Ma'arif-i Raza*, 9, (1989), 185–92. Raza Khan displayed his revulsion of the British by affixing postage stamps bearing the crowned bust of the sovereign upside down as a mark of disrespect.

[76] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/14, 5 Apr. 1919, para. 504. Abdul Bari's letter to the Viceroy was published in the *Ukhuwat* of 12 Mar. 1919.

[77] CID, UP, 12 Apr. 1919, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/19, 10 May 1919, para. 687.

ought to receive due consideration at the peace conference.[78] They also supported Abdul Bari's *fatwa* which was later published and circulated as were a number of handbills and circulars upholding the Khilafat demands.[79] To add legitimacy to the demands, the name of the Ottoman Caliph Mehmed V was included in the *khutba* in Farangi Mahal mosques and elsewhere in India.[80] Thus the pan-Islamists were able to produce a spurt of activity among the educated Muslims. Soon telegrams and memorials from various individuals and associations all over the country started to pour into the Viceregal Lodge in Delhi and Whitehall in London, entreating that Turkey be spared the humiliation of dismemberment.[81]

In spite of the hectic activity, however, the movement still lacked a cohesive all-India character. The agitation was mostly centred in the larger towns of the UP, Bengal, the Punjab, Bombay and the Frontier where the work was organized by local leaders through the existing network of the Muslim League organizations. An attempt to widen the scope of the movement had been made in March 1919, when Gandhi turned to Abdul Bari for support of his *satyagraha* or 'passive resistance' campaign against the unpopular 'Rowlatt' Bills.[82] Originally, Abdul Bari had strong objections to joining hands with Hindus as he considered such a liaison harmful for the Muslim community.[83] The vexed question of cow-slaughter was a stumbling block as the *'ulama*, especially of the Bareilly connection, had refused to clamp a ban on it.[84] With the changed outlook on a Hindu-Muslim *rapprochement*, however, Abdul Bari at once seized the opportunity and after an interview with Gandhi at Lucknow declared his support for the *satyagraha* campaign pronouncing it in accord with the Islamic

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[78] Ext., Rajputana and Ajmer Marwara Abstract, 19 Apr. 1919, para. 31, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/17, 26 Apr. 1919, para. 591.

[79] See Muin-ud-din Ajmeri, *Kalimatu Haq*, (Pilibhit, n.d.), in Jafri Nadwi, *Auraq-i gumgashta* (Lahore, 1968), 543.

[80] Ext., UP Abstract, 3 May 1919, para. 809, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/20, 17 May 1919, para. 746.

[81] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795 and 796.

[82] The Bills aimed at reloading the govt. with arbitrary powers in place of the Defence of India Act when it ceased to be operative six months after the conclusion of peace. See Verney Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement* (London, 1920), 171. Gandhi himself called his agitation 'civil resistance' and not 'passive resistance'. See his letter to Abdul Aziz, 8 Aug. 1919, *Collected Works*, xvi, 13.

[83] Abdul Bari, *Khutba-i sadarat* (Erode, 1921), 24.

[84] The Hindus had been trying to secure a ban since the 1880s. See Ahmad Raza Khan, *An-nafsu'l-fiqr fi qurban'il baqr*, in Sayyid Muhammad Sulaiman Ashraf, *ar-Rishad*, repr. of 1920 edn. (Lahore, 1981), Preface, vi–xiii.

principles.[85] In return Abdul Bari obtained a promise of Hindu support for the Khilafat cause.

> It was agreed [reported a government agent] that when the agitation was at its height there would be a large meeting of Ulemas, Maulvis and Mohammadans generally, at which Abdul Bari should be elected Shaikh-ul-Islam and the Muslim demands regarding the Khilafat, the holy places, etc., should be formulated. The Hindus would support these demands which should be submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy with the warning that non-acceptance of them would mean *jehad*. In return for the assistance of the Hindus, Abdul Bari, in his capacity as Shaikh-ul-Islam, was to issue a *fatwa* declaring that the animal originally sacrificed by Abraham was a sheep and not a cow, and that cow-sacrifice was prohibited in future.[86]

Evidently, both Gandhi and Abdul Bari were trying to utilize each other to mutual advantage. Gandhi exploited the Khilafat issue to gain Muslim support and through them the leadership of a united India. Otherwise, he himself admitted that he 'cared nothing for Turkey as such, but the Indian Mohammadans did . . . and [he] felt justified in championing it'.[87] The high sounding moral reasons which he gave for joining the Khilafat movement[88] were merely for public consumption. Moreover, by his help to the Khilafat movement Gandhi wanted 'to enlist the Musalman's sympathy in the matter of cow protection'.[89] Indeed he made the attainment of *swaraj* and even the survival of Hinduism conditional on the protection of cow.[90] Whether it was this aspect or just to bind the Hindu support for the Muslims that Gandhi treated the *Khilafat* as a '*Kamadhuk*',[91] the mythical cow that gave whatever one asked of her. Like the Khilafatists, he imported religion into politics and dared to hold on to it.[92] For Abdul Bari,

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[85] Ext., UP Abstract, 22 Mar. 1919, para. 578 in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/14, 15 Apr. 1919, para. 504; Owen, 'Rowlatt Satyagraha', 76; and Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 195–6.

[86] Govt. of Bombay, *Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India (Collected from Bombay Government Records)*, iii, part 1 (Bombay, 1958–65), 139.

[87] Ibid., 280 1.

[88] Gandhi held that it was 'a sense of moral responsibilities which has made me take up the Khilafat question and to identify myself entirely with the Mahomedans'. He could not be, he declared, a party to a broken pledge of Lloyd George. See *Young India, 1919–1922* (Madras, 1922), 152–4.

[89] *Young India, 1924–1926* (Madras, 1927), 1047.

[90] Ibid., 1323.

[91] *Collected Works*, xx, 192. Later Gandhi admitted: 'I have been telling Maulana Shaukat Ail [*sic* for Ali] all along that I was helping him to save his cow, i.e. the *Khilafat*, because I hoped to save my cow thereby'. *Young India, 1924–1926*, 1327.

[92] See K. R. Prabhu and U. R. Rao, *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi* (Bombay,

Gandhi's support meant the strengthening of the Khilafat movement and perhaps personal fame as the *Shaikhu'l-Islam* of the sub-continent. For this he was prepared to modify his earlier stance and preach cow protection even at the risk of inviting condemnation from certain quarters.[93]

Consequently, Muslim support was built up by rumours that the 'Rowlatt' Bills were 'intended to enable [the] Government to coerce the Mohammedans and prevent them from giving trouble so as to facilitate the dismemberment of Turkey'.[94] Steps were also taken, mainly at Kidwai's prompting, to organize an agency to concentrate solely on the Khilafat issue.[95] Wealthy Bombay Muslim businessmen of Farangi Mahal connection responded first and towards the middle of March 1919, a 'Khilafat Committee' was established at Bombay under a Halai Memon, Seth Jan Muhammad Chotani, the burly timber merchant and a prosperous government contractor who had his business empire spread all over India.[96] The Committee proved to be the embryo of the powerful Khilafat organization of the future but for the present its orbit was confined to the Bombay presidency. Thus, the Khilafat movement and Gandhi's 'Rowlatt' *satyagraha* turned into a powerful agitation because it was marked by an extraordinary fraternization of Hindus and Muslims.[97] But the Khilafat movement was the very antithesis of *satyagraha*; the Muslims were unwilling to adopt non-violence and instigated the Hindus to do the same.[98] The agitation quickly became violent. Early in April 1919, about half a

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1945), 70–1; and K. C. Chaudhry, *Role of Religion in Indian Politics (1900–1925)* (Delhi, 1978), 231–63.

[93] See below, 125.

[94] *History of the Freedom Movement*, ii, 750, 739 and 790.

[95] *Madras Mail*, 25 June 1923.

[96] Bombay Presidency, Police Abstract of Intelligence for 1919, pares. 503, 529, 575, 603 and 628, cited in Owen, 'Rowlatt Satyagraha', 76–7. Prominent among those present at the meeting of 19 Mar. were: Chotani, Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan, B. A. Koor, Ahmed Haji Siddik Khatri, S. K. Barodawala, Omar Sobani, S. D. Canjee, R. Currimbhoy, M. A. Y. Ispahani, M. M. Khandwani, H. Lallji, H. C. Tyabji, M. H. Maqba, M. H. A. Manyar and A. R. H. Yacoob. See *Bombay Chronicle*, 20, 21 and 22 Mar. 1919.

[97] In a moment of extreme camaraderie Muslims admitted Hindus to mosques and speakers like Shraddhanand, Gandhi, Mrs Naidu, B. Chakrabarti and others, addressed congregations at Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore and other places. See Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 681, *Report of the Committee appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc.*, 5 and 37. Also see Owen, 'Rowlatt Satyagraha', 74–5.

[98] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 170. Also see Jamnadas Dwarkadas, *Political Memoirs* (Bombay, 1969), 304.

dozen Europeans and some Indian police officials were coldly murdered and considerable damage was done to railway and telegraph lines besides other government property.[99] The outbreaks were ruthlessly suppressed and hundreds perished in police and military firings. The most serious tragedy was the massacre at Amritsar in the Punjab on 13 April, when a prohibited but peaceful public meeting was broken up by shooting without warning by the orders of Brigadier-General Dyer (1863–1927) killing, according to the official count, approximately 379 and wounding 1200.[100] It was followed by martial law in the Punjab province, punitive measures and humiliating orders, incorporating a racial element.[101]

The pang over the severity of measures did not come immediately but twinged much later when the Congress and the Hunter Commission reports revealed the real extent of government repression. For the present, through a series of coercive measures, the Punjab had been cowed and the rest of India forced into quiescence.[102] But though the Rowlatt agitation was a political failure, the eruption had convinced Chelmsford that the source of the trouble was

[99] Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 681, apps. ii and iii.

[100] Ibid., ch. iii. Sir Valentine Chirol called it 'a black day in the annals of British India'. See his *India Old and New* (London, 1921), 177.

[101] Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History* (Michigan, 1961), 346. These included public whipping, crawling and saluting orders, compulsory military roll-call for students miles away from the town which O'Dwyer called 'a useful bit of discipline'. At Gujranwala aeroplane bombing and strafing was resorted to. Fines amounting to half year's revenue were imposed in certain villages near Lahore. Montagu took a strong exception to the racial aspect of the issue. See Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 681, ch. iii; O'Dwyer to Chelmsford, 16 and 21 Apr. 1919; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 423, 23 Apr. 1919; Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 2142, 2 Sept. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and *Reports of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress* (Lahore, 1920), 2 vols. On the Punjab issue also see various writers in Kumar, *Essays on Gandhian Politics*; Alfred Nundy, *The Present Situation with Special Reference to the Punjab Disturbances*, 2nd edn. (Dehra Dun, 1919); P. Mohan, *An Imaginary Rebellion and How it was Suppressed* (Lahore, 1920); Lajpat Rai, *The Agony of the Punjab* (Madras, 1920); H. N. Mitra, *Punjab Unrest, Before and After* (Calcutta, 1920); A. K. Ghose, *Lord Chelmsford's Viceroyalty* (Madras, 1921); Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 534, 705 and 771; R. Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar* (London, 1963); and Arthur Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset* (London, 1964).

[102] See the manifesto issued on 18 Apr. 1919, under the signatures of Muhammad Shafi, Nawab Fateh Ali (1862–1923) Quizilbash, Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan (1873–1933) and several other Muslims in *Hindu*, 24 Apr. 1919. Also see expressions of loyalty on behalf of the Shi'as and the Ahmadis in IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, Poll.—May 1919–305–306—Part 1 B; Poll.—May 1919–29—Deposit; and Pol.–May 1919–476 Part 1 B.

the Muslim discontent over Turkey, which had been aggravated by the 'unusual fraternization between Hindus and Mohamedans, undoubtedly fostered by Mahomedans'.[103] It is striking that at places where Muslims were not much disturbed, as in Madras, things remained quiet, and apart from Ahmedabad and other places where Gandhi's influence was supreme, the chief centres of the trouble were those areas where Muslim feelings ran high. Of course, factors common to Muslims and Hindus—distrust of the reforms, racial tension, economic distress, famine and disease, industrial strife, restlessness of the disbanded soldiery and the repressive policy of the hard-headed satraps like Sir Michael O'Dwyer (1864–1940) of the Punjab[104]—had all inflamed the situation but the Khilafat issue was at the bottom of the Muslim eruption. This is fully supported by contemporary evidence. For instance, reports from the Punjab indicated that city mobs were generally composed of Muslims under the direction of pan-Islamists and Hindu agitators.[105] In the Frontier, Muslim politics played a more important part in the demonstrations than the 'Rowlatt' Bills.[106] Harcourt Butler of the UP was of the opinion that it was chiefly the M[uslim]'s' who were in the forefront.[107] In Bengal, too, it was mostly Muslims who were prominent with almost a total exclusion of the Hindu element.[108] Montagu's assessment based on the provincial reports was also the same: 'Moslem feeling is the real cause of the trouble'.[109] Gandhi was himself positive about this and considered the Khilafat question to be the chief factor of the unrest.[110] On 14 April 1919, he told Maffey, the private secretary to Chelmsford:

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[103] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 370 15 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[104] See Syud Hossain's article in *Young India*, 4 Aug. 1918; Sir Shafa'at Ahmad Khan, *The Indian in South Africa* (Allahabad, 1946), esp. 1-127; Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 681, 62; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 117, 21 Feb. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; *The Times*, 11 Mar. 1919. Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 681, 62; and Chelmsford to Montagu, 16 and 30 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[105] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 394, 19 Apr. 1919, in ibid. Also see the chronological statement issued by the Punjab govt. in Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 534.

[106] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 390, 17 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[107] Butler to Earl Richards, 22 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Butler Papers.

[108] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 357 and 363, 13 and 14 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[109] Montagu to Willingdon, 16 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[110] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 114 and 117.

> The ferment among the Mahomedans is too great to be checked forever. It may burst like a torrent at any moment and behind the present disturbances are to be traced the results of extreme dissatisfaction. It is not confined to classes, but it most decidedly permeates the masses.[111]

Later, Gandhi told the Bombay police commissioner that

> He was quite convinced that there would have been no disturbances in April had it not been for the fact that Muhammadans were behind the Hindus. He put it down to the Muhammadans' fear that the Rowlatt Act had been framed with the express intention of suppressing the expression of their opinions with regard to the Khaliphate question. Had it not been for this fact the Muhammadans would not have instigated the Hindus to violence. He was thoroughly satisfied that had it not been for the incitement of the Muhammadans, the Hindus would have shown no violence.[112]

A fair idea of the hardened feelings of the Muslims can be drawn from the letter that the Ali brothers wrote to Chelmsford towards the end of April 1919 from Chhindwara. The memorandum recounted at length the wrongs alleged to have been perpetrated on Muslims by the British government, making excessive demands for the restoration of Egypt and all other occupied territories of the former Ottoman Empire to the caliph. It declared that the government had no claim on the allegiance of Muslims who must, if their legitimate demands were not satisfied within a reasonable time, declare *jihad* or else perform *hijrat*.[113] The demands, as Gandhi put it, were 'extravagant' and the language in which they were presented 'inflammatory', but even his cautious counsel that they should be re-drafted in 'a reasoned and logical statement',[114] was not accepted. *Status quo ante bellum* was for the Muslim leaders their irreducible minimum and they presented it as a purely religious requirement.

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[111] *Collected Works*, xv, 219-20.

[112] Special Branch, Punjab, 11 July 1919, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/27, 12 July 1919, para. 1241.

[113] Memo dated 24 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1574 with 1451/1919. The letter was proscribed by the Punjab, UP and Bombay govts.

[114] Gandhi to Ali brothers 23 May 1919, *Collected Works*, xv, 317-18. Also see Gandhi to Abdul Bari, 5 June 1919, ibid., 342-3. It is interesting that in his interview to an Intelligence functionary, Gandhi used a stronger expression to describe the letter- 'unreasonable and foolish'. See Ext., Bombay Abstract, 17 May 1919, para. 666 in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/22, 31 May 1919, para. 915.

Chelmsford had already in a secret letter to the heads of the local governments warned that the peace terms were likely to be harsh and that they had better prepared themselves for any Muslim ebullition.[115] On 3 May 1919, the warning was repeated and the local governments were instructed 'to do whatever is possible beforehand to alleviate the shock and to discount its effects'.[116] The information received from the local governments confirmed that the question of the Khilafat was the one issue on which the Muslims were generally agitated and harsh terms were likely to stir up trouble. But if the shadow at least of the Turkish Empire was retained with Istanbul and Anatolia forming part of it and the caliph exercising nominal suzerainty over Arabia in order to 'save the face of Islam', the Indian Muslims would ultimately acquiesce.[117] Even a staunch British ally like the Nizam of Hyderabad had some time ago warned Chelmsford that the British government 'should treat this subject with the greatest gravity and delicacy it deserves'.[118]

Thus, the fear of serious repercussions drove the Government of India to take precautionary measures and to adopt an attitude of understanding and conciliation towards the Muslims with regard to the Khilafat issue.[119] Chelmsford repeatedly impressed upon the British government the importance of taking some steps to soothe the Indian Muslims 'whose attitude was becoming daily more significant'.[120] Montagu, who was also convinced of the necessity of conciliating the Muslims, tried to represent their case sympathetically. But he found the British cabinet extremely ill-disposed towards Turkey.[121] Lloyd George, as a true Gladstonian Liberal of the old 'bag and

[115] Circular dated 19 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[116] Marris's letter to Local Govts., 3 May 1919, IOL&R, P/Conf./50. ICH(P)P, May 1919, Proc. no. 363.

[117] IOL&R, P/Conf./50. ICH(P)P, May 1919, Proc. nos. 362–76.

[118] Memo by the Nizam, dated 27 Mar. 1919, encl., Nizam to Chelmsford, 27 Mar. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[119] See the Viceroy's letter to Local Govts., 19 Apr. 1919, in ibid. For an analysis of Chelmsford's policy, his method and its application to politics and reform also see P. G. Robb, *The Government of India and Reform: Polices Towards Politics and Constitution, 1916–1921* (Oxford, 1976), esp. 119–258.

[120] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 364, 14 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[121] During the last stages of the war, a high powered Eastern Committee, appointed by Lloyd George with Curzon, Balfour, Gen. Jan Smuts (1870–1950), Montagu and Gen. Sir Henry Wilson (1864–1922) as members, was charged to examine a policy for the annexation of Turkey in the event of a speedy Turkish or Russian collapse. For details see PRO, CAB, 27/24.

baggage' school, was violently anti-Turk and equally pronounced in his pro-Greek sentiments. His 'romantic admiration' for ancient Greece and his adulation of Eleutherios Venizelos (1864–1936), the Greek premier, must also have influenced his approach.[122] Equally responsible for the formulation of his anti-Turk views were the imperial policy of expansion and some latent religious prejudices. As regards India, Lloyd George was handicapped by all kinds of notions. He had no personal acquaintance with India and worse still, he could not rid himself of the feeling that the 'coloured' people were inferior.[123] Viscount Arthur Balfour (1848–1930), a nephew of Salisbury and secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, was another redoubtable opponent. On top of it he had abdicated the Office to the premier resulting in the creation of what Curzon has called, 'the Second F.O.' with its own secretariat under Philip Kerr (1882–1940), later Lord Lothian.[124] In the circumstances, Viscount Milner (1854–1925), secretary of state for Colonies, was Montagu's only supporter in the cabinet.[125] Nevertheless, the Indian delegation to the peace conference, consisting of Montagu, Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner (1880–1943), attempted to acquaint the Allied statesmen with the Indian Muslim view on the future of Turkey.[126] On 17 May 1919, through the efforts of the Aga Khan, they were able to present their case before the Council of Four at Paris.[127] The Aga Khan himself and two other prominent Indian Muslims, Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan (1867–1930) and Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872–1953), accompanied the delegation. In the interview, the deputationists passionately pleaded for leniency to Turkey, laying particular stress on the Allied pledges, especially the twelfth point of the American President Woodrow Wilson's (1856–1924) Fourteen Points which called for a 'secure sovereignty' of the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire.[128] But the Indians had no leverage like the Jews who had a bevy of

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[122] Thomas Jones, *Lloyd George* (London, 1951), 197.

[123] See John Grigg, *The Young Lloyd George* (London, 1973), 296–7.

[124] Mosley, *Curzon*, 206–8.

[125] See Montagu to Chelmsford, 25 June 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Mosley, *Curzon*, 206–8.

[126] See memos dated 5 Feb. and 1 Apr. 1919, encls., Montagu to Chelmsford, 31 Mar. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[127] See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 4 June 1919, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 85; and the stenographic notes of the meeting in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, v (Washington, 1946), 690–701.

[128] Ibid. (The latter ref. only).

highly placed co-religionists holding important positions in the Allied delegations to look after their interests.[129] Therefore, in the context of the policies to which the Allied Powers had already agreed in principle, the delegation's interview was merely an eyewash. Lloyd George pretended that he at least had been converted to their cause but in fact the delegation was never treated seriously.[130]

The intractable attitude of the British government and their allies dismayed the Indian Muslims. But pressure was kept up through prominent Indian Muslims in Britain, such as Mushir Kidwai, Hashim Ispahani, Ameer Ali, Yusuf Ali, Syed Abdul Majid (b. 1868), Nawab W. H. M. Jung and Khwaja Kamal-ud-din (1870–1923), who utilized the services of such organizations as the London Muslim League, the Islamic Society, the Woking Islamic Centre and whatever support they could muster from the British Turcophiles.[131] Much, however, depended on the course of the movement within India. The chance to step up the agitation came about the middle of May 1919, when the Afghans launched a sudden attack on British India.[132] Ubaidullah Sindhi, 'home member', and Zafar Hasan Aybek, secretary to the 'provisional government' of India in Kabul, issued posters in Thal exhorting Indians to rise against the British and help the Afghans.[133] The pan-Islamists lost no time in coquetting with the Afghan agents.[134] Since the Amir's machinations had left the areas nearer the Afghan border more excitable, the dissemination of the Khilafat propaganda became easier there. Abdul Bari circulated an 'inflammatory' leaflet and a lengthy *jihad* pamphlet appeared in the UP which, on the basis of numerous quotations from the Qur'an and the *ahadis*, emphasized

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[129] Levene, 'Nationalism and Alternatives', 522.

[130] See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 4 June 1919, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 85; and Montagu to Curzon, 28 Aug. 1919, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/851 and 852.

[131] The Central Islamic Society Series, no. 13, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795, file 4105/1919. The Woking Mission was originally established by Dr Lietner with the monetary assistance from the Begum of Bhopal and Nawab Salar Jang of Hyderabad. In 1912, Khwaja Kamal-ud-din and his Ahmadiyya sponsors captured the Mission. For details see Ashiq Husain Batalwi, *Chand yaden chand ta'assurat* (Lahore, 1969), 339–405.

[132] For Anglo-Afghan hostilities see Parl. Papers, 1919, Cmd. 324, *Papers Regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919*. Also see G. N. Molesworth, *Afghanistan 1919* (London, 1962); and Adamec, *Afghanistan*, 108–35.

[133] Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 139–41; and Ext., NWFP, 17 and 24 May 1919, paras. 230 and 240, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/22–23, 31 May and 7 June 1919, paras. 930 and 1030.

[134] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 564, 21 May 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

the necessity of a religious war.[135] Similarly in the Punjab, the prophecy of Shah Ni'amatullah, originally issued several hundred years before, was widely in circulation and in Bengal a prophecy based on a well-known collection of the *ahadis*, which predicted the downfall of Christianity and the ultimate triumph of Islamic power under a reborn *Mahdi*, was gaining currency.[136] A further fillip to the movement came from the Anglo-French decision to authorize the Greek troops to occupy Izmir, deep in the heart of Turkish Anatolia, on the assertion that the Greeks constituted a majority in population there.[137] When on 15 May 1919, the Greeks carried out the landings accompanied by inexplicable brutality, it produced an immediate reaction in Turkey and an equally strong indignation in India.[138] Protest meetings were held all over the country and resolutions were telegraphed to the India Office and the Downing Street registering their abhorrence. The telegrams also contained threats of serious repercussions if their demands were not accepted.[139] The intensity of excitement prompted Sir George Roos-Keppel (1866–1921), the chief commissioner of the Frontier, to report that 'The people of the Punjab and N.W.F.P. are frankly hostile to us. . . . I have got the Peshawar people down just in time or we should have had an organized rising here . . .'[140]

Worried by the events, the local governments mobilized their resources to counter the agitation. Harcourt Butler, for instance, tried to influence Abdul Bari through a number of people on whom the latter depended for financial support.[141] He also manipulated an advice to the Muslim community from the Nawab of Rampur to the effect that they should remain loyal to the British.[142] Similar attempts

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[135] Bamford, *Histories*, 141.

[136] Report by the Chief Civil Intelligence Officer of the Punjab, 27 May 1919, encl., Chelmsford to Ronaldshay, 31 May 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see Cleveland to Hignell, 30 May 1919, encl., ibid.; and Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 22 May 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. The verses which were added to the old prophecy are available in Special Branch, Punjab, 28 May 1919, para. 874, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/22, 31 May 1919, para. 920.

[137] Tamperley, *A History of the Paris Peace Conference*, vi, 25–6. Also see Sir John Tilley's minute of 10 Apr. 1920, PRO, FO 371/5141.

[138] The Maharaja of Bikaner, as the Indian rep. to the Peace Conference, at once protested to the Supreme Council on behalf of the Indian Muslims. See ibid., 26.

[139] See various telegrams in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795 and 796.

[140] Roos-Keppel to Butler, 12 June 1919, IOL&R, Butler Papers.

[141] Butler to Chelmsford, 20 Apr. 1919, ibid.

[142] Butler to Chelmsford, 10 May 1919, ibid.

to contain the agitation were made by other local authorities. In Sind, Khan Bahadur Nabi Bakhsh, an assistant commissioner, tried to build up opposition to the Khilafat movement with the help of certain obscure *maulawis*.[143] A pamphlet by one of the *maulawis* of the Nawabshah district, Faizul Karim by name, was published and distributed free which condoned the appointment of Sharif Husain of Makkah as caliph and proclaimed Muslim loyalty to the British government.[144] In the Punjab, too, Khan Bahadur Muhammad Zafar Khan, an extra-assistant commissioner, moved *pir* Jama'at Ali Shah of Alipur in the Sialkot district to address a large number of *maulawis* on the duty of loyalty and the advantages of the British rule.[145] The *pirs* and the *sajjada nashins* of the Punjab went a step further and presented an address of loyalty to the lieutenant-governor of the province. However, the *pirs* of Taunsa Sharif, Khwaja Hamid (d. 1931), and Mihr Ali Shah of Golra, did not join them in such expressions.[146] In any case the loyalists had little impact and instead their activities raised a storm of protest.[147]

To counter such moves, the Muslim League, to whose share had fallen the work of organizing the movement, decided to step up the pressure on the government. Two deputations, one to London and the other to Simla, were proposed. In fact an eight-member League deputation had already been lined up for Britain to give evidence before Lord Selbourne's parliamentary select committee on Indian reform.[148] Syed Zahur Ahmad (d. 1942), the energetic and able honorary secretary of the League, who had succeeded Syed Wazir Hasan, directed the deputation to take up the additional responsibility of presenting the questions of the Khilafat and the holy places while in Britain.[149] A similar request had come from Seth Chotani that the deputation might as well represent his Bombay Khilafat Committee.[150]

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[143] Soleman, *Anti-Khalif Intrigues in Sind*, 3.

[144] See Maulana Faizul Karim, *Facts About the Khilafat* (Karachi, 1919), *passim*.

[145] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/23, 7 June 1919, para. 1027.

[146] Ibid., para. 1029; and David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam* (London, 1988), 64–5.

[147] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 186/1920. Ext., Bombay Abstract, 26 July 1919, para. 1004, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/32, 16 Aug. 1919, para. 1585.

[148] See corr. in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Chotani to Yakub Hasan, 14 May 1919, encl., Yakub Hasan to Lloyd George, 1 July 1919, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 3908/1919.

The Government of India, however, was not keen on giving clearance to some of the members and by May 1919 only Yakub Hasan (1875–1940) of Madras was able to depart for London.[151] Jinnah, the leader of the deputation, Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgri (1878–1924) of Hyderabad (Sind) and Barrister Hasan Imam (1871–1933) proceeded later one after the other.[152] The second deputation, which was intended to supplement the efforts of the Aga Khan and others in Britain and for which considerable preparations had been made, did not materialize because Chelmsford declined to receive them saying that no useful purpose would be served.[153] He maintained that his government was fully acquainted with the Indian Muslim sentiment and that he had already conveyed them to his superiors in London.[154]

Meanwhile, in June 1919, one more attempt was made by leading Muslim residents in England to move the British government. Ameer Ali prepared a memorial for Lloyd George but, unfortunately, a difference of opinion developed between the Shi'a and Sunni leaders over the slant of the contents. Ameer Ali's Shi'ite emphasis on the 'spiritual' rather than the 'temporal' side of the caliphal question was disapproved by the Sunnis, notably Kidwai and Yusuf Ali. They argued that such an emphasis in the memorial would weaken their case.[155] In the end, however, the differences were glossed over and the memorial was signed by all prominent Indian Muslims in Britain and their British supporters and was sent to the prime minister.[156] It was a welcome move for the Muslim League as it substan-

[151] He had sailed on 17 May 1919. See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii.

[152] Ibid. Jinnah's seat was booked for 7 June 1919 on P&O boat *SS Merkara*. See Jinnah to Syed Zahur Ahmad, n.d., ibid. For the life and work of Bhurgri see Hamida Khuhro, 'Rais Ghulam Mohammed Bhurgri', *Grassroots*, 2/2 (1978), 11–17.

[153] See Abdul Bari to Syed Zahur Ahmad, AH 30 Ramazan 1337 (29 June 1919), and its encls. in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii. For the efforts to organize the deputation see SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/23, 12 July 1919, para. 1270, and 41/26, 26 July 1919, para. 1410.

[154] *Hamdam*, 16 July 1919; and *Leader*, (?) 21 July 1919, encl., Chotani to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 25 July 1919, ibid.

[155] See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 4 June 1919, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 85. Ameer Ali, despite his 'unswerving adhesion' to Shi'a orthodoxy, held exceedingly liberal views on the Sunni standpoint. The difference of opinion is understandable because in his writings and statements Ameer Ali always emphasized the distinction between the concept of the *imamate* and the 'apostolical' and the 'pontifical' caliphate of the first three orthodox caliphs. See Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 87–8, citing Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam* (1961), 37, 103–5 and 293; and id., *A Short History of the Saracens* (1961), 20–54.

[156] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 1972/1920.

tially reproduced the views expressed at its Delhi session.[157] To add weight to it, Yakub Hasan, who had reached Britain as the vanguard of the League delegation, sent another memorial to Lloyd George.[158] Then on 10 July 1919, when Jinnah and Bhurgri arrived, the deputation called on Montagu and his under secretary and held discussions with them on the Turkish question.[159] In another move, Yakub Hasan and Bhurgri added their signatures to the 31 July memorial to Lloyd George submitted by Hashim Ispahani on behalf of the London Muslim League and its friends.[160] Jinnah, however, did not sign which created confusion about his views on the issue. Kidwai, in his usual flutter, complained to Abdul Bari that Jinnah was refusing to sign the memorial and that he should obtain an immediate disapproval of his action by the League council.[161] The quandary was probably due to Kidwai's habit of seeing red at the slightest tickle.[162] But Syed Zahur Ahmad, to whom the telegram had been passed on, not knowing what had happened, at once wired Yakub Hasan directing him to ask Jinnah to comply with the League policy or else withdraw from the deputation.[163] Back came the explanation that his memorial had been dispatched before Jinnah or Bhurgri had arrived in Britain and that a fresh one was being prepared for submission.[164] There is no clear evidence as to what really happened but most likely there was some misunderstanding. The storm in the teacup blew itself over and the memorial when ready was signed by Jinnah as the leader of the deputation and sent to Lloyd George early in September 1919.[165] The memorial, echoing Jinnah's statement before the joint parliamentary committee some days before, recalled that for generations past the Muslims of India had recognized the caliphate of the House of Osman and Istanbul as the seat

[157] *Hindu*, 31 July 1919.

[158] Yakub Hasan to Lloyd George, 1 July 1919, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 3908/1919.

[159] Yakub Hasan to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 24 July 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii.

[160] *Daily Telegraph*, 2 August 1919.

[161] Kidwai to Abdul Bari, Tel. 8 Aug. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii.

[162] See e.g. Kidwai to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 13 Nov. 1919, ibid.

[163] Syed Zahur Ahmad to Yakub Hasan (copy), n.d., ibid. Also see Syed Zahur Ahmad to Yakub Hasan, 14 Aug. 1919, ibid.

[164] Yakub Hasan to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 26 Aug. 1919, ibid.

[165] Encl., Jinnah to Lloyd George, 4 Sept. 1919, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 5889/1919. For fuller details see Naeem Qureshi, '(Quaid-i-Azam) Jinnah and the Khilafat Movement', 144–5.

of Islam. The Government of India had themselves encouraged the Muslims in their sympathy and solemn pledges were given from time to time which had left them with an impression that the status of the caliph would not be disturbed. The situation seems to have changed.

> Now that the victory has been achieved to which Muslim blood and money have contributed not a little [the memorialists added] the Muslims have the right to claim that nothing will be done to whittle down or alter the pledge you gave to the world generally and Muslims in particular. . . . We need not add that if Great Britain becomes a party in reducing H.I.M. the Sultan of Turkey and the Khalifa of the Muslim world to the status of a petty sovereign, the reaction in India will be colossal and abiding.[166]

Jinnah and his friends hoped that statesmanship would still find solution to the problem without taking recourse to dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and without 'giving the military victory a religious character or making it a sign of triumph of one religion over the other and without inflicting humiliation and dishonour on Islam'.[167] Jinnah also approached Lloyd George for a private interview to present the Indian Muslim point of view more properly to him[168] but does not seem to have succeeded in obtaining one.

All through the summer of 1919, the pro-Turkish movement continued in Britain with considerable zeal. Led by the Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali, a nucleus of devoted pan-Islamists and their sympathizers—Mushir Kidwai, Hashim Ispahani, Aftab Ahmad Khan, Abbas Ali Baig, Duse Mohamed and a few other energetic workers—had pushed their point of view to the British government through memorials, letters and articles in journals and talks at select gatherings. The umbrella for this work was provided by the London Muslim League and kindred associations like the Central Islamic Society and the Anglo-Ottoman Society.[169] The arrival of Jinnah and his delegation had given them strength. The object of their activity was dissemination of Indian view on the Turkish issue and negation of the Greek and Armenian propaganda to the contrary who were spend-

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[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Jinnah to Lloyd George, 4 Sept. 1919, IOL&R, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 5889/1919.
[169] Yakub Hasan to Syed Zahur Ahmad, (?) July 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii.

ing considerable amount of money on this.[170] But the Indians were handicapped by the shortage of finances and the absence of a journal of opinion to reach the British government and public. So far mainly the Aga Khan, Ispahani and Kidwai had funded the publicity work from their own resources. Other Indian residents were not so well off as to share the burden and the passing of the hat in front of the English friends was not considered dignified. The only alternative was to turn to the Muslim League. Ispahani advised the League to strengthen its local branches and make sure that inaction was not misconstrued as indifference to the fate of Turkey.[171] The Aga Khan and Kidwai laid particular stress on sustaining pressure on the government while Yakub Hasan recommended to Chotani a network of organizations all over India on the pattern of the Bombay Khilafat Committee.[172] There was no difference of opinion on these matters.[173]

But in spite of the efforts in London and the agitation in India no tangible results were produced. On the contrary, Reuters reports about the schemes of partition under consideration of the Supreme Council suggested that the fate of Turkey was almost sealed. Abdul Bari became worried and wished that the Ali brothers, who had been sent to the Baitul jail from Chhindwara for deliberately breaking internment orders, were free to lead the agitation.[174] He solicited Gandhi's support in obtaining their release and in sounding Chelmsford on the feelings of the Muslims.[175] But though Gandhi agreed that the time for a joint and firm action had arrived, he offered no solace and insisted that non-violent *satyagraha* was the only remedy for 'the future of Islam, the future of India and parenthetically, the future of the Ali brothers'.[176] Such a solution did not commend itself to Muslim leaders who were disturbed at the non-fulfilment of their prayers.

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[170] Ibid.; and Ispahani's memo of 10 Sept. 1919, encl., Ispahani to Yakub Hasan, 10 Sept. 1919 in ibid.

[171] Syed Zahur Ahmad's confidential circular, 18 Aug. 1919; and Ispahani's memo of 10 Sept. 1919 in ibid.

[172] See Aga Khan to Chotani, n.d., AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/ii; Kidwai to Shaikh Zahur Ahmad, 7 June [?1921], ibid., Misc./Khilafat/i (refers to the earlier period); and Special Branch, Punjab, 13 Aug. 1919, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/32, 16 Aug. 1919, para. 1587.

[173] Ext., UP Abstract, 6 Sept. 1919, para. 2017, in ibid., 41/37, 20 Sept. 1919, para. 1952.

[174] For details of the Ali brothers' imprisonment see IOL&R, P/Conf.//50, ICH(P)P, June 1919, Proc. no. 490, and July 1919, Proc. nos. 2-32.

[175] Abdul Bari to Gandhi, 4 Aug. 1919, *Collected Works*, xvi, 70, n. 1.

[176] Gandhi to Abdul Bari, 27 Aug. 1919, ibid., 70.

Syed Zahur Ahmad had been receiving numerous communications asking him to convene a special session of the Muslim League to consider the Turkish question.[177] However, when the matter was placed before the council of the League early in September 1919, it decided in favour of an all India Muslim conference for this purpose.[178] A notice to that effect was issued under the signatures of thirty-five prominent leaders.[179] Elaborate preparations were set afoot and prominent leaders and workers such as Hasrat Mohani, Zafarul Mulk Alawi (d. 1947) and Sayyid Jalib Dehlawi (1874–1930) were detailed to visit different provinces to build up enthusiasm for the conference.[180]

The conference was eventually held at Lucknow on 21 September 1919, despite the attempts by the disgruntled moderate faction of the Raja of Mahmudabad to disrupt it. This was puzzling because the idea of holding a conference had come from the Raja himself. But later, for some unknown reasons, he had withdrawn his name as convenor.[181] In any case, the conference was a success. 'Never in the history of Moslem public life', wrote the *Mussalman* of Calcutta, 'had an assembly of the character gathered'.[182] Nearly all the important Muslim leaders of different shades of political opinion in the country came to attend —about 400 coming from outside the UP and about 600 from out-stations in the province. In all 3,000 persons were present at the conference.[183] Prominent among those who attended (excluding the Raja of Mahmudabad) were: A. K. Fazlul Haq, Muhammad Akram Khan (1868–1968) and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar (Calcutta), Nabiullah, Syed Reza Ali, Salamatullah, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi (1884–1955), Abdul Hayy (1869–1923) and Mumtaz Hasan (Lucknow), Abbas Tyabji (Baroda), Seth Jan Muhammad Chotani and Abdul Rauf (Bombay), Syud Hossain, Khwaja Hasan Nizami,

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[177] Ext., UP Abstract, 6 Sept. 1919, para. 2015, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/37, 20 Sept. 1919, para. 1946.

[178] See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Annual Report . . . for the Year 1919*, 9. Also see Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal* (Aligarh, 1950), 210.

[179] See notice dated 18 Aug. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/ii.

[180] Special Branch, Punjab, 22 Sept. 1919, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/38, 27 Sept. 1919, paras. 2047 and 2048; and 41/39, 4 Oct. 1919, para. 2136.

[181] See Syed Zahur Ahmad to Yakub Hasan, 4 Sept. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii.

[182] *Mussulman*, 3 Oct. 1919.

[183] Ibid.; and Ext., UP Abstract, 27 Sept. 1919, para. 2164-B, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/40, 11 Oct. 1919, para. 2219.

Sheikh Zahur Ahmad and Muhammad Fakhir (Allahabad), Abdul Qasim (Benares), Sanaullah (Amritsar), Dr M. A. Ansari (Delhi), Rafiuddin Ahmad (Poone), Hasrat Mohani (Aligarh), Agha Safdar (Sialkot), Moazzam Ali (Muradabad), Haji Musa Khan (Agra), Maulawi Abdul Majid Sharar (Madras), Abdul Majid (1887–1931) (Badaun), and many others.[184] After some controversy as to who should occupy the chair, the two sessions of the conference were presided over alternately by Abdul Bari and Sir Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer (1881–1930), the latter a member of the imperial council.[185] Deep down it reflected power struggle between the radicals and the moderates in which the former group seems to have gained an upper hand. Extraordinary enthusiasm and intense feelings marked the proceedings. Abdul Bari stated that they wanted to follow both religion and law but if ever a conflict arose between the two they would prefer the former to the latter. In the afternoon session Jaffer read out a letter addressed to him by the Muslim members of the imperial legislative council to the effect that they were in perfect accord with the views expressed by Muslim representatives in London and that they relied on the truth of the war-time promises of the British prime minister that the Turkish Empire would be maintained.[186] The speeches and resolutions were particularly emotional. A newspaper reporter recorded:

> Many among the audience literally wept and loud sobs were heard when Sulaiman Nadwi said that they had gathered to mourn the demise of Islamic grandeur and power and to carry its dead body to the grave. Theirs was veritably a meeting of mourners gathered to read elegiac verses. Let them be prepared, he said, to be homeless like the Jews or else let them change their hopeless and degrading condition. He quoted from the Qur'an to the effect that no nation ever rose without effort on its own part. When concluding, he said, he was not parting with the audience but with the honour of Islam.[187]

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[184] *Mussulman*, 3 Oct. 1919; and SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/40, 11 Oct. 19919, para. 2219. Surprisingly, Abdul Bari's nomination was opposed by Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, Shahid Husain, Zahur Ahmad and Fazlul Haq. Abdul Bari himself declined owing to allegations by some (including Raja of Mahmudabad) that he had made a friendly overture to the provincial govt. which he strongly denied. At last Hasrat Mohani induced Abdul Bari to take the chair.

[185] *Madras Mail*, 23 Sept. 1919. Also see Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 47-8.

[186] Ibid. The letter was signed by Mir Asad Ali, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Choudhuri Mohammad Ismail Khan, Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhry (1863–1929), Umar Hayat and Syed Alla Hando Shah.

[187] *Mussulman*, 3 Oct. 1919.

The first resolution affirmed that 'the spiritual position of the Sultan as *Khalifa* is indissolubly bound up with his temporal power as a ruler and the contemplated dismemberment of Turkey and creation of a number of small states out of the component parts of the Turkish Empire with non-Muslim powers as mandatories is an intolerable interference with the *Khilafat* which will sow the seeds of permanent discontent in the Muslim world'.[188] The other resolutions concerned with protests against handing over predominantly Muslim territories to Allied Powers, expressed 'indignation and dismay' at the reported internationalization of Istanbul, and 'unjustifiable' encroachments of Turkish territory by the Greeks.[189] But the two most significant decisions taken by the conference were to establish a central co-ordinating body and to fix 17 October 1919 as the 'Khilafat Day'—a day of prayer and protest for the safety and integrity of the caliphate.[190]

The need for a central body arose because the agitation, which had hitherto been conducted at district and provincial levels, lacked proper organization, co-ordination and direction. No doubt, on the suggestion of Kidwai and the Aga Khan, Khilafat committees had already sprung up at some places, but there was no central supervisory body which could effectively guide and direct the movement. The Muslim League, which had managed the agitation so far, was reluctant to shoulder the responsibility any more because of the increasing militancy of the agitation. It was, therefore, thought necessary to bring into *temporary* existence an organization which could concentrate all its efforts solely on the Khilafat question.[191] Thus the Lucknow conference passed a resolution which recognized the Khilafat Committee of Bombay as the central body and recommended the formation of branches all over the country.[192] Seth Chotani, in his speech, explained the aims and objects of the Committee and its

[188] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/40, 11 Oct. 1919, para. 2219.

[189] Ibid. To arouse public enthusiasm a booklet containing poems by Maulawi Aqilur Rahman (written especially for the conference) and entitled *Zakhm-i jigar* was circulated among the audience. Another booklet by Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad of Qadian, supposedly in favour of the Khilafat, also went round.

[190] See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Annual Report . . . for the Year 1919*, 10. For the resolutions passed on that occasion see E. H. Jaffer to Montagu, Tel. 22 Sept. 1919, IOI&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 5984/1919.

[191] Its 'temporary' character was emphasized by Ajmal Khan in Dec. 1919 in his presidential address at the Muslim League session at Amritsar. See IOI&R, L/P&J/6/1651, file 900/1920. Emphasis added.

[192] E. H. Jaffer to Montagu, Tel. 22 Sept. 1919, IOI&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 5984/1919.

links with the Ottoman League of Britain.[193] Consequently, at a meeting held on 11 November 1919, the Bombay Khilafat Committee changed its title to 'The Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay' (CKC).[194] A draft constitution, in accordance with the resolution of the Second Khilafat Conference held at Amritsar in December 1919,[195] was later circulated among the various district and provincial Khilafat committees for opinion. This constitution was approved with some amendments in February 1920, at the Third Khilafat Conference held at Bombay. New provincial Khilafat committees were established and, those already in existence, were affiliated to it. Similarly, influential workers and *'ulama* were sent round to secure the formation of Khilafat committees in all districts.[196] Women's Khilafat committees were also established.[197] A Khilafat Flag was approved in June 1920 at the Allahabad meeting of the CKC.[198]

The offices of the CKC were set up at Chotani's residence in Padoni Bazaar, Kharadar, a Muslim area of Bombay. In May 1920, they were moved to a temporary location and then, a few months later, housed permanently in the famous Sultan Mansion, a rented accommodation in Dongri. In 1928, the building was purchased for the organization and renovated by Shaukat Ali to suit the requirements.[199] According to the constitution, the objects of the CKC were:

> To secure for Turkey a just and honourable peace; to obtain the settlement of the Khilafat question; also of the holy places of Islam and the Jazirat-ul-Arab in strict accordance with the requirements of the

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[193] *Mussulman*, 3 Oct. 1919.

[194] Bamford, *Histories*, 144. Zafar Ali Khan recited an impressive poem on that occasion. See his *Baharistan* (Lahore, n.d.), 201–2.

[195] *Indian Annual Register, 1920* (ed.), H. N. Mitra (Calcutta, 1919 [*sic* for 1920]), 462.

[196] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/ii.

[197] One such committee was operating in Lucknow with the wife of Hakim Abdul Qawi as its hon. sec. See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i.

[198] *Vakil*, 1 Sept. 1920.

[199] This information is based on several letterheads of the CKC. In July 1928, realizing that nearly Rs 80,000 had been spent on rent, a proposal was mooted in the CKC to buy the building in which its offices were located. The working committee was requested to sanction a sum of Rs 40,000 for the purpose but Azad raised technical objection that the money had been collected solely for the Turks and only the full meeting of the CKC was empowered to sanction a reappropriation. Eventually, when the CKC met at Delhi to deliberate on the issue on 25 Aug. 1928, it agreed to authorize the purchase. See encl. to circular letter dated 7 Aug. 1928, issued under the signatures of Shaukat Ali, Shoaib Qureshi, M. Irfan and Qamar Ahmad in AFM, Haroon Papers; and Azad to Mihr, 8 Aug. 1928, in Malik Ram (ed.), *Khutut-i Abu'l-Kalam Azad* (New Delhi, 1991), 146–8.

> Shariat; to secure the fulfilment of the pledges of Rt. Hon. Mr. Lloyd George, given on 5th January, 1919, and of Lord Hardinge, regarding the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish Empire; for the above purpose to approach the British Ministers, the Viceroy of India and the British public; to carry on propaganda work in and out of India; to take such further steps as may be deemed necessary.[200]

The CKC consisted of 200 members – later increased to 250. Bombay was given 54 seats, Sind 20, Madras 15 and the remaining seats went to other provinces. The office-bearers of the CKC consisted of one president, two vice-presidents, four (later increased to six) secretaries and a treasurer. For the ensuing year Chotani was elected president, Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy and Suleman Wahib, vice-presidents, and Mirza Ali Mohammed Khan (d. 1930), Badruddin Abdulla Koor, Ahmed Haji Siddik Khatri and Shaukat Ali (after his release) as secretaries.[201] Later, in 1923, when Chotani was forced to resign on account of the funds scandal, the presidents of the annual sessions were empowered to look after the affairs of the organization every term.[202] Changes in the constitution as well as the personnel were brought about as and when the occasion demanded.[203] The provincial and local Khilafat committees, about which information is patchy,[204] were required to work in affiliation with the CKC and where no such branches existed the work was to be conducted by the central body. The collection of funds was entrusted to both the central and the provincial committees and the accounts were to be maintained properly. It was the CKC's job to have them examined by a chartered accountant, and on the 15th of each month to publish a statement of accounts. The CKC was also entrusted with the arrangement of holding Khilafat conferences and was empowered to frame bye-laws,

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[200] Manley's note on the Third Khilafat Conference, Bombay, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 2591/1920. English translation of the Constitution is available in app. (a), below.

[201] Ibid. An unconfirmed report alleged that the CKC was not run by Chotani and his Khilafatists but by a Swiss, an Englishman, a Hindu and a Rumanian. Probably, this was meant to discredit the Khilafatists. The Govt. of India, however, failed to substantiate it. See Lloyd to Montagu, 25 June 1920; and Montagu to Lloyd, 30 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[202] Ext., Bombay Abstract, 9 June 1923, para 1049, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/24, 23 June 1923, para. 237. Also see ch. v, 343 ff.

[203] For instance, the agenda for the all India Khilafat Conference at Meerut from 7 to 9 Apr. 1921, refers to the approval of the constitution passed at the Lucknow session held on 28 February 1921. See AFM/NAP, AIML, Misc./Khilafat/i.

[204] Some details, for the Punjab at least, are available in Lal Khan Papers. In all, there were reported to be 2,688 local branches in the province.

affiliate and disaffiliate provincial committees and fill up vacancies.[205]

Subsequently, the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind, as the Khilafat set-up was known, expanded into a vast organization, overshadowing for a few years the Muslim League as well as the Congress. With several hundred local branches and a membership running into tens of thousands, the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat was the most powerful and well-organized Muslim body led by radical professional politicians and it remained so until the re-vitalization of the Muslim League in 1924. The enlarged CKC became the Jam'iyyat's high-powered executive committee, committed to the realization of its fundamental objectives, one of which was the attainment of *swaraj* for India.[206] Millions of rupees poured into the Khilafat Funds which were utilized for mobilizing and sustaining the agitation. At one time the CKC ran five departments—general department, accounts department, books and pamphlets department, receipts and clothes department and propaganda department. In all there were fifteen full-time salaried workers active in these departments, besides a private secretary to the honorary secretaries and another private secretary to 'Bi-Amman', the mother of the Ali brothers. The propaganda work was at first entrusted to provincial organizations, but because of the lack of co-ordination it was later taken over by the propaganda department of the CKC and Abdul Bari succeeded Shaikh Zahur Ahmad as its head.[207] This department also published a weekly bulletin in Urdu called the *Khilafat-i 'Usmaniyya*. Later, it was turned into a daily newspaper and the title was shortened to just the *Khilafat*. Its circulation rose to several thousand before it dropped around 1927 to about 1400.[208] The first editor of the *Khilafat* was Chaudhry Abdul Ghani (1920–23), followed by Hafiz Ali Bahadur Khan (1923–26), Qamar Ahmad (1927–28), Badar Jalali (1928–31), and Shaukat Ali (1931–33). The last one to fill this position was Rais Ahmad Jafri (1934 onward). The *Khilafat* of Delhi, which appeared in 1920 with Qutb-ud-din

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[205] Manley's note in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 2591/1920.

[206] See ch. v, 343.

[207] Unknown to the Khilafatists, Shaikh Zahur Ahmed (not to be confused with Syed Zahur Ahmad) had been spying for the govt. on the activities of the CKC and the Jam'iyyat as a paid informer of the CID which compromized the organization's activities. See Robinson, *Separatism*, 360.

[208] Jafri, 'Bambai ki Urdu sahafat', 400–1; report on the Khilafat funds in *Statesman*, 17 Mar. 1923; and AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii. Also see AFM, Haroon Papers.

Siddiqui as its editor apparently had no formal links with the CKC.[209]

Once the organizational side had been taken care of, efforts were made to draw in the Hindus still closer. The experience of the previous April had brought home to the Khilafatists the unbounded advantages of a Hindu-Muslim *rapprochement*. But, for the majority of the Hindus, the religious and even the political aspects of the Khilafat movement had little appeal. Among their leaders, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861–1946) was perhaps the chief sceptic. In December 1918, as the president of the Congress—which was then 'a vast [but] unwieldy organization'—[210] he had ruled out the plea of C. R. Das (1870–1925) to lend support to the Khilafat issue.[211] Sankaran Nair (1857–1934) was openly critical of the Khilafatists' motives.[212] B. G. Tilak (1856–1920) was another sceptic[213] though in May 1919, he had attended a Muslim meeting on the Khilafat issue in London.[214] Two prominent Maharashtrians, Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950) and Indulal K. Yajnik (1892–1972), exchanged 'many unholy jokes and laughs over the sacred cause of the Khilafat'.[215] Bipin Chandra Pal (1858–1932), who had always dreaded 'the virus of Pan-Islamism',[216] was also hesitant to lend his support.[217] Pandit Motilal Nehru (1861–1931), coming from a province well-known for its pan-Islamic traditions, considered that there were 'many things nearer home than the question of the Khilafat which we have to attend to'.[218] V. S. Srinivasa Sastri (1869–1946) advised even Gandhi to stay clear of the Khilafat movement for 'We have no right to embarrass the Government of India'.[219] There were others who gave only verbal support and yet

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[209] The information is based on several issues of the *Khilafat* of Bombay, the official organ of the CKC. Also see Khurshid, *Sahafat*, 467–8; and SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/27, 10 July 1920, para. 1390. In July 1923, when the govt. instituted proceedings against Abdul Ghani and the daily *Khilafat* faced a crisis, Azad asked Ghulam Rasul Mihr (1895–1971) of the *Zamindar* to take over its editorship but the latter declined the offer. See Azad to Mihr, 24 July and undated 1923, in Malik Ram, *Khutut-i Abu'l-Kalam Azad*, 120–2.

[210] J. C. Jha, 'The Struggle for Swaraj (1919–1922)', in *A Contemporary History of the Indian National Congress (1885–1985)*, ii (Delhi, [1985]), 52.

[211] *Indian Annual Register, 1923*, ii, suppl., 184–5.

[212] C. S. Nair, *Gandhi and Anarchy*, 2nd edn. (Madras, 1923), 30 and 33–4.

[213] D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, i (Bombay, 1951), 351.

[214] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795, file 4105/1919.

[215] I. K. Yajnik, *Gandhi as I Knew him* (Bombay, [1933]), 105–6.

[216] B. C. Pal, *Memories of My Life and Times* (Calcutta, 1932), 417.

[217] A. C. Gupta, *Studies in the Bengal Renaissance* (Jadavpur, 1958), 576–7.

[218] Quoted in Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 198.

[219] Quoted in B. R. Nanda, *The Nehrus* (London, 1962), 182.

others attached conditions of cow protection before they joined the Muslims.[220]

Abdul Bari was prepared to do anything within the limits of the *shari'at* to placate the Hindus. Already, as a friendly gesture he had abandoned cow killing at Farangi Mahal and advised his co-religionists to do the same.[221] Apparently, Gandhi, who had by this time been definitely pulled into the Khilafat movement by Abdul Bari, was also disinclined to lay down conditions as precedent to Hindu co-operation. He impressed upon his co-religionists that 'unconditional co-operation means the protection of cow'.[222] His writings and speeches were consequently profuse with appeals for Hindu support to the Khilafat movement.[223] So when the Khilafat Day approached, Gandhi pleaded with prominent Hindu and other non-Muslim leaders, as well as the Hindu masses, to join the Muslims in their demonstrations so as to 'put a sacred seal on the Hindu Mahomedan bond'.[224]

But in spite of Gandhi's efforts and his earlier claims that twenty-one crores of Hindus were ready to help the Muslims dictate to the government whatever terms they wished,[225] the Khilafat Day (17 October 1919) inaugurated no big Hindu-Muslim entente. Only at Dhaka, Bombay, Lucknow, Hyderabad (Sind), Sukkur and a few other places did the Hindus join the Muslims in demonstrations and *hartals*. The Muslims were themselves divided and the observance of the Khilafat Day was mostly confined to larger towns.[226] This lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Muslims was perhaps because of the fact that their leaders who exercised a hold over the community were still interned. However, the significance of the Khilafat Day lies in the fact that if the Lucknow conference had imparted an all-India

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[220] Ram Gopal, *The Indian Muslims* (Bombay, 1959), 138.

[221] Reference in *Young India, 1919 1922*, 142.

[222] See e.g. ibid., esp. 141-2.

[223] This can be followed in *Collected Works*, esp. vol. xx, 90.

[224] The circular dated 10 Oct. 1919, was sent to twenty-nine non-Muslim leaders, including Rajagopalachari, Kasturi Ranga Ayengar, Joseph Baptista, Shraddhanand, Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, J. B. Kripalani, Rajendra Prasad, Pandit Kunzru, C. F. Andrews, Deshpande, Khadilkar and Harkaran Nath Mishra. *Collected Works*, xvi, 228-9. Also see *Hindu*, 16 Oct. 1919.

[225] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1001, 15 Oct. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[226] *Bombay Chronicle*, 18 Oct. 1919. At Lahore the Day was not observed at all, perhaps because of the strong influence of the moderates. An interesting record of the proceedings in Sind is found in Abdoola Haroon, *The Khilafat Day in Sind* (Karachi, 1919), *passim*. Also see Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 199-202; and Zahida Memon, 'Khilafat Day in Sind on 17 October 1919', *Grassroots*, 2/1, (1978), 61-7.

character to the agitation, 17 October gave it the semblance of an *organized* movement.

Despite the growing agitation, however, there was no certainty about the final outcome of the peace settlement.[227] On the contrary, Lloyd George's crusading spirit evidenced by his speeches in and outside Parliament and the news from other sources, including Jinnah who had returned from England, foreshadowed the adverse nature of the peace treaty.[228] The Khilafatists braced themselves for the shock but decided to continue efforts in Britain to counter such propaganda. Already, the Indian Muslims in Britain had been able to establish an Islamic Information Bureau with Ispahani as its chairman and Marmaduke Pickthall (1875–1936) as secretary. Yakub Hasan and Bhurgri promised to assist them so long as they were in Britain.[229] A modest fund with contributions from India, especially from Seth Abdoola Haroon and Seth Jamal of Rangoon, was floated and a journal of Muslim opinion, the *Muslim Outlook*, edited jointly by Pickthal and Yakub Hasan, was launched.[230] An Indian Khilafat dep-

[227] The delay in the settlement was due to the Allied rivalries and the withdrawal of the United States from the negotiations in the autumn of 1919. See Henry H. Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East* (London, 1938); S. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton, 1961); and L. Evans, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914–1924* (Baltimore, 1965).

[228] Some of his statements had been particularly emotive and full of religious fervour. For instance, in Aug. 1919, while proposing a gratuity to Field Marshall Viscount Allenby (1861–1936), he had declared in Parliament: 'The name of General Allenby will be ever renowned as that of the brilliant commander *who fought and won the last and most triumphant of the crusades*. It was his good fortune, aided by his skill, to be able to bring to a glorious end an enterprise which absorbed the chivalry of Europe for centuries. We forget now that the military strength of Europe was concentrated for generations upon this purpose, and concentrated in vain. A British Army under the command of General Allenby achieved it and achieved it finally.' Parl. Papers, 1919, *Hansard*, 119, HC Deb. 5s, col. 418. Emphasis added. For other speeches see *The Times*, 18 Oct. and 10 Nov. 1919. Also see Jinnah's interview to the press on 14 Nov. 1919 on his return from England. *Daily Gazette* (Karachi), 17 Nov. 1919; and *Times of India*, 17 Nov. 1919. For the press tels. on the subject see *Madras Mail*, 25 Nov. 1919.

[229] Yakub Hasan to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 16 Oct. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii. Its offices were located at 33 Palace Street, Westminster, London.

[230] See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 4 June 1919, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 85. Also see Abdoola Haroon to Abdul Bari, 11 and 13 Jan., 20 May, 24 July and n.d., 1919, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 106–9. Also see Alhaj Mian Ahmad Shafi, *Haji Sir Abdoola Haroon: A Biography* (Karachi, n.d.), 64; and Ext., Bombay Abstract, 18 Oct. 1919, para. 1365, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/43, 8 Nov. 1919, para. 2468. The first issue of the journal was proudly dispatched to India by Yakub Hasan in the last week of October 1919. See Yakub Hasan to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 23 Oct. 1919, ibid.

utation to London and Washington was also proposed but the Aga Khan thought that while a deputation to London was useful its visit to the United States had no meaning as the Americans had washed their hands off their commitments in Europe and the Middle East.[231] Jinnah, Bhurgri, Kidwai and Ispahani also advised similarly.[232] Therefore, the CKC decided to approach the British government only. On 14 November 1919, it resolved to dispatch an all-India Muslim deputation to Britain early the next year.[233] But the radicals under Abdul Bari were not satisfied with the moderate approach of the Bombay men and pressed for an open clash with the government. As a token of their opposition they advocated a boycott of the forthcoming victory celebrations in December 1919. A move in this direction, which had the support of Gandhi, had already been afoot in Bombay, the Punjab and the UP.[234] But the CKC, under the moderate leadership of Chotani, was against such a step and wished to adopt a middle course: agreeing to celebrate peace with Germany and Austria, but abstaining from the festivities should they be extended to include victory over Turkey.[235] The rift widened when the radicals refused to accept this compromise. A complete deadlock was, however, averted when the CKC agreed to accept the radicals' contention on the condition that they postpone the operation of the proposed boycott until such time as a Khilafat conference had been convened to decide the issue.[236]

When on 23 November 1919, the first session of the All India Khilafat Conference opened at Delhi under A. K. Fazlul Haq's presidency, religious emotions ran high and anger towards the British government was manifest. Abdul Bari's group from the UP, supported by the Punjab delegates and other radicals, dominated the proceedings.[237] The ground had already been prepared by Sayyid Jalib, the

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[231] Ref. in M. H. Ispahani, M. Bhurgri and M. H. Kidwai to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 13 Nov. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/iii.

[232] Syed Zahur Ahmad to Yakub Hasan, 19 Nov. 1919 in ibid.

[233] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 186/1920.

[234] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 1048, 1101 and 1119, 28 Oct., 17 and 25 Nov. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; Fazlul Hasan to Montagu, Tel. 4 Nov. 1919, L/P&S/10/795; *History of Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 211–14; and *Hindu*, 6 Nov. 1919.

[235] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1119, 25 Nov. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[236] Ibid.

[237] Ibid. Also see Ext., Delhi Abstract, 29 Nov. 1919, para. 857, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/49, 20 Dec. 1919, para. 2995; Viceroy to Sec.

editor of the *Hamdam* (Lucknow) and a protégé of Abdul Bari, who had been dispatched to Delhi in advance to iron out differences and remove impediments.[238] Fazlul Haq's presidential address, written by Abdul Ghaffar, set the tone of the proceedings. He regretted that their constitutional protests had been of no avail. The viceroy had refused to receive the deputations and the one to Britain was treated with but scant courtesy. The Muslims had fought for the Allies against Muslims in the last war on the assurance that their religion would not suffer. Now when the funeral of the Ottoman Empire was in progress they wanted the Muslims to take part in the victory celebrations. They had no faith left in Britain and as such would take a suitable action themselves with Hindu support who were with them.[239] Others who followed him in the second session under Syed Reza Ali maintained the tempo. Once they got out of the unseemly wranglings and difference of opinion in the subjects committee, the resolutions were framed and passed with gusto. The first resolution thanked Gandhi and the Hindus for their sympathy for the Khilafat and the holy places. The second proposed the boycott of peace celebrations as religious duty. The speeches made on this occasion were fiery. Those who favoured owning the celebrations were denounced as *kafirs*. Gandhi vouched for Hindu support. The provincial and other local Khilafat committees were asked to render all possible help to the committee which had been set up under Dr Ansari's chairmanship to oversee the boycott.[240]

The peace celebrations question having been settled, the conference went on to formulate a definite line of action. Three major decisions were taken. The first recommended the dispatch of a deputation to Britain and if necessary to the United States, to lay the 'true sentiments of Musalmans before the responsible British Ministers'. Several names were suggested out of which the final selection was to be made later.[241] Secondly, in the event of the settlement with Turkey not being

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of State, Tels. nos. 1115 and 1118, 24 and 25 Nov. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; *Madras Mail*, 24 Nov. 1919; and *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii part 1, 237-41.

[238] See Sayyid Jalib to Abdul Bari, 3 Nov. 1919, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 159.

[239] For Fazlul Haq's presidential address see *Khutba-i sadarat* (Delhi, 1922). The one that Asaf Ali and Rauf Ali wrote was discarded for being too aggressive. See SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/49, 20 Dec. 1919, para. 2995.

[240] See above, n. 237.

[241] Ibid. Also see Fazlul Haq to Lloyd George, Tel. 2 Dec. 1919, IOL&R,

concluded to their satisfaction, they were to launch a progressive boycott of British goods. A sub-committee of Syed Zahur Ahmad, Abdoola Haroon, Siddik Khatri, Sanaullah, Hasrat Mohani, Agha Safdar (d. 1935), Zafarul Mulk Alawi, Arif Hasawi (1888–1936), Akram Khan and three others was nominated to make necessary recommendations.[242] In the third place, they were to initiate a gradual cessation of co-operation with the government. A sub-committee of Fazlul Haq, Abdul Bari, Ajmal Khan, Abdul Majid Sharar, Syed Reza Ali, Abdoola Haroon, Hasrat Mohani and a few others was appointed to chalk out a practical programme for this purpose.[243]

The Delhi programme, however, was finalized after a heated debate. A particular subject of controversy was the boycott of British goods, proposed by Hasrat Mohani as an extension of the anti-peace celebrations resolution. Mohani was supported by Abdul Ghaffar, Mumtaz Hussein Fakher (d. 1920), Muhammad Fakhir, Sanaullah and Daud Ghaznawi (1895–1963).[244] Encouraged perhaps by the successful boycott of Italian goods during the Tripolitan War in 1911/12,[245] they argued that the only way to force Britain to accept their demands was to injure its trade.[246] Gandhi, Chotani, Abdoola Haroon, Syud Hossain (1888–1949) and Syed Reza Ali opposed it on various counts.[247] Chotani and Haroon, like Omar Sobani (d. 1926) and other wealthy merchants, had helped the movement financially but they were not oblivious of the adverse effects that boycott might have on fellow businessmen who were trading in British piece goods.[248] Gandhi claimed that he was an expert on boycott and as such knew more about it than anyone else. He argued that since boycott was opposed to the principle of *satyagraha* and embodied an element of

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L/P&S/10/796; and *Indian Annual Register, 1920*, i, 252. Those who were to form the deputation included the Raja of Mahmudabad, Sir Abbas Ali Baig, Fazlul Haq, Dr Ansari, Syed Reza Ali, Syud Hossain, Hasrat Mohani, Seth Chotani, Hasan Imam, Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy, Haji Abdoola Haroon, Abul Kasem, Mirza Ali Ahmad Khan, Abdul Majid Sharar, Ibrahim Sialkoti, Abdul Bari, Munir-uz-zaman, S. D. Canjee, with power to add to their number.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Ibid.

[244] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 239–40. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1118, 25 Nov. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Syed Zahur Ahmad's note dated 30 Nov. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/ii.

[245] See ch. i, 56.

[246] See above, n. 244.

[247] Ibid.

[248] Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 203–4.

revenge it would cause great sufferings on others.[249] A more sublime alternative was refusal to co-operate with the government. It was, he said, an inalienable right of citizens to mark displeasure of government's actions by withdrawing co-operation if co-operation meant degradation. The second objection, with which others also concurred, was its impracticability: that the British manufacturers would defraud the Indians by importing goods under false pretensions and pass them off as having been made in Japan or some other country. In any case, it would not be possible to induce the consumers to practice boycott without any alternative means of fulfilling their needs. Lastly, the argument ran, if there was to be a boycott of British goods then why should that not be extended to other Allied countries also who were equally responsible for the misfortunes of Turkey.[250] But Gandhi and his supporters were overruled. Syed Zahur Ahmad and Abdul Ghaffar, in particular, scouted Gandhi's exposé both in the subjects committee and in the open session and demanded a total boycott. The resolution was finally carried.[251] It was a clear setback for Gandhi and the moderates.

There was, however, one consolation for Gandhi. The gradual withdrawal of co-operation ('non-co-operation') which he had devised to circumvent Muslim inclination for boycott and violence, was presented by Syud Hossain and accepted without opposition.[252] At this time non-co-operation was so vague a concept that perhaps Gandhi himself did not know what he meant by it. Even Abdul Bari, who was later to doubt its efficacy and dispute its accent on non-violence, accepted it without demur when Syud Hossain interpreted 'non-co-operation' as *tark-i muwalat* (and not *'adm-i ta'awun*) in contradistinction to *ishtirak-i 'amal* which was seen as having no religious overtones.[253] The adoption of progressive stages in the non-co-operation programme by the Khilafatists was intended to parry objections that anything, which might bring destruction to Muslims, was prohibited

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[249] Ref. in Zahur Ahmad's note dated 30 Nov. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/ii.

[250] Ibid.

[251] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 239–40. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1118, 25 Nov. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[252] M. K. Gandhi, *The Story of My Experiment with Truth* (London, 1949), 400–1; *Madras Mail*, 26 Nov., 1919. Also see H. C. E. Zacharias, *Renascent India* (London, 1933), 196.

[253] Abdul Bari, *Khutba*, 22.

in Islam.[254] But however vague the scheme was at this stage, it was a momentous decision and a landmark in the history of the Khilafat movement and indeed of India. The sub-committee, which had been asked to examine the proposition and suggest measures, knew better than others that there was to be no turning back.[255]

In order to obtain the Hindu approval of conference decisions, a special joint meeting of Hindu and Muslim delegates was held the following day (24 November). Overnight, the moderates had recovered their lost ground by a skilful manoeuvring. The radicals also realized that if they persisted on following an aggressive course they might lose Gandhi's support and, as a consequence, Hindu sympathy. Expediently, they offered the chair to Gandhi. As a further concession to him, they rejected Fazlul Haq's proposal to combine the Punjab 'wrong' with the Khilafat issue as a means to ensure Hindu co-operation, which had the support of Swami Shraddhanand (1856–1926), Hasrat Mohani, Shankarlal Banker (b. 1889) and others. Similarly, the resolution on the boycott of British goods, which Gandhi had opposed, was not pressed. Instead, a resolution was passed thanking him and Hindus for their sympathy. Once Gandhi had been placated, the resolution on the boycott of the peace celebrations was passed without any difficulty amidst great enthusiasm.[256]

Another significant outcome of the Delhi gathering was the formation of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama -i Hind, the religio-political body of the Indian *'ulama* which was to play a crucial a role in the Khilafat movement.[257] Abdul Bari had been toying with the idea of forming an association of the *'ulama* for a long time through such of his friends as Azad Subhani and Sulaiman Nadwi. Some of the Ahl-i Hadis *'ulama*, especially Sanaullah and Muhammad Ibrahim (1874–1956) of Sialkot, also supported him on this issue.[258] The task was accomplished when immediately after the conference the *'ulama* held a

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[254] This was disclosed later in Nov. 1920 by Shabbir Ahmad Usmani in his address to the Delhi sessions of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind. See his, *Tark-i muwalat par zabardast taqrir* (Delhi, 1920), esp. 15.

[255] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 239–40.

[256] Ibid., 240–1.

[257] For the formation and aims of the Jam'iyyat, see Muhammad Miyan (ed.), *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama kya hai?* (Delhi, [1946]), 16. Also see Mufti Kifayatullah (ed.), *Musawwada dasturu'l-'amal Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind* (Delhi, 1922); and Parveen Rozina (ed.), *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, i (Islamabad, 1980), 32–40.

[258] Ext., UP Abstract, 26 Apr. 1919, para. 754 in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/19, 10 May 1919, para. 684.

meeting on his initiative and decided to close their ranks and launch the Jam'iyyat. Kifayatullah was appointed president and Ahmad Saeed its secretary.[259] The only discordant voice was that of Sayyid Jalib who thought that the *'ulama*, instead of founding a separate organization, should work from within the fold of the Muslim League.[260] But his proposal was turned down and speaker after speaker—Abdul Razzaq, Kifayatullah, Sanaullah, Ghazi Mahmud and Munir-uz-zaman—rose to support the establishment of the new organization, not as a parallel movement but rather as a body from which to make their voice heard more effectively.[261] So far the *'ulama*'s participation in the movement had been on an individual basis and mostly the result of Farangi Mahal influence. But now they joined the movement as a collective force. With their enormous prestige and following amongst the Muslim masses, the *'ulama* infused a new life into the agitation. Despite the opposition from Bareilly and the Jami'a Bahru'l-'Ulum faction of Farangi Mahal and the neutrality of Deoband, the Jam'iyyat, within a short time of its inception, became the nucleus of the Indian *'ulama* and imparted a sense of direction to the Khilafat movement.

With the backing of the Jam'iyyat, the Khilafatists were in a position to launch the boycott of the victory celebrations.[262] Abdul Bari's *fatwa* declaring the participation in the celebrations as sinful and unlawful, forced even the unwilling to coalesce.[263] So much so that a moderate like Mohammed Iqbal, whose pan-Islamic fervour had led him to treat the Khilafat issue 'purely [as] a religious matter,'[264] was unable to restrain himself at what the Allies were doing to Turkey and favoured abstaining from the peace celebrations.[265] As the secretary of the provincial Khilafat committee, he had started taking

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[259] See IOL&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 2626/1919; and Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 46.

[260] See Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, i, 34.

[261] Ibid., 34 6.

[262] *Hindu*, 4 Dec. 11 1919. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1149, 10 Dec. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[263] The *fatwa* was issued in the name of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama. Ext., UP Abstract, 22 Nov. 1919, para. 2489, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/47, 6 Dec. 1919, para. 2833. For its impact see the summary of Indian papers in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 73/1920.

[264] See Iqbal to Khan Muhammad Niaz-ud-din Khan, 9 Nov. 1919, in Sayyid Muzaffar Husain Barni (ed.), *Kulliyat-i maktubat-i Iqbal*, ii (Delhi, 1991), 146.

[265] Parveen Shaukat Ali, *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal*, 2nd edn. (Lahore, 1978), 316–17.

active part in the Khilafat affairs after an initial suspicion that the movement was being directed from abroad by 'the Shi'as of London', meaning the Aga Khan, Ameer Ali, Ispahani and others.[266] In a hard hitting speech at a meeting called at Lahore to discuss the boycott in December 1919, he declared:

> ... the nation which had spread the [ideas of] freedom and liberty abroad is itself today being deprived of its benefits. [But] why should we complain [about it] to a human being? We should complain only to God. Nothing can be achieved through flattery, supplications and entreaties. Submission to no one but God is binding on us.[267]

The Muslim League lent its support to the boycott proposal[268] and Jinnah resigned from the Peace Celebrations Committee in Bombay to which he had been appointed without consultation.[269] When the peace celebrations were finally held on 13 December 1919 and the following days, the Muslim community in most of the larger towns of northern India stayed away in protest.[270] Even though the Nizam of Hyderabad and other Muslim rulers had participated with enthusiasm, the boycott was extremely successful.[271] It was the first trial of strength between the Khilafatists and the Indian government. The success with which the Khilafatists had used the issue unmistakably revealed that the peace terms, when announced, would not be accepted passively. This became even more evident when towards the end of December 1919, the leaders gathered at Amritsar to attend the Second Khilafat Conference and the annual sessions of the Muslim League and the Congress. Of course, there were attempts, principally by Mohammed Yaqub of Muradabad, to tear away

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[266] He had been nominated at a public meeting held on 30 Nov. 1919 outside Mochi Gate. His friend Fazl-i-Husain was named president. See Special Branch, 15 Dec. 1919, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41/49, 20 Dec. 1919, para. 3000. Also see *Paisa Akhbar*, 3 Dec. 1919.

[267] Atiq Siddiqi, *Iqbal: jadugar-i Hindi nazad* (New Delhi, 1980), 81-2. Eng. tr. mine. Earlier he had expressed a similar opinion in verse. See Iqbal to Sulaiman Nadwi, 27 Sept. 19119, in Ataullah, *Iqbalnama*, i, 106-7.

[268] Zahur Ahmad to Pte. Sec. to Viceroy, 10 Dec. 1919, L/P&S/10/797, file 814/1920.

[269] Jinnah to Montagu, Tel. 28 Nov. 1919, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795; and *Hindu*, 11 Dec. 1919.

[270] *Bombay Chronicle*, 16 and 17 Dec. 1919. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1170, 23 Dec. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[271] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 1149 and 1163, 10 and 19 Dec. 1919, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. But some over-zealous local officers did interfere. See *Bombay Chronicle*, 16 and 17 Dec. 1919.

the League sessions to a place other than where the Congress was meeting. Fazlul Haq came out with a strong condemnation of the 'hidden hands' which were trying to separate the League from the Congress and obtained a prompt assurance from Syed Zahur Ahmad against such a possibility.[272]

The Amritsar proceedings were exceptionally aggressive because considerable efforts had preceded on systematic lines to stir up popular feelings through leaflets, posters, pamphlets and poetic compositions.[273] Secondly, as a result of the Royal Proclamation accompanying the enactment of the Government of India Act 1919, most of the political detenues had been released.[274] The presence at Amritsar of the Ali brothers, Dr Saif-ud-din Kitchlew (1884–1963) and other released leaders (Abul Kalam Azad was not released until January 1920) imparted a certain vitality to the deliberations, ushering an era of militant mass politics.[275] The speeches of the Ali brothers were especially emotional and effusive, making it plain that for them religion was more important than personal liberty. The others were no less demonstrative.[276] After Amritsar the leadership of the Khilafat movement passed from the moderate Bombay businessmen to the radical concomitant of reckless politicians and fire-eating *'ulama*. Chotani remained the president of the CKC with its headquarters still in Bombay but Shaukat Ali became the virtual dictator. Under the leadership of the Ali brothers, the CKC emerged as the most powerful Indian political organization. The Muslim League, which had conceived and developed the movement from its platform, became a mere appendage of the Khilafat Committee. Jinnah, the League's new president, could do nothing to arrest its decline. Its membership dwindled still further and it gradually lost its hold on Indian

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[272] See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, lxxxvii.

[273] See reports for the period just before the Conference in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 41 and 42.

[274] For the text of the Govt. of India Act 1919, and the Royal Proclamation see Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 610. Initially, the govt. was reluctant to release the Ali brothers. But later, it included them in the amnesty concession realizing that their continued detention, when contrasted with the release of Hindu detenues, would embitter the Muslims still further. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 82, 2 Feb. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[275] Special Branch, Punjab, 20 Jan. 1920, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/4, 24 Jan. 1920, para. 213. Mohammed Iqbal recited laudatory verses on the release of the Ali brothers. See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Proc., 1919, lxxxviii, 27.

[276] See Special Branch, Punjab, 27 Jan. 1920, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/5, 31 Jan. 1920, para. 266.

Muslims who began to look for a lead to the CKC and the recently established Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama. It was also at Amritsar that an understanding was arrived at between the Muslim and Hindu leaders which enabled them to organize the Khilafat movement jointly. Earlier hesitancy on the part of many Hindu leaders like Motilal Nehru, B. C. Pal, Lajpat Rai (1856–1928) and even B. G. Tilak vanished and they began to pledge Hindu support to the Khilafat cause.[277] The Congress which had hitherto stood aloof, also began cautiously to lend its support.[278]

The Khilafat conference, which opened under Shaukat Ali's presidency on 31 December 1919, was clearly in no mood to be complacent. It expressed its disappointment at the disregard shown by the British government to repeated Muslim representations but preferred to achieve its objectives through constitutional means. It, therefore, decided to send a delegation to Britain and the United States. Another delegation was proposed for Turkey ostensibly to tender to the caliph 'sentiments of Islamic brotherhood' on behalf of Indian Muslims.[279] A Special Branch officer of the Punjab Police who attended the proceedings, reported:

> The speeches at the last Congress, League and Khilafat Conferences, would have been unthinkable a year back and there can be no doubting the tremendous effect that they will have on the people of the Punjab, especially women and rustics. . . . One thing is, however, quite clear. The events of the Christmas week have emphasised the waking [up] of a new spirit in the land, which Government would do well to recognize. The people's point of view has changed and their aspirations have undergone a striking expansion, which it will require both tact and firmness to keep within reasonable bounds.[280]

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[277] *Indian Annual Register, 1920*, 365; *Report of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Indian National Congress held at Amritsar on the 27th, 28th, 30th, 31st December 1919 and 1st January 1920* (Amritsar, 1922), 158–9; IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 3885/1920; and T. L. Shay, *The Legacy of Lokamanya* (Bombay, 1956), 145.

[278] *Report of the Thirty-Fourth Congress*, 157. Also see Special Branch, Punjab, 20 Jan. 1920, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/4, 24 Jan. 1920, para. 213. But, the Hindu support for the Khilafat cause, as the *Hindu* (Madras) admitted, was 'not a religious sympathy but a sympathy born of common political ideals, a growing national solidarity and of the conviction that Mahomedan and Hindu interests are identical and inseparable'. See *Hindu* (Daily), 27 Nov. 1919.

[279] *Bombay Chronicle*, 5 Jan. 1920.

[280] Special Branch, Punjab, 12 Jan. 1920, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/3, 17 Jan. 1920, para. 169.

Shortly after the conference, on 19 January 1920, an influential deputation of Indian leaders led by Dr Ansari and representing cross-sections of Hindu-Muslim communities, waited on Chelmsford at Delhi in order to obtain permission for the delegations to proceed abroad.[281] The deputationists, in an address prepared by Mohamed Ali and signed by twenty-seven prominent leaders, repeated the Khilafat demands, declaring that no Muslim could accept or acquiesce in an unjust settlement 'without jeopardizing eternal salvation'. Even if the Ottoman Turks were made to accept such a settlement, warned the signatories, 'it would remain unacceptable as ever to every believing Musalman'.[282] Chelmsford, 'though not at all happy about it', had agreed to receive the deputation 'so that they might give vent to their feelings'.[283] But he fully recognized that the Indian Muslims felt very deeply on the Turkish issue. He promised to extend certain facilities to the delegation but was in no position to give any assurance about the fate of Turkey. Nevertheless, Chelmsford tried to pamper the deputationists with sympathetic words, though he was equally emphatic that Turkey, when she had her choice, deliberately drew her sword against the Entente Powers and must be prepared to pay the price. The ultimate decision lay not with Britain but with other Powers. He, however, hoped that whatever the decision, the Indian Muslims would remain staunch in their allegiance and loyalty to the King Emperor.[284] But empty words of sympathy carried little weight with the Khilafatists. The following day they issued a rejoinder in which they openly declared that if the peace terms were unfavourable to 'Muslim religion and sentiments', it would be impos-

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[281] Besides Ansari, the deputation consisted of Abdul Bari, Abul Kalam Azad, Gandhi, Chotani, Ajmal Khan, Kitchlew, Hasrat Mohani, Shaukat Ali, Mohamed Ali, Kifayatullah, Ram Bhaj Dutt Choudhri, Shradhanand, Sanaullah, Muhammad Ali (Ahmadi), Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy, Abul Kasem, Abdoola Haroon, Mumtaz Hussein, Syud Hossain, Mirza Yakub Beg, Ghulam Mohy-ud-din, Abdul Majid Qadiri, Zahur Ahmad, Muhammad Fakhir, Syed Sulaiman Nadwi and Agha Safdar.

Those who were unable to come but telegraphed their support included Raja of Mahmudabad, Motilal Nehru, M. M. Malaviya, M. A. Jinnah, Aqa Hasan, Raja (Tasadduq Rasul Khan) of Jahangirabad (1851 1921) and Fazlul Haq. See Indian Khilafat Delegation, *The Khilafat Settlement and the Muslim and Indian Attitude*, Publication no. 1 (London, 1920).

[282] The text of the address is available in ibid.

[283] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. 8 Jan. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[284] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 30, 20 Jan. 1920, IOL&R, ibid. Also see *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 Jan. 1920.

sible for them to give the assurance of loyalty which the viceroy had hoped for.[285]

In the circumstances, the Khilafatists decided to hurry a delegation to Europe, especially as the peace conference at Paris had not yet taken a final decision with regard to the future of Turkey. In the meantime, an All India Khilafat Conference was held at Bombay from 15–17 February 1920, under G. M. Bhurgri's presidency, to devise ways and means for strengthening the hands of the delegation.[286] The conference reiterated the Muslim demands and issued a manifesto explaining its demands and warning the Allied governments of 'the likely consequences of a wrong decision'.[287] The conference also decided to raise a sum of thirty lakh (three million) of rupees for the expenses of the delegation and the Khilafat work generally. But when it came to the important issues of policy, such as the proposed non-co-operation with the government, combined with the boycott of British goods and the propaganda in the army, the cleavage between the radicals and the moderates again came to the surface. The *'ulama* who supported non-co-operation developed their argument on the basis of the Qur'anic verses in *sura* (chapter) *Mumtahina* which prohibit *muwalat* or co-operation with non-Muslims at war with the faithful but allow dealings with those who are friendly.[288] The chief proponent of this argument was Abul Kalam Azad though several other front-rank *'ulama*, such as Abdul Bari, Mahmud Hasan, Kifayatullah and Azad Subhani, had also given their verdict in its favour.[289] The burden of Azad's exegesis was that the *tark-i muwalat* against the British was a religious duty but the Hindus were beyond the force of this injunction as they were friends and collaborators.[290] Those who continued their dealings with the unfriendly non-Muslims despite the ban were guilty of disregard for the clear directions of the Qur'an.[291] It was perhaps for this reason that many prominent

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[285] *Pioneer*, 23 Jan. 1920.

[286] For Bhurgri's hard-hitting speech condemning the anti-Turk agitation in Britain and his proposal for resolving the Turkish problem, see Mahmud Ilahi (ed.), *Intikhab Khutbat-i Khilafat* (Lucknow, 1988), 65–73.

[287] For the manifesto see app. (b) below.

[288] Al-Qur'an, lx: 8–9.

[289] See Azad, *Mas'ala-i Khilafat*, 141–5 and 315–6; and Majlis-i Khilafat Punjab, *Tahrik-i 'adm-i ta'awun aur ihkam-i din-i mubin* (Lahore, 1920), 1–12.

[290] Azad, *Mas'ala-i Khilafat* (1978), 297 ff.

[291] See Mihr, *Tabarrukat-i Azad*, 202–6.

leaders—Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Hasan Imam, Fazlul Haq, Gandhi, C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru—had stayed away from Bombay. The UP radicals under Abdul Bari, supported by Nur Muhammad of Sind and Daud Ghaznawi of the Punjab, pressed for the immediate adoption of non-co-operation.[292] On the opposite side, the moderates, consisting mostly of the Bombay delegates under Chotani, who was himself under Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola's moderating influence,[293] were not prepared to adopt such a course. At the end of a heated discussion the radicals almost succeeded in carrying the motion in the subjects committee.[294] But at the intervention of Bhurgri, who had been detached from the radicals by Sir George Lloyd (1879–1941), governor of Bombay, a compromise formula was accepted. The radicals agreed to shelve the proposals of non-co-operation until the result of the Khilafat delegation to Britain was known.[295] For the time being the champions of extremism were safely side-tracked.

But there was enough fuel to hearten the radicals. Hardly had the conference ended than a wave of discontent spread amongst the Indian Muslims as a direct result of the agitation in Britain for the expulsion of the Turk from Istanbul and the 'redemption' of the 'cathedral' of Hagia Sophia to Christianity.[296] The British public opinion, nurtured as it was for almost a century on hatred and contempt for Turkey, had always been anti-Turk.[297] But the immediate cause of the furore was the decision of the Supreme Allied Council at its London meeting on 14 February 1920 to allow the sultan provisionally to retain his capital in the teeth of opposition from Lloyd George.[298] Annoyed and agitated by the decision, the Turcophobes, especially Lord Robert Cecil (1864–1958) and Viscount James Bryce (1838–1922), the most vehement critics of Turkey, let loose a storm of protest.[299] On 26

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[292] Manley's note in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 2591/1920.

[293] Chelmsford had asked Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, to get Sir Ibrahim to use his influence with Chotani and persuade him to adopt a moderate course. See Chelmsford to Lloyd, 9 Feb. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 265, 14 Feb. 1920, ibid.

[294] See Manley's note in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 2591/1920.

[295] Ibid. Also see Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 605, 27 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[296] *The Times*, 17 Feb. 1920.

[297] K. K. Aziz classifies the anti-Turk opinion in Britain into eight well-defined groups. See his *Britain and Muslim India* (London, 1963), 109–11.

[298] See the minutes of the Allied Conference of 14 Feb. 1920. PRO, CAB 29/82, ICP-- 28.

[299] For Lord Robert Cecil see Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 123 HC Deb. 5s, col.

February 1920, a debate was forced in the House of Commons where Sir Donald Maclean (1864–1932), Robert Cecil, T. P. O'Conner (1848–1929), S. F. Ormsby-Gore (1863–1950) and Sir Charles Oman (1860–1946), relentlessly attacked the Allied decision and vigorously advocated the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.[300]

The campaign also received sustenance from a number of prominent orientalists and intellectuals, including Professor D. S. Margoliouth (1858–1940), at one time the tutor of Mohamed Ali at Oxford, and historian Arnold Toynbee (1889–1974).[301] The British press, led by *The Times* of Viscount Northcliffe (1865–1922), lent its active support.[302] To reinforce their demands the Turcophobes magnified the alleged Armenian massacres during the war and later in early 1920 in Marsh (Cilecia) by the nationalist Turks.[303] An exceedingly vigorous propaganda was conducted on behalf of the Armenians through such media as the cinema, the theatre and the press.[304] A powerful support came from the Church dignitaries headed by Dr Randall Davidson (1848–1930), the Archbishop of Canterbury and a former Clerk of the Closet in the Royal Household, and Dr Cosmo Lang (1864–1945), the Archbishop of York. Equally in the forefront were Dr Arthur Winnington-Ingram (1858–1939), the Bishop of London, and Edmond Knox (1847–1937), the Bishop of Manchester. Probably,

730. For Lord Bryce see his 'The Settlement of the Near East', *Contemporary Review*, 117/1 (1920), 1.

[300] For details see Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 125 HC Deb. 5s, esp. cols. 1949–55, 1961–3, 1971–89, 2006–8 and 2025–8.

[301] For Margoliouth's views see his 'The Caliphate', *New Europe*, 14/182 (1920), 294–300. For Toynbee see his 'A Review of the Turkish Problem', ibid., 14/170, 1–5; id., 'The Meaning of the Constantinople Decision', ibid., 14/175, 129–31; and id., 'Mr. Montagu's Pound of Flesh', ibid., 14/176, 145–9. For Sir C. W. Oman see his 'East and West', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4/3, (1920), 5–6. For the views of Ormsby-Gore, Sir D. Maclean and T. P. O'Conner, see Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 116 HC Deb. 5s, cols. 676, 752 and 723–4; 125 HC Deb. 5s, cols. 1951–5. For E. A. Bagley, John Buchan, H. Hamilton Fyfe and Samuel Hoare see *The Times*, 13 Jan. 1920. Also see P. Tonapetean, *The Sultan is not Caliph* (London, 1920); and C. A. Nallino's, *Notes on the Nature of the Caliphate*, ([London], 1916). Originally, it was issued by the Italian foreign ministry as *Appunti Sulla natura del 'Califfate' in genere e sui presento 'califfate Ottomano'* to dispute the Ottoman claim to the caliphate. IOL&R, L/P&S/10/895, file 3344/1920.

[302] See e.g. *The Times*, 7 and 21 Jan. 1920.

[303] For details of the Turco-Armenian tragedy, see Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians*, 289–312.

[304] Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India* (Lahore, 1967), 137. A document, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–16*, prepared by Toynbee and Lord Bryce in 1916 and presented to Parliament, was often cited as an indictment against the Turks. See Parl. Papers, 1916, Cmd. 8325.

they felt that they had been robbed of their plan of making Istanbul the seat of the united Anglican and the Greek Orthodox Churches. Thus in order to enhance the prestige of the Anglican Church, they deliberately gave the agitation the semblance of a struggle between the Cross and the Crescent.[305] Powerful sections of the business community joined the campaign because of their vested interests.[306] It was the furore of the 1870s and 1890s all over again. Kidwai and other Indian Muslims in Britain, with the help of their Turcophile British friends, tried as usual to stem the tide,[307] but a mere mention of the word Armenia in British gathering was enough to defeat the Turkish case.[308]

These unguarded outbursts of the clergy and the statesmen in Britain produced a strong reaction in India.[309] To make matters worse Lloyd George, while defending the Allied decision on Istanbul, had admitted in the House of Commons that his pledge of 5 January 1918, was after all a solemn pledge, a 'specific, unqualified, and deliberate' declaration, made with the consent of all the parties in order to reassure the British people and the Indian Muslims.[310] This led the Khilafatists to argue that if he was committed to Istanbul

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[305] *The Times*, 20 Feb. 1920; Sulaiman Nadwi to Abdul Majid Daryabadi, 1 Apr. 1920, in Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi (ed.), *Barid-i Farang* (Karachi, 1952), 35; and Felix Valyi, *Spiritual and Political Revolutions in Islam* (London, 1925), 37–8.

[306] Valyi, *Spiritual and Political Revolutions*, 39.

[307] Again, the London Muslim League, the Islamic Society, and the Islamic Information Bureau, were the main organizations through which the work was accomplished. They were ably assisted by the British Muslims like Marmaduke Pickthall, Umar Flight and Khalid Sheldrake and the British Turcophiles such as Col. Josiah Wedgwood (1872–1943), Brig.-Gen. H. C. Surtees (1858–1933), Lt.-Col. Aubury Herbert, (1880–1943), Lt.-Comdr. J. M. Kennworthy (1886–1953) and Sir J. D. Rees (1854–1922). Among other well-known sympathizers were Earl Winterton (1883–1962), Earl Abingdon (1836–1928), Lord Ampthill (1869–1935), Lord Carmichael (1859–1926), Sir Theodore Morison (1863–1936), Sir Louis Dane (1856–1946), Field Marshall Sir Charles Egerton (1848–1921), and Sir James La Touche (1844–1921), Sir George Roos-Keppel and Prof. E. G. Browne (1862–1926), who had been connected with India in one way or the other. The Anglo-Ottoman Society of Lord Mowbray Segrave and Strouton of Strouton (1867–1936) also gave its full support. See M. Naeem Qureshi, *Mohamed Ali's Khilafat Delegation to Europe* (Karachi, 1980), 15–19.

[308] Hamid, *Muslim Separatism*, 137.

[309] See Bhurgri to Montagu, Tel. 26 Feb. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 2261/1920; Chotani to Montagu, Tel. 27 Feb. 1920, ibid., file 1737/1920; and Abdul Bari and Kidwai to Ameer Ali, Mohamed Ali and Ispahani, Tel. no. 0017, 9 Mar. 1920, ibid., file 2261/20.

[310] Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 125 HC Deb. 5s, cols. 1960–2. In private talks he had always contended that it was not a pledge. See Montagu to Lloyd, 14 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

he was equally pledged to Thrace and 'the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor'.[311] Yakub Hasan, while returning to India, had warned Syed Zahur Ahmad:

> It is not likely that he [Lloyd George] would receive any other deputation.... H. H. the Aga Khan is the only one who could see the prime minister and he has of course done his best to influence him. Lord Curzon is the evil genius in this case and if it were not for the strong attitude adopted by Mr. Montagu to secure justice for Turkey the cause would have been lost altogether.[312]

A Khilafat conference was held at Calcutta from 28 to 29 February 1920, which, because of the recent release of Abul Kalam Azad, had become the political storm-centre. There, the Khilafatists went wild. The proceedings of the conference were more militant and anti-British than any yet known. The resolutions were supported 'with speeches of great violence offering sacrifices of life and property in the cause of Islam'.[313] Two of the delegates, Fazlul Haq and Abul Kasem, placed letters of resignation from their seats in the provincial legislative councils, with the president of the meeting for use when needed.[314] But it was Abul Kalam Azad's presidential address which definitively determined the ideological bearings of the Khilafat movement. Based on the Qur'an, *ahadis*, *fiqh* and historical precedents his discourse became a manual for the Khilafatists. It centred on three issues: the *Khilafat*, non-co-operation and Hindu-Muslim relations. As regards the caliphate he declared that the retention of the institution was a fundamental principle of Islam and not just a question of recognizing the sultan of Turkey as the *Khalifatu'l-Muslimin*. Similarly, *tark-i muwalat* was basic to the *shari'at* as any *muwalat* (co-operation) with the non-Muslim 'enemies of Islam' was a sin. On the Hindu-Muslim question, he divided non-Muslims into two categories—the combatants and the friendly. Therefore, co-operation was disallowed vis-à-vis the British but permitted with the Hindus for extending the hand of friendship.[315] The main resolution of the

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[311] Ref. his pledge of 5 Jan. 1918. See *The Times*, 7 Jan. 1918.

[312] Yakub Hasan to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 16 Jan. 1920, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i. Eng. tr. mine.

[313] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 219, 7 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[314] Ibid.

[315] See Abul Kalam Azad, *Mas'ala-i Khilafat*, esp. 141 5. Cf. Malik Ram, *Kuch Abu'l-Kalam ke bare men*, 113–14; and AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i.

conference, moved by Abdul Bari, went even further and threatened to 'cease all relations of loyalty' with Britain and to assist the caliph 'by all possible means' if his dominions were not kept intact as they were before the war. The conference also decided that a general *hartal* should be observed throughout the country on 19 March 1920, in order to disprove the assertion of Viscount Bryce that the Indian Muslims were not concerned at the expulsion of the Turk from Istanbul.[316]

The indignation at the 'machinations' of the new 'crusaders' and the attempts of the British statesmen 'to misrepresent and misinterpret the Moslem feelings'[317] was so intense that it not only disturbed the 'extremists' and the moderates, it also alarmed certain members of the British community in India.[318] Crum and Paton, the representatives of the Bengal and Bombay chambers of commerce, respectively, in the imperial legislative council, impressed upon Chelmsford the necessity of continued pressure on the British government to 'avoid interference with Moslem religious beliefs and scruples'.[319] Similarly, Lt. Colonel (Sir) Henry A. J. Gidney (b. 1873), requested him on behalf of the Anglo-Indian and the domiciled European community in India, to inform the prime minister and British Parliament of their strong feelings in favour of the retention of Istanbul by the sultan of Turkey and his recognition as the 'head of the Moslem religion'.[320] The Government of India was perturbed at this state of affairs. On 7 March 1920, Chelmsford reported to Montagu:

> . . . the open expression of disloyalty although conditional is danger signal and may at any rate lead to local disorder. Bengal and other Local Governments have been consulted by us as to the measures to be adopted to deal with the situation and to check further extension of campaign of violence recognizing on the one hand the danger that fanaticism of masses may be excited to disorder point by unchecked

[316] *Englishman*, 1 Mar. 1920. Also see Azad to Lloyd George and Montagu, Tel. 1 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 1894/1920.

[317] President, Anjuman-i Atibba, Bombay, to Montagu, Tel. 2 Mar. 1920, ibid., file 1785/1920; and Chotani to Lloyd George, Tel. 6 Mar. 1920, ibid., file 2246/1920.

[318] See Bhurgri's telegram to Lloyd George and Montagu in *Englishman*, 1 Mar. 1920; and IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795 797, file 2960/1920.

[319] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 216, 6 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Crum tried to approach the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to persuade them to give up the agitation. See his message to one Ellison of London in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 228 10 Mar. 1920, ibid.

[320] IOL&R, P/Conf./57, ICH(P)P, Poll.--Mar. 1920- 28—Part 1 B.

> agitation, and on the other hand the danger that action against individuals may precipitate trouble.[321]

Such expressions were heard throughout India.[322] But fortunately for the government, as the volume of excitement increased, the moderates began to withdraw their support from the increasing militancy of the Khilafat movement. They looked upon the Calcutta resolutions with deep alarm and detected in them an unacceptable proposition.[323] Even a front-rank leader like Syed Zahur Ahmad frankly admitted that:

> I do not agree with the implied message in the Calcutta Khilafat Committee's announcement that the pursuance of the dictates of the *shari'at* would necessarily mean the cessation of loyal connections with the British government. On the contrary, in my opinion, this relationship is a useful and powerful instrument which we can use in the support of the *Khalifatu'l-Muslimin* and [the freedom of] the holy places. To snap this connection is to lose this instrument.... Therefore, I consider a break off [akin to] a suicide, an unnecessary act, and, in fact, an absurd [notion].... Homage and countenance of the *Khalifatu'l-Muslimin*, the great sultan, in my opinion, is not at all repugnant to our allegiance to the British Crown.[324]

Gandhi was also unnerved by the Muslim reaction and declared that he would co-operate with them only if they acted with 'sufficient restraint' and did not resort to violence. He frankly told the Muslims that he would cease to co-operate and would advise every Hindu to do the same 'the moment there was violence actually done, advised or countenanced', though he admitted that 'my argument today against violence is based upon pure expediency, i.e. its utter futility'.[325]

The Khilafatists realized that the moment was not yet ripe for the display of violence. Fear of losing moderate support and Hindu co-operation and Gandhi's restraining influence made them to change

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[321] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 219, 7 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[322] See e.g. Zafar Ali Khan's speech at the Khilafat Conference at Burhanpur in Ghulam Husain Zulfikar, *Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan*, 668–94.

[323] Ref. in Gandhi's manifesto of 7 Mar. 1920, *Collected Works*, xvii, 73–6. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 260, 25 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[324] Syed Zahur Ahmad to [? Abdul Bari], 18 Mar. 1920, AFM/NAP, AIML, Misc./Khilafat/i. Eng. tr. mine.

[325] See *Collected Works*, xvii, 73–77; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 260, 25 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

their tactics.[126] On 9 March 1920, the CKC issued a manifesto urging the people to observe the *hartals* peacefully.[127] Shaukat Ali, however, warned that it was their last appeal to the British government and in case no positive response was forthcoming, they would be forced to implement the Calcutta resolutions.[128] Thus, when on 19 March 1920, the Second Khilafat Day was observed, in spite of the news of the Allied occupation of Istanbul on 16 March, there was no violence or intimidation. The demonstrations were peaceful and the fairly successful *hartals* were voluntary. At some places, particularly in Patna and Bombay where the local governments had been able to split the Muslims into two camps, the Calcutta resolutions were not accepted. Hindu participation on the whole was sparing and half-hearted. Their attendance at public meetings was also sparse, as at Lahore, Kanpur and Assam, because the Muslims would not drop the Calcutta resolutions. Even at a place like Bombay, the Hindu element constituted only four per cent of the participants at the protest rally. However, the 'extremist' Hindu leaders, except for Tilak and his party, co-operated with the Muslims whole-heatedly.[129] In an interesting note the Bombay and Sind CIDs reported:

> Perhaps the most unwelcome feature of the Caliphate propaganda is the ascendancy which the Maulvis and Mullas have suddenly acquired. Many of these people are as a rule unscrupulous mercenaries, impatient of continued peace and peaceful Government. . . . All fear of, or respect for the law has vanished from the minds of political agitators, and they no longer shun, but positively court prosecution and conviction, feeling assured that after a fortnight or a month in jail at most they will be released under some 'Proclamation' [or] 'Amnesty'.[130]

Meanwhile, the Khilafat delegation led by Mohamed Ali and consisting of Syud Hossain, Sulaiman Nadwi and Hasan Muhammad Hayat (1882–1955)—joined later by Abul Kasem and M. H. Kidwai—

[126] See Gandhi's Tel. to Shaukat Ali 6 Mar. 1920, asking him to exercise moderation, ibid., 70.

[127] *Times of India*, 10 Mar. 1920.

[128] Ibid., 18 Mar. 1920.

[129] See *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 and 21 Mar. 1920; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel, no. 260, 25 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; Lloyd to Montagu, 26 Mar., 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 271, 2 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; various Tels. from different parts of India to Lloyd George, Montagu and Ameer Ali in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797; and Iqbal Shaidai to Abdul Bari, n.d., *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 210.

[130] Ext., NWFP Abstract, 20 Mar. 1920, para. 238, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/15, 10 Apr. 1920, para. 738.

had arrived in London on 26 February 1920,[331] amidst great anti-Turk commotion. They managed to have two interviews: the first on 2 March, with H. A. L. Fisher (1865–1940), Liberal historian and president of the Board of Education, who received them on behalf of the indisposed Montagu, and the second on 19 March, with Lloyd George at 10 Dawning Street.[332] As the spokesman of the Khilafat delegation, Mohamed Ali pointed out in the interviews that there were certain clear obligations imposed on Muslims by their faith. Among those was the question of the Khilafat. Islamic outlook on life being supranational rather than national, the Muslims had always had two centres—personal and local. The personal centre was the caliph, the successor of the Prophet of Islam, and the local was the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* as delimited by Muslim geographers. The institution of the caliphate embodied both the temporal and the spiritual duties and it was incumbent upon the entire Muslim nation to preserve it. Hence the connection of the Indian Muslims with the Ottoman caliphate. As the 'Commander of the Faithful' the caliph's temporal power, especially after the Balkan Wars, had been reduced to a minimum with which he could maintain his dignity and act as the 'Defender of the Faith'. Therefore, the irreducible minimum was the restoration of territorial *status quo ante bellum*. In consonance with the religious requirement, the caliphate should be preserved with adequate temporal power and the caliph should retain his control over the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* and the wardenship of the holy places and the sacred shrines. Mohamed Ali argued that if the caliph retained his control of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab*, and if the pledges of the British prime minister and of President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) of the United States were redeemed in entirety, the restoration of the territorial *status quo ante bellum* would be achieved automatically. Within

[331] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Sept. 1920, Proc. no. 100; and Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 22; and Sulaiman Nadwi to Abdul Bari, 4 Mar. 1920, Sulaiman Nadwi, *Barid-i Farang*, 14. At that time there were no less than six different delegations in Britain representing the Near and the Middle Eastern countries, besides the Greek delegation whose propaganda the Indian delegation had to counter. Ahmed Haji Siddik Khatri, *Hisabat wafd-i Khilafat yurup*, (Bombay, 1923), 7–8. Also see Rais Ahmad Jafri, *Sirat-i Muhammad 'Ali*, 2nd edn. (Lahore, 1950), 333.

[332] See IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 370, 'Report Submitted by the Delegation and Accepted by Mr. Fisher'; and B. 371, 'Minutes of Proceeding at a Deputation from the Indian Khilafat Delegation to the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street on Friday, 19th Mar. 1920'. For Fisher's tenure at the Board see Dennis Dean, 'The Dilemmas of an Academic Liberal Historian in Lloyd George's Government: H. A. L. Fisher at the Board of Education, 1916–1922', *History*, 79/255 (1994), 57–81.

the scheme of Turkish sovereignty, he pointed out, reasonable guarantees could be taken for the autonomous development of all communities, whether Muslim, Christian or Jewish. Mohamed Ali did not hesitate to state that their allegiance to God and his Prophet took preference over allegiance to any earthly sovereign. He was joined by Syud Hossain and Sulaiman Nadwi in laying stress on the point that for the Indian Muslims the question of the Khilafat was purely a religious one and not a political issue. Syud Hossain, in particular, pointed out that the Hindus had supported the movement because they had come to regard the Khilafat as a national rather than a sectarian question.[333]

In the short time given to the delegation the case was presented 'very clearly and very fully' and even Fisher and Lloyd George appreciated their lucidity and moderation. But as the case is with such deputations they are suited only to the convenience of the government. Lloyd George had been thoroughly briefed by the India Office through his private secretary, Philip Kerr, who had much influence with him. Even at the interview Lloyd George was aided by experts on Indian and Islamic affairs. He knew about the antecedents of each member of the delegation and whom they represented. Answers to any possible arguments, as well as the general line of reply from the point of view of Indian public opinion, had been prepared well in advance. He was advised that he should quote from the Qur'an and refer to Muslim history 'as an Oriental appreciates [such] references'. It had also been taken care of that the interview would end with the address of the prime minister.[334] Naturally, therefore, the result of the interviews was a foregone conclusion.

In their replies to the delegation, Fisher was non-committal and Lloyd George obdurate. With his anti-Turk and anti-Indian bias, the British premier told the delegation that in dealing with Austria-Hungary they had applied the principle of self-determination and the same must apply to the Ottoman Empire. Turkey was not being

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[333] Ibid. Ref. about Wilson alludes to the relevant item in his Fourteen Points of Jan. 1918. See Arthur S. Link, et al. (eds.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 45 (1984), 536.

[334] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 370 and B. 371; Philip Kerr's note to Sir William Duke (1863–1924), Perm. Under Sec. of State, dated 15 Mar. 1920; minute by (Sir) John Shuckburgh (1877–1953), Sec., Pol. Dept., IO, dated 16 Mar. 1920; and C. C. Garbett's undated minute in L/P&S/10/798, file 2130/1920. For fuller details see Naeem Qureshi, *Mohamed Ali's Khilafat Delegation*, 22 ff.

treated severely because it was a Muslim country and they must get this well into their heads. The Turk had been an intolerant and inept ruler and the interests of civilization demanded the imposition of some control over him. Therefore, the Allies must supervise Asia Minor. Arabia should belong to the Arabs who had no wish to be ruled by the sultan of Turkey. Thrace should go to Greece as reliable census had shown the Muslim population there was 'in a considerable minority'. The same applied to Izmir where 'a most careful investigation by a very impartial Committee' had revealed a preponderance of non-Turk population and that the Greek Muslims preferred Greek rule to that of the Turks.[335]

Lloyd George remained unmoved by the delegation's arguments and refused to concede a single demand. All through the interview he was impatient and avoided being drawn into discussion. He touched and emphasized only those aspects which suited him and refused any discussion on the Palestine question or the massacre of the Turks in Izmir. He made no reference to his own pledge of 5 January 1918, which he had admitted was a 'specific, unqualified, and deliberate' declaration. His arguments were one-sided and he drew wrong analogies. His statistics on Thrace and Izmir were defective and overwhelmingly Muslim majority areas were handed over to Greece which had not been even at war with Turkey[336]—a decision which was detested by Montagu, disputed by Admiral Sir John Michael de Robeck (1862–1928), the British high commissioner in Istanbul, and disapproved by the General Staff.[337] The settlement of Asia Minor was based on an incident (Armenian 'massacres') the fundamental responsibility for which had not been established by an impartial investigation.[338] And there seems to have been no basis either to his claim that not merely had the Indian Muslims been heard but the settlement was very largely affected by their opinion. The Indian delegation at the peace conference to which he referred, was never seriously treated.[339] And as for the Istanbul decision, the

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[335] Ibid., esp. 25; and L/P&S/10/18, B. 371.

[336] See the minute by Sir John Tilley (1869–1952), Asst. Sec., FO, dated 10 Apr. 1920. PRO, FO 371/E 2830/139/44. Also see Admiral Sir John de Robeck to Curzon, 9 Mar. 1920. PRO, FO 371/E 229/56/44.

[337] See Montagu's minute of 11 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795, file 8039/1920; Admiral de Robeck to Curzon, 9 Mar. 1920, PRO, FO 371/E 229/56/44; 371/E 2207/3/44; and /E 3325/3/44.

[338] See de Robeck to Curzon, 9 Mar. 1920, PRO, FO 371/E 229/56/44.

[339] See Montagu to Curzon, 28 Aug. 1919. IOL&R, L/P&S/10/851, file 4995/1919.

credit goes to Etienne Millerand (1859–1953) and Saverio Nitti (1868–1953), the French and the Italian prime ministers, respectively who, in spite of Lloyd George's opposition, had insisted on retaining the city for the Turk.[340]

But then Lloyd George's attitude precisely reflected the feelings of some prominent British statesmen and the vocal section of the British public who had no soft corner for the Indian demands. Even Curzon and Hardinge, the former viceroys and then at the Foreign Office as secretary of state and permanent under-secretary of state, respectively had been highly critical of the Khilafat agitation in India.[341] They also lamented the 'shocking weakness' of the Government of India which they thought had rendered the agitation formidable.[342] Similarly, T. P. O'Conner, a well-known Member of Parliament, dismissed the Khilafat movement as nothing but a well-organized, lavishly financed, artificial agitation.[343] T. W. Arnold (1864–1930), who had been associated with the University of the Punjab and the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College of Aligarh and at the time was educational adviser to the secretary of state for India, thought that the movement had no sound religious basis;[344] and Arnold Toynbee was emphatic that it was unrepresentative of the world Muslim feeling.[345] No wonder Lloyd George's firmness won him the gratitude

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[340] At the Allied Conference in London in Feb. 1920, Lloyd George had made no secret of his designs and regretted missing 'a great opportunity of ridding Europe once and for all this pest and potential source of trouble [i.e. the Turk]'. But he was compelled to yield to Millerand who wanted to leave Istanbul with Turkey for very cogent reasons, and to Nitti who believed that it was useless for the Allies to demand things unless they were certain to get them. Lloyd George alleged that the decision of the Conference was due to pro-Muslim prejudice and until the end tried his best to limit the sultan's suzerainty in Europe. See the minutes of the Allied Conference of 14 Feb. 1920, in London in PRO, CAB 29/8, ICP -28. The decision of the British cabinet had been taken earlier on 6 Jan. 1920. Curzon had recorded a note of dissent with the decision. See Cabinet Minute 1 (20) and CP-- 407 and app. iv, in PRO, CAB 23/20.

[341] Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe, Paris Peace Delegation, no. 7289, 30 Oct. 1919, encl., FO to IO, no. 145162/ME/44A, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/796, file 6818/1920; and Hardinge's note in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/795. Curzon was a parson's son. His father, Lord Scarsdale, was in the Holy Orders. See Bence-Jones, *The Viceroys of India*, 170.

[342] See Curzon's minute in PRO, FO 371/E 2505/139/44. Hardinge thought that the Govt. of India was paying too much attention to the Muslim feelings. See his undated minute (presumably of 12 May 1920) in PRO, FO 371/E 4935/139/44.

[343] Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 125 HC Deb. 5s, col. 1893.

[344] See T. W. Arnold's minute of 17 Mar. 1920, in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 2012/1920.

[345] A. J. Toynbee, 'The Question of the Caliphate', *Contemporary Review*, 117 (1920), 193.

of many in Britain,[346] though it most certainly disappointed the Indian Muslims and their sympathizers.[347] The nationalist press was profuse with bitter comments. The *Bombay Chronicle*, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta) and the *Independent* (Allahabad) were especially critical of Lloyd George's attitude.[348] The Khilafatists' disappointment was even greater because some of them like Abdul Bari and Kidwai had been well-disposed, especially after the interview with Fisher, towards accepting the decisions of the Supreme Council with certain modifications. Now they felt annoyed and despondent.[349]

The refusal of the British government to accept any of the Khilafatists' demands called for action. The radicals, particularly Abul Kalam Azad, who ridiculed the 'methods of begging', pressed for 'some means of exerting direct pressure'.[350] Naturally, therefore, when on 22 March 1920, the Khilafatists met at Ajmal Khan's house in Delhi to consider how best the Calcutta resolutions of the previous month could be followed up, the question of non-co-operation with the government received the top priority.[351] Gandhi, who had been

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[346] See *The Times*, 22 Mar. 1920. Orientalist Margoliouth also praised the firmness of the premier. See his 'The Caliphate', *New Europe*, 14/182, (1920), 294–300.

[347] Maj.-Gen. Lord Edward Gleichen (1863–1937), for instance, wrote a very bitter letter to Lloyd George accusing him of vengeance against Turkey in marked contrast to the treatment of Austria and Germany:

'Your reply to the Indian Caliphate Delegation', he wrote, 'amiable and considerate as it is, still excuses by reason of vengeance the entry of Turkey into the war against us. . . . Your reply also speaks of the destruction of Austria and the taking away of Alsace Loraine. You have not occupied Vienna; you have not yet agreed to the treatment of Turkey as favourable as Germany.

'If you explain your attitude towards Turkey by the law of self-determination, apply, we beg, self-determination to all Thrace, to all Constantinople, and to the Province of Aidin (Smyrna). We would even beg that this whole principle be applied to Cilicia and Armenia, where a system of administrative sectors could easily solve the question of contiguous minorities'.

See the letter (written on his behalf by A. G. Field) dated 22 Mar. 1920 in PRO, FO 371/5141.

[348] For the comments of the Indian papers see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 3885/1920. Also see T. L. Vaswani, *The Spirit and Struggle of Islam* (Madras, 1921), 52–61.

[349] On 4 Mar. 1920, Abdul Bari had sent the following tel. to Mohamed Ali and Ispahani: 'Interview with Fisher hopeful. Accept Montagu's formula. Countries Muslim before war should remain under Muslim government and Khalifa's s[i]ya[da]t'. See IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 2261/1920.

[350] Since Jan. 1920, Azad had been pressing for a more effective action. See Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, i, 344.

[351] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 260, 25 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Prominent among those who attended were Dr Ansari, Abdul Bari, Ajmal Khan, Azad, Kidwai, Shaukat Ali and the Nawab of Dhaka. Among the Hindus were Gandhi, Lajpat Rai, Patel, Malaviya, Khaparde and Tilak.

trying to take the sting out of the Calcutta programme by disputing such items as boycott of British goods and advice to the soldiers to refuse to serve,[352] made yet another attempt. As an alternative to violence or *jihad*, he again insisted that non-co-operation should be absolutely non-violent.[353] The majority of the Muslim leaders was loath to accepting non-violence as a principle. Particular objection to it came from Abdul Bari who preferred *jihad* or *hijrat* because other methods would take years to yield any result. In the end, however, the line suggested by Gandhi was generally accepted.[354] At this stage the organizers were vague as to what form the scheme should take but eventually the four-phased non-co-operation programme contemplated, in its first sage, renouncing of government titles and relinquishing of honorary posts. In the event of a negative response from the government, they were to proceed with the second stage of persuading government servants to tender their resignations. In the third stage those in the armed services were to be asked to resign and, finally, the non-co-operators were to withhold payment of government dues and taxes. The organizers also agreed to implement the scheme progressively in slow stages. In fact, the last two stages were remote and distant steps.[355]

The Khilafatists had agreed to modify the original scheme of non-co-operation mainly because of their desire to conciliate Gandhi and not for any intrinsic liking for a non-violent programme. Therefore, when Gandhi learnt of this from Hasrat Mohani, he remonstrated to Ajmal Khan that if the Muslim leaders were not enthusiastic about the scheme 'at least they should get rid of a man like myself'.[356] The Khilafatists could ill-afford to lose Gandhi. Dr Ansari and Ajmal Khan hastened to reassure Gandhi that 'violence (even if it could be practised) ought to be scrupulously avoided'. They further informed him that most of the Khilafatists would be with him though they

[352] *Collected Works*, xvii, 73 6.

[354] Gopal Krishna, 'The Khilafat Movement: The First Phase', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, parts 1 2 (1968), 46 7.

[354] Ibid. Azad, in his autobiography, mistakenly attributes the proceedings of the Mar. meeting to Jan. 1920. It was after this meeting that the leaders proceeded to the Meerut Khilafat Conference. See *India Wins Freedom* (Bombay, 1959), 9.

[355] *Collected Works*, xvii, 380 90. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 260 and 271, 25 Mar. and Apr. 2 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[356] Gandhi to Razmia (Ajmal Khan's Sec.), 27 Mar. 1920, *Collected Works*, xvii, 293 4.

were not sure about people with vested interests.[357] In order to give a practical demonstration of Muslim sincerity, Ajmal Khan proceeded with his personal non-co-operation. Early in April 1920, he renounced the title of *Haziqu'l-Mulk*, conferred upon him by the government, and returned his *Kaiser-i Hind* and Coronation Durbar medals.[358]

But not all the Khilafatists reciprocated these feelings. Apart from the Abdul Bari group, which was still reluctant to accept a non-violent programme, there was a considerable body of opinion within the Khilafat organization which opposed non-co-operation for completely different reasons. They, like Gandhi, viewed some of the items—tempering with the army and government services, and refusal to pay taxes—as extreme measures. The chief dissentients were Mirza Ali Mohammed Khan and Badruddin Abdulla Koor, both honorary secretaries of the CKC. Others who expressed disagreement were Sulleman Cassim Mitha, Suleman Abdul Wahib, (Sir) Rahimtoola Chinoy (b. 1882), Sheriff Dewjee Canjee and G. M. Bhurgri.[359] Chotani himself was hesitant to support the programme. He had privately promised George Lloyd, governor of Bombay, that he would 'do his best to get the clauses referring to the tampering with troops or Government servants eliminated from the non-co-operation programme'.[360] Chotani kept his word and when the CKC met at Bombay on 11–14 April 1920, he tried his utmost to that end.[361] But, Chotani was overruled and the CKC decided in principle to introduce non-co-operation after the publication of the peace terms.[362] The more bellicose like Hasrat Mohani, who were unhappy with the CKC's policies, wanted to rid it of moderate influence by shifting its offices from Bombay to Delhi. To force the issue a Khilafat workers' conference was convened at Delhi from 18 to 19 April 1920 which made quite

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[357] Letter dated 1 Apr. 1920, quoted in Gopal Krishna, 'The Khilafat Movement', 47.

[358] For his letter to the DC, Delhi, see Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal*, facing 221.

[359] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Sept. 1920, Proc. no. 100, app. ii.

[360] Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 605, 27 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[361] Intercepted letters between Chotani and Kidwai bear testimony to this. See Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 688, 13 May 1920, ibid.

[362] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P Sept. 1920, Proc. no. 100, app. ii. Judith Brown (*Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 207–8) and Francis Robinson (*Separatism*, 308–9) maintain that this meeting took place in Mar. 1920. In fact, no such meeting of the CKC was convened in March of that year. It was held a month later in April 1920.

a flutter. Ostensibly, the purpose was declared to be to give practical effect to the policies already agreed upon.[363] Suspecting imprudence, most of the front rank Khilafatists chose to stay away from the conference. In fact the Delhi proceedings were mostly ignored and except for Abdul Bari, Salamatullah, Hasrat Mohani, Kifayatullah and a few others no leader of prominence even bothered to send messages.[364] The conference itself was well-attended—500 delegates and nearly 2,000 audience. But the Punjab and the UP workers dominated the proceedings with the fire-brands like Daud Ghaznawi, Attaullah (1891–1961), Malik Lal Khan (1889–1976), Ghulam Muhammad Aziz Amritsari (1896–1971) and Arif Hasawi in command. There was such emotional exuberance that it was generally believed that *jihad* would be declared without hesitation.[365] However, Ahmad Saeed, chairman of the reception committee, told the delegates to control themselves as they could not declare *jihad* or undertake *hijrat* on their own. They must abide by the decisions of the CKC and wait for Chotani's instructions though in the case of *hijrat* he was in favour of taking advantage of the Amir's offer of hospitality to emigrating Muslims.[366] After much difficulty reckless demands were side-tracked. The most important decision was the establishment of the Majlis-i Khuddam-i Khilafat, an organization which, assured Hasrat Mohani, was not intended to be a parallel body with any new programme but would work within the parameters of the accepted policy.[367] Its members swore to observe the laws of *shari'at* for the preservation of the caliphate.[368] Thus, in spite of the highly charged mood of the assembly, the CKC managed to come out almost unscathed.

As one final effort to move the British government, Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and others put pressure upon Gandhi to proceed to London immediately and, without prejudice to Mohamed Ali's delegation, place before the British ministers and the public, Hindu-

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[363] For details of the proceedings see *Dastur* (Sherkot), 24 Apr. 1920; and Ext., Delhi Abstract, 24 Apr. 1920, para. 454, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/19, 15 May 1920, para. 992.

[364] Ibid.

[365] Ibid.; and Aziz Hindi Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', in Jafri Nadwi, *Auraq*, 777–8.

[366] *Aftab*, 23 Apr. 1920.

[367] *Dastur*, 24 Apr. 1920.

[368] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 15 May 1920, para. 515, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/22, 5 June 1920, para. 1184.

Muslim feelings on the question of the Khilafat.[369] But Gandhi, realizing perhaps the futility of the measure, was reluctant to oblige, unless he was assured that the public opinion was generally in favour of sending another delegation abroad, and that the permission and approval of the viceroy was also forthcoming.[370] These were just delaying tactics for Gandhi knew that the CKC was divided regarding the dispatch of another delegation and Chelmsford was also sceptical of the expediency of such a mission.[371] Montagu, too, when approached by Gandhi, gave no favourable response.[372] The India Office had no intention of encouraging 'another talker' or giving Indian agitators 'joy-rides' to Europe.[373] But the basic issue was whether the British government would recognize the right of a non-Muslim Indian to a special voice in matters relating to Turkey. It could have established a most embarrassing precedent for the government.[374] But in the meantime, the CKC, in deference to the wishes of the majority, had decided to drop the matter. Nevertheless, Gandhi's hesitation had created misgivings among some of the Khilafatists, particularly Abul Kalam Azad, as to the disinterestedness of his motives.[375] The suspicion, however, did not last very long as Gandhi had plunged himself ever so vigorously into the Khilafat movement.

Mohamed Ali's delegation, which had stayed on in Britain despite the disheartening conditions and suggestions for its recall, made two attempts to secure a hearing before the peace conference. But it met with no success.[376] Its two interviews with Montagu also yielded nothing beyond an assurance of his continued personal support. Montagu

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[369] Ref. in Gandhi to Hignell (Pte. Sec. to Viceroy), Tel. 13 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[370] Gandhi to Chotani, Tel. 18 Apr. 1920, *Collected Works*, xvii, 322. Also see ibid., 345–6.

[371] *Collected Works*, xvii, 346

[372] Gandhi to Montagu, Tel. 22 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 3255/1920; and Hignell to Gandhi, 6 May 1920, referred to in Gandhi to Hignell, 12 June 1920, encl., Chelmsford to Montagu, 23 June 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[373] See minutes by (Sir) J. W. Hose (1865–1958), Sec., Judicial & Public, and J. E. Shuckburgh dated 27 Apr. 1920, in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 3255/1920.

[374] See Shuckburgh's minute above, n. 373.

[375] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 379, 7 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[376] Even Ameer Ali and other Indian Muslims in Britain seemed reluctant to give much further support to the delegation. They were particularly embarrassed by the prime minister's argument regarding the Khilafatists' objection to the Arab desire for independence. See James A. Malcolm to Sir John Tilley, 24 Mar. 1920, PRO, FO 371/5141; and Ameer Ali to Sir William Duke, 25 Mar. 1920, IOL&R,

complained of the delegation's uncompromising attitude and the extreme nature of demands 'obviously put forward in the knowledge that they cannot be met'.[377] Nor was the delegation able to enlist the support of the British political parties.[378] To combat hostile propaganda, the delegation undertook to pay the entire cost of the *Muslim Outlook*, subsidized *India*, the journal of the British Congress Committee, and contracted the Socialists' organ, the *Daily Herald*, to publish their news in a favourable manner.[379] But in the final analysis the delegation's work in Britain was fruitless.

Disappointed, the delegation first thought of going to the United States and Japan but later turned to the European Powers, especially France and Italy, which were known to be sympathetic to Turkey. In France they met with some success in influencing public opinion but failed to win over the French government. Millerand, the French premier, gave no encouragement. In Italy, Giovanni Giolitti (1842–1928) promised all help to the delegation. He even allowed Mohamed Ali to use the Italian diplomatic bag at Rome to correspond with Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938) and the Turkish nationalists. The delegation also met Pope Benedict XV (1854–1922), flirted with the Arabs, and re-established contacts with Talat Paşa and the Committee of Union and Progress Turks in Territet (Switzerland).[380] But it failed to obtain a lenient peace treaty for Turkey. The overall impact of

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L/P&S/10/797, file 2410/1920. Also see Abul Muhasin Muhammad Sajjad to Abdul Bari, 2 July 1920, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 96; Mohamed Ali's letter to *Nation*, 29 May 1920, 279; and *Indian Annual Register*, *1921*, part 1, 184(*b*).

[377] For this information see Montagu to Chelmsford, 1 Apr. and 23 June 1920, Montagu Papers; Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, 6 May 1920, encl., Chelmsford to Montagu, 3 June 1920, IOL&R, ibid.; and Sulaiman Nadwi to Abdul Bari, 6 May 1920, in Sulaiman Nadwi, *Barid-i Farang*, 66–7.

[378] Their meeting with Asquith, the former prime minister and leader of the Liberal Party, came to nothing. The contacts with the Labour Party, too, yielded nothing beyond a brief statement of their case at the twentieth annual conference of the party at Scarborough. Their interview with Toynbee, who had compiled the documents on the Armenian 'massacres', was also fruitless. See Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 127, HC Deb. 5s, cols. 640–1; *Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (Scarborough, 1920), 144–5; *The Times*, 24 June 1920; Afzal Iqbal, *Select Writings*, 49; 'Q', 'Self-Determination and the Turkish Treaty', *Foreign Affairs*, spec. suppl. (1920), xxiii; and Toynbee, 'The Indian Moslem Delegation', *New Europe*, 15/185 (1920), 56–60.

[379] See Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, 6 May, 1920, encl., Chelmsford to Montagu, 3 June 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers. Eventually the journal was banned from entering India. See IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1706, file 6777/20.

[380] For the delegation's activities in Britain and on the Continent see Naeem Qureshi, *Mohamed Ali's Khilafat Delegation*, 40–61.

the delegation's efforts on the Allied policy towards Turkey was insignificant though the West could no longer plead ignorance of either the demands of the Indian Muslims or of their nature. The odds against the delegation were too many and difficult to surmount. On top of this, post-war Europe was entwined in its own problems to take any notice of the predicaments of a distant part of the British Empire. And all this was notwithstanding the sizeable sum of money that the delegation incurred on its trip to Europe, and the allegations of extravagance and misappropriation of funds which Mohamed Ali undeservedly earned for himself from his more uncharitable critics.[381]

Meanwhile, the fate of Turkey was sealed at San Remo (19–26 April 1920) when the Allied prime ministers approved the framework of the peace treaty.[382] Montagu and other representatives, who knew of the secret undertakings, were left aghast. They had tried their best to plead clemency for Turkey, and just before the conference Montagu had demanded the right to send a memorandum to the Powers in his capacity as plenipotentiary for India.[383] Lloyd George, anti-Semitic as he was,[384] had enough of his irritating Jewish colleague. 'In fact throughout the [Peace] Conference', he rebuked Montagu, 'your attitude has often struck me as being not so much that of a member of the British Cabinet, but of a successor on the thrown [*sic*] of Aurangzeb!'.[385] In these controversies, Curzon also 'rode full tilt' against Montagu 'whose chariot', wrote Winston Churchill, 'was drawn by the public opinion of India, the sensibilities of the Mohammedan world, the pro-Turkish propensities of the Conservative Party, and the voluminous memoranda of the India Office'.[386] No

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[381] See Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970; and Francis Robinson, 'Professional Politicians in Muslim Politics, 1911–1923', in Pandey, *Leadership in South Asia*, 377–9. The allegations, in fact, had sprung mostly from the delay in submitting accounts as well as the high cost of living in Europe. Unfamiliar with European standards, the Indians thought that the members of the delegation lived expensively. Otherwise, even a critic like Sir Basil Thomson (1961–1939), Scotland Yard's Director of Intelligence, testified to the careful manner in which Mohamed Ali spent his money. See Khatri, *Hisabat wafd-i Khilafat*, 1–6 and 17–20; and PRO, FO 371/E 10670/139/44.

[382] Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 27 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[383] Montagu to Lloyd George, 15 Apr. 1920, Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers.

[384] Grigg, *The young Lloyd George*, 260 and 295, n. 2.

[385] Lloyd George to Montagu 25 Apr. 1920, Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers.

[386] Quoted in Munir Ahmad Baluch, 'The Greek Expedition of Asia Minor and the Role of the Indian Muslims, 1918–1922', Ph.D. thesis (Thessaloniki, 1987), 115.

wonder Montagu contemplated resignation, but pocketed the insult and chose to stay on hoping that he might still avert trouble in India when the peace terms were finally announced.[387]

The Allied decision, however, had no relevance to the ground realities. The Allies could, of course, coerce the sultan and his government in Istanbul but they had no hold on the nationalists in Ankara under Mustafa Kemal in whose favour the balance of power had gradually shifted. The movement for the Turkish regeneration had begun early in May 1919 when Mustafa Kemal, the highly decorated general of Gallipoli (1915) fame, started to pick up the pieces of the late Ottoman Empire. What spurred the Turks to action were the Greek landings in Izmir.[388] The sight of the country's heartland being trampled by the enemy was too much for the proud Turk. The movement spread quickly not so much as a revolt against the established authority of the sultan-caliph but rather as a popular rising against the invaders threatening their national existence.[389] Kemal's intention was to create a new Turkish State 'unconditionally independent and based on national sovereignty'.[390] To achieve this he conducted his struggle, initially at least, in the name of the sultan-caliph and employed religious idiom to widen it.[391] The boundaries of new Turkey, as determined by the Sivas Congress (September 1919) and embodied later in the *Milli Misak* or the National Pact (January 1920), were inhabited by a Muslim majority, united in religion, culture and race. But the rise of the nationalists militated against the plans of the Istanbul government as well as those of the Allies. In March 1920, when the latter occupied Istanbul as a consequence of the Cilesia uprising, the Grand Vizier Damad Farid Paşa, decided to suppress the movement. On 11 April, he secured from an obliging, conniving *Shaikhu'l-Islam*, Dürrizade Abdullah (1869–1923), a *fatwa* declaring the nationalists common rebels and liable to be punished by death.[392] The nationalists hit back and obtained a counter *fatwa* charging the grand vizier and his colleagues of high treason.[393] When

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[387] Montagu to Chelmsford 20 May 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[388] See above, 112.

[389] Dunkwart A. Rustow, 'Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920–1955', in Richard N. Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West* (The Hague, 1957), 70.

[390] Ulug Igdemir, E. Z. Karal, et al., *Atatürk*. Eng. tr. A. J. Mango (Ankara, 1981), 45.

[391] Rustow, 'Politics and Islam in Turkey', 71.

[392] Ibid., 76. Also see Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 246.

[393] Rustow, 'Politics and Islam in Turkey', 76.

Farid Paşa dissolved the chamber of deputies, Kemal proceeded to convene the Grand National Assembly in Ankara which he opened on 23 April 1920, just when the Allied premiers were meeting in San Remo.[394] It was an event of far reaching consequences foreshadowing the establishment of a national government, a national army and eventually a republic.

In India, as the expected announcement of the Turkish peace terms drew nearer, Muslim restlessness began to mount rapidly. The Government of India was not oblivious to the possibility of violent outbreaks. But it was well prepared to meet the situation and had alerted the military authorities.[395] However, expediency impelled it to avoid, as far as possible, any interference with the movement. It preferred 'not to make martyrs of fanatical leaders or precipitate trouble by prosecution or executive action'.[396] This moderate course of action was evidently dictated by the belief that the movement would die out, or, if it became aggressive, would be defeated by its own violence.[397] Therefore, proceedings were confined to local agitators.[398] Action against Gandhi was avoided as it was likely to focus public attention and provoke outbursts of violence.[399] Similarly, in the case of Shaukat Ali, no immediate action was proposed, though the legal possibilities of a prosecution were examined.[400] Montagu, despite some difference of opinion with Chelmsford, fully supported the Government of India's policy for he wished not in the least to interfere with the latter's discretion in the maintenance of law and order.[401] But at the same time he did not hesitate to point out, as a general proposition, the dangers of anyone governing 'a la O'Dwyer'.[402] Chelmsford, whose policy of moderation was always qualified, had been equally emphatic that 'in matters of law and order and of the safety of English men and women there can be only one policy and that is the indisputable supremacy of the British Raj'. He was

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[394] Igdemir, *Atatürk*, 71 ff.; and [A.] Afetinan, *A History of the Turkish Revolution and Turkish Republic*. Eng. tr. Ahmet E. Uysal (Ankara, 1981), 74 6.

[395] See Chelmsford to Montagu, 17 Mar. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[396] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 320, 25 Apr. 1920, in ibid.

[397] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 379, 7 May 1920, in ibid.

[398] See e.g. Butler to Vincent, 26 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Butler Papers.

[399] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 320, 25 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[400] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 379, 7 May 1920, in ibid.

[401] Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tels. nos. 641 and 699, 3 May 1920, in ibid.

[402] Montagu to Chelmsford, 1 Apr. 1920, in ibid.

prepared for prompt and drastic action if necessary. The Punjab affair of the last year was for him no hindrance: 'we are confident here that what we did last year was necessary and we are prepared to act again if any similar occasion arises'.[403]

But Chelmsford's optimistic confidence was soon disturbed by the announcement, on 11 May 1920, of the peace terms with Turkey. In the past, imperial Powers had often drawn inaccurate or straight lines across continents to create artificial boundaries. But this time they went too far and stripped Turkey of all its Empire and destroyed any semblance of its independence. According to the proposed treaty,[404] Turkey was to cede Thrace to Greece almost to the Chataldja Lines and Izmir. It was also to cede Tenedos and Imros to Greece. A large area in Asia Minor, comprising Izmir and certain other portions, was to be formed into a separate autonomous unit under Greek administration but Turkish suzerainty. After five years it was to decide its own future by a plebiscite. Turkey was compelled to recognize the independence of Armenia, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and the Hijaz, and the autonomy of Kurdistan. It was also to recognize the British protectorate over Egypt and Sudan, the British sovereignty over Cyprus and a British mandate for Palestine and Iraq. Similarly, Turkey was to recognize the French protectorate over Syria and Tunisia and a French zone in Morocco, and Italian sovereignty over Libya and the Dodecanese. Turkey was also to renounce her rights secured by the Suez Canal Treaty of 1888 in favour of Britain. The Straits and the Dardanelles were internationalized and a zone of the Straits was created which was to be controlled by a commission appointed by the League of Nations. The Turkish army was to be reduced to only 50,000 men, including 2,500 officers whose tenures of service were also restricted. The navy was to be abolished with the exception of a few small vessels for police duties. The Turkish air force was to be completely disbanded. The proposals also contained stringent financial clauses. Even the power to impose taxes was withdrawn from the Turkish government and vested instead in a commission composed of Britain, France and Italy. Capitulations were re-established.[405]

[403] Chelmsford to Montagu, 28 Apr. 1920, in ibid.

[404] For details see Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 964, *Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Signed at Sèvres*, 10 Aug. 1920.

[405] Ibid.

The peace terms were published in India on 15 May, with a message from Chelmsford who, in view of their severity, found it difficult to assuage the feelings of the Indian Muslims. His assurance to them that the settlement had been greatly influenced by their representations,[406] bore little comfort for the heart-broken Muslims. The attitude of the Anglo-Indian press, which lamented that Turkey had been let off lightly,[407] added to their disappointment. The nationalist papers—the *Bombay Chronicle*, the *Independent*, the *Tribune*, the *Hindu*, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*—were bitter at the contemptuous disregard shown to Indian remonstrances.[408] Even the moderate papers like the *Leader* and the *Bengalee* recognized the severity of the terms.[409] Indeed the Muslim disappointment over the 'outrageous' peace terms was profound.[410] From Paris the Khilafat delegation sent a telegram to the sultan of Turkey entreating with him to reject the terms summarily as the whole Muslim world was behind him.[411] Shaukat Ali fumed that the Government of India's communiqué and the viceroy's message were 'an insult to our intellect'. He asked the Muslims to brace themselves for a life-long struggle and commence the non-co-operation campaign which 'must be given a full and fair trial'.[412] Abdul Bari declared in anger that the peace proposals were completely against the religious injunctions of Islam and, therefore, whoever accepted them would invite upon himself the wrath of the God Almighty.[413] Gandhi, still worried about the possibility of Muslims getting out of control, pleaded with them to exercise restraint. But agreed that non-co-operation was 'the only effective remedy both for avoiding violence and for healing the wound inflicted on Mohammedan India'.[414]

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[406] *Madras Mail*, 15 May 1920.

[407] For the views of the Anglo-Indian press see *Civil and Military Gazette*, 14 May 1920; *Pioneer*, 15 May 1920; *Statesman and Empire* (Calcutta), 16 May 1920.

[408] For their comments see exts. in *Bombay Chronicle*, 17, 18 and 22 May 1920.

[409] *Hindu*, 20 May 1920.

[410] See the statements of Abdul Bari and Kidwai in *Bombay Chronicle*, 18 May 1920.

[411] Copy of the telegram in Rear-Adm. Webb (Istanbul) to Curzon, 14 May 1920, PRO, FO 371/5142. The India Office looked into the possibility of prosecuting members of the delegation for having addressed themselves to 'an enemy sovereign'. But the idea was dropped as Sir Edward Chamier (1866–1945), the legal adviser to the sec. of state for India, did not think that a case could stand against them. See IOL&R, L/P&S/10/789, file 3828/1920.

[412] *Bombay Chronicle*, 18 May 1920.

[413] *Dastur*, 1 June 1920. This refers to the events of May 1920.

[414] *Bombay Chronicle*, 18 May 1920.

In fact, the CKC, anticipating harsh peace terms, had already decided on 12 May—three days before the terms were published in India—to start the non-co-operation campaign.[415] The decision, however, had been secured after a good deal of pressure from Mushir Kidwai, who threatened to resign from the CKC.[416] The dissenters were further softened by Shaukat Ali and Gandhi who coaxed them into accepting the non-co-operation programme in all its four stages.[417] A committee consisting of Shaukat Ali, Chotani, Gandhi, Abul Kalam Azad, Khatri, Muhammad Ali and Abdul Qadir (1863–1942) of Kasur, was formed to draw up the details of the scheme.[418] Gandhi described this committee as the 'Martial Law Committee' of the Khilafat movement and himself as the 'dictator'.[419] But it was becoming increasingly evident that the leadership was following the masses rather than leading them.[420]

On 28 May 1920, the CKC issued a manifesto announcing its policy. It declared that there was 'no question of compromise in this matter of life and death [i.e. the Khilafat] with millions of Musalmans'. The remedy was simple. The Muslims and Hindus must 'withdraw co-operation from the government and continue to do so till justice is done'. Should non-co-operation fail, Muslims reserved 'the right to take such other and further steps as may be enjoined upon them by their religion'.[421] But the policy outlined in the manifesto was overly restricted in its scope and constituted a virtual reversal of the decision arrived at earlier on 12 May, which had proposed a much harder line. Only a few items—surrender of honorary offices and

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[415] See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 18 May 1920, Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 515. Also see Shaukat Ali to Abdul Ghafur of Peshawar, 13 May 1920, which was intercepted by the authorities. Chief Com., NWFP, to Pte. Sec. to Viceroy, Tel. no. 467, 14 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. The notice for the May meeting had been issued early in Apr. 1920. See Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan, B. A. Koor, and Khatri to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 1 Apr. 1920, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/i.

[416] For the summary of his letter to Chotani see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 425, 20 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see Bamford, *Histories*, 152–4. For Kidwai's views on non-co-operation see his *Taqrir-i sadarat* (Lucknow, [1920]), 21–3.

[417] Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 688, 13 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see Lloyd to Montagu, 21 May 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[418] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 413, 19 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[419] David Page, *Prelude to Partition* (Delhi, 1986), 27.

[420] Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 219.

[421] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 19.

titles, stoppage of all voluntary financial support and surrender of civil employments under the government—were selected for implementation.[422] The moderation was obviously an attempt to accommodate the waverers. But the adoption of even this moderate programme brought the rift into the open. Those members of the CKC who passionately believed that the programme was unconstitutional or dangerous to the best interests of the Muslims, or that Gandhi had given a wrong lead to them, realized that they could no longer stay on the Committee. The first to resign were B. A. Abdullah Koor, Sir Fazul Bhoy Currimbhoy and Azam Ghulam Husain.[423] They were followed by Mirza Ali Mohammad Khan, G. M. Bhurgri and Syed Rifai.[424] The moderate Khilafatists were not the only sceptics of non-co-operation. Even the radicals among them, Azad and Abdul Bari included, were reported to be dissatisfied with a mere passive step and were doubtful of its success.[425] Azad, in particular, favoured Muslims reorganizing themselves by electing an *imam* (to which office he aspired) and obey his orders regardless of consequences.[426]

Shaukat Ali and Gandhi had to work hard to keep unity among the leaders. At one stage Shaukat Ali was so much disgusted with Chotani and his Bombay group for their attitude towards non-co-operation that he tried to move the headquarters of the CKC from Bombay to Lucknow where he could personally supervise its affairs. Chotani also wished the transfer to take place for in that case he could discreetly dissociate himself from the CKC.[427] But in the end the differences were patched up. Chotani agreed to support the campaign and resigned his honorary magistracy.[428] Azad's doubts about the non-co-operation scheme also vanished and Abdul Bari was prevailed upon by Shaukat Ali to give an honest trial to 'Gandhi's prescription' for at least four or five months and in the event of its

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[422] Ibid.

[423] Ibid.; and CKC's circular to Abdul Bari, 23 May 1920, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 76–7.

[424] Ibid. Koor was later replaced by Kitchlew (July 1920) and Khan by Yakub Hasan (Aug. 1920).

[425] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel, no. 461, 4 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[426] Ibid. Also see Ronaldshay to Montagu, 23 June 1920, IOL&R, Zetland Papers; and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, *Asar-i Abu'l-Kalam Azad* (Bombay, 1949), 67–8. Azad had also persuaded Abdul Bari to support his candidature but the plan never materialized. For details see M. U. Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India*, 88–104.

[427] See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 18 May 1920, Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 515.

[428] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 19.

failure 'we shall do what God will command'.[429] Clearly it had been a victory for Shaukat Ali and Gandhi.

The leaders, however, were cautious. They strongly deprecated any action which might precipitate a collision with the government and thus afford it an opportunity to smash the movement prematurely. An appeal was issued by Gandhi that none should act without instructions from the CKC.[430] Those who appeared over-enthusiastic, were quickly reprimanded by Shaukat Ali.[431] The Khilafatists seemed to be of the opinion that before embarking on non-co-operation they should try to extract some last-minute concessions from the government.[432] Because of this, the implementation of the non-co-operation programme was delayed. Another hurdle in this connection was the hesitancy of the Congress leaders. Most of the Hindu leaders had no faith in the non-co-operation scheme either because it was the programme of the Khilafat Committee or that it was, they thought, anarchistic in nature. Apart from the moderates, the sceptics included such men as B. G. Tilak, G. S. Khaparde (1854–1938), Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, Lajpat Rai (1856–1928), B. C. Pal, I. K. Yajnik and the Patel brothers—Vithalbhai (1873–1933) and Vallabhbhai.[433] In order to resolve the differences, the Khilafatists, in consultation with Gandhi, decided to invite Hindu-Muslim leaders, regardless of opinions already expressed on the policy of non-co-operation, to discuss the issue at a special meeting of the CKC at Allahabad in the first week of June 1920.[434] In the meantime, the All India Congress Committee (AICC), which was meeting at Benares on 30 and 31 May

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[429] Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari 18 May 1920, Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 516.

[430] *Collected Works*, xvii, 446.

[431] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 425, 20 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[432] Kidwai, Gandhi and Mazhar-ul-Haq held this opinion. See ibid. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 442, 28 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and *Collected Works*, xvii, 446.

[433] Shay, *The Legacy of Lokamanya*, 144; B. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, i (Madras, 1935), 19 and 31–32; M. R. Jayakar, *The Story of My Life* (Bombay, 1958), i, 371; Jawaharlal Nehru (ed.), *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 1958), 17; Yajnik, *Gandhi as I knew him*, 107–9, read in conjunction with 105–6; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 379 and 442, 7 and 28 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. For an opposite view of Tilak on non-co-operation see M. A. Kishaurji, *Bhagwan Tilak* (Lahore, 1921), 133.

[434] See Chotani's letter of invitation, 23 May 1920, IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 19.

was given an opportunity to examine the question.[435] But in view of the extreme divergence of opinion among the Congress leaders, the Benares meeting ended in a stalemate. The consideration of non-co-operation, or any other suitable course of action, was postponed for a special session of the Congress at Calcutta to be held in the beginning of September.[436]

As arranged, the meeting of the CKC took place at Allahabad on 1 and 2 June 1920 despite the absence of most of the moderates and some 'extremists' like C. R. Das, Tilak and Joseph Baptista (1864–1930), who declined the invitation.[437] However, all the top-notch Muslim and Hindu leaders and workers, numbering about 125, were present. The preliminary session was held on 1 June at Barrister Zahur Ahmad's bungalow under Chotani's presidentship. Considerable resentment was expressed against the Congress apathy towards non-co-operation. A strong body of opinion among Muslims wished to adopt *hijrat* as an alternative. But the issue was side-tracked by referring it to a committee of *'ulama* whose decision, it was agreed, would be obeyed as if it were the ruling of the Privy Council.[438] Gandhi circulated a manifesto on behalf of the CKC giving reasons for resorting to non-co-operation but pleaded that only the first two items, i.e. surrender of honorary offices and titles and civil employment under the government, be enforced for the present. But Abdul Bari castigated Gandhi and refused to resile an inch from all four items of the programme. Hasrat Mohani and Azad Subhani supported Abdul Bari saying that the last two items were more important than the first two. No resolution, therefore, was adopted at this stage.[439] The same evening, a joint Hindu-Muslim meeting was convened at the Railway Theatre. Nearly 300 delegates attended. Azad Subhani

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[435] See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari 22 May 1920, in Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 516.

[436] *Madras Mail*, 2 June 1920.

[437] The account of the Allahabad meeting is based on: *Paisa Akhbar*, 8 June 1920; *Hindu*, 10 June 1920; Ext., Delhi Abstract, 12 June 1920, para. 1357, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/24, 19 June 1920, para. 1276; IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 19; *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 282–6; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 477 and 497, 9 and 19 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and *Young India, 1919–1922*, 194. For Tilak's non-participation see D. Keer, *Lokamanya Tilak* (Bombay, 1969), 435; and V. Prasad Varma, *The Life and Philosophy of Lokmanya Tilak* (Agra, [1978]), 428.

[438] Ext., UP Abstract, 12 June 1920, para. 1357, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/24, 19 June 1920, para. 1276.

[439] See above, n. 437.

and Muhammad Ali of Kasur made a fervent appeal to the Hindus to support the non-co-operation programme in order to bear political pressure on the government. But most of the Congress leaders were strongly against non-co-operation or were hesitant to accept it. Mrs. Annie Besant (1847–1933) and Tej Bahadur Sapru (1875–1949) opposed the scheme vehemently. C. Y. Chintamani (1880–1941) declared that the plan was unrealistic, and Pandits Malaviya and Motilal Nehru expressed their doubts about its practicability. Only B. C. Pal and S. Satyamurti (1887–1947) seemed to support the Muslims in their ordeal though Vallabhbhai Patel was also coming round by this time.[440] Shaukat Ali was furious that the Hindus were not forthcoming despite Muslim assurances and pressed for an immediate decision. Even if they did not accept it, he threatened, the Muslims would still go on to launch the non-co-operation programme.[441]

Further differences developed on the second day (2 June) of the joint meeting when Hasrat Mohani, the most radical of the Khilafatists, suggested joining any Afghan army that might invade India to drive out the British. Such suggestions, in the context of the *hijrat* campaign then in progress,[442] were bound to cause apprehensions among the Hindus. Malaviya at once raised strong objections and Lajpat Rai warned the Muslim leaders that at the first sign of any Afghan involvement 'Hindus would not only cease to help, but would actively oppose them'. Shaukat Ali, Azad Subhani and Zafar Ali Khan assured the Hindu leaders that they would fight to a man any invader who wanted to conquer India, but the plea made little impact for they appeared to be sympathetic to the idea of an invasion which was undertaken to uphold the prestige of Islam. Reza Ali interrupted at this point but was bogged down in argument with Malaviya. Kidwai's sophistry also did not pacify the Hindus. Even Gandhi's reiteration of support to Muslims if they did not resort to violence, failed to save the situation. The meeting ended without an agreement on the non-co-operation issue.[443]

Thus, when on the night of 2 June the CKC held its second session at Barrister Zahur Ahmad's house, the disappointed Khilafatists

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[440] Ibid. Also see Rajmohan Gandhi, *Patel: A Life* (Ahmedabad, [1990]), 86. Based on D. Keer, *Mahatma Gandhi* (Bombay, 1973), 324.

[441] Ibid.

[442] For *hijrat* see ch. iii.

[443] See above, n. 437.

decided to go ahead with non-co-operation in all its four stages without Congress sustenance. Reza Ali tried to limit its execution to only the first stage but was shut up by Abdul Bari. The Khilafatists were expecting wonders at this meeting but all that they got was a reaffirmation of Gandhi's personal support in the 'war between false Christianity and Islam'. On his advice they agreed to approach Chelmsford first and to give him one month's notice to see if the peace terms were revised. In the meantime a sub-committee, consisting of Gandhi, Shaukat Ali, Abdul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Ali of Kasur, Khatri, Kitchlew and Hasrat Mohani (Chotani refused nomination), was appointed to work out the details. Another sub-committee, with some additional members like Zafar Ali Khan, Agha Safdar, Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Omar Sobani, Dr Nur Muhammad, Shaikh Abdul Majid (1889–1978) and a few others, was nominated to work out the *swadeshi* programme.[444]

The interesting feature of the Allahabad meeting was that it revealed the extent of Hindu apathy towards the Khilafat movement and its programme. Fear of an Afghan invasion, genuine or imaginary, was trumped up to cloak the real issues. Yet in public, both Shaukat Ali and Gandhi played down the differences. Shaukat Ali also preferred not to give much publicity to Gandhi's proposal to transpose the third and the fourth stages of the non-co-operation programme by concentrating on the first two only.[445] The passage of the final resolution on non-co-operation was secured when by a clever move Shaukat Ali and his friends confined the voting to the members of the CKC only. Thus only thirty persons out of a hundred and fifty present on the occasion were allowed to vote and they were committed to the programme.[446] As regards Gandhi's claim to 'dictatorship' and the Muslim acquiescence therein, the whole show was a pretence. Evidently, the Khilafatists were exploiting Gandhi's weakness for power and leadership and pretended to play his game. Otherwise, Gandhi's position in the Khilafat movement was no more than that of *primus inter pares*. For his leadership Gandhi was dependent on the Khilafatists and without them he had no status, at least among the Muslims. He could maintain his shaky hold only by continuing his support to the Khilafat cause and by guaranteeing Hindu co-operation.

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[444] Ibid.
[445] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 284.
[446] *Pioneer*, 9 June 1920.

Gandhi was reported to have taken exception to Shaukat Ali's reference to an Afghan invasion but quickly made up with him.[447] It was no empty boast when Shaukat Ali claimed that 'We created political consciousness among the Hindus; we built up Gandhi.... [and we] placed the Congress on the path to independence'.[448]

Shortly after the Allahabad meeting, the members of the non-co-operation committee of the CKC, with the exception of Azad who had been taken ill, assembled at Bombay and decided to push the non-co-operation scheme.[449] A letter to Chelmsford was drafted and circulated for signatures. Eighty-two leading Sunni Muslims from every province of India signed the letter. Important abstentions were Abul Kalam Azad and Dr Ansari. Azad refused to sign because in his opinion the letter did not correctly indicate Muslim demands. Ansari was angry that the powers delegated to the non-co-operation committee at Allahabad had been disregarded, and objected to inviting signatures from outside the committee membership.[450] Nevertheless, on 22 June the memorial, couched in a moderate but firm tone, was sent to Chelmsford with a covering letter from Gandhi.[451] The signatories, claiming to represent the largest body of Sunni Muslim opinion, informed Chelmsford that the Turkish peace terms were 'in direct violations of the religions sentiments of Mussalmans' and contrary to the pledges of the British ministers. In certain respects, they contended, 'Turkey had been treated worse than other powers' and the Indian Muslims could not 'bear the thought of the temporal power of the Sultan being adversely affected'. Therefore, they requested the viceroy to ask the British government to secure a revision of the peace terms and to warn them that on their failure to do so, he would make common cause with the Indian people. 'If unfortunately', the signatories declared, 'Your Excellency will not adopt our humble suggestion, we shall be obliged, as from the 1st August next, to withdraw co-operation from the Government and to ask our co-religionists and Hindu brethren to do likewise'. They expressed the hope that such a serious step as non-co-operation would not be necessary and assured Chelmsford that 'we shall strive our utmost to

[447] Ext., UP Abstract, 12 June 1920, para. 1357, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/24, 19 June 1920, para. 1276.
[448] Jafri, 'Shaukat 'Ali', 173.
[449] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 284.
[450] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 22.
[451] Encl., Gandhi to Hignell, 22 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

avoid violence'. They would take up non-co-operation in progressive stages 'so as to cause the least necessary dislocation or embarrassment to the Government and so as to enable us to control and discipline popular feeling'.[452]

The memorial was followed the same day by a separate letter from Gandhi to Chelmsford in which he explained his reasons for associating himself with the Khilafat movement. He claimed that, by patient reasoning, he had been successful in weaning away the Muslims from *hijrat* and violence, but confessed that he did so purely on utilitarian grounds and not for any moral reason. He declared that non-co-operation was 'the only dignified and constitutional form of such direct action' open to the Muslims. The escape from non-co-operation was possible if Chelmsford himself led the Khilafat movement. He admitted the risks attending the campaign when practised by the masses, but maintained that the fear of 'risks now will be to court much greater risks [later], if not virtual destruction of law and order'.[453]

The non-co-operation campaign was to be inaugurated formally on 1 August 1920. The items for the first stage finally agreed upon were announced on or about 25 June. These were: surrender of all titles of honour and honorary offices; refusal to take government loans; suspension by lawyers of practice and settlement of civil disputes by private arbitration; boycott of government schools by parents; boycott of the reformed councils; non-co-operation in government social parties and similar other functions; refusal to accept any civil or military post whether in Iraq or in the Turkish territories under Allied control; and *swadeshi*. The last two, i.e. refusal of civil and military service and *swadeshi*, as well as the refusal to take government loans, could be started immediately. But for the rest the commencement date was 1 August.[454] The boycott of British goods, which Syed Zahur Ahmad had pursued so forcefully some months before, had been set aside in deference to Gandhi. No one realized that the boycott of British goods was one item that promised the most success. The statistics gathered by Zahur Ahmad indicated that the boycott could affect the very source from which Britain was earning

[452] Ibid.
[453] Gandhi to Chelmsford, 22 June 1920, ibid.
[454] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 25.

over 40 crore of rupees annually.[455] But expediency and perceived hazards in practising the boycott proved more overpowering. In the end it was not taken up.

The boycott of the reformed councils, educational institutions and law courts were innovations in the non-co-operation programme and had been incorporated after a careful re-appraisal of the situation. In the matter of the council boycott, the CKC was in fact preceding by almost a week Lajpat Rai's declaration to the same effect.[456] There was also a difference in outlook: while the CKC proposed the boycott on the issue of the Khilafat, Lajpat Rai advocated it on the basis of the Punjab 'wrong'. But then the Khilafatists, especially Mohamed Ali and his delegation in Britain, were already exploiting the Punjab issue.[457] After the publication of the Hunter Report in May 1920, the government's exoneration of O'Dwyer and other Punjab officials and the inadequate punishment meted out to Brigadier-General Dyer and his glorification in European circles in India and in Britain, had considerably affected the attitude of the Indians.[458] Even the moderates were not wanting in their condemnation of the government.[459] The Punjab issue also provided Jinnah and the Bombay Liberals the peg on which to hang the Khilafat grievances.[460] Gandhi, ever ready to seize on others' ideas, quickly changed his previous stance and tacked the Punjab issue with the Khilafat as a bait to attract the Hindus to the non-co-operation campaign.[461]

Meanwhile, on 25 June, the CKC had dispatched a secret letter to various provincial committees throughout the country urging each one of them to send to Bombay a special representative and a com-

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[455] See Syed Zahur Ahmad's note dated 30 Nov. 1919, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat/ii.

[456] Lajpat Rai, *India's Will to Freedom* (Madras, 1921), 103 6.

[457] Indian Khilafat Delegation, *The Case for Turkey and the Khilafat*, Publication no. 4 (London, 1920); Indian Khilafat Delegation, *Justice to Islam and Turkey*, Publication no. 6 (London, 1920); and Montagu to Chelmsford, 16 June 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[458] See Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar*, 142-3 and 156–60; Parl. Papers, 1920, *Hansard*, 131 HC Deb. 5s, cols. 1705 1814; and HL, XLI 222-78.

[459] See the resolutions of the National Liberal Federation at Calcutta dated 12 June 1920 in *Madras Mail*, 15 June 1920.

[460] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 489, 17 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see Jinnah to Montagu, Tel. 13 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1670, file 2414/1920.

[461] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 287-9; and *Bombay Chronicle*, 30 June 1920. For his earlier stance on the Punjab issue see *Madras Mail*, 26 Nov. 1919.

plete provincial census of persons prepared to act up to the non-co-operation manifesto.[462] The provincial committees were not very optimistic about the campaign. Hindus as a community were standing aloof. Its reception among the various classes of the Muslim community was also uncertain. Of course, Mahmud Hasan's return from a long internment at Malta in June 1920 and his sudden support for the non-co-operation campaign had spurred the Deoband *'ulama* into joining the Khilafatists[463] but apart from giving anxious moments to the government this did not materially alter the situation. It was still doubtful whether the *taluqdars*, *zamindars*, titleholders and the people holding high civil appointments would respond favourably. Men like the Nawab of Dhaka, the Raja of Mahmudabad, the Chiefs of the Punjab and some of the moderates had long dissociated themselves from the Khilafat movement.[464] The Shi'a *mujtahids* had instructed their followers to stand aside[465] and the All India Shi'a Conference held in Nagina (UP) in April 1920, had also accepted the decree.[466] The Qadiani Ahmadis, under the direction of Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad, braving ostracism by the Khilafatists, also refused to join the campaign.[467] Loyalty to the Crown had been their principle and they lived up to it.[468] Among them, only the Lahori faction of Maulawi Muhammad Ali (1874–1951) chose to join the Khilafatists.[469]

Even among the Khilafatists themselves there was no unanimity.

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[462] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 25.

[463] See Madani, *Naqsh-i hayat*, ii, 131, 136, 235, and 246 8; Muhammad Miyan (ed.), *'Ulama-i Haq* (Muradabad, n.d.), 209–10; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 431, 22 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Chiryakoti, *at-Tanqid, passim.* Interesting material in connection with the release of Mahmud Hasan is available in IOL&R, P/Conf./50, ICH(P)P, June 1919, Proc. nos. 440 91; P/Conf./51, Aug. 1919, Proc. nos. 415 26; P/Conf./58, June 1920, Proc. nos. 280–324; and IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers, vols. ix, x and xii.

[464] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 62-C and 379, 15 Apr. and 7 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[465] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 260, 25 Mar. 1920, ibid.

[466] *Pioneer Mail*, 9 Apr. 1920.

[467] Mirza Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad, *Mu'ahada Turkiyya aur Musalmanon ka a'inda rawaiyya* (Qadian, 1920), 4 16.

[468] See the address presented by the community to Sir Edward Maclagen, lt. gov. of the Punjab, on 17 Dec. 1919, at Lahore. The 58 signatories included Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan (later the foreign minister of Pakistan). IOL&R, L/P&S/10/797, file 2562/1920. Also see F. M. Sayal and A. Nayyar to IO in ibid.; and Agha Mohd. Sultan Mirza, *An Essay Towards a Better Understanding of the Caliphate*, 2nd edn. (Delhi, 1920), 22.

[469] Khwaja Hasan Nizami, *Gaurmint aur Khilafat* (Delhi, 1920), 7. For Maulawi Muhammad Ali's pro-Turkish views see his *Hukumat aur Khilafat* (Delhi, 1920).

Yakub Hasan, for instance, objected to specific items like the proposal to boycott the educational institutions and the reformed councils.[470] He specifically came down to Bombay in the hope of securing the abandonment of these proposals.[471] K. B. Kuddus Badshah and Abdul Majid Sharar of Madras did not think that the province was ready yet.[472] Similarly, leading Nagpur Muslims declined the CKC's injunction to test public feelings on non-co-operation.[473] The Bihar Provincial Khilafat Committee reported that there were hardly ten or twelve people willing to adopt non-co-operation in that province.[474] In the UP also there were serious difficulties. The secretary of the Meerut Khilafat Committee informed the CKC that only two lawyers in the UP were willing to give up their practice, and that the public opinion was opposed to the boycott of the Christian Mission schools and colleges.[475] The Punjab also appeared to be strongly opposed to the non-co-operation programme.[476] In Delhi, Khwaja Hasan Nizami and his supporters were reportedly annoyed over the rejection of their proposal to extend non-co-operation to the Indian States.[477] On the whole, the provincial reports indicated that many local leaders preferred to postpone the inauguration of the non-co-operation campaign until after the special Congress in September 1920.[478] But the CKC went ahead with the preparations. It probably hoped to carry the public opinion once non-co-operation was under way.

The policy of the Government of India, in spite of the fact that anxiety had caused Chelmsford neuralgia,[479] remained unchanged. Even when the Nizam, who had in his own dominions clamped down restrictions on the Khilafat activity,[480] coaxed him that 'time for preventive measures has surely come',[481] and strong provincial

[470] See Yakub Hasan to Shaukat Ali, 2 July 1920, IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 25.

[471] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 291.

[472] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1711, file 7220/1920.

[473] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 27.

[474] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 291.

[475] Ibid., 291.

[476] Ibid., 291.

[477] Ibid., 291. Also see Khwaja Hasan Nizami, *Desi ryaston men Khilafat ajiteshan aur nankoapreshan ke khilaf Mahatma Gandhi ka faisala* (Delhi, 1920).

[478] Ibid., 291.

[479] Chelmsford to Montagu, 9 June 1920. IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[480] See Nizam's *farman* of 19 May 1920, in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 5313/1920. Also see tr. of his extraordinary *Jarida* no. 48 of 30 May 1920, in ibid.

[481] Nizam to Chelmsford, 13 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

governors rattled at him,[482] he preferred to wait at least until after 1 August. In any case, the Government of India's hands were tied by the joint opinion of the advocate general and the standing counsel of Bengal that it was doubtful whether a case would stand against Shaukat Ali and Gandhi under ordinary criminal law before the Khilafat movement had reached its second or third stage, i.e. relinquishment of civil appointments or withdrawal from the army or the police.[483] But the government had successfully held at bay the 'undesirable' element either by repression or internment. The most interesting case was that of Mahmud Hasan and his associates. Even when one of them—Hakim Nusrat Husain—died in detention owing to illness, the Government of India refused to release them. In their 'humble petition' to Montagu, Mahmud Hasan and his friends had expressed their 'complete innocence' and 'incapacity for causing any trouble whatever'. They maintained that they had always occupied themselves with religious studies 'and never during our life had anything to do with politics'. They pleaded that in their absence some mischievous persons, through 'pure inventions and unfounded lies', had implicated them by misinforming the authorities. Still the government resisted their release and repatriation. Only when the pressure from India mounted and the closure of St Clements Barracks, where they were being kept in Malta, also became imminent that it reluctantly agreed to accept their release. Even then the government hoped to use the good offices of Sir Rahim Bakhsh (1861–1935), president of the Council of Regency at Bahawalpur, to exercise a moderating influence on the Maulana when he arrived in India.[484]

All through the month of July 1920, Gandhi and Shaukat Ali, accompanied by Kitchlew, Agha Safdar, Saraladevi Chaudhrani (1872–1954) and others, went up and down northern India to explain the non-co-operation programme and to win support for it.[485] Towards the end of the month, the non-co-operation committee of the CKC issued instructions advising a full *hartal* on 1 August. Mill hands were not to participate without the employers' permission, nor were persons engaged in essential services—hospital workers, sanitary men

[482] See e.g. Lloyd to Montagu, 23 July 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.
[483] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Sept. 1920, Proc. no. 102.
[484] For details see IOL&R, P/Conf./51, ICH(P)P, July–Dec. 1919, Proc. nos. 415–26; and P/Conf./58, ICH(P)P, May–Aug. 1920, Proc. nos. 280–324.
[485] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 292–313.

and dock workers—required abstaining. The day was to be devoted to prayers and fasting. Meetings were to be held throughout the country where resolutions urging revision of the Turkish peace terms were to be passed and sent to Chelmsford for transmission to the British government. The committee made it clear that since the campaign was not civil disobedience, there were to be no processions or unrestrained speeches of any kind. All police and government instructions and regulations, such as the Seditious Meetings Act, were to be 'strictly and scrupulously obeyed'. The committee expressed its hope that all title-holders, honorary magistrates, justices of peace, members of the legislative councils, 'who feel about this important question affecting the well-being of millions of Muslims', would renounce their titles and honorary posts on that day.[486]

Thus, from a limited protest of the educated classes the pan-Islamic Khilafat movement, despite divisions among the Muslim ranks, had become a mass agitation. It drew its support both from the illiterate masses and the educated élite, though initially the latter were more vehemently vocal. Its centre of gravity, which of course shifted from time to time, was both in Muslim minority and majority provinces—the UP, Bombay, the Punjab and Bengal. The religious appeal was the most dominant but it was not the only reason which attracted all that sustenance for the movement. In fact the agitation ran at two different levels: whereas with the masses it was mostly a religious issue, for the politically-minded educated it was both religious and political in as much as they could whip the government with it. The traditionally moderate politicians and the propertied élite were apprehensive, too, but they were not prepared to go to the extreme lengths in making the government accede to their demands. The significance of the Khilafat movement lies in the fact that it drew into its fold the whole galaxy of Muslim leadership, counting in its ranks some of the most influential politicians, *'ulama*, businessmen, journalists, and professional men from all walks of life. The participation of Hindus, though on a very limited scale, also added to its strength. The CKC itself became the most powerful political body in India, even more than the Muslim League and the Congress. With its rise pan-Islam had come to don a militant cap again.

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[486] *Collected Works*, xviii, 78–9. Also see the posters in ibid., 87–8; and in *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 294–7.

But inevitably the pan-Islamists were heading towards a clash with the government. The more exuberant radicals like the Ali brothers overshadowed the leaders who originally built up the movement. Their inseparable political partnership became the cutting edge of the Indian Khilafatists. But one must not forget the part played by the Muslim residents in Britain in initiating the work in Europe and in guiding the Indian leaders from abroad. The failure of the British government to accede to any of their demands had turned despair into reckless emotionalism which was held in check only by the restraining influence of Gandhi, Ajmal Khan, Ansari, Chotani and other leaders of their stamp. But their hold was precarious. The situation could have been saved by a sympathetic attitude of the British government but unfortunately the interests of the imperial power clashed with those of the subject people. The Indian pan-Islamists, therefore, pinned their hopes on Mustafa Kemal and his nationalists in Ankara whose role in the transitional period had become crucial. And they were in no mood to bid farewell to arms. Under the circumstances, the only alternative for the Indian Khilafatists seemed to go for the non-co-operation experiment. The stage was thus set for the opening of a new chapter in the history of British India.

CHAPTER THREE

HIJRAT TO AFGHANISTAN

In summer 1920, when the pan-Islamists were still pondering over the final course of action, thousands of Indian Muslims, under severe emotional stress, began to emigrate to the neighbouring Muslim country of Afghanistan. Believing that India was no longer safe for Islam they had sought refuge in the classical tradition of *hijrat* as the only course left open to them.[1] This was in imitation of Prophet Muhammad's example who, in the face of challenge from his enemies, emigrated from Makkah to Medina in 622 and laid the foundations of an Islamic polity.[2] Conceptually, the obligation of *hijrat* stems from the Hanafi view that the world is set apart in two divisions—*daru'l-Islam* and *daru'l-harb*.[3] The *daru'l-Islam* is a territory where Muslim law and rule is supreme and *daru'l-harb* where it is not so, especially in matters of worship and security of life and property of the faithful and the *zimmis*.[4] According to jurists, a Muslim must reside only

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[1] For a discussion of the concept and significance of *hijrat* see Zakaria Bashier, *Hijra* (London, 1983), esp. 90 5; Muhammad Khalid Masud, 'The obligation to migrate: the doctrine of *hijra* in Islamic law', in Eickelman and Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Travellers*, 31 ff.; and Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 41–2.

Voluntary exodus, however, is not peculiar to Islam. Other notable examples are those of the Plebeians to secure rights from the Patricians of Ancient Rome, the planned flight of the Israelites, the withdrawal of the Puritan Fathers from England and the emigration of the Doukhobors from Russia. For the *hijrat* of 1920 see Map II.

[2] For the impact of the Prophet's *hijra* see A. M. Narr, 'The Structure of Society in Pre-Islamic Arabia and the Impact of the Hijra: A Traditional Archaeology', in I. R. Netton (ed.), *Golden Roads: Migration, Pilgrimage and Travel in Medieval and Modern Islam* (London, 1993), 3 10.

[3] Masud, 'The obligation to migrate', 35. Also see *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (ed.), H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (Leiden, 1935), 69. The Shafi'ites, however, mention a third category, i.e. *daru's-sulh* or *daru'l-'ahd* the territory of treaty. See Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 11. Ameer Ali equates these spheres as merely the counterparts of the mutually exclusive Christian concepts of 'Christendom' and 'Heathendom'. See his *The Life and Teachings of Mohammed or The Spirit of Islam*, 3rd edn. (London, 1899), 211 13 and 218.

[4] Ibid. The Hanafi formulations prescribe three conditions under which *daru'l-Islam* becomes *daru'l-harb*: '(i) the laws of disbelievers gain supremacy and no law of Islam can be executed; (ii) the Muslim and non-Muslim populations are no longer governed by the original pacts that they enjoyed before the non-Muslim occupation; and (iii) the land in question is adjacent to the territory of *daru'l-harb* so that there

in *daru'l-Islam*. When a *daru'l-Islam* does become *daru'l-harb* as a result of non-Muslim occupation or domination, it is incumbent upon Muslims to withdraw to a *daru'l-Islam* and reconquer the *daru'l-harb* (erstwhile *daru'l-Islam*) whenever possible.[5] The doctrinal basis of *hijrat* notwithstanding, the variations between the Hanafis and the other schools of Islamic jurisprudence rest on the *fiqh*, i.e. the Qur'an, *hadis*, *ijma'* and *qiyas*. The Qur'anic injunction on this point centres on the *sura* 4:97–100[6] while its affirmation rests on several sayings of the Prophet.[7] Additional avowal comes from the consensus of the Islamic community which also points to *hijrat* as a duty.[8] Since it is a *jihad*-related obligation and the conquest of Makkah (631) an ideal model, the supporters of the *hijrat* of 1920, when undertaking emigration to Afghanistan, had indeed the concept of *jihad* in view.[9]

The doctrine of *hijrat* has gone through several reformulations, especially from the twelfth century but more specifically after the fall of Sicily and Spain in the fifteenth century, when *fatawa* were sought as to the obligation of good Muslims under Christian rule.[10] Relevant

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is no land of Islam between them.' See *Fatawa-i Alamgiri*, iii. Urdu tr. Syed Ameer Ali (Lucknow, 1932), 415, in Masud, 'The obligation to migrate', 39.

[5] See Moulvi Cheragh Ali, *A Critical Exposition of the Popular 'Jihad'*, esp. 114–19, 134 ff. and 155. H. Th. Oebink has tried to disprove Cheragh Ali's argument that *jihad* is essentially defensive. See Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 2 3. For a legal discussion of *jihad* see M. Hamidullah, *Muslim Conduct of State* (Lahore [1945]), 150–9; and Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1955), 51–82. Also see Ayatullah Ahmad Jannati, 'Jihad and the Holy Quran', *The Voice of Islam* (Karachi), 34/12-B&C (1987), 5 9; Abdul Hameed Siddiqi, 'Meaning of Jihad' in ibid., 10–15; Amin Ahsan Islahi, 'Jihad: Prerequisites and Conditions', ibid., 16–20; Syed Abul a'la Maudoodi, 'Why Jihad [?]', ibid., 21–27; and Afzalur Rahman, 'Jihad in the Holy Quran', ibid., 28–31.

[6] 'Whoso migrateth for the cause of Allah will find much refuge and abundance in the earth'. There are also several other references to *hijrat* in the Qur'an, e.g. 8:72.

[7] e.g. 'I have nothing to do with any Moslem that resides among the polytheists'. For details see Masud, 'The obligation to migrate', 32–3.

[8] Muhammad Khalid Masud, 'Shehu Usuman Dan Fodio: Restatement of the Doctrine of Hijrah', *Islamic Studies*, 25/1 (1986), 65–8.

[9] For instance, the *muhajirin* who emigrated under the leadership of Ahmad Ali of Lahore had two black standards with the Qur'anic inscriptions on them: 'O! triumph is from Allah and a speedy victory' (61:13); 'It is He who had sent His Apostle with guidance and religion of truth to proclaim it over all the religions even though the pagans may detest it' (9:34); 'We are God's helpers' (3:52); and 'Certainly, the group of Allah must triumph' (5:59). Also see speech by Sanaullah on 1 May 1920 at Lahore and a poem on *hijrat* by Muhammad Ismail of Amritsar in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/28, 17 July 1920, para. 1460; and *Zamindar* (Lahore), 3 July 1920.

[10] Masud, 'The obligation to migrate', 34 8; and Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 41.

to the Indian context, however, was the nineteenth-century Muslim response to creeping British expansion in the Subcontinent. What prompted the debate immediately was General Lord Lake's capture of Delhi in 1803 which had turned Shah Alam II, the blind old Mughal, a captive in his own capital.[11] The *'ulama*, who were already disturbed by the marauding Sikhs and Marathas as well as the progressive European interference with the *shari'at*, were overwhelmed by the East India Company's latest success. This necessitated a re-examination of the whole question of the Muslim-non-Muslim relations. When a reference was made to Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1824), the son and successor of Shah Waliullah of Delhi, he is reported to have pronounced the Company's possessions in India *daru'l-harb*.[12] But the fact is that his ruling was completely misunderstood as its context was economic rather than political and at best flaunted as a legal distraction to satisfy the religious qualms of the faithful who had been forced to live under Christian rule.[13] Otherwise, there was already among the Muslim élite and *'ulama* a certain degree of 'surface acquiescence' in the British system which did not at first appear potentially detrimental to their interests.[14] Apparently, Shah Abdul Aziz, in line with the tenor of his other *fatawa*, was trying to hedge in on the possible implications of his ruling and ignored both *hijrat* and *jihad* and disallowed usury transactions that the Hanafis permit in *daru'l-harb*.[15] Evidently, he had realized that for the Muslims a certain degree of accommodation with the British was advisable and as such avoided a confrontation with them.[16] But since the early nineteenth-century writings and *fatawa* generally exuded an air of antag-

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[11] Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals*, 34 ff. and 37 9; and Mujeeb Ashraf, *Muslim Attitudes Towards British Rule*, 32 8.

[12] Shah Abdul Aziz issued his ruling on the ground that the city of Delhi was being ruled not by the orders of the *imamu'l-Muslimin* but those of the Christian rulers. See Abdul Aziz, *Fatawa-i 'Azizi*, i (Delhi, 1906), 16–17. Abdul Aziz disparagingly called Lake a louse by translating the Farsi version of his name (*'lik'*) as meaning *'jun'* in the local dialect. See Mushirul Haque, 'Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz. His Life and Times: A study of Indian Muslim attitude to the British in the early 19th Century', MA thesis, (McGill, 1966), repr. in *al-Ma'arif* (Lahore), 27/4–6 (1994), 30 1.

[13] The *istifta* clearly shows that the motive was to ascertain whether interest from non-Muslims was permissible. See Mushirul Haque, 'Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz', 31–8.

[14] Mushirul Haque, 'Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz', 5–6 and 23 7; and Powell, *Muslims and Missionaries*, 71–2.

[15] Mushirul Haque, 'Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz', 31 46.

[16] He had allowed his son-in-law, Abdul Hayy, to accept service under the East India Company as had done many other *'ulama*. See Mushirul Haque, 'Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz', 24–6. Also see Mujeeb Ashraf, *Muslim Attitudes*, 121.

onism to the British rule, Shah Abdul Aziz's *fatwa* was interpreted as preaching *jihad* or *hijrat*, a view which some modern Muslim writers have enthusiastically supported.[17]

From then on the controversy kept raising its head time and again. Most often the *fatawa* were so vague that they seemed to endorse contradictory stances. For instance, the rulings of Shah Abdul Hayy (d. 1828), the son-in-law of Shah Abdul Aziz, declared India *daru'l-Islam* but pronounced Calcutta and its dependencies *daru'l-harb*.[18] The *fatawa* of Sayyid Dildar Ali, the leading Shi'a *mujtahid* of Lucknow, followed the same pattern as that of Shah Abdul Aziz.[19] On the other hand, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, a close follower of the Delhi divine, organized *hijrat* and *jihad* of his Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya disciples without explicitly pronouncing India *daru'l-harb*.[20] The Faraizis of Bengal were even more definite about India being *daru'l-harb* and yet Haji Shariatullah did not preach *jihad* against the British.[21] A clearer verdict on the admissibility of *jihad* and *hijrat* is found in the *fatawa* issued during and after the Revolt of 1857 when many among the *'ulama* fought against the British and later went on *hijrat*, even though some of them, including Fazl-i Haq Khairabadi, had earlier declared the British their *ulul-amr*.[22] The concept was invoked even more vigorously by the *mujahidin* remnants of Sayyid Ahmad who dared to stand and fight for the establishment of a *daru'l-Islam*.[23] However, in the wake of the so called 'Wahhabi' trials of the 1860s and 1870s and the ensuing controversy let loose by J. O'Kinealy and William Hunter that Muslim disloyalty was a religious obligation[24]

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[17] Mujeeb Ashraf, *Muslim Attitudes*, 125-6.

[18] Muhammad Abdul Hayy, *Majmu'atu'l-fatawa*, i, (Calcutta, n.d.), 124, cited in ibid., 131.

[19] Powell, *Muslims and Missionaries*, 72-3.

[20] For details see Muhammad Abdul Bari, 'The Politics of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi', *Islamic Culture*, 31/1 (1957), esp. 160-1.

[21] Abdul Bari, 'The Reform Movement in Bengal', *History of the Freedom Movement*, i (Karachi, 1957), 547; Muin-ud-din Ahmad Khan, *History of the Faraizi Movement in Bengal, 1818-1906* (Karachi, 1965), 1 and 69 ff.; and Aziz Ahmad, *An Intellectual History of Islam in India* (Edinburgh, 1969), 10.

[22] See ch. i, 19. For Khairabadi, also see Najmu'l-Ghani Rampuri, *Tarikh-i Awadh* (Lucknow, 1919), 222, cited in Mushirul Haque, 'Shah 'Abdul 'Aziz', 7.

[23] For the *mujahidin* see ch. i, 44, n. 191.

[24] O'Kinealy and Hunter utilized the *Calcutta Review* to express their point of view. Later Hunter published his *Indian Musalmans: Are they Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen?* (Calcutta, 1871) to elucidate his argument. See M. Mohar Ali, 'Hunter's *Indian Musalmans*: A Re-Examination of its Background', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1 (1980), 30-51.

there was some rethinking on the part of the Muslim élite primarily to defuse criticism of their community.[25] Already in 1867, Karamat Ali Jaunpuri had a disputation with Maulawi Abdul Jabbar of Barisal when the *fatwa* of the *muftis* of Makkah declaring British India *daru'l-Islam* was obtained.[26] In 1870, Sayyid Amir Husain got hold of a *fatwa* from some north Indian *'ulama* which declared hostility to the British government illegal.[27] The same year, Nawab Syed Abdul Latif provided Karamat Ali the platform of his Mahomedan Literary Society to formulate a legal basis for accepting the British rule in accordance with the Hanafi *fiqh*.[28] Others resorted to crude tactics and distorted the *fatawa* or fabricated evidence to dispel British fears of Muslim antagonism.[29] Syed Ahmed Khan and Ubaidullah Ubaidi Suhrawardy, in particular, denied that India was *daru'l-harb*.[30] The Ahl-i Hadis *'ulama*, in the tradition of Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan, firmly decided to repudiate the concept of British India as *daru'l-harb* and, in 1876, Maulawi Muhammad Husain Batalwi circulated a *fatwa* to that effect.[31] Another of their scholars, Deputy Nazir Ahmad, also affirmed that India was not *daru'l-harb*.[32] To *Shams al-'Ulama* Sayyid Muhammad Nazir Husain Mahaddis Dehlawi, India was definitely *daru'l-Islam*.[33] The Barelwi point of view, as articulated by Ahmad Raza

[25] Mohar Ali, 'Hunter's *Indian Musalmans*', 30–51.

[26] Karamat Ali, *Hujjat-i qati'a* (Calcutta, 1865/66), introduction cited in ibid., 37. Mohar Ali refers to the 1925/26 edn. For earlier controversies see M. M. Ali, 'The Bengal Muslims' Repudiation of the Concept of British India as *Dar-al-Harb*', *Dacca University Studies*, 19 (1971), part A, 47–58.

[27] *Englishman*, 24 Sept. 1870, in ibid.

[28] See *Abstract of the Proceedings of the Mahomedan Literary Society of Calcutta*, *passim*. Besides Karamat Ali, the *'ulama* who attended the meeting on that occasion were Fazl Ali, Abdul Hakim, Muhammad Abdul Rauf, Shaikh Ahmad Efendi Ansari. See ibid., 1 and 7–8.

[29] Ibid., 7–9; I. H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, 172–3; Mujeeb Ashraf, *Muslim Attitudes*, 126–7; and Abbasi, *Muslim Leadership in South Asia*, 14–15.

[30] See Syed Ahmed Khan, *Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Musalmans* (Lahore, n.d., repr. of Benares, 1872), 39 ff. and xi–xxiii; and Sir Hassan Suhrawardy, 'India', in A. J. Arberry and R. Landau (eds.), *Islam To-day* (London, [1942]), 204.

[31] The contents of this *fatwa* were published in a treatise entitled *al-Iqtisad fi masa'il-i jihad* (Lahore, n.d.), 72–3, and later repr. in *Isha'atu's-Sunna*, 2/11 (1879). See Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 207–8. For Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali see his *Tarjuman-i Wahhabiyya* (Lahore, n.d.), 15.

[32] See *Hurriyyat*, 26 Apr. 1920, in Abdul Bari, *Majmu'a risala-i hijrat wa risala-i qurbani gao* (ed.), Shaikh Shahid Ali (Farangi Mahal, 1920), repr. in Jafri Nadwi, *Auraq*, 148.

[33] Sayyid Muhammad Nazir Husain Muhaddis Dehlawi, *Fatawa-i Naziriyya*, ii (Delhi, 1918), 39, 41, 47 and 472–3.

Khan, was also against considering India *daru'l-harb* which meant that by corollary *jihad* and *hijrat* were also inadmissible as they would cause disaster to the community.[34] The *fatawa* of the Deobandi *'ulama*, on the other hand, were ambiguous and contradictory. Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi, for instance, considered India *daru'l-harb* for the obligation of *hijrat* but *daru'l-Islam* for the purpose of usury transactions.[35] Rashid Ahmad Gangohi's decrees have the same ring of confusion and at best are non-committal.[36] By 1898, he was definitely preaching loyalty to the British. Indeed, at one point, he called himself 'an obedient [servant] of the *sarkar*'.[37] Ashraf Ali Thanawi preferred to call British India *daru'l-Islam*[38] and Mahmud Hasan believed India was both *daru'l-harb* and *daru'l-Islam*, depending on whether or not the Muslims enjoyed religious freedom.[39] The *'ulama* of al-Nadwa, principally Shibli Nu'mani, advised the Indian Muslims to remain loyal to their rulers in accordance with the dictates of the Qur'an and *sunnat*.[40] The Shi'a *'ulama* and the Ahmadis also believed that India was *daru'l-Islam* and, therefore, loyalty to the British was in order.[41]

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[34] The *fatwa* was originally formulated in 1888. See Ahmad Raza Khan, *I'lamu'l-a'lam bi anna Hindustan daru'l-Islam* (Bareilly, [1927]), 2 ff. The treatise has been repr. in Muhammad Abdul Hakim Sharf Qadiri (ed.), *Do aham fatwe* (Lahore, 1977), 17–36. Also see id., *Dawamu'l-'aish*, 108, in Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 204–6 and 208; and id., *Fatawa-i Razuiyya* (Mubarakpur, n.d.), vi, 2, in ibid., 204–5.

[35] Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi, *Qasimu'l-'ulum: maktubat mutarjam* (Lahore, 1874), 362, in Sharf Qadiri's introduction to *Do aham fatwe*, 11.

[36] See *Fatawa-i Rashidiyya*, i (Muradabad, 1906), 76 and 87. Also see Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi, *Hindustan ki shar'i haisiyyat*, 35–6, in Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 212.

[37] Ashiq Ilahi, *Tazkiratu'r-Rashid*, ii, 80, in Sharf Qadiri's introduction to *Do aham fatwe*, 6.

[38] Ashraf Ali Thanawi, *Ta'ziru'l-Ikhwanu'r-riba fi'l Hindustan* (Thana Bhawan, n.d.), 3–9, repr. in Sharf Qadiri, *Do aham fatwe*, 37–56.

[39] See Mahmud Hasan's interview cited in Sharf Qadiri's introduction to *Do aham fatwe*, 12.

[40] Shibli Nu'mani, 'Musalmanon ko ghair mazhab hukumat ka mahkum ho kar kyunkar rehna chahiye', in *Maqalat-i Shibli*, i, (Azamgarh, 1954), esp. 168–9 and 171.

[41] For Shi'a views see Ameer Ali, 'The Caliphate', 681–94; Maulvi Cheragh Ali, *The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammadan States* (Bombay, 1883), 23–25; Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans*, 115–19; and for the Ahmadiyya views see Khwaja Kamal-ud-din, *Attitude of Muslims of India Towards British Government and other Muslim and Non-Muslim Powers* (Lahore, 1912), 10–11. It is interesting to note that the controversy still exists in India today. The known opinion of the *'ulama*, esp. of Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi of Aligarh, is, however, in favour of regarding India *daru'l-Islam*. Their argument is that Muslims share in the running of the govt. and also enjoy religious freedom. As a corollary, Pakistan's wars with India, as in 1965 and 1971, are not categorized as *jihad*. See 'Jihad', *Aj Kal* (Delhi), 30/6 (1972), 8–10.

In the renewed frenzy of the 1920s, when Muslim interests were seen to be threatened by their Christian rulers, it was natural that the doctrine of *hijrat* should be revived. The question was raised whether or not the circumstances required the Muslims of India to leave their 'unholy country' and go to some other land under Muslim rule. Such views had already been expressed by the Ali brothers in April 1919 in the memorial which they had sent to the viceroy, Lord Chelmsford:

> When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives, *Jehad* or *Hijrat*. That is to say, he must either make use of every force God has given him for the liberation of the land and the ensurement of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of Islam, or he must migrate to some other and freer land with a view to return[ing] to it when it is once more safe for Islam.... In view of our weak condition, migration is the only alternative for us.... This step, which we shall now have to consider with all the seriousness that its very nature demands, will be perhaps the most decisive in the history of our community since the *Hijrat* of our Holy Prophet.[42]

Other Khilafatists held somewhat similar views. Zafar Ali Khan, for instance, was a staunch supporter of the idea of *jihad* and *hijrat*. His speeches were full of exhortation to either of the two alternatives.[43] Abul Kalam Azad also believed that *hijrat* was an important constituent of the five pillars which firmly held the structure of the Islamic society, i.e. fealty of the *jama'at* to the caliph, its rallying to his call, its submission to his authority and, finally, a resort to *jihad*. To him *hijrat* was a sacrifice of inferior gains for nobler objectives. It was noble because it inculcated a spirit of sacrifice.[44] Though the Khilafatists in general held the same opinion,[45] the Ali brothers were the principal advocates of an actual exodus.[46] Their speeches at the Amritsar Khilafat Conference in December 1919, and later during their tour of northern India in January and February 1920, bordered closely on calls to *jihad* and *hijrat*.[47]

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[42] Memorial dated 24 Apr. 1919, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1574, file 3915/1919.

[43] See e.g. Zafar Ali Khan, *Taqarir-i Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan*, (Meerut, n.d.), 36 and 50; and *Zamindar*, 30 July 1920.

[44] Azad, *Khutbat*, 220–8.

[45] Ghulam Husain Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat* (Amritsar, 1921), 4; and IOL&R, P/Conf./58, ICH(P)P, Aug. 1920, Proc. no. 71.

[46] Shaidai's 'Memoirs', NAP, Shaidai Papers.

[47] Muhammad Ali, *Taqarir-i Maulana Muhammad 'Ali*, i (ed.), Munshi Mushtaq Ahmad, 2nd edn. (Meerut, 1921), 16–17; Shaukat Ali (Alig.), (ed.), *Mohamed Ali* (Lahore, 1922), 38; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 82, 2 Feb. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

If any incitement was needed, it was provided by Amir Amanullah Khan (1892–1960) of Afghanistan, who had been trading on the excited state of mind of Indian Muslims for his own dreams of a greater Afghanistan enveloping Central Asia and parts of British India. In a speech delivered at Kabul on the anniversary of the murder of his father (20/21 February) the Amir undertook to welcome all those Muslims and Hindus who intended to migrate. He even offered to sacrifice his own life for the defence of the faith and the caliphate, vehemently opposing any suggestion for the settlement of the Khilafat question by 'infidel powers'.[48] Further weight to the earnestness of the Amir's offer was lent by the professed support for the Khilafat movement and Turkey by the Afghan delegation, which had arrived in India in April 1920 for negotiations with the Indian government on the resumption of friendly relations.[49] Mahmud Tarzi (1866–1935), the Afghan foreign minister and head of the mission, in a speech on 16 April after the Friday prayers at the Landour mosque near Mussoorie, was reported to have remarked that the principal object of the delegation in coming to India was to secure just and favourable treatment for Turkey.[50] He referred to the Amir's speech of the preceding February reassuring his audience that he would welcome Muslims who felt compelled to leave British India.[51]

The gesture was, in fact, never meant seriously by the Afghan government. Their motive in encouraging *hijrat* was to embarrass the British and thereby to strengthen their own bargaining position at the Mussoorie talks.[52] But the 'invitation' evoked great response in India. The Indian Muslims were led to believe that the Afghans would welcome them with open arms. The asylum given by the Afghans in the past to Indian pan-Islamists, revolutionaries and runaway students[53] had further encouraged them in this belief. Impressed by the attitude

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[48] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/19, 15 May 1920, paras. 1007 and 1008; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 426-S, 12 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920; *Hurriyyat*, 20 Apr. 1920; and *Dastur*, 24 Apr. 1920.

[49] For the Anglo-Afghan Conference see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/810 and 811.

[50] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/19, 15 May 1920, para. 1008; and *The Times*, 1 May 1920.

[51] *Aftab* (Lahore), 10 May 1920. Also see *Dastur*, 24 Apr. 1920; and Adamec, *Afghanistan*, 153.

[52] A member of the Afghan delegation confided in Sahibzada Qayyum that his govt. could easily expel from their country the *émigré* Indian revolutionaries and the Bolshevik agents 'if it were made worthwhile'. See IOL&R, L/P&S/18, A. 190, 'Afghanistan: Relations from Signing of Treaty of Peace, August 1919 to Dispatch of Mission to Kabul, January 1921', 7. Also see Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 202–4.

[53] See above, ch. i, 78 ff.

of the Afghan mission, a number of Khilafatists got in touch with the delegates.[54] The real enthusiasm for *hijrat*, however, developed at the Khilafat Workers Conference which was held at Delhi on 18 and 19 April 1920 at the bidding of Hasrat Mohani. The purpose of the conference was to put pressure on the CKC to approve a direct action programme. Though this did not work, the young firebrands were able to turn the meeting into a forum for launching *hijrat*.[55] Ahmad Saeed of Delhi told his audience that though *jihad* and *hijrat* had not been declared by the CKC, he was prepared to spread the idea among the troops and government servants. Ataullah (1891–1961) of Amritsar advised taking advantage of the Amir's invitation to Afghanistan. Malik Lal Khan of Gujranwala went a step further and declared that those who refused to migrate were infidels. And Ghulam Muhammad Aziz of Amritsar, *alias* Aziz Hindi, in spite of the cautious counsels, exhorted the Muslims to undertake either *jihad* or *hijrat*.[56] In fact, Aziz Amritsari who was indulgently referred to by Mohamed Ali as a 'dangerous fanatic',[57] had already been preaching *hijrat* or *jihad* under the influence of the *mujahidin* leader, Fazl Ilahi of Wazirabad.[58] At Delhi, his passionate appeal for *hijrat* proved an instant success. A public meeting in the evening under Asaf Ali's (1888–1953) chairmanship overwhelmingly confirmed the call for *hijrat*.[59] The idea then caught on and even the CKC, not realizing that the Afghan overtures were merely a propaganda stunt, released to the press a summary of the Amir's promises.[60] The resultant publicity aroused considerable enthusiasm for *hijrat* in various parts of the country.[61]

In the furore that followed, the *'ulama* were approached to express

[54] *Paisa Akhbar*, 28 Apr. 1920; *Zamindar*, 28 Apr. 1920; *Aftab*, 16 May 1920; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 337, 30 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[55] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 24 Apr. 1920, para. 454, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/19, 15 May 1920, para. 992; and 42/25, 26 June 1920, para. 1328; Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 758 ff. For the Delhi conference also see *Aftab*, 23 Apr. 1920; *Dastur*, 24 Apr. 1920; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 390, 25 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. For other issues at the Delhi conference see ch. ii, 151 2.

[56] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 24 Apr. 1920, para. 454, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/19, 15 May 1920, para. 992.

[57] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 761.

[58] Ibid., 766 8. For a biography of Fazl-i Ilahi see Khalid Gharjakhi, *Maulana Fazl Ilahi Wazirabadi* (Gujranwala, n.d.).

[59] *Dastur*, 24 Apr. 1920; and Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 778 80.

[60] Ext., Bombay Fortnightly Report, no. 506, 16 Jan. [*sic* for June] 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920.

[61] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 337, 30 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Report on the Political and Economic Situation in the Punjab for the

their views on the issue and thus give a lead to those who were planning to migrate.[62] But they were divided. Broadly, the divisions among the *'ulama* reflected the conflicting points of view in Indian Islam, different schools of thought, and different sufi allegiances. To some extent these differences were the outcome of personal recriminations and political considerations.[63] Already, the prominent among the *'ulama* had stayed away from the Khilafat Workers Conference in Delhi in April 1920, where *hijrat* to Afghanistan had been proclaimed. Yet, a *fatwa* was needed to boost an exodus. The first enquiries in this connection were addressed to Abdul Bari.[64] But Abdul Bari was convinced that India under the British was not *daru'l-harb*. Such views were put forward as early as December 1918 at the Delhi sessions of the Muslim League, though the language in which he expressed his ideas was too twilled to be understood easily by ordinary people.[65] His letters and writings during the period that followed emphasize the same argument. In June 1919, for instance, he had expressed his disagreement with the Ali brothers who wanted to undertake either *jihad* or *hijrat* in case the Khilafat demands were not accepted.[66] Abdul Bari's stance against *hijrat* from British India was despite the fact that doctrinally Farangi Mahal had been favourably disposed towards the *fatwa* of Shah Abdul Aziz.[67] The pith of his argument was that: India was a country which had been bequeathed to them by their great men. It was where their forefathers lay buried. They now belonged to that place and would never ever leave. They had spread the *kalima* and had turned the country into *daru'l-Islam* from where *hijrat* was not mandatory. Even under duress it could not be declared as totally binding. It was especially not desirable for those whose exodus would harm the interests of Islam and benefit the enemies of the *din*. *Hijrat* was not an end in itself; it was to be undertaken solely for the defence of the faith.[68]

When in April 1920, Abdul Bari sent his reply to a telegraphic

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Fortnight ending 30 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Thompson Papers. Also see report on the Conference at Mussoorie, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/808, file 7382/1920.

[62] *Siyasat* (Lahore), 21 May 1920.

[63] For details see M. Naeem Qureshi, 'The 'Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920', *Modern Asian Studies*, 13/1 (1979), 46 ff.

[64] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 781.

[65] See his speech dated 31 Dec. 1918 in NAP/AFM, AIMLR, *Karwa'i al Indya Muslim lig ijlas yazdaham mun'aqada ikattis Disambar unnis-sau athara*, 109–10.

[66] Abdul Bari to Chelmsford, 12 June 1920, in ibid., 145–6.

[67] Abdul Bari, *Majmu'a risala-i hijrat*, 150.

[68] Ibid., 138–68.

enquiry from Aziz Amritsari, the contents of his message were so brief that he appeared to be supporting *hijrat*.[69] It was no *fatwa*; it was just an advice. But before he could correct the impression, his telegram had found its way into the vernacular press and received wide publicity. Arif Hasawi of the daily *Hurriyyat* (Delhi) was the first to give prominence to it. Hasawi was one of those who believed in the necessity of *hijrat* and enthusiastically promoted the campaign.[70] From the *Hurriyyat* the contents of Abdul Bari's telegram reached the *Paisa Akhbar*, the *Zamindar*, the *Khilafat* and a number of other newspapers of India. An impression was created, deliberately or otherwise, that Abdul Bari had given a *fatwa* enjoining *hijrat* for the freedom of India and the question of the Khilafat.[71] Abdul Bari was taken aback by this misrepresentation and promptly issued a clarification to the *Hurriyyat* explaining in some detail that in his opinion

> *Hijrat* from *daru'l-harb* to *daru'l-Islam* is desirable and in certain conditions becomes obligatory. In fact, residence in *daru'l-harb* without any *shar'* injunction is forbidden. I regard India *daru'l-Islam* and am staying here for the [express] purpose of exalting the faith and propagating God's *kalima*. For this reason I do not consider *hijrat* obligatory. But when there is no alternative but to do *hijrat* or [else] remain in peril or become guilty of accepting an evil or when continued residence may not be as useful as emigration then in that case *hijrat* becomes permissible. In the present circumstances if able and competent people perform *hijrat* to Afghanistan or if industrious and hardworking individuals emigrate then it is hoped that Islam will doubly benefit [from it] and also render service to our beloved country.[72]

In his communication to Aziz Amritsari, Abdul Bari wrote:

> According to most of our *'ulama*, India is not *daru'l-harb* either in accordance with the assertion of Imam Abu Hanifa or of Imam Muhammad [al-Shaibani]; rather it is *daru'l-Islam*. It appears from the general sense gleaned from the *Bahru'r-Ra'iq* that in view of the predominance of the unbelievers the country may appear outwardly to be *daru'l-harb* but in fact it remains *daru'l-Islam*. In the opinion of Shah Abdul Aziz of

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[69] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 781 2.

[70] Ibid., 781–2.

[71] *Paisa Akhbar*, 28 Apr. 1920; *Jhang Siyal*, 30 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, L/R/5/202; *Khilafat*, 1 May 1920; Ext., Bombay Fortnightly Report no. 506, 16 Jan. [*sic* for June] 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920; Habibur Rahman to Hakim Barham Gorakhpuri, 12 May 1920, in Chiryakoti, *at-Tanqid*, 78; Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 3; Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 56; and Maqbul Ahmad, 'Tahrik-i hijrat', *Intikhab* (London), (Dec. 1968), 20.

[72] *Hurriyyat*, 26 Apr. 1920, in Abdul Bari, *Majmu'a risala-i hijrat*, 148. Eng. tr. mine.

> Delhi—may God purify his soul—and that of his associates, India has become *daru'l-harb* because God's rites are no longer in force.... The inclination of some of the great *'ulama* of Farangi Mahal is also towards [accepting] the ruling of Shah Sahib. But even now I believe [India] to be *daru'l-Islam*.... In my view *hijrat* from India is not mandatory. Even in the state of [complete] aversion an absolute command [in its favour] cannot be given. On the contrary in certain circumstances the non-admissibility of *hijrat* or [even] its suppression is apparent. Even if India were *daru'l-harb* in consonance with the research of Shah Sahib... *hijrat* from this country is not mandatory at all times. After what has been said about me I reflected upon the matter and consulted [friends]. The people on whose advice I act in all such matters counsel me against *hijrat*. Since I myself do not consider [*hijrat*] obligatory I cannot disregard their advice just for no reason. My stay in India has been for the purpose of the defence [of Islam] and as a tactical measure.... So long that is the target I cannot undertake *hijrat*. If you are aware of the conditions in the Islamic countries you will never say that better facilities exist there. If you are unaware then do not decide in haste. Do not place an implicit confidence in Kabul which it does not deserve. I can say this much that if my guidance is not useful then [please] deliberate upon the matter before taking action. *Hijrat* is among the finest tenets of *shari'at* and it should not go in vain.[73]

It is evident that Abdul Bari was not in favour of *hijrat* and did not give a *fatwa* in its support, nor did he declare it to be mandatory; all he said was that it was valid under certain conditions and that too as a last resort. Certainly, he refused to authorize *hijrat* which did not please the promoters of the campaign. They accused Abdul Bari of fickleness and brought pressure to bear upon him to revise his views. A correspondent taunted that there were contradictions in his earlier stance and statements.[74] Sanaullah Amritsari of the Ahl-i Hadis, for instance, wanted to know what had made Abdul Bari pronounce his verdict against the *hijrat*.[75] Abu Turab Abdul Haq (1868–1949) of Amritsar, on the authority of Shah Abdul Aziz and Abdul Hayy, questioned Abdul Bari's standpoint and asserted that ever since the British occupied India it had ceased to be *daru'l-Islam*.

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[73] See Abdul Bari's undated letter to Aziz Amritsari, in ibid., 149–51. Eng. tr. mine.

[74] See Abdul Bari's response to one such letter dated 22 May 1920 in *Paisa Akhbar*, 24 June 1920.

[75] *Paisa Akhbar*, 11 June 1920. The ref. is to an earlier event. Later, Sanaullah changed his stance and declared that India was neither *daru'l-harb or daru'l-Islam* but was *daru's-salam*. See *Ahl-i Hadis*, 17 Mar. 1932, cited in Abul Wafa Sanaullah Amritsari, *Fatawa-i Sanaiyya*, ii (ed.), Muhammad Daud Raz (Lahore, 1972), 360.

In support of his argument he pointed out that the British had gradually replaced the *shari'at* by their own administrative and legal system. This progressive intervention with the Islamic law had turned India into a *daru'l-harb* and, therefore, *hijrat* had become a religious duty.[76] Some, like Munir-uz-zaman Islamabadi of Bengal and Azad Subhani of Kanpur, argued that religious injunctions were absolutely clear on the point: the countries under non-Muslim domination fell under the category of *daru'l-harb* and those under Muslim rulers were *daru'l-Islam*. Moreover, the Prophet had already set an example and the Muslims should follow it. *Hijrat* from India could be easily managed as there were sympathizers abroad who could look after the *muhajirin*. The emigration of a few lakh out of a population of several crore would cause no calamity.[77] The other chief supporters of this argument were Sayyid Taj Mahmud Amroti (d. 1929), Pir Mahbub Shah of Hyderabad (Sind), Abdul Razzaq of Malihabad, Ahmad Ali (1877–1962) of Lahore, Muhyi-ud-din Ahmad (1889–1971) of Kasur, and Abul Ma'arif Muhammad Irfan (1888–1939) and Abdul Ghafur (b. 1860/70) of Peshawar.[78]

In spite of the pressure, Abdul Bari remained firm. He maintained that though Shah Abdul Aziz had declared India *daru'l-harb*, he had not pronounced *hijrat* mandatory. There was no contradiction in his stand: he had always pronounced India *daru'l-Islam* and his critics were deliberately distorting his views.[79] In any case, he preferred to wait until such time that the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind had given a verdict. All he would do was to advise reflection and deliberation before embarking on *hijrat*.[80] The only compromise he was willing

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[76] *Vakil*, 7 May 1920. It is interesting to note that though Abu Turab preached *hijrat* he prevented his son from emigrating to Afghanistan on the pretext that he was a minor, still devoted to his studies and needed parental guidance. See *Vakil*, 22 Aug. 1920. There is some discrepancy regarding Abu Turab's date of birth but 1868 seems to be more plausible. See Ihsan-ul-Haq Turabi (ed.), *Shakhsiyyat Abu Turab* (Rawalpindi, 1957), esp. 30 and 32.

[77] Munir-uz-Zaman Islamabadi to Abdul Bari, n.d., *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 197 8.

[78] The information is based on: Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 3–4; IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920; IOL&R, P/Conf./58, ICH(P)P, Aug. 1920, Proc. no. 71; NWFPA/NDC, CID file 12/8/3/i, S-377; Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 759; *Zamindar*, 20 July and 7 Aug. 1920; A. H. Khan (ed.), *Mard-i mu'min* (Lahore, 1964), *passim*; and Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi, 'Pir 'Ali Anwar Shah Rashidi marhum', *Jang* (Rawalpindi), 23 Apr. 1974.

[79] *Vakil*, 23 June 1920.

[80] Ref. in Muhammad Anis to Abdul Bari, 24 June 19[20], *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 220; Islamabadi to Abdul Bari, n.d. in ibid., 197 8: Abdul Bari, *Khutba-i sadarat*, 26; and Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 3.

to make was that even though *hijrat* was not obligatory it could be adopted as a last resort. And that was to be his final verdict.[81]

Abdul Bari had other *'ulama* on his side, too. The *'ulama* of Deoband, for instance, chose to stand aloof from the campaign. They had generally become cautious in their pronouncements since the discovery in 1916 of the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy'. Habibur Rahman Ludhiyanawi (1892–1956), the principal of the seminary, in particular, was inimical to *hijrat* or *jihad*.[82] Even his illustrious mentor, Mahmud Hasan, after his return from Malta seemed to have become unenthusiastic about it.[83] Ashraf Ali Thanawi, a later Deobandi, was definitely against the venture. He did not think that the conditions prescribed by the *shari'at* for a voluntary withdrawal were in existence in British India.[84] Hakim Abu Nasir Khurshid, editor of the *Misbah* (Saharanpur), in spite of some reservations as to the status of British India in *shari'at*, thought it prudent to side with Abdul Bari and advised Muslims to follow his declaration.[85] Muhammad Abdul Rauf (1874–1948) of Danapur (UP) though accepted the obligatory nature of *hijrat* was unwilling to support the campaign without the CKC's approval as it would, he thought, create divisions among Muslims.[86] Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi, whose views on the status of India in *shari'at* had been well-known since the 1880s, declined to lend support.[87] Among the other critics of the *hijrat* movement were Pir Jama'at Ali Shah of Alipur, Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur, Pir Mihr Ali Shah of Golra, Muhammad Ishaq (1888–1962) of Mansehra; Abdul Hakim of Peshawar, and Aslam Jayrajpuri (1882–1956) of Aligarh who opposed the venture for they honestly believed that it was irrelevant, unnecessary and harmful to the community.[88] Mirza Bashir-ud-din Muhmud Ahmad of Qadian,

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[81] See Abdul Bari's declaration in *Vakil*, 23 June 1920.

[82] See his letter to Gorakhpuri, 12 May 1920, in Chiryakoti, *at-Tanqid*, 78. For biographical details of Ludhiyanawi see Aziz-ur-Rahman Jami'i Ludhiyanawi, *Ra'isu'l-Ahrar Maulana Habibu'r-Rahman Ludhiyanawi aur Hindustan ki jang-i azadi* (Delhi, 1961).

[83] Mahmud Hasan, *Hazrat Shaikhu'l-Hind ka ek zaruri khatt* (Azamgarh, n.d.). Also see *Madina* (Bijnor), 9 Sept. 1920. This refers to earlier events.

[84] Ahmad Saeed, *Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi aur tahrik-i azadi* (Rawalpindi, 1972), 69–70.

[85] *al-Khalil*, 1 June 1920.

[86] *Zamana*, 11 June 1920, cited by Hakim Muhammad Sikandar of Amritsar in *Vakil*, 23 June 1920.

[87] See Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 197–8 and 204–5.

[88] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/32, 14 Aug. 1920, para. 1663 and 42/35, 4 Sept. 1920, para. 1770; NWFPA/NDC, CID report dated 15 May 1920, para. 422, file 12/8/2/i, S-376 and file 12/8/3/i, S-377; Faiz Ahmad, *Mihr-i munir*

opposed *hijrat* on the ground that India under the British was not *daru'l-harb*.[89] In any case the Qadianis were considered a heterodox sect in confrontation with orthodox Islam and as such their beliefs on *jihad* and *hijrat* were taken for granted as favouring the British.

There is no denying the fact, however, that Abdul Bari's rulings, couched as they were in a complex syntax, had created a good deal of confusion. This encouraged the organizers of the *hijrat* campaign to step up the exodus. They were able to obtain the support of no less a person than Abul Kalam Azad. It was he who supplied them with the much-needed *fatwa*. Azad declared:

> After examining all the reasons embodied in the *shari'at*, contemporary events, interests of the Muslims, and the expedient counsels, I feel completely satisfied in my perception that for the Muslims of India there is no *shari'* alternative but to go on *hijrat*. For all those Muslims who would like to fulfil their biggest Islamic obligation in India today, it is imperative that they should embark on *hijrat*; and those who are unable to do so immediately should help and assist the worthy *muhajirin* in such a way as if they were themselves going on *hijrat*. That is to say the factual *shari'* matter facing [the Muslims] now is *hijrat*. There is nothing else besides this. Before the war *hijrat* from India was commendable; now in accordance with the spirit of the *shari'at* it has become mandatory. However, if there is presumption about those whose stay in India, as compared to their *hijrat*, is more desirable for carrying on the struggle [for the caliphate] or for proclaiming and commemorating the true *kalima* or those who have acceptable reasons for not doing *hijrat* or there is delay due to genuine logistical problems experienced in large-scale population transfer, such people can undoubtedly stay. [But] they should devote all their energies to the compliance of [the dictates of] the *shari'at*. They should live their lives by acquiring the mien of an organized society. And so far as their determination and conduct is concerned [they] should not be devoid of [a continued] enthusiasm and ardour for *hijrat*. Under the present circumstances, the creation of such a [Muslim] party will be the real achievement.
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> It should, however, be understood that the form in which [the question of] *hijrat* is facing India today does not mean that every one should decide on ones own and embark on the venture individually and haphazardly. All actions with regard to *hijrat* should be undertaken collectively in an organized manner. It is to be decided by the party chief

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(Golra, 1973), 144 and 270 9; Amritsari in Jafri Nadwi, *Auraq*, 792; and *Paisa Akhbar*, 12 June 1920.

[89] Mahmud Ahmad, *Mu'ahada-i Turkiyya*, 8–9. Also see his *Tark-i muwalat aur ahkam-i Islam* (Qadian, 1920), 9 and 47–53.

as to who should emigrate forthwith and whose presence is required for useful service within the country. Moreover, to which place and under what circumstances *hijrat* should be undertaken so that it might be fruitful and auspicious. Not every one can decide about these matters for oneself.

When the order for *hijrat* is given to a seeker it would become mandatory to migrate. The model of *hijrat* that the Prophetic tradition has left us lays down that the *bai'at* is more important than the act of *hijrat* itself. Without *bai'at, hijrat* should not be undertaken. Therefore, it is essential that whoever performs *hijrat* must undertake *bai'at.*

Due to various reasons . . . it is evident that not everyone can migrate from India all at once, nor is that required by the *shari'at.* The process of *hijrat* will go on and [at the same time] a Muslim community will continue to exist in India. Those who remain in India and so long as they are here they are required by the *shari'at* not to have any kind of ties of goodwill or friendship or collaboration with the assailants of Islam. Whoever does that he will be counted, in the clear meaning of the Qur'anic injunction, an enemy of Islam.[90]

Clearly Azad, in his *fatwa*, exhorted the Indian Muslims to undertake *hijrat* as a commendable and mandatory step. However, he admitted that it was neither possible nor desirable for the entire Muslim population in India to migrate. Those staying behind were, therefore, advised to continue the struggle for the caliphate and to experiment non-co-operation with the government. Those 'seeking righteousness' were asked to get in touch with him or obtain instructions from Abdul Qadir of Kasur and his son Mohy-ud-din, Daud Ghaznawi of Amritsar and Abdur Razzaq of Malihabad, who were Azad's chief associates in the campaign.[91] An analysis of the *fatwa* suggests that Azad was using this occasion to further his claim to the position of *imam'ul-Hind* for which he had been parading his candidature since the Calcutta moot of February 1920. The oblique references to obtaining guidance of the *'sahib-i jama'at'* is an indication of his cherished aspirations.[92] Though he could not achieve his ambition due to want

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[90] Eng. tr. mine. The exact date of the *fatwa* is not known. But from internal evidence it appears that it was given in the last week of April or the first week of May 1920. The *fatwa* was published by the *Ahli-i Hadis* (Amritsar) of Abu Turab Abdul Haq in its issue of 30 July 1920. For the text of the *fatwa* see Ghulam Rasul Mihr (ed.), *Tabarrukat-i Azad* (Lahore, [1959]), 203–6. Ian Douglas's view that the *fatwa* soon became a dead letter does not correctly assess the situation in view of the events that followed. See his *Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography* (ed.), Gail Minault (Delhi, 1988), 173–74.

[91] Ibid., 205–6.

[92] Qazi Muhammad Adil Abbasi, *Tahrik-i Khilafat* (Lahore, 1986), 133–4.

of support from prominent *'ulama* like Mahmud Hasan and Abdul Bari,[93] his verdict on *hijrat* was accepted by many.

Thus armed with the *fatwa* and emboldened by the Afghan overtures, the enthusiasts of *hijrat* worked up an active campaign. Azad's influence was particularly strong in the Punjab, Sind and the NWFP where he had many followers.[94] But the man who had started playing the central role in the *hijrat* campaign, Aziz Amritsari, was neither an associate nor even a formal devotee.[95] Amritsari had established on his own accord a central *hijrat* office at Delhi in the Fatehpuri Mosque premises to provide facilities to the intending *muhajirin*.[96] This was despite Shaukat Ali's warning that unchecked enthusiasm might give an opportunity to the government to smash the non-co-operation campaign prematurely.[97] But Aziz Amritsari, with the hotheads like Abdullah Churiwala, Tajuddin and Arif Hasawi around him, was flying high[98] and enlisted a corps of volunteers to assist in the work. Then he sent off a telegram to the viceroy that 'Islamic injunctions make it impossible for the faithful any longer to remain under the British rule peacefully' and hoped that the government would allow them quietly to migrate to Afghanistan.[99] Another was addressed to Mahmud Tarzi, the Afghan envoy at Delhi, thanking him for the Amir's offer of hospitality.[100] He also sent Arif Hasawi to Simla to meet the Afghan consul general, Sardar Gul Muhammad, and obtain from him the necessary permission and instructions for the intending *muhajirin*.[101] A few days later, the Afghan consul sent a royal *farman* and a *nizamname* containing instructions to the effect that on entering Afghanistan the *muhajirin* would be entitled to the same rights as the Afghan nationals. Every *muhajir* would receive six to eight *jarib*s of land with

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[93] Ibid., 129–30.

[94] Ibid., 134.

[95] Of course, Aziz Amritsari had met Azad but no formal allegiance had taken place. In fact, in a letter written to Azad on the eve of his departure for Afghanistan (2 July), Amritsari apologized for having campaigned for *hijrat* without his permission and begged forgiveness. See Eng. tr. of an ext. of his intercepted letter to Azad, dated 2 July 1920, in NWFPA/NDC, CID file 12/8/3/i, S-377. Also see Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 761 ff.

[96] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 782.

[97] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/22, 5 June 1920, para. 1187.

[98] Ibid.

[99] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 28 Apr. 1920.

[100] *Paisa Akhbar*, 29 Apr. 1920. Also see Col. C. E. Yate, 'Unrest in India: the Question of the Khaliphate', *Asiatic Review*, 16/47 (1920), 379–80.

[101] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 784.

the facility of *taqavi* loans payable after three years in several easy instalments. In the meantime they would receive free rations on a modest scale. The *muhajirin* would be sent to Jabal-us-Siraj, at the mouth of the Panjsher valley, where they would stay for two months. Thereafter, they would be settled in areas wherever the Afghan government desired and they would not be permitted to take part in politics.[102] Obviously, the Afghans did not want the *muhajirin* to gain a position from where they could influence the local politics. Since the main route to Afghanistan lay through Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar before entering the Khyber Pass, Aziz Amritsari paid a visit to these places early in May 1920 to make necessary arrangements. First, he established *hijrat* committees with the help of local Khilafat workers.[103] At Peshawar, in particular, he was helped by Sayyid Agha Afzal Khan, the commander of the Khilafat volunteer corps, and Haji Jan Muhammad, a wealthy local contractor (not to be confused with Haji Jan Mohammad Chotani). The Peshawar Hijrat Committee consisted of Agha Sayyid Maqbool Shah (president), Maulawi Abdul Ghafur (secretary), Mir Yahya (chairman, reception committee), and Haji Jan Muhammad (secretary/treasurer).[104] The offices of the Hijrat Committee were set up in one of the shops in the Namakmandi, a business centre of Peshawar, which had several *serais* in its vacinity. These *serais* were hired for the board and lodging of the intending *muhajirin* and a dozen workers were engaged to register names and prepare lists for obtaining entry permits from the Afghan agent. Funds were also collected for the purpose and Jan Muhammad contributed Rs 30,000 from his own pocket in addition to providing his *serai* for free accommodation.[105]

Quite apart from its religious aspect the aim of the *hijrat* was political. In addition to the internal dynamism of the Khilafat-non-cooperation movement, the political turmoil in the adjoining territories

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[102] Ibid., 784. The text of the eight-point *nizamname* is available in NWFPA/NDC, CID report dated 31 May 1920, file 12/8/2/i, S-376.

[103] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 790–3. Also see Lal Baha, 'Hijrat Movement and the North-West Frontier Province', *Islamic Studies*, 18/3 (1979), 232.

[104] NWFPA/NDC, Ext. NWFP Abstract, 15 May 1920, para. 422, CID file 12/8/3/i, S-376. There seems to be a confusion in the names of the office bearers of the Hijrat Committee as sources vary in their accounts. See Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 792–3; NAP, Lal Khan Papers; Farigh Bukhari, *Bacha Khan* (Lahore, n.d.), 53–5; Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar, *Karwan-i azadi* (Charsadda, 1972), 27; and Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Sarhad aur Jidd-o jahd-i azadi* (Lahore, 1968), 215–16.

[105] Ibid.; and Yusufi, *Sarhad aur Jidd-o jahd-i azadi*, 216.

of Central Asia and the Caucasus following the fall of tsarist Russia had left a vacuum which sucked in the Indian pan-Islamists and revolutionaries just as it had drawn the British and the Bolsheviks into a renewed 'Great Game', like in the nineteenth century.[106] The latter's indulgent attitude towards Muslims under their rule, at least in the beginning, had created a favourable impression but it was the November 1919 decision of the Communist International (Comintern) to set the East ablaze that changed the scenario.[107] Kabul became the hub of this game and the news of these pan-Islamists and revolutionaries shuttling between Istanbul, Berlin, Moscow, Kabul and other European and Middle Eastern capitals heartened those who wished to see the British ousted from India.[108] By 1920, most of them, whether based in the East or the West, were in direct contact with Moscow.[109] In the context of the perceived Bolshevik threat, against which the British were trying to fend themselves,[110] the *hijrat* movement was considered an effective instrument of bringing pressure on the government. Emigration of large number of people in protest of their policy towards Turkey was an assured method of attracting attention. This is apparent from the exhortations of Ataullah reported by an Intelligence officer:

> According to the doctrines of Islam, Muslims were quite justified in declaring *jihad* against [the British] . . . but at present they were unable

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[106] Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, 'The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan: An Attempt (1917–1979)', Ph.D. thesis (Peshawar, 1992), esp. 197–8. For a discussion on the nineteenth century Anglo-Russian conflict see M. A. Yapp, 'British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India', *Modern Asian Studies*, 21/4 (1987), esp. 647–8.

[107] Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, 82 ff.; and Peter Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze* (London, 1984), 100–2.

[108] Notable among them were Abdul Jabbar Khairi and his brother Abdus Sattar Khairi (d. 1945), Barakatullah, Mahendra Pratap, Ubaidullah Sindhi and his associates, Abdur Rab Peshawari, and Dr Abdul Hafeez (1889–1964). See Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad*, 229–30; K. H. Ansari, *The Emergence of Socialist Thought Among North Indian Muslims (1917–1947)*, (Lahore, 1990), 19 ff., 242–3, and 249–50; Zafar Imam, *Colonialism in East-West Relations* (New Delhi, 1969), 118; and Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 230.

[109] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 350.

[110] After 1919, the British had left the luxury of the old Afghan buffer policy and instead preferred to monitor firsthand the situation in Central Asia and elsewhere. Apart from Sir Wilfrid Malleson in Meshed and Maj. (later Sir) Percy Etherton in Kashghar, they had sent Col. F. M. Bailey to Central Asia to report on the Bolshevik activities there. See Yapp, 'British Perceptions of the Russian Threat to India', 658; Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze*, 12–96; and F. M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent* (London, 1946), *passim*.

> to do so, though the question of *hijrat* was practicable in consequence of the announcement of the Amir. If they hesitated to leave their country, their host (the Amir) would come and fetch them. To migrate was to follow the example of their Holy Prophet who left Mecca and reached Medina by concealing himself in the hills along the route. They should similarly proceed to Afghanistan, where the Amir wanted 6 lakhs of men. God would soon provide them with the means to declare *jihad*. No Muslim should in future enter military service. Those who were already serving should make a solemn promise that they would not open fire upon their own brothers but would kill their employers.[111]

A similar course of action was advised by Daud Ghaznawi when he declared that after *hijrat, jihad* had become imperative as both the obligations were inseparable and those who followed these injunctions would be the blessed ones.[112] Preparations were thus set afoot with priority on familiarizing the masses with the religious aspects of *hijrat* and *jihad*.[113] Large posters were displayed advising that no one should migrate without proper arrangements or provisions in order not to be a burden on anyone in Kabul.[114] The propaganda was launched in those provinces where the response seemed to be visibly strong or the organizers themselves enjoyed considerable influence—the UP, Sind, the Punjab, and later, the Frontier. Propaganda leaflets were widely circulated and preachers appointed to spread the campaign. Mosques were frequently utilized for this purpose. The *maulawis* preached from the pulpit that the Muslims who did not migrate would become infidels. Writers stirred popular emotions through prose and poetry calling upon the Muslims to action and inciting them to leave for Kabul. The vernacular press published rosy accounts of life in Afghanistan. The people were told stories of red carpet receptions which awaited the *muhajirin*: that the Amir had promised them a tract of fertile land in Jabal-us-Siraj; that they would be helped and fed by their Afghan co-religionists; and that for three months they would have to do no work at all. The other aspect of this propaganda was more sinister,

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[111] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/20, 22 May 1920, para. 1054.

[112] Ibid., 42/25, 26 June 1920, para. 1328.

[113] In one of his speeches Daud Ghaznawi of Amritsar is reported to have declared: 'Oh, that I had a weapon at this moment in my hand! I would cut the throat of every Englishman in India'. See Govt. of the Punjab, *A History of Non-co-operation in the Punjab 1919–24 with an Account of the Khilafat Movement and Sikh Agitation* (Lahore, 1925), 18.

[114] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 784; and *Zamindar*, 30 July 1920.

though the Khilafatists do not seem to have been directly responsible for this. Some *mullas* were reported to have issued a *fatwa* that any man who did not go on *hijrat* would have to divorce his wife. Wild rumours were spread that Makkah and Medina were in British occupation and that the sacred sanctuary of the *Ka'ba* had been destroyed; that the study of the Qur'an was being prohibited in British India; that Sunday, and not Friday, was to be fixed as the day for prayer; that the government was going to confiscate half of everyone's property; that heavy marriage tax was going to be imposed; and that British soldiers were going to be let loose in villages to outrage women. This had great effect on the simple-minded peasantry and the illiterate.[115]

But though the appeal to *hijrat* was conducted primarily on religious injunctions, other factors had combined to give it a sting. Among these was the desperate economic condition of the Indian peasantry. There were some people who were attracted by the prospects of improving their lot in Afghanistan.[116] For the poor peasants *hijrat* meant elimination of poverty and liberation from feudal servitude. The *hijrat* activity was thus most widely accepted in those areas—the UP (in the early stages), Sind and the Frontier—where the economic condition of the peasantry was particularly bad. In the Punjab, where their lot was comparatively better, the rural areas were much less affected. There were also some militant Muslims who wished to go to Turkey via Afghanistan in order to fight for the caliph.[117] Yet others found in *hijrat* an opportunity to go abroad and, with the help of a friendly foreign power, find some way of striking at the British power in India.[118] Thus, not unnaturally, the 'extremists' among the *hijrat* lead-

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[115] The information is based on: Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel., no. 379, 7 May 1920, Chelmsford Papers; Grant to Carter, no. 1420-R, 21 May 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920; Ext. from Bombay Fortnightly Report, 16 Jan. [*sic* for June] 1920; IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920; IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 45; *The Times*, 16 Aug. 1920; Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 3–4; Abdul Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal*, 222; Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, *My Life and Struggle* (Delhi, [1969]), 50; and Baha, 'Hijrat Movement', 234. For various poems intended to encourage *hijrat* see Haji Ahmad, *Dard-i Khilafat* (Aligarh, 1921 [comp. in 1920]); Anjuman-i Islahu'l-Muslimin, *Nala-i Khilafat*, (Lahore, 1920); Muhammad Badar-ud-din, *A'ina-i 'ibrat* (Muradabad, 1920); *Zamindar*, 3, 20 and 30 July and 4 Sept. 1920; *Paisa Akhbar*, 17 July 1920; and *Siyasat*, 28 June, 8 and 28 July, 9 Aug. and 7 and 8 Oct. 1920.

[116] Contemporary newspapers carried exhaustive analyses of the causes of the *hijrat* movement and its failure. See e.g. *Zamindar*, 8 Oct. 1920. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 521, 26 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[117] Ibid.; and Muzaffar Ahmad, *The Communist Party of India and its Formation Abroad* (Calcutta, 1962), 16.

[118] Ibid., 16; and Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow* (Benares, 1927), 1.

ers encouraged the venture with the ultimate view of overthrowing British dominance in India by paralyzing the government.[119]

Whatever the reasons, the *hijrat* received a fair impetus. Afghanistan was for the Indian Muslims 'the land of promise and cynosure'.[120] The *Zamindar* of 7 May 1920, published a communication from the secretary, Anjuman-i Muhajirin-i Islam Subah Sarhaddi at Mardan, announcing that 1338 persons, corresponding to the numerals of the *Hijra* era, were ready to proceed at once to Afghanistan.[121] The letter contained a detailed tehsil- and district-wise breakdown of the intending *muhajirin* who were advised to wait until the peace terms with Turkey had been formally announced.[122] Realizing the extent of enthusiasm for *hijrat*, the *Siyasat* of Lahore advised the Hijrat Committee that instead of wasting time on publicity it should start dispatching the *muhajirin* immediately from among those who had already registered their names for this purpose.[123] The journal threatened that if within eight days the Committee did not comply with its demand the Punjab Khilafat Committee would send the names of the intending *muhajirin* to the central office for immediate action.[124] At this the Hijrat Committee promptly announced that necessary arrangements were being made and that it would soon announce the date of departure.[125] Consequently, a number of *muhajirin* began to arrive in Peshawar, mostly from Delhi and Lahore and a few from Bhopal.[126] Already, some enthusiasts had started crossing the border secretly for fear of official reprisal because some of the emigrants had been arrested in Tira and kept under custody.[127] Early in May 1920, the political agent, Khyber, reported that forty persons had reached Jalalabad through routes other than the Khyber.[128] But *hijrat* as an organized exodus may be

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[119] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 497, 19 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[120] Govt. of Punjab, *A History of Non-co-operation*, 20.

[121] The notice was signed by one Mian Qamar-ud-din Kaka Khel and six others.

[122] *Zamindar*, 7 May 1920.

[123] *Siyasat*, 8 May 1920.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid., and 13 May 1920.

[126] Grant to Carter, No. 1420-R, 21 May 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920.

[127] See NWFPA/NDC, CID diary dated 14 May 1920, file 12/8/3/i, S-377. Shaidai's 'Memoirs', NAP, Shaidai Papers. Also see Muzaffar Ahmad, *Communist Party of India*, 13.

[128] Grant to Carter, No. 1420-R, 21 May 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920.

said to have begun on 18 May 1920—three days after the peace terms with Turkey were published in India—when the first *qafila* of twenty-two eager *muhajirin* crossed the border for Kabul 'with great happiness and success'.[129] At first the local authorities were uncertain as to what policy they should adopt but later allowed them to pass through the Khyber unmolested.[130]

But the exodus, in spite of the efforts of the campaigners like Ataullah Bukhari and Zafar Ali Khan, was slow. Though many had eagerly enrolled themselves, the number of the actual emigrants was small. By the end of June 1920, only about 133 persons, mostly from the central Punjab districts, Delhi, Bhopal, Bikaner and Peshawar, had emigrated to Afghanistan.[131] Earlier that month, the viceroy, giving his reasons for this slow progress, had reported to the secretary of state for India: 'The prospect [of *hijrat*] is not attractive; there is to be no return from emigration and those wishing to emigrate cannot receive any financial help'.[132] But the more important factor in this connection was the reluctance of the CKC and the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama to patronize the *hijrat* campaign. At their meetings at Allahabad, in the first week of June 1920, both the organizations, despite Azad's *fatwa* and Shaukat Ali's pleadings, had pronounced the *hijrat* optional and decided that there was to be no emigration *en masse*. Only the common people were to embark on the venture, the real workers staying behind to carry on the agitation.[133] Primarily, the reason for this decision was the preoccupation of the CKC and the Jam'iyyat with the proposed inauguration of the non-co-operation programme. Until that had been experimented they could not think of taking up another venture. Besides, *hijrat* was encountering strong opposition from prominent Khilafatists like Hasrat Mohani, Ajmal Khan, Ansari,

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[129] *Rajput Gazette* (Lahore), 22 May 1920; and *Vakil*, 22 May 1920. According to official figures as many as twelve *muhajirin* were from the Punjab. See Ext., NWFP Abstract, 22 May 1920, para. 438, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/23, 12 June 1920, para. 1226.

[130] *Madina* (Bijnor), 28 May 1920, citing the Frontier correspondent of the *Englishman* of Calcutta.

[131] See, for instance, the details of the 5th, 6th and the 7th *qafilas* in *Zamindar*, 18 June 1920. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 521, 26 June 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[132] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 461 4 June 1920, in ibid.

[133] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 497, 19 June 1920, ibid.; and Ext., UP Abstract, 12 June 1920, para. 1357, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/24, 19 June 1920, para. 1276.

Kitchlew, and Asaf Ali, and the moderates such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum (1866–1937), Mohammad Shafi, Fazl-i-Husain, Mohammed Iqbal, and others.[134] They honestly believed that the venture was not in the best interests of the community and did all in their power to stem its tide.[135] Among the *'ulama*, opposition to *hijrat* came as usual from Ahmad Raza Khan and his Barelwi followers. He alleged that it was a Hindu ploy to get rid of the Muslims and buy up their lands cheaply and acquire their mosques and tombs just to desecrate them.[136] Surprisingly, Mahmud Hasan was also reported to be opposed to declaring *hijrat* obligatory.[137]

Another important influence on the CKC was the opposition from the Hindu press and Hindu leaders.[138] Gandhi himself was utterly opposed to the *hijrat* campaign though he did not venture to condemn it publicly and in strong terms.[139] He argued that Muslim withdrawal from India was not a practical step as 'we cannot think of bringing pressure on the Government through it'.[140] Therefore, he pressed for

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[134] Amritsari in Jafri Nadwi, *Auraq*, 777 and 783; Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal*, 222; *Aftab*, 30 Mar. and 10 May 1920; *Zamindar*, 28 Apr. 1920; *Paisa Akhbar*, 28 Apr. 1920; Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 4; IOL&R, P/Conf./58, ICH(P)P, Aug. 1920, Proc. no. 71; L. F. Rushbrook Williams's letter to the author dated 11 Oct. 1968; and his *The State of Pakistan* (London, 1962), 9; M. S. Toosy, *My Reminiscences of Quaid-i-Azam* (Islamabad, 1976), 14; and A. H. Albiruni, *Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India* (Lahore, 1950), 177. Also see Grant to Carter, no. 1420-R, 21 May 1920 IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 442, 28 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; *The Times*, 14 Aug. 1920; and Yusufi, *Sarhad aur jidd-o jahd-i azadi*, 218. Iqbal's opposition is curious because in *'Rumuz-i bekhudi'* (1917) he had declared *hijrat* as 'the rule of Muslim's life' and indeed as 'one of the causes of his stability'. See Mohammed Iqbal, *Kulliyat-i Iqbal* (Lahore, 1975), 114. Originally, he referred to this in his letter to Maulawi Alif Din, 9 Jan. 1917 in Ataullah, *Iqbalnama*, i, 214.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 205; and *Rasa'il-i Razwiyya*, ii, 203.

[137] Ext., UP Abstract, 21 Aug. 1920, para. 2071, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/36, 11 Sept. 1920, para. 1809.

[138] *Hindu*, 2 June 1920; and *Sindhi* (Sukkur), 28 May 1920, IOL&R, L/R/5/177.

[139] Writers like Rajput and Briggs have wrongly accused Gandhi of starting the *hijrat* campaign. See A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League: Yesterday and To-day* (Lahore, 1948), 32; and F. S. Briggs, 'The Indian Hijrat of 1920', *Moslem World*, 22/2 (1930), 164.

[140] Gandhi to Shraddhanand, 2 May 1920, *Collected Works*, xvii, 381. Also see *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, iii, part 1, 307. Such views he had expressed as early as June 1919, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1576, file 4695/1919. Curiously, in the late 1920s and 1930s, the concept of migration became an important item in Gandhi's *satyagraha* action. See G. Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, 2nd edn. (Ahmedabad, 1951), 278; and H. B. Sarkar, 'Non-Violent Non-co-operation in World History', *Journal of Indian History*, 48/142, part 1 (1970), 72.

the postponement of *hijrat* until the last stage of the non-co-operation experiment had been gone through.[141] In his view *hijrat* meant wasting people's sacrifices needed so desperately for the success of non-co-operation.[142] The Khilafatists had realized that if they were to retain Hindu support, they must remove the fear of an invasion from the north-west which the *hijrat* campaign seemed to have promoted. Thus, it is not surprising to see Shaukat Ali agreeing to the decision of the CKC to discourage *hijrat*. In a statement issued in the first week of July 1920, he reaffirmed that so long as non-co-operation was not pushed to its logical conclusion, it would be unwise to take up *hijrat* as it was likely to divide attention and mar the unity of action.[143] It is puzzling, however, that soon afterwards he was again declaring *hijrat* and *jihad* the only viable alternatives.[144]

But the set-back to the *hijrat* campaign was only temporary. The Muslim deputy commissioner of Hissar (Punjab) had observed: 'Whatever may be the fate of the emigration movement, the *hijrat* of men's mind towards Kabul had commenced'.[145] From early July 1920, as a result of fresh efforts, the enrolment of the *muhajirin* increased and more and more began to proceed on *hijrat*.[146] But it was in Sind that the *hijrat* activity was most conspicuous at this time. The Khilafat conference which was held at Dadu on 17 April 1920, passed a resolution in favour of *hijrat*. Consequently, a *hijrat* office was set up in the house of Barrister Jan Muhammad Junejo (1886–1921), a leading politician from Larkana, and a large number of the intending *muhajirin* began to register their names.[147] The Bombay government, which was anxious not to precipitate trouble by provoking the excited Muslims, allowed a special train to be arranged through the railway authorities. Eventually, in the first week of July 1920, about 750

[141] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 45.
[142] *Paisa Akhbar*, 29 July 1920.
[143] *Hindu*, 8 July 1920.
[144] See the proceedings of the Sind Khilafat Conference (24 July 1920), in *Paisa Akhbar*, 31 July 1920.
[145] Report on the Political and Economic Situation in the Punjab for the Fortnight ending 15 June, 1920, IOL&R, Thompson Papers.
[146] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 541, 2 July 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.
[147] Zahida Memon, 'A Hero of the Khilafat Movement', *Grassroots*, 1/1 (Autumn 1977), 47.

muhajirin, far fewer than the twenty-five thousand originally announced, accompanied by their families, left for Peshawar under Junejo.[148] Attempts to stop them did not succeed.[149] The rail fare of the entire *qafila* amounting to thousands of rupees was paid by Junejo from his own pocket.[150] All along the way, wherever the train stopped, emotional scenes were witnessed. The locals turned out in thousands to welcome the *muhajirin* who were garlanded and showered with gifts and money. Speeches were made and poems recited in their honour.[151] At the Wazirabad junction when some people began to cry in response to such overtures, Junejo stopped them from doing so saying that it was not the occasion for crying but time for action. They were going to Kabul not to eat grapes and pomegranates of Kandahar but to save Islam. India was no longer a place where they could keep their *iman* intact.[152] At Peshawar, an even more tumultuous welcome awaited them. An eye-witness account gives a graphic detail of their reception:

> [The train] . . . arrived in Peshawar one day late owing to the delay caused by the feteing and entertainment of its passengers [all the way from Larkana]. When it arrived it was profusely decorated with Turkish Flags, the engine was heavily garlanded. Great preparations have [*sic*] been made for the reception of the Muhajirin in Peshawar, and the streets were profusely decorated with flags and triumphal arches. Much money had been collected to entertain them, and motor-cars and tongas and other conveyances were collected for their use. They arrived and were taken in procession through the City and billeted in various serais and in private houses. They were everywhere feted, and after a stay in Peshawar of about 5 days they left [on 16 July] amidst great rejoicing for Kabul.[153]

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[148] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 609, 24 July 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[149] Shaidai's 'Memoirs', NAP, Shaidai Papers.

[150] *Paisa Akhbar*, 15 July 1920.

[151] For their reception in Bahawalpur, Multan, Lahore, Gujranwala, Lalamusa, Gujrat and Chaklala see, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/29, 24 July 1920, para. 1514–18; and Govt. of Punjab, *A History of Non-co-operation*, 20.

[152] *Zamindar*, 15 July 1920. For the Sind *muhajirin* also see *Siyasat*, 12 and 13 July 1920; *Paisa Akhbar*, 13 and 15 July 1920; *Zamindar*, 13 and 16 July 1920; and *Vakil*, 13 and 16 July 1920.

[153] 'Report on the Hijrat Movement During the Summer and Autumn of 1920 in the Peshawar District', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

The news about the Sind contingent produced a wave of excitement in upper India giving a fillip to the *hijrat* movement.[154] Their arrival in Peshawar spurred the campaign in the Frontier, since the province was already sullen over the killing of a *muhajir* by a British soldier in a fracas at Katcha Garhi, a small railway station between Peshawar and Jamrud.[155] The official communiqué on this tragedy, which had laid the entire blame on the *muhajirin*, had aroused feelings still further.[156] By the end of July 1920, the *hijrat* had become fairly intensive in the Frontier. The most seriously affected were the rural areas in the Peshawar and the Mardan districts, particularly the Doaba and the Hashtnagar tracts of the Charsadda sub-division. The peasants gave up their agricultural pursuits and abandoned their lands in anticipation of joining the *hijrat* trail.[157] Crafty landlords and speculators, mostly Hindus, exploited the ignorant and encouraged them to emigrate in order to buy up cheaply the property and crops of the intending *muhajirin*.[158] Most of the buyers were Kaka Khels among the Muslims and the *banyas* among the Hindus.[159] As a result, the poor peasants were forced to sell their belongings at very low prices. At some places in the Frontier land valued at Rs 10,000 could not fetch even Rs 100. A buffalo worth Rs 200 was offered at Rs 40. Crops and houses were similarly undervalued.[160] An eye-witness described the scene thus:

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[154] *The Times*, 14 July 1920; *Siyasat*, 15 Oct., 22 Nov. and 25 Dec. 1920; *Zamindar*, 16 Oct. and 31 Dec. 1920; *Vakil*, 20 Oct. and 23 and 30 Dec. 1920; and interview with Malik Lal Khan.

[155] For details of the Kacha Garhi incident see IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Dec. 1920, Proc. nos. 325 52; IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920; and L/P&J/6/1697, file 5978/1920.

[156] *Englishman*, 12 July 1920; *Vakil*, 16 July 1920; *Tribune* (Lahore), 18 July 1920; and *Muslim Outlook*, 19 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1659, file 1676/1920. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 845-S, 9 July 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[157] Grant to Carter, No. 2090-R, 27 July 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[158] *Church Missionary Review* (London), 71 (1920), 362. Also see *Paisa Akhbar*, 12 Aug. 1920; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 661 13 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Rushbrook Williams's letter to the author, 11 Oct. 1968.

[159] 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[160] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 624, 30 July 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see *Paisa Akhbar*, 5 Aug. 1920.

> Thousands . . . left their homes. Houses were deserted. Standing crops were left unprotected. Those matrimonially engaged were asked to get married immediately. The wedding ceremonies were performed quickly and the brides and the bridegrooms left their homes and became *Muhajirs*. Children were parting with their parents, old mothers unable to accompany their sons, were crying and advising them to remain faithfully [*sic*] to their Holy Prophet, and sisters were saying goodbyes to their brothers with tears in their eyes. Several had to divorce their wives, because somehow they could not accompany their husbands and the crying unfortunate mothers. Awful scenes were witnessed and even the most stone hearted people were deeply moved.[161]

Peshawar, being the staging post for Afghanistan, had assumed unprecedented importance. It was decided, therefore, to shift the central offices of the Hijrat Committee from Delhi to Peshawar. The decision was taken by Ahmad Saeed, secretary of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama, who had been entrusted with the office after the *hijrat* of Aziz Amritsari. The charges of misappropriation of funds, which had been levelled against Amritsari by Tajammul Husain and his brother Qari Abbas Husain, might also have prompted this decision.[162] However, a skeleton office was retained in Delhi to look after the *muhajirin* of the area. Rawalpindi, which originally served as an intermediate camp, had already been wound up in June 1920 in view of the fact that the *qafila*s had started reaching Peshawar directly from their hometowns.[163] Gradually, the whole of the Frontier came under the surging tide of the *hijrat*. The excitement spread to Kohat, Hazara and the tribal areas. The *hijrat* of large numbers, particularly through the Mohmand country, produced an unsettling effect on the Afridis and the tribes north of the river Kabul.[164] The *maulawis* used this opportunity to stir up anti-government feelings. The frenzy reached such heights that at a public meeting in Peshawar when Khwaja Safdar of Sialkot dared to question the *'ulama*'s wisdom in advising *hijrat*, he was pulled down from the dais and insulted by an emotional audience.[165] Twice in August 1920, the tribesmen attacked

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[161] Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Maulana Mohamed Ali Jauhar: The Khilafat Movement* (Karachi, [1980]), 62-3.

[162] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 3 July 1920, para. 651, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/29, 24 July 1920, para. 1512.

[163] See *Zamindar*, 16 July 1920; and *al-Khalil* (Bijnor), 16 June 1920.

[164] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 205 and 207, 19 Aug. 1920, ibid.

[165] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 207, 19 Aug. 1920, ibid.; and Yusufi, *Maulana Mohamed Ali Jauhar*, 61.

the British post at Oghi but they were repulsed.[166] In retaliation the government resorted to aerial bombardment; but it took time before the situation returned to normalcy, especially because of the adamant attitude of the tribesmen.[167] Around this time, the Frontier correspondent of an English daily reported that

> There is a delirious excitement among the inhabitants of Tehsil Swabi of the Peshawar District. Therefore, there is a more vigorous *hijrat* activity taking place there as compared with the other districts.... They [the *muhajirin*] are full of strong enthusiasm. When they pass along the road through Jamrud they beat their drums and dance... [in] enthusiasm as if they were going into a battle.[168]

The excitement, however, could not veil the fact that the *hijrat* movement, especially in the Frontier, was having a disastrous effect. The villages and towns wore a deserted look and the *sahukars* were having a feast day. Some of the intending *muhajirin* had set fire to their property and crops, as there was nobody to look after them. This prompted anxious appeals to the Khilafat leaders to take notice of the alarming situation. Dr Mirza Yaqub Beg, for instance, sent a telegram to Shaukat Ali early in August reminding him that it was the duty of the CKC to rise to the occasion and impose its will otherwise there would be disaster. He did not object to the 'pious principles' of *hijrat* but questioned the time and method of organizing the campaign. He asked the CKC to ponder over the situation and prevent the people from going on *hijrat*, especially when Abdul Bari had rejected it and Azad had not pronounced it mandatory for everyone.[169] He also called in question the justification of putting burden on the Amir of Afghanistan and demanded a *fatwa* to stop the exodus.[170] But no one was ready to listen to rational counsels.

The *hijrat* propaganda, combined with the non-co-operation campaign, had also penetrated the services. The employees of the N-W Railways were encouraged to join the *hijrat* campaign in the event of non-acceptance of their demands. In fact the president of the railway employees association had directed all station branches to send

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[166] Grant to Chelmsford, 2 Sept. 1920, IOI&R, Grant Papers.
[167] Grant to Chelmsford, 30 Oct. 1920, ibid. Also see *The Times*, 22 Sept. 1920.
[168] Reference in *Paisa Akhbar*, 19 Aug. 1920. This refers to earlier events.
[169] *Siyasat*, 2 Sept. 1920.
[170] Ibid., 3 Sept. 1920.

names of the intending *muhajirin* to the central Hijrat Committee.[171] Its effect on the army was especially disturbing to the military authorities.[172] Most of the *muhajirin* came from areas which supplied recruits to the British army. Muslim soldiers, already agitated over the rumours of the desecration of the *ka'ba*, now were extremely disturbed by alarmist letters from home reporting that some of their near relations were emigrating.[173] The Punjabi battalion serving in the Khyber was considerably alarmed by the propaganda.[174] The military detachment in Sukkur was also affected.[175] A serious situation developed among the 127th Baluchis at Multan and Major-General Nigel Woodyatt (1861–1936), the brigade commander at Ferozepur, had to rush to the scene to take necessary measures.[176] By early August, the number of Muslim soldiers who had proceeded on *hijrat* was equivalent to one complete company with its Indian officers.[177] One *qafila* of the *muhajirin* included a havildar and six sepoys.[178] More were still resigning and desertions were also reported.[179] The police service was also affected. There were some resignations in the Charsadda sub-division but they were later withdrawn. The *patwaris* were the other class stirred by *hijrat*. There were about 68 resignations in the Charsadda tehsil and some in the Peshawar tehsil but the tactful handling on the part of the tehsildars and other officials prevented a crisis from getting out of hand.[180]

The Government of India and the local governments, which had been following a policy of cautious watchfulness, became extremely apprehensive, particularly in view of the close historical connection between *hijrat* and *jihad*.[181] As a precautionary measure Zafar Ali Khan's

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[171] *Paisa Akhbar*, 13 July, 1920.

[172] GOC, Northern Command, Murree, to Chief Com., NWFP, Tel. no. G. S.-25, 8 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[173] Wazirforce, Dera Ismail Khan, to CGS, Simla, Tel. no. 2254-G. L.-9, 12 Aug. 1920 in ibid.

[174] GOC, Murree, to Chief Com., NWFP, no. G. S.-25, 8 Aug. 1920 in ibid.

[175] IOL&R, ICH(P)P, Feb. 1921, Proc. no. 352.

[176] Gen. Woodyatt, Ferozepur, to GOC, Murree, Tel. no. 88-1-1. A., 19 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[177] GOC, Murree, to Chief Com., NWFP, Tel. no. G. S.-25, 8 Aug. 1920, in ibid.

[178] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 661, 13 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[179] Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 12.

[180] The resignations were later withdrawn. See 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[181] Chelmsford to Montagu, 11 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

entry into the Frontier was prohibited.[182] In order to check the concentrated flow of the *muhajirin*, the Government of India, on the recommendation of the Frontier and the Punjab governments, withdrew the facility of providing special trains to the *muhajirin* and attempted to persuade the Muslims to drop the campaign altogether.[183] But instead of taking any overt action, the government encouraged the local officers to dissuade people from going.[184] The deputy commissioner of Peshawar and all assistant commissioners in charge of the sub-divisions along with other local officers toured their areas to dissuade the people from emigrating or at least impress upon them to make proper arrangements before leaving.[185] Care was also taken through publicity officers to let the Muslims know that Hindus were profiting at the expense of the *muhajirin*.[186] As regards the government servants intending to proceed on *hijrat*, the Frontier authorities had, as early as May 1920, warned them that they would be refused re-employment if they decided to return.[187] Efforts were also made to check disaffection in the army. But no restrictions were placed on persons wishing to resign lest it should be interpreted as an interference with their religion. Short leave was liberally granted to soldiers whose families were proceeding on *hijrat* to enable them to put their home affairs in order, for if leave were to be refused this would have

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[182] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 295-P.N., 6 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920. Zafar Ali Khan strongly protested against this ban saying that his intentions had been misunderstood. He claimed that he wanted to stop the *hijrat* movement as the *muhajirin* were proceeding to Afghanistan thoughtlessly. Besides, he wanted to obtain authentic information at first hand and to curb the turmoil which had resulted from the anti-Turk British policy. See his undated telegrams to Grant and Pte. Sec. to Chelmsford, in Zahid Munir Amir (ed.), *Makatib-i Zafar 'Ali Khan* (Lahore, 1986), 253 5.

[183] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 609 and 667, 24 July and 13 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Rushbrook Williams's letter to the author, 11 Oct. 1968. The British had made it plain to the Afghans at Mussoorie that unless they expelled the *émigré* Indians from Kabul and refrained from helping the Bolsheviks, Anglo-Afghan relations would not normalize. See report by Dobbs, app., 'Proceedings of the British-Afghan Conference, PRO, FO 36/127, cited in Imam, *Colonialism*, 76.

[184] Chelmsford to Montagu, 11 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers. Also see Edmund Candler, *Mas'ala-i Khilafat par azadana bahs* (Lahore, 1920), 30-1.

[185] 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[186] Rushbrook Williams's letter, 11 Oct. 1968.

[187] Grant to Carter, no. 1420-R, 21 May 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/811, file 7020/1920.

provoked discontent without stopping desertions.[188] The disaffected units were posted away from the Frontier for the time being.[189] To forestall panic among Muslim soldiers serving abroad their military commanders were directed to pacify them.[190]

The Frontier government had generally followed a policy of non-interference throughout the *hijrat* movement. Even when the home department of the Government of India pressed for drastic action against some of the more violent agitators, Sir Hamilton Grant (1872–1937), the successor of Roos-Keppel as chief commissioner, preferred to wait and see. Justifying his cautious stance, Grant told Chelmsford:

> . . . whatever the gallant arm-chair militarist of Simla may say or think, I can solemnly assure you that in the present circumstances the first volley fired in Peshawar city will reverberate through Central Asia, and the trouble will not stop there. The Peshawar District contains a million of the most virile people in the world—at present in a state of intense fanatical excitement, flanked all round by the best fighting tribes of the Frontier, themselves in [a] state of fanatical expectancy—and the result of drastic action might be far-reaching. On grounds, therefore, of expediency I shall continue to do all in my power to avoid the necessity of using force; and I shall do so more readily because my affection for these people is very real, and my sympathy for the feeling that had led them to make such foolish and disastrous sacrifices very deep.[191]

All this had been done to avert a tragedy that he feared might precipitate a strong action. Had he come down heavily, Grant reported to Chelmsford a few weeks later,

> . . . there would have been outbreaks through the length and breadth of the Peshawar District, which it would have been difficult to control with the force at our disposal and which would inevitably have led to serious bloodshed.[192]

This is not to say that the provincial government was oblivious to maintaining law and order in the Frontier. When Zafar Ali Khan

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[188] Wazirforce, Dera Ismail Khan, to CGS, Tel. no. 2254-G.L.-9, 12 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[189] Gen. Woodyatt to GOC, Murree, Tel. P., 88-1-1. A., 19 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[190] CGS, India, to GOC, Bagdad and repeated to other GOCs abroad, Tel. no, 1435-7 M.O. 3., 18 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[191] Grant to Chelmsford, 15 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[192] Grant to Chelmsford, 2 Sept. 1920, in ibid.

seemed to be meddling in the affairs, he was immediately externed from the province, as were later Muhammad Ishaq and Muhammad Irfan.[193] But on the whole, Grant preferred to use persuasion rather than coercion to achieve results. When Simla suggested that he might send a deputation to Makkah to establish that the holy places were intact or reduce the daily number of the *muhajirin* going up the Khyber or impose postal censorship between the Frontier and the Punjab, he just disagreed and did nothing.[194]

Meanwhile, endless streams of intending *muhajirin* had kept descending on Peshawar from several parts of India as far as Bhopal and South India, but mostly from the Frontier, the Punjab and Sind. In many cases whole families, and in some, whole villages had set out for *hijrat*. By 3 August 1920, the number of the *muhajirin* who had crossed into Afghanistan had reached 13,000. Less than a week later, it shot up to over 20,000 and more were still crossing the border.[195] At the outset, the Frontier *muhajirin* came from humble classes, mostly labourers and unemployed. However, as the excitement increased, scions of wealthy landowning families, like Rais Muhammad Akbar Khan of Mardan, Rais Abdul Majid Khan of Kathuzai and the Banuchi Khani élite like Malik Ghulam Jilani Khan, Mazullah Khan, Faqir Haji Mir Sahib Khan, Sheikh Ghulam Sarwar, Qazi Fazl Qadir, Maulawi Abdul Jalil, Haji Sher Ali Khan, Malik Jilani Khan and Salim Khan Baba also began to emigrate in large numbers. The wealthier financed the passage of their poorer companions.[196] The Sind *muhajirin*, like those of the Frontier, also came from the poorer classes with a sprinkling of well-to-do people like Barrister Junejo. Others,

[193] See Extract, NWFP Abstract, 5 Nov. 1921, para. 762, in SBR, Supplement to Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/45, 26 Nov. 1921, serial nos. 34–5; and Revised List of Political Agitators in NWFP, in ibid., 45/32, 18 Aug. 1923, serial nos. 36–7.

[194] Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, to Chief Com., NWFP, Tel. no. 977-S, 6 Aug. 1920, NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./i; and Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 327-N, 10 Aug. 1920, in ibid.

[195] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 285-N., 3 Aug. 1920; and Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 314-N., 9 Aug. 1920, IOI&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920. Also see Briggs, 'The Indian Hijrat of 1920', 165.

[196] Ibid.; Note by E. W. Tomkins, IG Police, dated 2 Aug. 1920, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./i; *Vakil*, 6 July 1920; *Siyasat*, 16 Aug. 1920; Gul Ayub Saifi, *Bannu au da Waziristan tarikh* (Bannu, 1969), 234–41; and Secret Fortnightly Report for the NWFP for Oct. and Nov. 1920, in Baha, 'Hijrat Movement', 235.

such as Pir Anwar Shah, Pir Turab Ali and Taj Mahmud Amroti, who had accompanied the *muhajirin* to Jamrud, returned to make arrangements for more *qafilas*.[197] Drs Nur Muhammad and Ghulam Rasul Khan were among the other important *muhajirin* but they came from Bombay and not from Sind proper.[198] The Punjab *muhajirin*, on the other hand, unlike those from the Frontier and Sind, were mainly from towns, owning no land and included no men of prominence.[199] The rural areas of the Punjab seem to have been affected but little, due perhaps to the powerful influence of the loyal landowning class and the efforts of the moderates like Shafi and Fazl-i-Husain.[200]

The procedure adopted by the Hijrat Committee for the onward transmission of the *muhajirin* to Afghanistan was quite effective. On arrival in Peshawar, the *muhajirin* were met by the representatives of the Committee who took them to various *serais* reserved for their stay. All expenses for the board and lodging of the *muhajirin*, which exceeded rupees 3,000 daily, were borne by the Committee. A corps of some three hundred volunteers organized on military command basis had been raised to look after their needs. The intending *muhajirin* then registered their names with the Committee which sent the list to the Afghan Agent for the issue of the passes. This having been arranged, the *muhajirin* then proceeded to Jamrud, some 30 kilometres from the Indo-Afghan border. There they stayed on Thursday nights preparatory to their departure to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass on Fridays. They proceeded weekly and only on regular caravan days.[201] The alternative routes, used mostly by the unregistered *qafilas*, lay through Ali Kandi and Gando in the Mohmand country, another through the Tochi Pass, and yet another, preferred by the Banuchi

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[197] Sec. to Govt. of Bombay, Special Dept., to Sec. to Govt. of India, Home Dept., Tel. no. 723-S.D., 2 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, P/Conf./58, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 45. Also see Ali Muhammad Rashidi, 'Unnis-sau bis ki tahrik-i hijrat ki dastan' *Jang*, 23 Apr., 1, 12 and 24 May 1973.

[198] *Siyasat*, 16 Aug. 1920.

[199] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 661, 13 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[200] See above, 197.

[201] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 846-P., 12 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920. Also see Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 144-P.N., 13 July 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920; Notes by E. W. Tomkins, IG Police, dated 6 Nov. 1920, and 13 June 1922, in NWFPA/NDC, CID file 12/6/6/i, S-375; A. H. Khan, *Mard-i mu'min*, 54; and *Vakil*, 9 Aug. 1920.

Khanis, was through Daud Shah, Komey, Spinwam, Landrey to Khost in Afghanistan,[202] The Hijrat Committee supplied to the *muhajirin* detailed instructions about the procedure of *hijrat* with maps of Afghanistan, weather conditions there, hazards of journey and the articles of use they were required to take with them. From Peshawar to Jalalabad the *tonga* fare was Rs 60 per person. At Jamrud the political agent interrogated the *muhajirin*. Each one of them was charged a rupee as entry fee. In case of government servants, a discharge certificate was demanded and permission to cross the border was not granted if they failed to produce one. From Jamrud to Landikotal the *tonga* fare was rupees four per person and the toll tax was annas twelve. From there to Dakka in Afghanistan, a distance of about 15 kilometres, the journey was covered on camels or mules. They were also informed that in Jalalabad they would be received by the volunteers of the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Jandu'llah Rabbaniyya who had offered themselves to help the *muhajirin*.[203] The majority of the *muhajirin* being poor, they set out either on foot or in bullock carts or *tonga*s all the way to Kabul, a distance of nearly 225 kilometres from Peshawar. To their economic misery were added hazards of the journey. The *muhajirin* had to pass through barren mountainous country in unbearable summer heat. Food and water were scarce. The fifty-two kilometres stretch of the Khyber Pass was the most treacherous of the entire journey. But once they left the Indian territory their trek turned into a nightmare. To an eyewitness the spectacle appeared to be nothing short of 'a calamity' but for the religiously committed among the *muhajirin* it was the most desirable feat in pursuance of God's command and the Prophet's tradition.[204]

The tale of the *muhajirin*'s plight in Afghanistan is even more touching. The land-locked mountainous Afghanistan of 1920 was a poor country with meagre resources. Climatically, its extreme temperatures, large desert regions with virtually no railways and no good roads except in the capital made it an extremely inhospitable country. Its economy was precarious and means of communications almost prim-

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[202] Govt. of India, *Confidential Summary of Chief Events in the North-West Frontier Tribal Territory from 8th August 1919 to 31st December 1920* (Delhi, 1921), 7; Saifi, *Bannu au da Waziristan tarikh*, 234 41; and Secret Fortnightly Report for the NWFP for Oct. and Nov. 1920, in Baha, 'Hijrat Movement', 235.

[203] *Siyasat*, 26 May 1920; and *Zamindar*, 27 June and 7 July 1920.

[204] Yusufi, *Sarhad aur jidd-o jahd-i azadi*, 215.



Source: M. Naeem Qureshi, 'The 'Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920', *Modern Asian Studies* (Cambridge University Press), 13/1. (1979), 44.

itive. Ethnically, the Afghans were though overwhelmingly Pukhtun the northern and eastern provinces were inhabited mostly by the Dari-speaking Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Being tribal in tradition, customs and socio-cultural mores, the Afghan society, in spite of the Amir's

personal inclination towards modernity, was conservative to the core.[205] And since Afghanistan had just come out of a war its energies were concentrated on consolidating advantages gained from the British and in forging internal cohesion. Therefore, there was bound to be divergence in what the *muhajirin* expected and the degree to which the Afghans could respond. As a rule religious affinity between the *muhajirin* and the Afghans should have been a binding link but in view of the disparity in their perceptions and motives it proved to be a tenuous link. Even those from the Frontier who had linguistic and racial bonds with the Afghans did not feel at home. They were at cross purposes and could neither appreciate each other's difficulties nor fathom the emotional burden. Of course, the Amir had issued a *farman* exhorting his people to display their traditional hospitality towards the *muhajirin* and had also promised funds and land for distribution.[206] But Afghan enthusiasm, after the initial flurry, generally evaporated, especially as the number of the *muhajirin* began to multiply rapidly.[207] Jalalabad was the first major Afghan town on way to Kabul, where the tired *muhajirin* could find refuge. But it was a small town without any appreciable facilities. In spite of the Amir's instructions very little had been done.[208] Some officials were appointed by General Nadir Khan (1880–1933), the Afghan commander-in-chief, to look after the *muhajirin* along the main route to Jalalabad but he did not have enough resources to cope with the increasing numbers.[209] In Kabul the situation was a little better. Still the government machinery was not geared to handling the demand put on it. The facilities of the capital city were stretched to the limits and even then no suitable arrangements could be made for all. Most of

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[205] For information on the land and people of Afghanistan see Muhammad Hayat Khan, *Afghanistan and its Inhabitants*. Eng. tr. of *Hayat-i Afghan* by Henry Priestly (London, 1974), 1 20; Lt.-Gen. Sir George MacMunn, *Afghanistan* (London, 1928), 1 26; Brig.-Gen. Sir Percy Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, i (London, 1940), 1–16; and Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, 1973), 1 14.

[206] *Paisa Akhbar*, 24 June, 15 July, and 11 Aug. 1920.

[207] The plight of the Indians in Afghanistan has been graphically recorded in the statements of the returned *muhajirin*. See NWFPA/NDC, CID files 1826, 12/8/4/ xiii xxiii, and 12/8/5/i iv, S-378.

[208] Briggs, 'The Indian Hijrat of 1920', 165 7; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 193, 28 May 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see *al-Barid* (Kanpur), 20 July 1920, in *Muslim Outlook*, 19 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1659, file 1676/1920.

[209] He was given only Rs 30,000 for the expenses of the *muhajirin*. See NWFPA/ NDC, CID file 12/8/3/i, S-377. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 189 14 May 1920; and Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 212 13.

the *muhajirin* had to be accommodated in tents in open spaces or in gardens such as the Chaman Hazuri. Articles of daily use, cheap and plentiful in the beginning, gradually became expensive and scarce.[210] Those who knew arts and crafts were able to earn their livelihood. But the majority was left to the mercy of the locals and, though the evidence is conflicting, had to put up with considerable harassment, humiliation and even plunder.[211] The *muhajirin* were least equipped to face the situation. Most of them, despite warnings, had travelled with nothing on them and were soon exposed to privation and starvation. What bothered them the most was the absence of privacy of family life as they were compelled to sleep out in the open.[212] The leading Indians in Kabul did all in their power to help but owing to the ineptitude of the Afghan officials they could not make much headway. The Anjuman-i Muhajirin, a non-official welfare committee that the Amir had helped to install under Sardar Muhammad Abdul Aziz, was so ill-provided that it was unable to render any worthwhile assistance.[213] The Amir was not to be blamed entirely; he seemed quite sincere. The lapses occurred owing to the mismanagement of the state functionaries and the ever-increasing numbers of the emigrants.

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[210] The prices of various items and the exchange rates are available in *Zamindar*, 26 Sept. 1920.

[211] Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 213. Shaikh Abdur Rahim of Kasur gives an opposite viewpoint. According to him the people of Kahul were hospitable and helpful and refuted the allegations that the *muhajirin* were ill-treated or that they were reduced to starvation. See *Zamindar*, 26 Sept. 1920. Also see letter from Abdullah Quraishi of Peshawar in *Siyasat*, 26 Aug. 1920; and editorial of *Zamindar*, 8 Oct. 1920.

[212] Ibid.; and 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[213] Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 22 23; and Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 820. The members of the Anjuman were: Dr Abdul Ghani, Hakim Muhammad Aslam, Muhammad Akbar Yusufzai, Dr Nur Muhammad, Muhammad Raza Arbab of Peshawar, Ghulam Muhammad Aziz, Dr Preyawarda (former editor of *Bharat*), Shala Safar of Benares, Muhammad Iqbal Shaidai, Barrister Jan Muhammad Junejo, Abdul Karim, Muhammad Zakaria, Abdul Ghaffar of Utmanzai, Sher Muhammad Khan Ghauri, Shaikh Abdur Rahim of Kasur, Shaikh Abdul Haq of Multan, Rahmat Ali Zakaria of Lahore, Muhammad Saleh Abbas of Sind, Pir Usman Shah of Kohat, Muhammad Afzal of Kasur, Mir Rahmatullah of Lahore, Maulawi Ubaidullah of Delhi, Abdur Rahim Bashir (*vakil* of the *mujahidin*), Maulawi Shamsul Qamar, Maulawi Ahmad Ali of Lahore, Muhammad Khan, and Syed Qamash. Encl., Hamilton Grant, Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, no. 7336-P, 14 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920. Also see encl. to the Sarhaddar, Dakka, to the Political Agent, Khyber, 12 Aug. 1929, IOL&R, L/J&P/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

The result was that the *muhajirin* were overcome by inertia. Unlike in Turkey, where mass migrations from Central Asia had helped increase a sense of communal solidarity which brought down social barriers,[214] the Indians in Afghanistan were hopelessly divided. Generally, they gravitated towards the groups that already existed among the Indians in Kabul: the pan-Islamists and the Bolshevik sympathizers.[215] Within these two main groups there were several factions. The most important was the one led by Ubaidullah Sindhi which attracted the largest number. Its core consisted of the self-exiles, *émigré* revolutionaries and the *mujahidin* leaders. Sindhi and his associates were active again after some difficult times under the late Amir. Sindhi's chief worry was how to save the helpless *muhajirin*. The second faction was under Abdur Rab of Peshawar, an Indian revolutionary who, after his rift with Sindhi in 1918, had gone over to the Bolsheviks. He had returned to Kabul in December 1919 with Lenin's envoy, Z. Suritz, whose mission also included Mahendra Pratap, Barakatullah and others. The third faction was led by Abdul Latif Kohati who was very close to the Afghan establishment and as such believed to be influential. The fourth was headed by Muhammad Aslam, a glib and clever man from Peshawar, who always seemed to attract a good crowd and had connections with the Afghan officials. The fifth was under Najaf Ali and his brother Dr Abdul Ghani (1864–1943). Dr Ghani was an educationist and in the Afghan service. The brothers had suffered under the late Amir for sympathizing with the Young Afghans desirous of introducing a parliamentary system in the country. Now they were back in the saddle and very much sought after by those who wanted the Amir's attention. There were several other Indians, including Sardar Muhammad Aslam Baluch, the editor of the *Arain* of Amritsar, who offered their services to the *muhajirin* but were not very effective.[216]

With such wide divisions there could be no unanimity of action. Ubaidullah Sindhi and his associates, supported by the Afghan government, encouraged the *muhajirin* to move on to Jabal-us-Siraj, some seventy or eighty kilometres up north, and take up residence there.[217]

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[214] Karpat, 'The *hijra* from Russia and the Balkans', 139.

[215] Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, 6–8.

[216] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 811–12; Aybek's letter to me dated 26 Dec. 1967; and Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad*, 30–1.

[217] Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, 6 ff.

Another group led by Maulawi Abdul Haq (d. 1925) was in favour of proceeding immediately to Turkey to fight for the caliph whereas Abdur Rab encouraged the young *muhajirin* to go to Russia, especially to the ancient Central Asian city of Tashkent, where the Bolsheviks were known to be sympathetic to the Indians.[218] However, the Amir's orders prevailed and a large number of *muhajirin* had to proceed to Jabal-us-Siraj. The idea was to relieve Kabul of congestion and at the same time to control the *muhajirin* more effectively. From there they were to be dispersed to other areas, especially in Turkestan, where there was plenty of land available for distribution.[219] The journey was difficult but the climate of the region was suitable for the Indians. By the middle of June 1920, nearly two hundred *muhajirin* had been settled in Jabal-us-Siraj. From among them a *qafila* under Abdul Rashid of Peshawar had moved on to Turkestan with the intention of going ultimately to Turkey by way of Russia. Another *qafila* under Muhammad Akbar of Peshawar was preparing to leave soon.[220] There they went through another round of hardships. Many died of hunger or disease or failed to stand the rigours of climate. But those in Jabal-us-Siraj were able eventually to settle down which encouraged the Afghan government, despite Aziz Amritsari's advice to the contrary, to send more *muhajirin* to the area.[221]

The resistance to this plan developed with the fresh arrivals from India, especially of the Sindhis. Their extraordinarily warm reception in the Punjab and the Frontier had created among them an impression that they would be received with the same enthusiasm in Afghanistan. But the reality of the situation was too painful and shocking. Already exhausted by their nightmarish journey, they decided to languish in Kabul rather than opt for an uncertain life in far off Turkestan. The prospect of tilling land there or serving in the army in some remote inhospitable region did not appeal to them. Those among

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[218] Ibid., 6 11; and G. Adhikari (ed.), *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India*, i (New Delhi, 1971), 39.

[219] Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 817.

[220] Ibid.

[221] Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, 6–11; and Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 821. In his report Aziz indicated that if the Afghans wished to settle the *muhajirin* in Jabal-us-Siraj they would require a huge sum of money. And since they had only meagre resources they had better ease the pressure on the *muhajirin*. But his recommendations were not implemented.

them who had joined the army at Jalalabad found that life in Afghanistan was no picnic.[222] Others became weary of idle life and held protest meetings. The young hot-heads, particularly those from the Frontier, delivered an 'ultimatum' to the Afghan government to provide them with weapons for a *jihad* against the British or else allow them to leave for Anatolia or return home.[223] There was a wide gap between the Indian and Afghan perceptions. The miracle that the Indians were expecting did not come about. In sheer disappointment some of them began to think of returning home. When the Amir heard of this he sent them a message through Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988) of Utmanzai that they should refrain from taking a hasty decision.[224] He thought that in the approaching winter they would be much better off in Turkestan where the climate was relatively milder. As to the demand of *jihad* he advised that the *muhajirin* had better wait and receive proper military training before taking on the British. But, in their enthusiasm, the impetuous, especially those from Swabi and Daudzai, ignored all good counsels and blandly told the Amir that they would accept no decision short of fighting the British.[225] To put more pressure they held demonstrations and ransacked fruit gardens which necessitated the arrest of the miscreants. A rumour had it that a group of renegades had been especially sent by the Indian government to create a situation whereby the Amir would get so annoyed as to send them back home. In any case, the Amir told the *muhajirin* that those who did not wish to settle in Turkestan or Jalalabad they were free to go to any area of Afghanistan. But in that case they would receive no official subsistence.[226] The result was dismay among the *muhajirin* and anger among the Afghans.

Meanwhile, by early August 1920, the number of *muhajirin* in Afghanistan had grown to more than 40,000 of which Kabul received the bulk.[227] Even these estimates were not accurate as large numbers

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[222] See Junejo's statement in *Paisa Akhbar*, 22 Nov. 1920.

[223] See Abdullah Quraishi's letter to *Siyasat*, 26 Aug. 1920; and Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 33 4.

[224] Ibid. Also see 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii; Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 877-P., 20 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920; and Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 34.

[225] Abdullah Quraishi's letter to *Siyasat*, 26 Aug. 1920.

[226] Ibid. Also see Mir Rahmatullah Humayun's statement in *Zamindar*, 16 Nov. 1920.

[227] Encl. to the Sarhaddar, Dakka, to the Political Agent, Khyber, 12 Aug. 1920 IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

had been emigrating without the assistance of the Hijrat Committee and many had not even bothered to notify the Afghan authorities. Besides, a number of them had wound their way through routes other than the Khyber. On top of this, *hijrat* was still continuing and the *muhajirin* were pouring in at the rate of seven to eight thousand a week. Within the next few weeks Kabul was going to receive several thousand more *muhajirin* who were heading for the capital from different directions. It was impossible to make arrangements for sixty thousand or more. Quite justifiably, the Afghan authorities panicked. The Anjuman-i Muhajirin was manoeuvred to petition the Amir to postpone the *hijrat* campaign for the time being.[228] On 9 August, the Amir issued a *farman*, promulgating that only after the earlier *muhajirin* had been absorbed, would any fresh emigrants be allowed into Afghanistan. In future the *muhajirin* were to be admitted piecemeal on a fixed quota. They were first to obtain passports from the Afghan officials at Peshawar and on entering the Afghan territory, they were to become Afghan subjects. If they were to leave Afghanistan after that, they would have to do so only on Afghan passports. A new colony for the *muhajirin* was to be set up in Katghan in the Afghan Turkestan. The Afghan government promised financial assistance to those *muhajirin* who were keen on starting vocations in trade, industry and education. Those who wished to serve in the army could do so provided they agreed to be stationed to any place of the government's choice. At Kabul three regiments of the *muhajirin* were proposed for enlistment in the regular army and subject to its rules and regulations. The young *muhajirin* of good families ('Khanzadas') could enter the military college and, after the completion of their training, were to be appointed in these newly-established regiments. Military training to other *muhajirin* was to be given by Afghan instructors in their respective colonies, such as Jabal-us-Siraj and Katghan. But they were to be considered volunteers and not entitled to any pay. Teachers, doctors and skilled workers were to be employed according to the requirements of the various departments. Those who desired to proceed to Anatolia 'for the purpose of Islam and in the interests of India', were allowed to send a delegation to explore the possibilities of an eventual emigration to that place.[229]

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[228] Ibid.
[229] Ibid.

These were commendable proposals, but the postponement order sent wrong signals. Already, there had been misgivings about the Afghan intentions; the *farman* proved to be the last straw and signalled the start of a mad rush back to India. Nobody bothered to appreciate the Afghan position or ponder as to how British India, pronounced *daru'l-harb* so vehemently, had suddenly become *daru'l-Islam* again.[230] The *muhajirin* began to return in the same impetuous manner in which they had left their homes. They were following each other like blind sheep. Even those few who had enlisted in the Afghan army or had joined the faculty of the Habibia College deserted or resigned to join the trail back to Peshawar. The Amir was perturbed as was the Anjuman-i Muhajirin.[231] At the *'Id* durbar especially, he expressed his disapproval of what was going on. He instructed his officers to try and dissuade the *muhajirin* from returning home and allow them to settle wherever they wanted but that did not work.[232] At Jalalabad, Nadir Khan's friendly persuasions also fell on deaf ears. On the contrary the number of the returning *muhajirin* suddenly increased when the fifteen thousand newly arrived from Peshawar also joined them. Fear and disappointment had taken such a firm hold of the *muhajirin* that no persuasion worked. Even Haji Turangzai, who happened to be in Jalalabad at the time, could do nothing. His son, however, was able to persuade some 4,000 *muhajirin* to accompany him to his village in the Mohmand country while about 2,000 went with the Afridis. The rest among the disenchanted returned to Peshawar.[233]

Following the decree of 9 August, the Afghan government took necessary steps to publicize the postponement. Copies of the *farman* were distributed among the returning *muhajirin* and some were sent to the Afghan Agent at Peshawar for transmission to Muslim leaders in India.[234] On 12 August 1920, Akbar Khan, a leading *muhajir* of the village of Utmanzai in the Charsadda tehsil, returned with a number of these copies. The same day, the Amir's decision was offi-

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[230] Mir Rahmatullah Humayun's statement in *Zamindar*, 16 Nov. 1920.

[231] See the statement of Shaikh Abdur Rahim of Kasur in *Zamindar*, 26 Sept. 1920. The ref. about desertions is in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 214, 7 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[232] The statement of Shaikh Abdur Rahim of Kasur in *Zamindar*, 26 Sept. 1920.

[233] Abdulllah Quraishi's letter to *Siyasat*, 26 Aug. 1920.

[234] NWFPA/NDC, Tribal Cell, file 51/2-Pol./i; Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 860-P., 14 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

cially communicated to the British authorities. To his embarrassment, Hamilton Grant found it very difficult to get the *farman* promptly communicated to the public. For if he had done so it would have been at once discredited as a machiavellian device of the government to stop the *hijrat* by exploiting the Amir's name. So he chose to make the contents known through the provincial Khilafat committee.[235] On their part, the officials of the committee were reluctant to invite the wrath of the intending *muhajirin*. However, on 14 August, under Grant's pressure, they reluctantly sent telegrams to all the Frontier Khilafat committees informing them of the Amir's decision. Copies of the proclamation were also printed and distributed.[236] In the Punjab, the postponement was publicized through the provincial Khilafat committee but the village *nambardars* and *zaildars* were told to emphasize that it was in fact cancellation.[237] The CKC, too, advised the intending *muhajirin* to wait and not make hurried preparations till further notice.[238]

In spite of the precautions, rumours spread that the government had paid a large sum of money to the Amir as a bribe to stop the *hijrat*; that the Frontier Hijrat Committee had been bribed, too; and that the Amir's *farman* was a forgery.[239] Nevertheless, the Committee managed to persuade the majority of the newly-arrived *muhajirin* in Peshawar to return to their homes except for a *qafila* of over seven thousand which had already left for Jamrud on 12 August. They refused to turn back when asked to do so by the Peshawar Hijrat Committee and became violent. The Afghan Agent at Peshawar, who himself proceeded to Jamrud to try persuasion was stoned and had to return. When the vanguard of the *qafila* reached the border on 14 August, it was confronted by the Afghan commandant with a guard of 50 men who were determined to stop this new influx, if necessary by force. But when the *muhajirin* threatened to pull down the barrier, the Afghan officials were unnerved and compelled to admit them on condition that they would bear their own expenses.[240]

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[235] Ibid.; and Grant to Chelmsford, 15 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Grant Papers.
[236] Grant to Chelmsford, 15 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, in ibid.
[237] See the editorial of *Zamindar*, 8 Oct. 1920.
[238] *Bombay Chronicle*, 27 Aug. 1920.
[239] Grant to Chelmsford, 15 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Grant Papers.
[240] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 853-P., 14 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

The incident is indicative of the alarming heights to which passions had been aroused. The postponement order was either disbelieved or ignored and several thousand more *muhajirin*, mainly from the Frontier and Sind, had in the mean time gathered in Peshawar. With difficulty the authorities were able to send them all back except for fifty emigrants from Sind who said that they were fleeing because of the government's interference with their religion and the suffering caused by the alleged stoppage of the canal water.[241] Similarly, another two thousand *muhajirin* had assembled in Bannu and pressed to go to Afghanistan via the Tochi Pass. They agreed to disperse on the condition that their deputation would be allowed to go to Khost to enquire into the possibility of immigration there.[242] This, however, does not seem to have materialized.

It took some time before the Afghan postponement order had its effect. Already, the *muhajirin* had started to return without ascertaining the facts. Then there was a scramble back to India. Those returning were mostly from Charsadda, Swabi, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Lahore, Amritsar, and Sind. Some of them had returned from Kabul while others from Jalalabad and also included those who had emigrated as late as 13 August. They were extremely incensed at their cold reception and bad treatment in Afghanistan.[243] But those in India at first did not know what was happening in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan. New *muhajirin* kept on pouring into Afghanistan. In fact sometimes those returning home were met on the way by the incoming enthusiasts, failing to comprehend the confusion, adding chaos to the messy situation.[244] But their sympathetic reception in India and the news that they would be resettled on their lands relieved them of some of their anxiety. Those who had held back for fear of punitive measures now returned too.[245] The flow of the returning *muhajirin*

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[241] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 875-P., 19 Aug. 1920, ibid. The Sind authorities later issued a denial. See *Bombay Chronicle*, 27 Aug. 1920.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 877-P., 20 Aug. 1920 in ibid.; and SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/36, 11 Sept. para. 1808.

[244] Lal Din Akhgar, *Anwar-i wilayat*, i (Lahore, 1965), 121–2; and Amritsari, 'Tahrik-i hijrat ki tarikh', 824.

[245] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 882-P., 21 Aug. 1920 in ibid.

increased and reached approximately to two hundred a day.[246] The Mohmand route was used for a short time but later abandoned owing to the depredations of the tribesmen.[247] In order to stem fresh emigration, the British authorities delayed the returning *muhajirin* at every large halting place long enough to tell the tales of their hardships to those who were still thinking of emigrating.[248] Among the notable *muhajirin* who returned were Ahmad Ali, president of the Lahore Khilafat Committee and a nephew of Ubaidullah Sindhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan of Utmanzai, Barrister Junejo and Mir Rahmatullah Humayun of Lahore.[249] Junejo and Humayun had specifically arrived to raise funds for the settlement of *muhajirin* who disclosed that several thousand of them were still stranded in Afghanistan due to the non-availability of transport and money and were anxious to return.[250]

Help was, however, forthcoming from the government. Free food shops were opened for immediate relief and free railway warrants were issued.[251] Special efforts were made to publicize that the Afghans were turning back *muhajirin* at the point of gun and bayonet.[252] The authorities also made arrangements for safeguarding the property rights of the *muhajirin* and settling land disputes speedily under Section 8 of the Frontier Crimes Regulations rather than under the ordinary law.[253] In the worst affected areas special officers were appointed to look after the interests of the soldiers and their families.[254] Apart from the British officers of the province, special appreciation was recorded

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[246] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 210, 9 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[247] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 10,000-P., 29 Nov. 1920 in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[248] Briggs, 'The Indian Hijrat of 1920', 167. Also see *Hindu*, 16 Sept. 1920; and *Englishman*, 11 Sept. 1920.

[249] Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 214; M. Yunus, *The Frontier Speaks* (Lahore, n.d.), 141–2; Officer in Charge, Special Bureau, to Sec., Foreign & Pol. Dept., Tel. no. 189-B., 28 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[250] Officer in Charge, Special Bureau, to Sec., Foreign & Pol. Dept., Tel. no. 189-B., 28 Sept. 1920; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 214, 7 Oct. 1920, ibid. Also see *The Times*, 15 Oct., 1920.

[251] A. H. Khan, *Mard-i mu'min*, 58.

[252] Rushbrook Williams's letter, 11 Oct. 1968.

[253] 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii; and Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 868-P., 17 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[254] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 895-P., 22 Aug. 1920 in ibid.

in respect of Khan Sahib Mirza Ghulam Samdani and Khan Bahadur Sadullah Khan for restoring confidence among the returned *muhajirin*.[255] An unofficial relief fund was instituted to facilitate the resettlement.[256] *Takavi* loans were given where required.[257] This sympathetic move on the part of the authorities was intended to help restore normal conditions quickly and prevent a recrudescence of the campaign.[258] But some difficulty was experienced while preparing an informal census of the *muhajirin* as people generally tried to conceal information for fear of official reprisals. However, through the efforts of Khan Sahib Mirza Samdani their fears were allayed and trust restored.[259] Difficulty was also encountered in the re-settlement work as most Hindus would not return the property they had acquired so cheaply.[260] The magnitude of the problem can be gauged from the fact that the special staff dealt with 2,407 'genuine' petitions just in the Peshawar district. A great number of applications considered untrue were not admited.[261] Nevertheless, hard hit as the returning *muhajirin* were, they expressed genuine gratitude at the relief measures undertaken by the government.[262]

But *hijrat*, though discredited, had not yet died down completely. There were renewed efforts in Delhi, Bihar and Orissa and the Frontier to revive the venture.[263] The CKC also decided to step in and, despite some opposition from Chotani, it resolved in the middle of August 1920, to control, supervise and finance *hijrat* in future. The president and the secretaries were empowered to appoint a Hijrat

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[255] 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii; and Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 10,000-P., 29 Nov. 1920 in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[256] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 875-P., 19 Aug. 1920 in ibid.

[257] Chief Com., NWFP, to Pte. Sec. Viceroy, Tel. no. 382-N., 2 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[258] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 875-P., 19 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[259] 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii; and Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 10,000-P., 29 Nov. 1920 in ibid.

[260] Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan*, 19.

[261] 'Report on the Hijrat Movement . . .', by DC, Peshawar, in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[262] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/37, 18 Sept. 1920, paras. 1845–6.

[263] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 698, 716 and 211, 21 and 28 Aug. and 15 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

Committee. A sub-committee under the chairmanship of Abdul Bari was to take up the matter and select workers for publicity.[264] Subsequently, the CKC in Bombay and the Hijrat Committee in Delhi opened communications with the Amir explaining the problems that had befallen them. They maintained that if he had consulted them before taking the drastic action they would have raised enormous sums to defray the expenses of the *muhajirin* in Kabul.[265] The CKC asked the Afghan envoy in India to obtain from the Amir clear and definite instructions as to the number and class of men to whom shelter could be offered in Afghanistan.[266]

The patronage of *hijrat* by the CKC at this late stage, however, seems to draw a veil over something more stupendous. The evidence from intelligence and other official sources, if not exaggerated or faulty, points to the presence of a grandiose, even fanciful, plan to oust the British from India. It is said that when Mohamed Ali went to Europe at the head of the Khilafat delegation, he met Talat Paşa, the former Turkish minister, at Territet in Switzerland early in August 1920 and there they reportedly prepared a plan for the invasion of India.[267] The invasion, it seems, was to be carried out by an army raised in Afghanistan from amongst the Afghans, the *muhajirin* and the tribesmen on the Indian frontier. The funds for organizing this army and for stirring up the tribes were to be provided, among others, by the CKC. Since Turkey was weak, the organizers were to rely on a concerted action by the Afghans and the Bolsheviks who were believed to have promised independence to India. The Bolsheviks were expected to make peace with the Poles, knock out General Pyotr Vrangel (1878–1928) of the 'White Forces', and then mass their armies for an offensive in Asia. The projected invasion of India was to synchronize with a rising within the country. For the proper execution of the plan, Talat Paşa was to move to Moscow; Enver Paşa, another fallen hero of pan-Islam, was to go to Tashkent; and Cemal Paşa (1872–1922), the former Turkish general, was to raise the army of invasion in Afghanistan. Mohamed Ali was expected to try to start

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[264] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 698, 21 Aug. 1920 in ibid.

[265] Memo no. 1121/201-B, dated 8 Sept. 1920, in NWFPA/NDC, CID file 1826, 12/8/3/i, S-377.

[266] *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 Aug. 1920.

[267] The information is based on Shaidai Papers in NAP and his 'Memoirs' in *Imroze*, 25 May 1969; IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 350 and B. 361; and Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 221–2. Also see Naeem Qureshi, *Mohamed Ali's Khilafat Delegation*, 56 61.

Chart
The Bolshevik-Asiatic Pan-Islamic Connection, 1920



Source: IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 350.

a revolution in India.[268] Such a scenario, however, was highly improbable, almost quixotic. But to the crest-fallen pan-Islamists and their cohorts any opportunity to get even with the British and their Allies was a cherished dream. On their part, the Allied governments and their intelligence agencies, paranoiac as they were in the context of post-war conspiracies and interlocking pan-Islamic-Bolshevik connections,[269] could not have but perceived such an eventuality within

[268] Ibid.
[269] See the Chart, above.

the realm of reality. In fact, not unknown to the Allies and the pan-Islamists, a scheme of this kind was already being pursued by the Bolsheviks with Lenin's blessings in the wake of the Baku Conference (18–21 September 1920) where Muslims of the East had been called upon to join in a *'jihad'* against the 'imperialist oppressors'.[270] The linch-pin of this scheme was M. N. Roy (1886–1954), the fugitive revolutionary from India, who was then an influential member of the Central Asiatic Bureau of the Communist International. His plan was to launch an attack on India by making Afghanistan the base[271] which was strikingly similar to the one designed by the pan-Islamists. Even if Mohamed Ali and Talat Paşa were unaware of Roy's secret plan, they must have noticed with comfort the Bolshevik policy of supporting pan-Islamic and nationalist movements to further the cause of their revolution.[272]

Thus, when towards the end of August 1920, Junejo returned from Afghanistan, he was reported to have brought the news that Cemal Paşa was on his way to Kabul.[273] The Khilafatists were anxious to form a direct liaison with the Paşa as well as with the Indian revolutionaries and pan-Islamists in Kabul, such as Mahendra Pratap, Barakatullah, and Ubaidullah Sindhi. But this could be done only if they had a pretext. In September 1920, Shaukat Ali approached the Afghan envoy at Simla requesting him to obtain facilities from the Amir for the resumption of *hijrat*.[274] He further informed that Yakub Hasan

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[270] Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze*, 108. Seven Indians from Tashkent, including Abdur Rab, Abdul Qadir, Abdul Fazal and Misri Khan, had attended the conference. For information on the Baku Conference also see IOL&R, L/P&S/18/C203.

[271] Ibid., 112 ff.

[272] For the Bolshevik policy towards India and Asia generally and their attempts to exploit pan-Islam, see Govt. of India, *Communism in India, 1924–1927*, comp. in Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept. (Calcutta, 1927); IOL&R, L/P&S/18, A. 184, 'Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan: Bolshevik and Pan-Islamic Movements & Connected Information', Nov. 1919; IOL&R, L/P&S/10/887, file 1847/1920; Ikbal Ali Shah, 'The Drifting of Central Asia—II', *New Europe*, 17 (29 Apr. 1920), 615–16; *The Times*, 2 Jan. 1920; *Madras Mail*, 27 Nov. 1922; Harish Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927* (Geneva, 1965), ch., ii; M. N. Roy, *Memoirs* (Bombay, 1964), part 3; G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (Berkeley, 1959), 7–43; David N. Druhe, *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism* (New York, 1959), ch., ii; and Imam, *Colonialism*, 65–82.

[273] Shaidai, 'Memoirs', NAP, Shaidai Papers. For the Khilafatists' contacts with Cemal Paşa also see Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 221; and Bamford, *Histories*, 167. Cemal Paşa finally arrived in Kabul on 27 Oct. 1920. See Officer in Charge, Intelligence Bureau, to Sec., Foreign & Pol. Dept., Tel. no. 203-B., 3 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[274] Shaukat Ali to the Afghan Envoy, 20 Sept. 1920 in *Zamindar*, 7 Oct. 1920; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1177-S., 8 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

and Abul Kalam Azad would soon wait on him to settle the issue. He promised that the CKC would not burden Afghanistan unnecessarily and to ensure that they had decided to send one lakh of rupees as first instalment towards the up-keep of the *muhajirin*.[275] The Afghan envoy wrote back agreeing to receive Yakub Hasan and Azad and informed that all preparations to re-start *hijrat* had been completed and that the *muhajirin* were free to enter Afghanistan again. He further told Shaukat Ali that the Amir's reply was awaited but he would finalize the details with the representatives of the CKC.[276] However, when the Government of India took a strong exception to the envoy's 'gross impropriety' of getting in touch with the Indian leaders directly, the Afghans became cautious.[277] The Indian government directed the local authorities of Baluchistan and the Frontier to disallow the delegation from crossing into Afghanistan, if it attempted to do so.[278] When in December 1920, Shaukat Ali took up the matter again, the Government of India instructed Sir Henry Dobbs (1871–1934), the secretary of the foreign and political department who was then in Kabul negotiating a treaty of friendship, to press Mahmud Tarzi to cancel the invitation which the Amir had extended to the CKC.[279] Since the Afghans were unwilling to withdraw their invitation, the Government of India was left with no option but to refuse permission.[280] In February 1921, Junejo, who had been deputed by the CKC to deliver funds to Kabul for the *muhajirin*, was also not allowed to proceed to Afghanistan.[281]

Despite these hurdles, the efforts to chase the British out of India were not given up.[282] Cemal Paşa established himself in Kabul and, aided by the Bolsheviks and to some extent by the Afghans, started to work in collaboration with the Indian revolutionaries, the *hijrat* lead-

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[275] Ibid.

[276] Afghan Envoy to Shaukat Ali, 25 Sept. 1920, in *Zamindar*, 7 Oct. 1920.

[277] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1177-S., 8 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and *Zamindar*, 9 Oct. 1920.

[278] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 20-S., 5 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[279] Ibid.; and Sec., Foreign & Pol. Dept., to British Rep., Kabul Mission, Kabul, Tel. no. 85-S., 18 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[280] British Rep., Kabul Mission, to Sec., Foreign & Pol. Dept., Tel. no. K.M.-2(?)-C, Kabul, 26 Jan. 1921 in ibid.

[281] NWFPA/NDC, CID report dated [Feb.] 1921, file 1826, 12/8/2/i, S-376; and *Zamindar*, 9 and 19 Feb. 1921. Junejo died soon after. See Memon, 'A Hero of the Khilafat Movement', 48–9.

[282] In the meantime, the revival of *hijrat* in Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and other

ers, and the *mujahidin* in the tribal belt.[283] Enver Paşa set himself up in Bukhara for similar anti-British activities and in addition to succour from the Bolsheviks he received some funds from India.[284] The Bolsheviks, on their part, tried to establish a network of subversion in Kabul. When the Afghans refused to oblige, Suritz and his friends entered into secret parleys with the *muhajirin*. The Soviet authorities viewed the *hijrat* movement as a 'sign that revolution in India was imminent' and tried to exploit it.[285] In the winter of 1920, they dispatched M. N. Roy to Tashkent to supervise the raising of the 'Army of Liberation' from amongst the *muhajirin* who had arrived in the capital of the Russian Turkestan.[286] The Bolsheviks were also in contact with Mohamed Ali in India through V. N. Chattopadhayaya (1883–1937), the revolutionary brother of the Congress leader Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949), and were reported to have even supplied him funds. This was in addition to what Mustafa Kemal was said to have offered him.[287] Whether these reported links were just co-incidental or were consciously designed, they do fit in the overall pattern of the post-war scenario of conspiracy and intrigue where pan-Islamists and revolutionaries were seen running around in search of support. The Bolshevik role was crucial to the whole game but as Barakatullah once explained to *Izvestia*, the Indians were neither socialists nor communists. They wanted to expel the British from the East and that had made them to seek the Bolshevik help.[288]

But owing to various factors, the cabals fell through. A significant reason for the failure was the collapse of the *hijrat* movement. The CKC did try to send relief money through Ali Mian Topiwalla, a Lahore based merchant-agent of Chotani, but it was too little and

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places had collapsed. Out of the 600 recent *muhajirin*, 200 had come back to India. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 819 and 859, 9 Oct. 1920, ibid.

[283] Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 222 5. For his reported contact with Aziz Amritsari see SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/49, 18 Dec. 1920, para. 2308. For the activities of the Ismus *mujahidin* of Maulawi Fazl-i Ilahi Wazirabadi, see ibid., 42/37, 18 Sept. 1920, para. 1850. For the British War Office comments on Cemal Paşa's mission see IOL&R, L/P&S/11/192, file P. 22/1921.

[284] Shaidai, 'Memoirs', NAP, Shaidai Papers. 158. The Punjab Khilafat Committee alone provided Rs 250,100 to Enver Paşa and Rs 51,000 to the *mujahidin*. See NAP, Lal Khan Papers. For Enver Paşa's activities also see IOL&R, L/P&S/11/152, file P. 2518/1919.

[285] NAI, Foreign Dept., file 61-M/1924, quoted in Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad*, 232.

[286] M. N. Roy, *Memoirs*, 420–6.

[287] IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 361.

[288] *Izvestia*, 6 May 1919, cited in Sareen, *Indian Revolutionary Movement Abroad*, 229.

too late.[289] About seventy-five per cent *muhajirin* had returned to India. Others had either chosen to stay in Afghanistan or moved on to Baku and Tashkent or had perished through exhaustion or disease. From among those who remained in Afghanistan, about five hundred were enlisted in the Afghan army. Others were driven off by the Afghan government towards Panjshir, Katghan, and Badakhshan and were reported to be in dire straits as they had no means of subsistence.[290] Those who had gone to Baku in Azerbaijan to fight for the Turkish nationalists were dismayed to find themselves unwanted and slowly trekked back to India.[291] From amongst those who had gone to Tashkent, some were given military and political training at a school known as Indusky Kurs. It was here in Tashkent that in October 1920, the Communist *muhajirin*, in concert with their revolutionary friends, founded an *émigré* Communist Party of India and later affiliated it to the Communist International.[292] Most of these *muhajirin*, however, found Bolshevism unpalatable and returned to India at the first opportunity.[293] Another reason was that the Bolsheviks, on whose support the anti-British conspiracy largely depended, were not really interested in 'liberating' India by armed action. In fact, no responsible Soviet leader, except perhaps Lev Trotsky (1879–1940) seriously thought of doing so. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Bolshevik help to M. N. Roy and other Indian revolutionaries was nothing more than a ploy to strengthen Soviet Russia's bargaining position in any British subterfuge.[294] After the second Comintern in July 1920, the Soviets (in line with Lenin's thesis on colonialism as against that of Roy) had decided to strike at India, 'the citadel of British imperialism', by supporting the bourgeois national movement

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[289] See Ext., Bombay Abstract, 11 Dec. 1920, para. 1583, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/1, 8 Jan. 1921, para. 38. Also see ibid., 43/4, para. 122.

[290] See the statements of the returned *muhajirin* in NWFPA/NDC, CID file 1826, 12/8/4/xiii–xxiii, and 12/8/5/i–iv, S-379; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 211 and 212, 15 and 23 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see *The Times*, 22 Sept. 1920; and Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 213.

[291] Muzaffar Ahmad, *Communist Party of India*, 54–5. Also see the note wherein the writer has cited from the memoirs of *muhajir* Fazle Elahi Qurban (1902–59).

[292] For details see ibid., 56 97; Adhikari, *Documents*, 55 60 and 215 33; and M. N. Roy, 'Report on the Formation of the Communist Party of India at Tashkent', in Sibnarayan Ray (ed.), *Selected Works of M. N. Roy*, i (Delhi, 1987), 179.

[293] They were returning as late as Oct. 1921. The govt. kept them under surveillance and took measures to prevent driving them underground. See Chief Com., NWFP, To Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 590-P., 29 Oct. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[294] Imam, *Colonialism*, 147.

there. The unrest in India and the progress of non-co-operation, it seems, had sent wrong signals to Moscow strengthening the Bolshevik perception that nationalism was the only effective way of dealing with Britain. The policy of a world revolution through the toiling masses was soft-pedalled and this trend was confirmed in June 1921 by the Third Comintern.[295]

Whether or not the Bolsheviks had ever been serious about the idea of military conquest, it is a fact that by the middle of 1921 they had given it up and decided instead to infiltrate India with underground movements and trained agents. The military school at Tashkent was abruptly closed and the remaining *muhajirin* were taken to Moscow and given intensive training at the KUTVa, the 'Communist University of the Toilers of the East'. They were then despatched to India at different times through various routes, particularly the Pamir-Chitral route. But these agents were caught, tried and convicted by the Indian government in the Peshawar and Kanpur Bolshevik conspiracy cases of 1922–24.[296] Furthermore, though the Afghans had toyed with the idea of invading India, they were suspicious of the Bolsheviks and in the end refused to play their game.[297] In March 1921, Cemal Paşa was compelled to leave Afghanistan for Moscow.[298] Anglo-Afghan relations had also improved and, as a consequence of pressure from the British, in October 1922, Ubaidullah

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[295] Ibid., 148 ff.

[296] See IOL&R, L/P&S/11/204 and 309; *Madras Mail*, 27 Nov. 1922; SB, Punjab, 7 Feb. 1923, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/6, 10 Feb. 1923, para. 64; *The Times*, 26 Feb. 1930, for the experiences of *muhajir* Abdul Qadir; Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, *The Tragedy of Amanullah* (London, 1933), 150–6, for the narrative of a *muhajir*; *Communism in India, 1924–1927*, 9–10 and 70; Muzaffar Ahmad, *Communist Party of India*, 34–54 and 90–1; Shaukat Usmani, *I Met Stalin Twice* (Bombay, 1953), 21–2; Mian Akbar Shah Badrashi, *Azadi ki talash*. Urdu tr. & introd. Syed Wiqar Ali Shah (Islamabad, 1989), *passim*; Druhe, *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism*, 35; and Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union* (Chicago, 1979), 101–1. The instructions given to the *muhajirin* agents by Roy and his Russian colleagues are available in NWFPA/NDC, CID file 1826, 12/8/4/xiii, S-379. In their immediate objective these communist *muhajirin* accomplished little though later they provided quite a few leaders to the socialist movements in India and Pakistan. Fazle Elahi Qurban played an important role in the Communist Party of Pakistan and Shaukat Usmani (1899/1901–78), Muhammad Shafiq (b. 1900), Ghulam Husain and Rafiq Ahmad (b. 1889) became the foremost leaders of the Indian Communism. Others settled down in various European countries—Rahmat Ali Zakaria in Paris and Iqbal Shaidai in Italy.

[297] The information was supplied to Grant by a nephew of Dr Abdul Ghani. See Chelmsford to Montagu, 25 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see *The Times*, 17 Aug. 1920; Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 226 and 228–33; and M. N. Roy, *Memoirs*, 403 and 443–4.

[298] Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 230.

Sindhi and his associates were forced to leave Kabul for Soviet Russia and other countries.[299] The Indian leaders seem to have misunderstood and exaggerated foreign sympathy for their country. In fact Dr Abdul Ghani, who was very close to the Afghan government, ridiculed the Indian 'voracity' for depending on foreign help and criticized the leaders for throwing blame wholly on Afghanistan when their plans did not seem to work out well.[300] The project also suffered because of the disappearance of its chief leaders. Since 1919, the Armenian death squads of the secret Dashnak Society had been chasing the eluding Turkish CUP leaders all over Europe to perform their executions code named 'Operation Nemesis'. At last the assassins caught up with Talat Paşa in Berlin in March 1921 and Cemal Paşa in Tiflis in July 1922. Several other CUP leaders were also gunned down at various places. Only Enver Paşa escaped their revenge later to die in August 1922 at the hands of the Bolsheviks against whom he had been fighting in Bukhara alongside the Basmachi nationalists for his dream of a pan-Islamic pan-Turkic state in the very cradle of the Turkish race.[301]

In retrospect, the *hijrat* of 1920 remains a curious phenomenon. In a way it reflects the depths of Muslim frustration. The Khilafat move-

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[299] Adamec, *Afghanistan*, 157–9; and Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 249–67.

[300] Dr. Abdul Ghani, *A Review of the Political Situation in Central Asia* (Lahore, [1921]), 2 3 and 233.

[301] See Derogy, *Resistance & Revenge*, esp. 58–61, 77 86, 163–73 and 175–90. For Enver and Cemal Paşas also see IOL&R, L/P&S/11/203, file P. 5111/1921. After seventy-four years, the Turkish government has brought back Enver Paşa's remains from Tajikistan and reburied him under a 12-meter high marble monument in central Istanbul. See *The News*, 5 Aug. 1996. The Basmachi movement began in the Farghana valley around 1918 as a popular revolt against the Soviet regime. It soon spread to the whole of Turkestan, receiving some impetus from the arrival in Bukhara of Ahmed Zeki Validov, the Beshkir intellectual, and later of Enver Paşa who assumed its command and imparted a certain unity. Though not a *jihad* like the earlier Naqshbandiyya movements, many sufi shaikhs and followers of various orders took part in the fighting. It continued with varying fortunes under Ibrahim Beg (1889–1932) and others until the 1930s when it was ruthlessly crushed. Disparate shades of opinion running counter to each other —pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic, pan-Turanian, Jadidists and Qadimists — had marred the unity and created political-ideological confusion. The Soviets on the other hand succeeded in winning over the *'ulama* who obliged them with the *fatawa* against the Basmachis. With almost no foreign assistance to rely on the movement was bound to fail. For details see Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in The Soviet Union*, 85 n; id. and Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union*, 76; Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, *The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia* (Peshawar, 1985), *passim*; and Yuri V. Gankovsky, 'Ibrahim Beg Lakai: An Outstanding Leader of Basmachi Movement in Central Asia', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 16/4 (1993), 1–8.

ment had made the Indian Muslims desperate and the *hijrat* was the result—though it was not 'the nearest approach to a crusade', as was commonly believed in some official circles at the time.[302] But it would also be an extravagant exercise to fit the whole thing in a cut and dried theoretical framework as if it were tied into both parallel and competing loyalties or the outcome of some kind of an archaic socio-political rural 'avoidance protest' of the peasantry.[303] The *hijrat* episode was nothing but a religiously-inspired movement with clear political objectives directed against the British when all other methods seemed to have failed. And yet, in spite of their crusading posture and unbounded excitement, the *muhajirin* remained completely non-violent. Of course in the context of classical Islamic juristic interpretations and Indian political developments, *hijrat* was neither illogical nor an isolated event, but it was ill-conceived, miscalculated and ill-organized. It ignored all economic and political realities. A poor country like Afghanistan could not sustain the influx of such a vast multitude of unskilled and destitute people, especially when it had not been able to settle its own *pawindas*.[304] The advocates of *hijrat* were in fact tricked into involvement by the machinations of the Afghan diplomacy. Once the Afghan relations with the British improved, they disowned any responsibility. The Amir frankly told some influential *muhajirin* that he had made peace with the British and, therefore, they had better forget about launching a *jihad*.[305] By their action, the Afghans had bought their independence and the British their peace but the Indian *'ulama* and their political cohorts, by encouraging *hijrat* in a fit of temper, had lost sight of a possible disaster. In theory, it was all very well that Muslims should leave India and then reconquer it;

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[302] Govt. of Punjab, *A History of Non-co-operation in the Punjab*, 20.

[303] Dietrich Reetz has attempted to explain the motivations of *hijrat* by juxtaposing the views of Paul Brass, E. J. Hobsbawm, J. C. Scott and Michel Adas to prove his point on the basis of just one IO file. See Dietrich Reetz, *Hijrat: The Flight of the Faithful. A British File on the Exodus of Muslim Peasants from North India to Afghanistan in 1920* (Berlin, 1995), 76 and 81 ff.

[304] A curious side-light of the *hijrat* movement was that some Afghan residents of Khost, who had reportedly lost their lands to the *muhajirin*, asked the DC, Bannu, to allow them to emigrate to India. See Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 326-P.N., 10 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[305] *Vakil*, 11 Sept. 1920, citing the Frontier corr. of the *Englishman* of Calcutta. In fact, the *muhajirin* were deadly against an Anglo-Afghan *rapprochement* and, at one stage, Maulawi Ahmad Ali had openly declared that if Afghanistan made peace with the British he would take his followers either to Turkestan or Turkey. See *Paisa Akhbar*, 19 Aug. 1920.

but its practical realization depended largely on external factors which were beyond their control. It had proved disastrous to Muslim communities in Spain and Sicily in the fifteenth century; it had the same results even now. Moreover, its success depended on the assistance of some foreign powers like Afghanistan, Russia and Turkey. No matter how well-intentioned the organizers might have been, they unconsciously pushed the Indian Muslims into a disastrous adventure. The local political demagogue and the unbridled village *mulla* were allowed to play their power game unhindered. Years later, Shaukat Ali was to blame the Punjab leaders for foisting a *fait accompli* on the CKC by prematurely launching *hijrat* without consulting the central body. He lamented that a useful instrument of civil disobedience was thus wasted and religious sentiments of the masses misused for cheap popularity. And when the crunch came they shifted the blame on the CKC and behaved as if they had nothing to do with it.[306] Zafar Ali Khan was perhaps the sole leader among the Punjabis who advised sending only the skilled persons to Afghanistan who would, like the pilgrim fathers in American history, make that country really wealthy.[307]

The *hijrat* movement caused considerable disruption for large numbers of people in a number of areas. The official statistics, calculated by the provincial authorities towards the end of November 1920 and considered 'fairly accurate' at the time, estimated the number of the *muhajirin* to be 31,723. Of these, 18,000 went through the Khyber and Tirah, and 13,723 via the Mohmand country.[308] The estimates of the Afghan authorities arrived at a little higher figure of 40,000.[309] But the actual number seems to be much higher than these estimates because over 7,000 had emigrated after the Amir's postponement order. Moreover, an unknown number had adopted different routes along the border where a proper check was out of question.[310] Besides, small

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[306] See Shaukat Ali to Shaikh Abdul Majid, 28 July 1927; and Shaukat Ali to Abdoola Haroon, 28 July 1927, AFM, Haroon Papers.

[307] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/29, 24 July 1920, para. 1504. Also see Govt. of Punjab, *A History of Non-co-operation in the Punjab*, 22.

[308] Chief Com., NWFP, to Foreign Sec., Govt. of India, Tel. no. 10,000-P., 29 Nov. 1920 in NWFPA, Tribal Cell file 51/2-Pol./ii.

[309] Encl. to the Sarhaddar, Dakka, to the Political Agent, Khyber, 12 Aug. 1920 IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[310] Encl. to the Sarhaddar, Dakka, to the Political Agent, Khyber, 12 Aug. 1920 IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

parties had kept emigrating as late as September 1920. The total, therefore, could safely be estimated at over 60,000 though the Punjab Khilafat Committee thought 120,000 to be the correct figure.[311] The areas from which the bulk of the *muhajirin* came, were the Frontier, especially the Peshawar district, followed in turn by the Punjab, Bombay (Sind) and other places of India. Thousands of families were disrupted, involving enormous personal suffering. Psychological cost was even greater than the socio-economic damage. There was high rate of mortality and according to an eyewitness the Khyber Pass was littered with corpses.[312] Another source reports that the road from the Indian frontier to Kabul was dotted with graves of *muhajirin*,[313] not to mention those who perished in Afghanistan or in Russia. Many languished in Afghan jails, including those who were accused of being British spies and some were even executed on that count.[314] It took a long time for the affected people to recover from the disaster.[315] Those who had stayed in Afghanistan or strayed off to Central Asia continued to trickle back in small groups until the early 1930s, giving considerable headache to Indian authorities who suspected some of them to be tainted with Bolshevik ideology.[316]

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[311] The number of the *muhajirin* has been variously estimated between 18,000 and two million. A *muhajir* in his account states that at one time in Kabul alone, the number had reached 1,25,000 and more were coming. Another *muhajir* puts the total at 23,000, while a third believes it was 36,000. Contemporary newspaper reports estimated between 100,000 and 120,000 though Malik Lal Khan gives an incredible figure of 235,000. However, the figure 60,000 seems more plausible. See The Punjab Khilafat Committee, *Punjab Khilafat kamaiti ka 'ilan* (Lahore, 1920), 3–4; relevant files in Lal Khan Papers; Parl. Papers, 1921, (202), *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1920, Fifty-sixth Number*, 52; Briggs, 'The Indian Hijrat of 1920', 165; Sokhta, *Dastan-i hijrat*, 31; Abdul Qadir's 'Memoirs' in *The Times*, 25 Feb. 1930; Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, 2; id., *I Met Stalin Twice*, 2; *Siyasat*, 9 Aug. 1920; *Vakil*, 9 Aug. 1920; *Paisa Akhbar*, 12 Aug. 1920; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no 698, 21 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1701, file 5703/1920.

[312] Williams, *The State of Pakistan*, 19.

[313] *The Times*, 30 Nov. 1920.

[314] See Abdullah Quraishi's letter in *Siyasat*, 26 Aug. 1920; *Paisa Akhbar*, 28 Aug. 1920; and Aybek, *Ap biti*, i, 216–17.

[315] Years later, Husain Ahmad Madani compared the sufferings of the *hijrat* of 1920 to the hardships undergone by the Muslim refugees in 1947 as an argument against the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. See Madani to M. Siddique, n.d., in Najm-ud-din Islahi (ed.), *Maqtubat-i Shaikhu'l-Hind*, ii (Deoband, 1954), 262–3.

[316] See NWFPA/NDC, CID files 12/8/4/xiii–xxiii, and 12/8/5/i–iv, S-379, and 12/8/5, i–iv, S-380.

And yet, though the pain caused by *hijrat* was enormous, the impact of its failure, in the overall scheme of things, was largely inconsequential. The protagonists of the venture were no doubt discredited but they escaped the expected wrath by sheltering behind the intricacies of theological exegeses or by shifting the blame onto others. The knowledgeable among the *muhajirin* reproached the ill-intentioned and the ill-informed for the debacle and absolved the Afghan government of any wrongdoing. They thought that most of the *muhajirin* were unaware of the sacrifices they would be called upon to make or were unused to the kind of life they experienced in Afghanistan and as a result were unable to adjust to the situation. Once the tide of the *muhajirin* turned back there was no stopping them.[317] Fortunately for the Khilafatists, there did not emerge any ominous divisions apart from those that already existed. This was because the differences over *hijrat* were scholastic and political rather than fundamental: the religious sanction was never in question; it was the expediency and timing of launching the campaign that had precipitated the divisions. The Khilafat movement thus remained largely unaffected by the *hijrat* campaign. It was only in certain areas that it seemed to have temporarily overshadowed the non-co-operation programme.[318] The majority of the Khilafatists had regarded the *hijrat* as a side issue and the CKC, like the Jam'iyyat, had treated the campaign almost with contempt. Even when the CKC finally decided in the middle of August 1920 to patronize *hijrat*, the opposition to the idea was strong. The fact of the matter is that the Khilafat movement, far from being adversely affected by *hijrat*, gained a certain momentum. For it was precisely from August 1920 that the non-co-operation experiment was launched and developed.

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[317] Such a post-mortem was undertaken by Junejo, Mir Rahmatullah Humayun and Abdur Rahim of Kasur. See *Zamindar*, 16 Nov. 1920; and *Paisa Akhbar*, 22 Nov. 1920.

[318] See e.g. the statement of Muhammad Shah Burq, Joint Sec., Kohat Khilafat Committee, in *Vakil*, 1 Sept. 1920.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NON-CO-OPERATION EXPERIMENT

The *hijrat* fever was still gripping the Muslims of north India and the revision of the Turkish peace terms nowhere in sight when the CKC formally launched the non-co-operation campaign on 1 August 1920 by observing a Khilafat Day—the third since the inception of the movement. Even those among the Khilafatists who honestly believed that the launching was premature or that the Congress verdict should be awaited,[1] decided, at the last moment, to abide by the CKC's instructions. Fairly successful *hartals* were observed in many parts of the country, with Hindus generally participating unwillingly, especially in the Punjab and the Frontier.[2] Public meetings exhorted non-co-operation and resolved to continue it until a modification of the peace terms was secured, consistent with Muslim sentiments and Islamic law.[3] A number of leading Muslims and Hindus returned their medals, renounced titles and resigned from honorary posts, seats in the legislatures and law practices.[4] It was obvious that the Khilafat issue, fused with the Punjab 'wrong', had emerged as a forceful drive towards the political reconstruction of India.

Following the inauguration of the non-co-operation campaign, the

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[1] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1711, file 7220/1920.

[2] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 635, 6 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/32, 14 Aug. 1920, para. 1657.

[3] *Bombay Chronicle*, 2 Aug. 1920; and *Madras Mail*, 2 and 3 Aug. 1920.

[4] Shah Sulaiman Phulwari resigned his honorary magistracy. Gandhi returned the medals awarded him for his loyal services in South Africa. Nurul Hasan resigned his membership of the Bihar legislative council. Haji Osman Sait resigned his councilship of Mangalore. Yusuf Ali, who replaced Yakub Hasan in the Madras legislative council, also resigned. Saraladevi Chaudhrani sent back her War Brooch. Maulawi Zahid Hasain of Madras and Shah Badar-ud-din Phulwari renounced their titles of *Shamsu'l-'Ulama*. Mrs Naidu returned her Kaiser-i Hind medal. All this was in addition to the resignations from the *sardari* and membership of local boards and municipalities which had taken place earlier in May and June 1920 by many, including Jan Muhammad Junejo from Sind. See K. K. Datta (ed.), *History of the Freedom movement in Bihar*, i (Patna, 1957), 301; *Zamindar*, 3 June 1920; Gandhi to Chelmsford, 1 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; Mrs Naidu to Chelmsford, 1 Sept. 1920, ibid.; *Bombay Chronicle*, 2, 3, 13, 18 and 30 Aug. 1920; and *Englishman*, 2 Aug. 1920.

CKC made a determined effort to mobilize support in the districts with the help of the provincial committees. But in order not to afford the government an excuse to crush the movement prematurely, the CKC instructed its subordinate organizations to maintain non-violence in speech and action.[5] The main task of campaigning fell on the shoulders of Shaukat Ali who, since his release in 1919, had emerged as the most powerful leader among the Khilfatists—menacing enough to earn the label of 'a pestilential brute' from a provincial governor.[6] Chotani, the president of the CKC, was merely a figurehead. Abdul Bari, his preceptor, was no propagandist and had chosen to remain unobtrusively behind scenes. Mohamed Ali was still in Europe with the Khilafat delegation. Abul Kalam Azad, Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Hasrat Mohani and others, though leaders in their own right, had to be content with a second place. Shaukat Ali towered above all of them. At his side was Gandhi, who, after Tilak's death on 1 August and the powerlessness of the Congress leaders to oppose him, had been left as the chief figure among the Hindus. Both Shaukat Ali and Gandhi were conscious of their power and influence and also of the fact that the government was afraid to touch them. They used these advantages with remarkable skill. Their own interdependence was extraordinary. None could do without the other. Shaukat Ali pretended to follow Gandhi and his non-violence creed and called him *bapu*—though the age difference between them was only four years. Gandhi owed much of his power to the Khilafatists under Shaukat Ali and could not afford to forsake him. Without him, Gandhi had no hold on the Muslims. The *'mahatma'* understood his own limitations well and frankly admitted that 'I would not stand alone and expect to carry the Mussalman masses with me'.[7] No wonder that when Malaviya appealed to Gandhi to suspend the campaign till the Congress had given its verdict, the latter declined to 'prove untrue to the Mussalman brethren'. With them, he said, non-co-operation had become a religious duty and they could not wait for the Congress decision: 'In matters of conscience the Law of Majority has no place'.[8]

All through the month of August 1920, Shaukat Ali and Gandhi went about a whirlwind tour of the country, particularly parts of the

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[5] *Indian Annual Register, 1921* (ed.), H. N. Mitra (Calcutta, 1921), part 1, 48.
[6] Willingdon to Ronaldshay, 8 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Zetland Papers.
[7] M. K. Gandhi, *Young India, 1919–1922*, i (Madras, 1922), 197–8.
[8] *Collected Works*, xviii, 112 13 and 123.

Madras presidency, which had become a storm centre of politics.[9] But in spite of their efforts, the outcome of the non-co-operation experiment remained uncertain. The pockets of resistance even among Muslims were quite strong. There were still many who objected to the specific items of non-co-operation like the boycott of professions, services and councils. In Madras, for instance, Kuddus Badshah, the president of the provincial Khilafat committee, and his brother Abdul Aziz Sahib refused to renounce their titles.[10] In the UP, Syed Zahur Ahmad of Lucknow insisted that these items of non-co-operation amounted to 'political suicide of [a] backward minority community' particularly when non-Muslims were not participating in the campaign.[11] In Bombay, Mirza Ali Muhammad Khan was actively working to make the reforms scheme a success.[12] In the Punjab, Fazl-i-Husain was leading the resistance.[13] And in Bengal, Fazlul Haq's enthusiasm against the triple boycott led him to take his 'crusade' to the press.[14] There were others who rejected the entire non-co-operation scheme. They, no doubt, regretted the Allied decision over Turkey and the British attitude towards the Punjab affair, but were against resorting to an extreme measure. Among them the Raja of Mahmudabad, Umar Hayat Malik, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto (1888–1957) and Sir Abdur Rahim (1867–1952), along with several other Muslim and Hindu members of the imperial legislative council, publicly dissociated themselves from the non-co-operation campaign.[15] Others like Syed Nawab Ali Chowdhuri (1863–1929), A. L. Ahmed of Cossipore and Nawab Habibullah of Dhaka (who had been forced by the government to spy on the activities of the CKC) objected to the scheme on personal, religious or political grounds.[16]

More disconcerting for the Khilafatists was the opposition of some of the leading *'ulama* of the country. Of course, Abdul Bari and Abul

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[9] *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 313–20.
[10] Ibid., 314–15.
[11] Ibid., 306.
[12] *Times of India*, 23 Aug. 1920.
[13] Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, 106.
[14] *Englishman*, 24 Aug. and 2 and 3 Sept. 1920.
[15] *Times of India*, 30 Aug. 1920.
[16] Syed Nawab Ali Chowdhry, *Views on Present Political Situation in India* (Calcutta, 1920), 12, cited in Broomfield, *Elite Conflict*, 157. For A. L. Ahmed see *Englishman*, 31 Aug. 1920. For the Nawab of Dhaka see AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat – ii; Ronaldshay to Montagu, 8 Apr. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers; *Statesman*, 31 Aug. 1920, and *Time of India*, 9 Sept. 1920.

Kalam Azad had moved quickly to envelope non-co-operation in a religious cloak early in 1920, but doubts had persisted as to the correctness of their interpretation. The nature of the *'ulama*'s disputations had been largely scholastic though political considerations were also apparent. The non-co-operating *'ulama* had built their case on the Qur'anic injunctions which prohibit affection or co-operation with unfriendly non-Muslims.[17] Those who disputed this contention, argued differently. Even the Barelwis and the followers of Ashraf Ali Thanawi were one on this issue though they were expected never to agree on anything. The Barelwis, for instance, found no sanction in the *shari'at* for *muwalat* with the Hindus while prohibiting them with the Christians.[18] Ahmad Raza Khan maintained that the Islamic injunctions in *sura Mumtahina* were applicable equally to the *mushrikin* and the *kuffar* and it would be wrong to target the Christians and spare the Hindus.[19] Here he was taking issue with Abul Kalam Azad and others who had given an opposite interpretation of the *sura*. Volatile by temperament, he accused the 'Wahhabi-Deobandi renegades (*murtadin*)' of deliberately misinterpreting *tark-i mu'amalat* as *tark-i muwalat* and were prostrating before Gandhi and Hindus.[20] 'Whenever Mahatma Gandhi utters his oracle', he taunted the Khilafatists, 'a supporting *fatwa* deferentially follows from Maulawi Abdul Bari as [if he were] a faithful disciple. The Hindus march forward and the Muslims follow them laying *din* and faith at their feet'.[21] Similarly, Munshi Taj-ud-din Ahmad Taj put the entire blame of the prevalent confusion on the non-co-operators' desire to please the Hindus. Otherwise, he maintained, *tark-i mu'amalat* with them was a religious duty and it did not behove leaders like Hakim Ajmal Khan to distort the Qur'anic injunctions.[22] And Sayyid Muhammad Naeem of Muradabad attacked

[17] See ch. ii. 137.

[18] See Ahmad Raza Khan, *al-muhjatu'l-mu'tamina fi ayati'l mumtahina* (Bareilly, [1920]). The full text of his *fatawa* is available in Jafri, *Auraq*, 225–305. Ahmad Raza Khan's *fatawa* have been collected and published in twelve volumes. See Wajahat Rasul Qadiri and Majidullah Qadiri (eds.), *A'ina-i Razwiyat* (Karachi, 1989), 83.

[19] Ibid., esp. 239.

[20] Muhammad Masud, *Fazil Barelwi aur tark-i muwalat* (Lahore, 1978), 16; and Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 189–90. Also see Muhammad Masud Ahmad, *Tahrik-i azadi aur as-Sawadu'l-A'zam* (Lahore, 1987), 104–111.

[21] Sayyid Ghulam Hasin-ud-din Naeemi, *Hayat sadru'l-fazil*, 100–1, quoted in Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 221. Eng. tr. mine.

[22] Taj-ud-din Ahmad Taj, *Hinduon se tark-i muwalat* (Bareilly, 1920), 2nd edn. (Lahore, 1982), 3 ff.

the Khilafat leadership in his contributions to the Barelwi organ, *as-Sawadu'l-A'zam.*[23] Ashraf Ali Thanawi and his school also disagreed on the interpretation of the terms *muwalat* and *mu'amalat.* In their view *muwalat* meant friendship and affection while the *mu'amalat* indicated dealings, co-operation or similar other transactions. And whereas friendship and affection for the opponents of Islam was prohibited, having transactions was a different proposition.[24]

The non-co-operators, on their part, hit back at Ahmad Raza Khan and Ashraf Ali Thanawi and dubbed them as superstitious communalists and indeed agents of the British. Muin-ud-din Ahmad Ajmeri (1882–1940) was particularly critical of them for indulging in 'useless wordy discussions'.[25] In his view the debate on the meaning and import of *muwalat* and *mu'amalat* was irrelevant. The real issue was whether or not the withdrawal of co-operation was incumbent on good Muslims. Ajmeri argued that the *fatawa* from Bareilly and Thana had confused the issue and restricted the orbit of the *mu'amalat.* The Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind had clearly laid it down that any co-operation or transaction which might strengthen the enemies of Islam was *haram.*[26] As to the rumours of difference of opinion among the Deoband *'ulama* themselves, Muhammad Anwar Shah Kashmiri, a teacher at Deoband, later announced that the *daru'l-'ulum* was unanimous on non-co-operation and all speculations to the contrary were baseless.[27]

The CKC was not at all at ease with the dissident groups among Muslims, and the Hindu attitude was disturbing it even more. Without the support of the majority community the Khilafatists felt insecure. Since the Allahabad Conference of June 1920, there had been hardly any change in the attitude of the Congress leaders. Rather their hostility towards non-co-operation had increased after its inauguration. The moderates in particular, saw it as 'bizarre in its conception and utterly impracticable'.[28] Especially distasteful to them was the boycott of the reformed councils, which not only threatened to deprive them of any share in the enhanced power and prestige, but also endangered the early realization of home rule for India. Understandably,

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[23] Sharf Qadiri, *Andhere se ujale tak*, 219.
[24] I. H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, 270.
[25] Muin-ud-din Ajmeri, *Kalimatu Haq*, in Jafri, *Auraq*, 541 ff.
[26] Ibid., 545–7.
[27] *Siyasat*, 22 Dec. 1920.
[28] Dinshaw Wacha to Chelmsford, 21 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

Mrs Besant called it 'a National suicide'.[29] Sir S. Sivaswami Aiyer (1864–1946) considered it an 'ill-advised' campaign 'fraught with disaster to the country'.[30] V. S. Srinivasa Sastri thought it was illogical and harmful.[31] Srinivasa Iyengar (1874–1941) pronounced the third and fourth stages as definitely illegal and unconstitutional.[32] The same was the opinion of Malaviya.[33] Some like Narayan Chandavarkar (1855–1923) and Jamnadnas Dwarkadas (b. 1890) questioned it on grounds of religion and practicability.[34] Others dubbed it as 'a weapon of revenge and retaliation.'[35] About a dozen non-official members of the imperial legislative council issued their public disapproval—they included Surendranath Banerjea (1848–1925), Sundar Singh Majithia (1872–1941) and R. D. Tata, and were joined later by Dinshaw Wacha (1844–1936), Shankar Malhar Chitnavis (1863–1931), and Dr Sachchidananda Sinha (1871–1950).[36] The moderates were so strongly opposed to non-co-operation that when invited to attend the forthcoming special Congress at Calcutta in September 1920, Banerjea reacted by explaining the uselessness of attending a Congress where the acceptance of the scheme was a foregone conclusion.[37]

The 'extremists', too, were still divided. In July 1920, Lajpat Rai had advocated the boycott of the reformed councils, but though the CKC's non-co-operation committee had quickly incorporated his suggestion in its programme along with the boycott of schools and courts, the Punjab leader had remained undecided.[38] Motilal Nehru was concerned about, among other things, the spread of violence as exhibited by the murder of R. W. D. Willoughby (deputy commissioner

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[29] Annie Besant (ed.), *Gandhian Non-co-operation or Shall India Commit Suicide?* (Madras, 1920), v.

[30] S. Aiyer, 'The Khilafat Situation', in ibid., 7–8.

[31] S. Sastri, 'Non-co-operation', in ibid., 10. As early as Apr. 1920, he had expressed his fear that the Khilafat movement would become violent. See his letter to Sir S. Sivaswami Aiyar, 13 Apr. 1920, in T. N. Jagadisan (ed.), *Letters of the Right Honourable V. S. Srinivasa Sastri* (London, 1963), 65.

[32] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 667, 13 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[33] J. B. Kirpalani, 'Madan Mohan Malaviya', in N. L. Singh (ed.), *Mahamana Malaviyaji Birth Centenary Commemoration Volume*, (Varanasi, 1961), 43.

[34] *Bombay Chronicle*, 30 July 1920. Also see N. G. Chandavarkar, *Non-co-operation in its Historical and Political Aspects*, (Bombay, 1920), 18–19.

[35] 'Vencam', *'Facts Unveiled'*, pub., by K. N. Shanker (Bombay, 1920), 8.

[36] *Englishman*, 30 Aug. 1920.

[37] *Hindu*, 2 Sept. 1920.

[38] Indulal K. Yajnik, *Gandhi as I Knew him* (Bombay, [1933]), 110–12; *Collected Works*, xvii, 13; and Lajpat Rai, *The Agony of the Punjab*, 127 and 129–31.

of Kheri in the UP) by a Muslim in August 1920.[39] The Bengalis and the Maharashtrians—C. R. Das, B. C. Pal, Byomkesh Chakravarty (1855–1929), G. S. Khaparde, N. C. Kelkar, Vithalbhai Patel and others—were as sceptical as ever. They agreed that non-co-operation was a perfectly constitutional weapon in a political struggle against the government, but were loath to its extension to the new legislative bodies which, they believed, needed to be boycotted from within. They were also against its application to schools and law courts. Besides, their personal rivalry with Gandhi and a sense of deep-seated cultural and temperamental differences with him prevented them from making a tame submission to the non-co-operation scheme.[40] No less important was the reluctance of the Hindu leaders to support an essentially Muslim campaign.[41] True, non-co-operation had been the brain-child of Gandhi, but it was an item of the Khilafat programme, formulated solely to redress the Khilafat 'wrong'. In its final operative form it had been shaped and developed by the Khilafatists themselves, with a religious overtone imparted to it by the *'ulama*.[42] No doubt the Punjab issue had been yoked with it to make it more acceptable to Hindus, but the direction of the campaign, despite Gandhi's efforts to the contrary, had remained in the hands of the non-co-operation committee of the CKC of which Gandhi was just a member. It must have been even more disconcerting to the Hindus to find Gandhi claiming that he was a Khilafatist and touring the country on the Khilafat expense account.[43] Such being the case, the majority of the Hindu leaders preferred to await a decision by the special Congress, notwithstanding the inclination of some provincial Congress committees to accept the non-co-operation principle.[44]

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[39] Ref. in Abdul Bari to Motilal, n.d., *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 9.

[40] B. C. Pal, *Non-co-operation* (Calcutta, 1920), 19–21; R. Chowdhury, *Ploughboy to President* (Calcutta, [1934]), 35–6; S. C. Roy, *The Story of My Times* (Calcutta, 1934), 223–4; Broomfield, *Élite Conflict*, 157; id., 'The Non-co-operation Decision of 1920: A Crisis in Bengal Politics', in D. A. Low (ed.), *Soundings in Modern South Asian History* (London, 1968), 225–60; and Al. Carthill, *The Lost Dominion* (Edinburgh, 1924), 227.

[41] See e.g. Broomfield, *Élite Conflict*, 157; and Al. Carthill, *The Lost Dominion*, 227.

[42] Gandhi himself acknowledged this. See e.g. *Hindu*, 16 Sept. 1920.

[43] *Collected Works*, xx, 523. When later in 1924, the CKC refused to honour Mohamed Ali's bills for expenses incurred on tours undertaken by him as the Congress president, he furiously complained that: 'We have never separated the Khilafat and Congress work and all Mahatma Gandhi's bill[s] used to be paid by the Khilafat [Committee] even when he was doing mainly Congress work'. See Mohamed Ali to Shoaib Qureshi, 27 Aug. 1924, in Shan Muhammad, *Unpublished Letters*, 256.

[44] For the attitude of the Congress leaders and the provincial committees between 1 Aug. and the special Congress see Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power*, 251–61.

The policy of the Government of India was generally one of watchfulness, with isolated attempts at repression. Except in the case of Pir Mahbub Shah of Sind, Zafar Ali Khan of the Punjab and a few other jailings, the action was confined to insignificant local agitators.[45] The contemplated action against the executive of the non-co-operation committee was dropped when the advocate-general of Bombay advised that the case would not stand against it.[46] Some provincial governors, particularly Earl Ronaldshay (1876–1961) in Bengal and Baron Willingdon (1866–1941) in Madras, reeled at the Government of India's 'masterly inactivity' and had wished to proceed against Shaukat Ali and Gandhi[47] but Chelmsford, taking an all-India view of the situation, bided his time. He was optimistic that 'this most foolish of all foolish schemes' would be repudiated by the 'thinking people' and if not, 'the Government is bound to and will use all the resources at its disposal' against it.[48] On 4 September 1920, the government issued a circular to the local governments explaining its position and justifying that it was expedient to wait and see rather than risk escalation by hasty repression. But it agreed that the local governments should take vigorous action and prosecute all incitements to violence.[49]

Early in September 1920, the Khilafatists, confident that their decision on non-co-operation was irrevocable, descended upon Calcutta to capture the special Congress with Gandhi's aid.[50] In fact, they had come well prepared and special Khilafat trains were arranged to take the delegates to Calcutta.[51] The opposition, too, came determined to give a tough battle. There had been a widely-shared feeling that something should be done to oust Gandhi from his position in the Congress and men like Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, Chakrabarty, Das, Motilal Nehru and Pal were all for it.[52] But Motilal Nehru, the man who had coun-

[45] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1696, file 5259/1920; and L/P&J/6/1698, file 5446. Action against Zafar Ali Khan was prompted no less by the Nizam's coaxing than by his political activities. See Nizam to Chelmsford, 8 July and 12 Aug. 1920, and Chelmsford to Nizam, 19 July and 4, Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[46] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1706, file 6763/1920.

[47] See Ronaldshay to Montagu, 17 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers; Willingdon to Montagu, 8 Aug. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers; and IOL&R, P/Conf./58, ICH(P)P, Aug. 1920, Proc. no. 127.

[48] *Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council*, lix (1920), 4 5. Also see IOL&R, P/Conf./58, ICH(P)P, Aug. 1920, Proc. no. 128.

[49] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1706, file 6763/1920.

[50] See circular letter from Shaukat Ali, Khatri and Kitchlew to CKC members, dated 3 Aug. 1920 in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat—ii.

[51] *Speeches and Writings of M. K. Gandhi*, introd. by C. F. Andrews (Madras, 1922), 46.

[52] S. C. Roy, *The Story of My Times*, 223.

selled the opposition to put up a united front, himself paused and reflected, and coaxed by his son Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), went over to the other side.[53] In order to show their strength to the Hindus, the Khilafatists held their conference on 5 September before the Congress took up the discussion on non-co-operation. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders were also invited. In the absence of the indisposed Mahmud Hasan of Deoband, the presidential chair was occupied by Abdul Majid of Badaun. Amidst wild enthusiasm, the Khilafat Conference unanimously reaffirmed its stand on non-co-operation as an absolutely binding religious obligation and resolved to continue incessant agitation against the stringent peace terms until Muslim demands were accepted. The Conference appealed for at least thirty lakhs (three million) of rupees and urged the provincial Khilafat committees to organize volunteer corps.[54] The move by Zafar Ali Khan and his Punjabi and Sindhi friends to establish a parallel Khilafat organization was successfully foiled.[55] The Muslim League, which had been under pressure from the Khilafatists to break its 'ostrich like silence' and wake up from 'habitual dumbness and lethargy'[56] also could not stand aloof. In spite of Jinnah's advice 'to weigh pros and cons of the question before you arrive at a decision',[57] it chose to follow the Khilafat Conference and affirmed the policy of non-co-operation.[58] In fact, in some matters of detail, it went even beyond the limits fixed by the Congress and the CKC.[59] However, it was the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind which made *tark-i muwalat* incumbent upon Muslims. At its sessions on 6 September, it decreed that since the European Powers and the British ministers were openly biased against Islam it was their religious duty to resort to non-co-operation. Later, this decree, moved by Azad, was attested by nearly 52 leading *'ulama*.[60]

[53] Kanji Dwarkadas, *Gandhiji Through My Diary Leaves, 1915 1948* (Bombay, 1950), 25. Dwarkadas records that Motilal Nehru's affection for his son 'got the better of his judgement'. See Kanji Dwarkadas, *Ruttie Jinnah: the Story of a Great Friendship* (Bombay, [n.d.]), 17. Also see B. R. Nanda, *The Nehrus* (London, 1962), 183–5.

[54] *Bombay Chronicle*, 7 Sept. 1920.

[55] Ref. in Shaukat Ali to Abdoola Haroon, 28 July 1927, AFM, Haroon Papers.

[56] See Ajmal Khan to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 30 Apr. [? June] 1920, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, xcvi.

[57] *Englishman*, 8 Sept. 1920.

[58] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, xcvi, 44–5. Also see *Bombay Chronicle*, 10 Sept. 1920.

[59] See Resolution iv in *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1920* (Lucknow, [1920]), app. iii, 26–9.

[60] Jafri, *Auraq*, 222.

When the proposition of non-co-operation was brought before the Congress it was debated for three days in the subjects committee. The discussion was so heated that at one point 'Shaukat Ali threatened to lay violent hands on Jinnah', the solitary Muslim opposing the motion, and 'was only prevented from doing so by the physical intervention of other delegates'.[61] The opposition, for its part, subjected Gandhi to considerable heckling, but he resisted all pressure to abandon the campaign. When he found that the feeling was running high against him, he threatened to go ahead with the help of the Khilafatists whether or not the Congress accepted it.[62] And the fact is that the Muslim dominance swung the balance in favour of non-co-operation. The proposition was finally accepted by a narrow majority of 144 votes to 132.[63] When the resolution was moved in the open Congress on 8 September, Lajpat Rai, the president, who had returned to India after the absence of six years, understood the political aspect of the Khilafat issue but chose to remain non-committal on non-co-operation.[64] Gandhi refused to admit that non-co-operation would lead to violence or bloodshed, maintaining that if it were adopted and practised in the manner he had presented it 'you can gain your Swaraj in one year'.[65] B. C. Pal of Bengal tried delaying tactics by proposing that before embarking on non-co-operation they should approach the British prime minister with regard to their demands and in the meantime re-examine the question of non-co-operation and participate in the elections.[66] He was supported by Jinnah, Malaviya, C. R. Das and Baptista, but, in the end, his motion was thrown out. Gandhi's resolution, managed by a juggle[67] and toned down with regard to the boycott of schools and courts,[68] was accepted on 9 September 1920 by 1826 votes to 884.[69]

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[61] Ronaldshay to Montagu, 22 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[62] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 789, 26 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[63] Ibid.

[64] J. S. Dhanki, *Lala Lajpat Rai and Indian Nationalism* (Jalandhar, 1990), 227 and 232.

[65] *Englishman*, 9 Sept. 1920.

[66] *Bombay Chronicle*, 9 Sept. 1920.

[67] The voters were asked to vote either for Gandhi's motion or Pal's amendment and those who were totally opposed to non-co-operation were given no chance to express their opinion. Moreover, Omar Sobani and Shankarlal added over a hundred 'delegates' from the streets on the day of the voting. See Dwarkadas, *Gandhiji*, 25.

[68] A third adjective, 'gradual', was added to the clause recommending 'non-violent' and 'progressive' non-co-operation.

[69] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 747, 10 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford

Thus, the Congress was compelled to adopt the whole programme of the CKC, even though the character of its decision had been advisory and not mandatory and the acceptance due more to estrangement from the government and to the personal influence of Gandhi than to the intrinsic soundness of the programme. But the determining factor was pressure from the Khilafatists who swayed the opinion in the subjects committee and obtained the verdict in their favour in the open Congress. The Muslim dominance was so visible that at one point Joseph Baptista accused Gandhi of 'handing over the Congress to Mahomedans'.[70] How deeply the Congress was committed to the restoration of the caliphate is a matter of conjecture, but the Calcutta decision gave the Khilafat movement the semblance of being a truly national movement. The acceptance of non-co-operation a month later by the Sikh League made the movement even more widespread. The opposition was gradually pushed into the corner, the most prominent victory having been the capture of the Home Rule League.[71] Jinnah, the president of its Bombay branch since 1917, resigned his membership with eighteen other members[72] and refused to come back 'for I am fully convinced that it [non-co-operation] must lead to disaster'.[73] Jinnah, in his reply to Gandhi's letter, admonished the latter that

> Your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and sons; people generally are desperate all over the country and your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youths and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganisation and chaos. What the consequence of this may be, I shudder to contemplate.[74]

Papers. The voting figures are, however, divergent in different sources. See e.g. *Collected Works*, xviii, 260; *Englishman* and *Bombay Chronicle*, 10 Sept. 1920; and *Hindu*, 16 Sept. 1920.

[70] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 789, 26 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[71] *Bombay Chronicle*, 5 Oct. 1920.

[72] Text of the letter of resignation in M. R. Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, i (Bombay, 1958), 404–6.

[73] *Bombay Chronicle*, 1 Nov. 1920. Also see Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (London, 1954), 83–4.

[74] Quoted in M. H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah (A Political Study)*, 3rd edn. (Lahore, 1962), 92.

The CKC and the Congress now pooled their resources for a vigorous campaign for non-co-operation. When early in October 1920, Mohamad Ali returned from Europe with the delegation, he took upon himself the larger share of the burden in an incomparable partnership with his elder brother.[75] He and the other members of the delegation were now fully convinced that real work had to be done in India itself.[76] In the areas such as the eastern Punjab where the Sikhs were proportionally strong, the task was shared by the Central Sikh League. The activity was not limited to urban areas; the rural population was also involved. More or less the same pattern was discernible in all the provinces. Particular attention was paid to opening branches in important mufassil centres and to conducting the campaign through deputations and social and economic ostracism of the recalcitrants.[77] In larger cities effort was directed towards industrial labour. The widespread economic discontent due to the widening gap between prices and wages and the industrial unrest were just ideal for the non-co-operators to exploit.[78] Within the span of a few months there had been over a dozen strikes in different parts of the country, ranging from the post and telegraph strike in Bombay to the police strike in Bengal. The CKC appointed paid itinerant lecturers, coached by its propaganda committee, to disseminate propaganda.[79] There were also a number of other secret workers and emissaries spread all over the country for the same purpose.[80]

Another instrument for controlling the movement was the corps of volunteers recruited by the provincial Khilafat, Congress and Sikh organizations. Volunteer groupings were not new to India. They had been fairly conspicuous during the 'revolutionary' activities in Bengal between 1905 and 1908. But the new volunteers assumed a somewhat

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[75] For a detailed analysis of their roles, see Naeem Qureshi, 'The Ali Brothers', 109–36.

[76] *Hindu*, 14 Oct. 1920. Also see Sulaiman Nadwi to Abdul Bari, 26 Aug. 1920, in Sulaiman Nadwi, *Barid-i Farang*, 178–9.

[77] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 836 and 859, 16 and 24 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[78] As early as May 1919, Ronaldshay had expressed the opinion that 'if serious trouble occurred the fate of the Caliph might be the excuse, but the price of food would be the real cause'. Ronaldshay to Chelmsford, 22 May 1919, ibid.

[79] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 836 and 859, 16 and 24 Oct. 1920, ibid. For a specimen of lectures prepared for the training of preachers by the propaganda committee of the CKC, see Abdul Majid Badauni, *Dars-i Khilafat*, i (Badaun, 1920).

[80] Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan of the Punjab, Maulawi Muhammad Ishaq of Mansehra and Maulawi Laqaullah of Panipat (d. 1969) were a few among them. Interview with Malik Lal Khan.

different character, developing a tendency to imitate military methods with identical ranks. Every evening Muslim volunteers in Turkish military uniforms drilled and paraded in the streets of major towns and tried to incorporate Egyptian and Irish militancy in their methods.[81] The non-co-operators were able to utilize them as a potent instrument of social boycott against those who refused to subscribe to non-co-operation.[82] Particular targets of ostracism were the Qadiani Ahmadis against whom feelings ran very high for refusing to join the Khilafat movement.[83] Their militancy furnished the government an opportunity to ban the volunteer organizations.[84] But even then these corps remained operative in most parts of the country.

Equally important in the propaganda campaign was the utilization of the press. Every day the nationalist newspapers and journals carried a number of articles in favour of the non-co-operation campaign. Marmuduke Pickthall was especially brought from Britain and entrusted with the editorship of the *Bombay Chronicle*.[85] Part of the propaganda appeared in the form of an endless number of pamphlets, poems and polemics (besides magazine and newspaper articles) by writers of all sorts. The bulk of this material, both in the vernaculars and in English, was meant to arouse public feelings by exploiting the usual theme of 'Islam in danger' or the 'machinations' of the Christian Powers and directly preached non-co-operation with the government until their demands were met. Some of the pamphlets were so inflammatory that they were proscribed and confiscated by the government.[86] Even more effective was the impact of the political poetry as a means of mobilizing masses. No public meeting or rally

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[81] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1731, file 570/1921. There is evidence to suggest that the Irish tried to incite the Indians against the British. See e.g. Eamon De Valera, *India and Ireland* (New York, 1920). The pamphlet was issued and circulated by the 'Friends of Freedom for India'. See PRO, FO 371/4558.

[82] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1731, file 570/1921. Even Hajee Ismail Sait (1859–1934), a wealthy and influential merchant of South India who had amply donated to the Khilafat fund, could not escape intimidation. *Hindu*, 13 Jan. 1921. The ugliest instance in this regard occurred at Delhi when the volunteers obstructed the burial of the dead-body of Khan Bahadur Abdul Ahad, a Muslim title-holder, for having refused to renounce his title when alive. See Chelmsford to Montagu, 8 Dec. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers; and *Siyasat*, 16 Dec. 1920.

[83] See Mirza Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad, *Malaku'llah* (Qadian, [1922]), 16–17. Also see Anjuman Hafizu'l-Muslimin, *Istinkafu'l-Muslimin wa mukhalifatu'l-Mirza'in* (Amritsar, 1920).

[84] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1731, file 570/1921.

[85] Anne Fremantle, *Loyal Enemy* (London, 1938), 313–14, and 385.

[86] A large number of proscribed pamphlets and other material are available in IOL&R, Vernacular Tracts series.

was complete without a poet moving the audience to frenzy by patriotic renditions. The print media was full of stirring verses to build up enthusiasm.[87]

Attention was also paid to raise funds, an essential ingredient of organizing and sustaining a movement. In the beginning most items of expenditure were borne personally by Chotani or managed through donations from other businessmen like Omar Sobani and Abdoola Haroon. But as the movement progressed and the Khilafat organizations expanded, the need for regular sources for funds became obvious. The target set by the Khilafat conference held at Amritsar in December 1919 was rupees 10 lakhs (one million).[88] It was raised to thirty lakhs in February 1920 by the second Khilafat conference at Bombay.[89] The main avenues were *zakat*, charitable bestowals by religious seminaries and contributions by the local Khilafat committees. But the largest chunk came from public subscriptions raised by workers and leaders during their 'begging' forays.[90] Apart from direct appeals for funds, the CKC issued 'paper currency' in the form of one-rupee receipts resembling a one-rupee note in shape and size but superscribed in Urdu with quotations from the Qur'an. The 'currency' obtained a considerable circulation, reaching as far as Rangoon in Burma.[91] Its success prompted the Khilafatists to propound scheme for the minting of the 'Khilafat Rupee', professing to be of slightly greater value than the standard rupee. They were to be banked at the Khilafat offices and issued in exchange for note issues.[92] In the fund-raising campaign the poor masses responded enthusiastically but

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[87] Gail Minault, 'Urdu Political Poetry during the Khilafat Movement', *Modern Asian Studies*, 8/4 (1974), 459–71; and A. D. Muztar, 'Some Punjabi Language Tracts on Khilafat Movement', *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, 3/1 (1982), 117–65.

[88] *Tribune*, 6 Jan. 1920.

[89] See above, 241.

[90] One of the first contributions of Rs 2,000 came from Sir Umar Hayat Malik Tiwana who asked his name to be kept secret. The list of subscribers included rich Indians abroad, esp. in South Africa and Madagascar, Indian princes and even the Nizam of Hyderabad. The Nawab of Dhaka pledged Rs 30,000 annually. See Dr Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali Jauhar aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970; Bamford, *Histories*, 182; and Bombay Report, 16 March 1920, NAI, Home Pol., file D/90/1920.

[91] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 908, 23 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. The Qur'anic verse read 'Whoever voluntarily gives anything to God reaps in return twofold as well as an enormous reward'. See SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/6, 12 Feb. 1921, para. 209.

[92] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 991, 22 Dec. 1920, in ibid.

the major donations came from the wealthy Indian commercial community which was incensed at the government for fixing the rupee exchange rate at a ratio unfavourable to Indian interests, i.e. 10 rupees to a gold sovereign.[93] Within a few years the rupee exchange had shot up from 1s. 4d. in the beginning of 1917 to 2s. 4d. in December 1919.[94] As the new rate had synchronized with a marked fall in the American rate for sterling, within few days of its announcement the exchange advanced from 2s. 4d. to 2s. 11d. and continued to rise. The Indian market was demoralized and business seriously handicapped.[95] A belief became current that the policy was designed 'to sap the prosperity of India, [and] to stimulate Britain's export trade'.[96] No wonder the Indian commercial classes poured huge amounts into the anti-British nationalist movement. It was this combination of the fall in exchange and in rupee prices which later intensified the *swadeshi* campaign.[97]

The funds were classified under two heads—the Khilafat Fund and the Smyrna Fund. The first was utilized for the movement in India while the second was meant for aiding the Turks. Subsequently, in September 1921, a third one, known as the Angora Fund, was started to help Mustafa Kemal and his Turkish nationalists. For all practical purposes the Smyrna Fund was then merged with the Angora Fund.[98] Besides, the provincial Khilafat committees had their own funds, parts of which were regularly surrendered to the CKC. The collections were normally placed as trust with dependable men and never deposited in banks for fear of their being frozen by the government.[99] But in spite of these efforts and the Ali brothers' way with the rich and the poor to empty their pockets, the collections fell far short of the target. Between January and May 1920, the total funds did not exceed Rs 2,10,214 which included the Ali brothers'

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[93] H. N. Brailsford, et al., *Mahatma Gandhi* (London, 1949), 139.

[94] *The Times*, 2 Feb. 1920. For details see Parl. Papers, 1920, Cmd. 527, *Report of the Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State to Enquire into Indian Exchange and Currency*. For the consequences of the British monetary policy in India, esp. after 1927, see Dietmar Rothermund, *India in the Great Depression, 1929–1939* (New Delhi, 1992), ch. ii.

[95] *The Times*, 9 Feb. 1920.

[96] Ibid., 24 Mar. 1920. For the views of the Indian commercial community, see the proceedings of the annual general meeting of the Indian Merchants Chamber, Bombay, under J. Petit on 2 Oct. 1920. *Indian Annual Register, 1921*, 51.

[97] See below, 292.

[98] *Hindu*, 12 July 1923.

[99] Interview with Malik Lal Khan.

entire purse of Rs 30,000 given them by a grateful public for steadfastness during internment.[100] In November 1920, Ahmed Siddik Khatri issued a statement which showed that the total had grown to Rs 5,32,973-10 6 while the balance after expenses was Rs 2,30,052-1-11.[101] By the end of the year, the total receipts had reached Rs 6,43,766-1-4 as against the expenditure of Rs 4,73,688-5-8.[102] The following year (1921), the position improved as the receipts swelled to Rs 20,99,789 4-5. Out of this amount, the remittances to Izmir amounted to Rs 5,34,857-13 10 and to Ankara Rs 3,75,231-3-9. The balance with the CKC was Rs 9,28,480-3-2.[103] For the proper maintenance of the accounts the constitution of the CKC had provided a specific procedure under the watchful eye of the executive committee which required regular auditing by a reputable firm of chartered accountants and a statement was issued annually.[104]

These funds helped the CKC to remit huge amounts to Turkey as well as to maintain large organization. They also enabled it to publish a weakly journal, the *Khilafat* (later turned into a daily), produce propaganda literature, finance leaders' tours, hold conferences and meetings and defray maintenance allowances to the families of the jailed workers, manage national educational institutions, establish new trades and industries and support the *muhajirin* and the Mappila sufferers.[105] The record was by no means poor though in an organization as vast as the CKC there were bound to occur some lapses. In a speech at Patna in August 1921, Dr Mahmud disclosed that by that date twelve lakhs of rupees had been collected. Out of this, Rs 6,50,000 had been sent to Izmir, Rs 2 lakh were spent on travelling, conferences, printing and stationery, Rs 1,50,000 were given to Mohamed Ali's delegation to Europe, Rs 50,000 to the *muhajirin* in Kabul and Rs 1,50,000 was in hand as balance.[106] It must also be stated that in October 1920, the Congress had launched its own

[100] *Bombay Chronicle*, 9 Mar. 1920; and *Madina*, 1 June 1920.

[101] *Zamindar*, 16 Nov. 1920. Also see Ext., Bombay Abstract, 27 Nov. 1920, para. 1523 (c), SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/49, 18 Dec. 1920, para. 2307.

[102] *Bombay Chronicle*, 1 Feb. 1920.

[103] Ibid.

[104] See clauses 37-49 of the Suppl. Rules of the CKC, *Dastur-i Asasi*, 13-14.

[105] See Central Khilafat Committee, *The Third and the Fourth Statements of Income and Expenditure of the CKC*, (Bombay, n.d.).

[106] Report by Col. Kaye of the CID dated 24 May 1922, NAI, Home Poll., 741/1922.

national fund of one crore rupees called the Tilak Swaraj Fund and invited the provincial Congress committees to make arrangements for the collection.[107]

In order to strengthen the religious appeal of the non-co-operation programme, the CKC mobilized the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i-Hind to formalize what Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari had already conceptualized. In their support for non-co-operation, the *'ulama* generally had been attracted by the same 'tactical' reason as the politicians, i.e. to press the Muslim demands on the government. But there was something more to it. The *'ulama* also wished to use non-co-operation against the onslaught of secularism: the legislative bodies would be replaced by a committee of *'ulama*, the 'infidel' law courts by *shari'at* courts and government schools by *daru'l-'ulum*.[108] Consequently, the Jam'iyyat met at Delhi on 19–21 November 1920, under the chairmanship of Mahmud Hasan, and reaffirming its decision on non-co-operation, drew up a *fatwa* mainly on the lines of the one issued in October by the chairman himself.[109] The *fatwa*, attested unanimously by about 120 prominent *'ulama*, supported the entire non-co-operation programme, item by item, on the basis of the Qur'anic text (mainly chapter, *Mumtahina*) and sayings of the Prophet.[110] It was a detailed *fatwa* and dealt with all aspects of *tark-i muwalat* from the religious point of view. For the time being, however, the proceedings of the Jam'iyyat were kept confidential and it was not until the following year that the *muttafiqa fatwa*, as the decision came to be known, was published. In the meantime, the leaders concentrated their energies on getting more signatures on the decree and achieving such amount of success as would compel the forthcoming Congress at Nagpur in December 1920, to confirm the acceptance of the non-co-operation policy.

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[107] *Bombay Chronicle*, 8 Oct. 1920.

[108] Robinson, *Separatism*, 324–5. For the *'ulama*'s verdict on non-co-operation, also see Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, *Tark-i muwalat par mufassal tabsara* (Deoband, 1920), *passim*.

[109] See resolution no. 2 in Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, i, 76–7; and *Fatwa Shaikhu'l-Hind Hazrat Maulana Mahmudu'l-Hasan* [*sic*] *Sahib Muhaddis Deobandi muta'alliq tahrik-i tark-i muwalat* (Vanyambadi, 1920). For Mahmud Hasan's presidential address see his *Paigham-i sadrat* (Delhi, [1922]).

[110] For variations in the *fatwa* see Muhammad Mubin, *nazim*, Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat, *'Ulama-i Hind ka muttafiqa fatwa* (Deoband, n.d.); Jafri, *Auraq*, 208–22. For its Eng. tr. see Bamford, *Histories*, app. G, 251–5; and app. (c), below.

Meanwhile, in spite of Gandhi's claim that the campaign had passed 'the stage of ridicule',[111] the success, particularly in the field of titles, honours and offices, was nominal. Table IV explains the position fully though each half-year there were at least a hundred ready acceptances of new titles. But then the non-co-operators were themselves not treating this aspect very seriously.[112] Their shock came with regard to the lawyers. Litigants had been urged not to go to the law courts for the redress of their grievances. Alternatively, a well-graded system of national arbitration, with the age-old institution of the *panchayat* as its basic unit, was proposed to decide cases.[113] Some efforts were made to put it into practice and lawyers were directed to induce parties not only to refer disputes to arbitration but also to withdraw the pending cases from the government courts and to submit them to the national courts. Even *sanads* were granted to counsels and petition-writers on payment of an annual fee. Financial aid was offered to those lawyers who were affected by the loss of their legal practice.[114] But the experiment of national courts was a failure. The cases brought before them were few and mostly pertained to divorce or the recovery of lost women. Failure to enforce their decisions was the chief hurdle and the remedy of social boycott was never effective. Most often the findings were ignored. Therefore, hardly any cognizable cases were dealt with by them.[115] Some barristers, *vakils* and *mukhtars*, counting such prominent names as Rajendra Prasad (1884–1963), T. A. K. Sherwani, Asaf Ali, Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman (1889–1973), did suspend their legal practice, but few could discontinue for an indefinite period. The official figures show that up to February 1921, only 99 lawyers throughout India had given up their practices.[116] Table V gives the official break-up of the province-wise position up to the first half of 1921. The only striking outcome of the boycott was the refusal of the non-co-

[111] *Collected Works*, xviii, 358.

[112] Mohamed Ali to Dr Abdul Hamid Said, [May 1921], encl., Montagu to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[113] Muhammad Ibrahim, *Girah katon ka foto* (Badaun, 1922), 2; and M. Asaf Ali, *Constructive Non-co-operation* (Madras, [1921]).

[114] Report on Draft Instructions for Congress Organizations, *Collected Works*, xviii, 281–2; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 836, 16 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[115] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 859, 24 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[116] Initially, Hindu lawyers were reluctant to give up practices. See Masud Ali Nadwi to Abdul Bari, 28 July 1920, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 237.

Table IV

Statement showing the number of persons in different Provinces who renounced titles, resigned public offices and public services up to the end of December 1920

Provinces	Titles	Honours	Offices	Services
Madras	7	—	32	—
Bombay	1	—	53	39
Bengal	1	4	10	—
UP	4	—	12	—
Punjab	—	2	—	48
Bihar & Orissa	1	—	2	—
Burma	—	—	—	—
CP	—	—	6	—
Assam	—	—	4	1
NWFP	1	2	—	162
Coorg	—	—	2	—
Delhi	3	—	—	3
Total:	18	8	121	253

Source: IOL&R, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1921, Pro. no. 234

Table V

Statement showing official information regarding the number of the pleaders who suspended their practice in pursuance of the non-co-operation resolution up to the first half of 1921

Province	Number
Madras	—
Bombay	23
Bengal	9
UP	5
Punjab	17
Burma	Nil
Bihar & Orissa	13
CP	30
Assam	1
NWFP	Nil
Coorg	Nil
Delhi	Nil
Administered Areas	1
Total:	99

Source: LAD, i, part 1, 1921, 795.

operators to defend themselves when tried in the government courts.

Having failed to achieve much in the spheres of titles and boycott of law courts, the non-co-operators directed their attention to the boycott of government-aided and -controlled schools and colleges. They had been quick to perceive that the educational institutions were most suitable for disseminating non-co-operation doctrines. In order to win support the non-co-operators launched an attack against the entire educational system. They argued that the system was alien and irrelevant[117] and that it was degrading to accept it after the Khilafat breach and the Punjab 'wrong'.[118] Though there was difference of opinion among the non-co-operators as to how a new system was to be instituted,[119] the campaign was facilitated by the readiness of the student community to breakaway from the government system. By doing so they imagined to be helping the national cause in some obscure way. Besides, there was among the students a steady recognition that the courses of education imparted to them were not helpful in terms of career.[120] Thus, the political appeal was strengthened by the economic factor. Added encouragement came from a *fatwa* to the effect that in such matters filial disobedience was not contrary to the Islamic religion.[121] At a time when the whole system was reacting to the political unrest the economic discontent of the low-paid teachers rendered the position particularly vulnerable.[122]

The first target of the educational non-co-operation was the late Syed Ahmed Khan's memorable handiwork—the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh, UP. The college, though not a government institution, was dependent on the government for its sustenance and its patronage for appointments. On 11 October 1920, encouraged by firebrands among the college students, Shaukat Ali and Mohamed Ali (who had returned from Europe a few days earlier), accompanied by Gandhi, descended upon Aligarh. A letter signed

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[117] Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, i, 368–9; and T. L. Vaswani, *The Gospel of Freedom* (Madras, 1921), 31–50.

[118] *Collected Works*, xviii, 307.

[119] Rajendra Prasad, *Autobiography* (Bombay, 1957), 116–17.

[120] J. A. Richey, *Progress of Education in India, 1917–1922*, i (Calcutta, 1923), 3–4.

[121] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 878, 11 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see *Hazrat Shaikh Mahmudu'l-Hasan [sic] ka ek zaruri khatt.*

[122] The salaries of the teachers bordered on the minimum necessary for existence. The UP report observed—and it was common throughout India—that in many districts teachers' unions were being formed to enforce their demands for better pay. See Bureau of Education, India, *Indian Education in 1920–21* (Calcutta, 1922), 2–3.

by the Ali brothers and six other trustees was addressed to the general body of the trustees and the students of the college, advising them to undo government interference and transform their institution into a national university by renouncing government grant, disaffiliating the college from the Allahabad University, and refusing the expected charter of the Muslim University. The non-co-operators called upon the students that if by 29 October the trustees did not accept the demands they should withdraw themselves from the college. The students were persuaded to pass a similar resolution. Gandhi, too, addressed a letter to the trustees advising action against the 'satanic' government.[123]

The trustees were compelled to approach the parents and the Old Boys of the college to intervene and save the only Muslim institution of repute from being destroyed.[124] The government also mobilized its forces to counter the Khilafatists who had gathered at Aligarh. Sir Harcourt Butler, the lieutenant-governor of the UP, 'whipped up' a number of trustees to reach Aligarh.[125] The Begum of Bhopal, who was one of the principal financial supporters, dispatched her son, Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan (1894–1960), himself an 'Old Boy' of the college and a trustee, 'to do his bit'.[126] She, like the Nawab of Rampur, also temporarily withdrew the Bhopal students and even threatened to stop the grant-in-aid to the college if the trustees succumbed to the Khilafatists' demands.[127] Dr Zia-Uddin Ahmad (1879–1947), the principal, pointed to the possibility of losing over one and a half lakhs of rupees annually in case the government grants were refused. He also warned that the land on which the college building stood would revert to the government if the institution was nationalized. As a result, the opposition to the non-co-operators grew strong. A number of parents and some more trustees arrived in Aligarh to help the college authorities.[128]

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[123] Abdul Ghaffar Mudholi, *Jami'a ki kahani* (Delhi, 1965), 19–20; Report submitted by Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan, Chief Sec., Bhopal Govt. to the Begum of Bhopal, 31 Oct. 1920, encl., Begum of Bhopal to Chelmsford, 3 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 875, 4 Nov. 1920, in ibid.; *Hindu*, 21 Oct. 1920; and *Bombay Chronicle*, 25 Oct. 1920.

[124] Dr Zia-Uddin Ahmad to Chelmsford, 26 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[125] See Butler to Vincent, 10 Nov. 1920, in ibid.

[126] Begum of Bhopal to Chelmsford, 3 Nov. 1920, in ibid.

[127] Hamidullah Khan's Report, in ibid. For the Nawab of Rampur see Bhatnagar. *History of the M.A.O. College*, 343.

[128] Bhatnagar, *History of the M.A.O. College*, 342–3.

On 27 October 1920, a crucial meeting of the trustees was held at Aligarh. The Ali brothers and their fellow signatories of the 'ultimatum' were also invited. After a heated discussion, the trustees successfully resisted the non-co-operators and rejected their demand by a majority of 48 to 11.[129] But the non-co-operators, refusing to admit defeat, occupied part of the college building and on the expiry of the 'ultimatum' on 29 October announced the establishment of the National Muslim University. The college authorities called in the police and ejected the Ali brothers from the premises. The latter, with a hundred and fifty students, moved out and pitched their camp in the immediate vicinity of the college in some tents and a couple of bungalows—one of these was given free by the old Muslim Leaguer, Moosa Khan (1872–1944). The inaugural ceremony of the 'National University', or the Jami'a Milliyya Islamiyya as it was called, was performed on 30 October 1920, by Mahmud Hasan of Deoband. Ajmal Khan became the Amir-i Jami'a and Mohamed Ali, on Iqbal's refusal, the Shaikhu'l-Jami'a. A foundation committee of 100 members and a syndicate of 16 were nominated and educationists from different parts of the country offered their services to teach at the new institution. The CKC sanctioned a sum of Rs 10,000 annually for the upkeep of the Jami'a.[130] Contrary to popular misconception the attack on Aligarh was not intended to wreck the college. In fact the idea was to involve the pre-eminent Muslim institution in the nationalist movement and thus break the official hold over the Muslim community through their acolyte.[131] The establishment of a separate 'national' university was, therefore, intended to be a temporary measure. The idea was to reunite the Jami'a ultimately with the Aligarh college when that was finally captured.[132] Therefore, there were no clear-cut aims and objects of the Jami'a Milliyya except that it ven-

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[129] Hamidullah Khan's Report, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Also see *Pioneer*, 29 and 30 Oct. 1920.

[130] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 875, 4 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; *Hindu*, 4, 7 and 11 Nov. 1920; *Bombay Chronicle*, 4 and 6 Nov. 1920; Mahmud Hasan, *Khutba-i sadarat* (Vanyambadi, 1921); Iqbal to Gandhi, 29 Nov. 1920, Gandhi Papers, quoted in Atiq Siddiqi, *Iqbal: jadugar-i hindi nazad*, 88–90; *Collected Works*, xix, 34; Mudholi, *Jami'a ki kahani*, 31–5 and 479 82; and Mirza Jawad Baig, 'Nawab Moosa Khan', *News* (Islamabad), 25 Dec. 1997.

[131] Abdul Majid Daryabadi, 'Muhammad 'Ali ('Alig)' in Jafri Nadwi, *'Ali baradaran*, 122; and W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, 2nd edn. (London, 1946), 129.

[132] Muhammad Sarwar (ed.), *Maulana Muhammad 'Ali* (Lahore, 1962), 11–12. Also see Daryabadi, 'Muhammad 'Ali ('Alig)', 122; and Mudholi, *Jami'a ki kahani*, 55.

tured 'to fuse together three ideals—western education, Islam, and nationalism'.[133] On Mohamed Ali's suggestion, all educational activities were suspended and the Jami'a was turned into a school for propagandists. The students were given, along with those from other colleges—200 to 300 in all—practical training in propaganda techniques and then in batches were spread all over India to further the Khilafat movement and to preach non-co-operation.[134] To counter the non-co-operators as well as to prevent the Aligarh funds from falling into their hands, the government decided to speed up the grant of university status to Aligarh. The university act had already been passed in the assembly in September 1920, but owing to red tape its enforcement was delayed. The timing was now used as a calculated political weapon. The writ was declared operational on 1 December 1920 with the Begum of Bhopal as the chancellor and the Raja of Mahmudabad as the vice-chancellor.[135] Ironically, it was the non-co-operating Khilafatists who had hastened the achievement of a Muslim university for which the Muslim community had been struggling for so long.

At other places also, attempts were made to influence the students. Gandhi turned towards Benares the moment he realized that some Muslims were suspecting him of destroying Muslim institutions without touching the Hindu university.[136] But here, too, the possibility of success was remote owing to the influence of Malaviya, the vice-chancellor. As expected, the non-co-operators were beaten back by the university court and Gandhi was compelled to abandon his attack.[137] On 19 October, Gandhi, accompanied by the Ali brothers,

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[133] F. Rahman, 'Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent', *Bulletin School of Oriental and African Studies*, 21 (1958), 90. Some idea, however, can be formed from Hakim Ajmal Khan, *Khutba-i sadarat* (Aligarh, 1922); and Muhammad Ali (Mohamed Ali), *Qaumi aur Islami ta'lim ka nizam*, 2nd edn. (Aligarh, 1924).

[134] See Mohamed Ali to Dr Said, [May 1920], encl., Montagu to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. A list of 22 such young propagandists from the Punjab who had been sent to different provinces is available in Ext., Bombay Abstract, 28 May 1921, para. 441, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/24, 25 June 1921, para. 1624.

[135] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 878 and 922, 11 Nov. and 2 Dec. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and *Proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council*, lix (1920), 201-13.

[136] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 878 and 916, 11 and 27 Nov. 1920, in ibid. Also see *Collected Works*, xviii, 378; Taj, *Hinduon se tark-i muwalat*, 20; Maulawi Abdul Hakim, *Mister Gandhi Musalmanon ke hargiz khairkhah nahin* (Lahore, 1921), 3; and Mian Sir Muhammad Shafi, *Some Important Indian Problems* (Lahore, 1920), 10.

[137] *Pioneer*, 17 Dec. 1920.

went to Lahore and conferred with the students of various colleges, including DAV, Diyal Singh and Islamia, who were already excited over the Aligarh incident. As a result many came out on strike.[138] A considerable pressure was built up through the press and public rallies to compel the Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam, the body governing the Islamia College, to join the non-co-operation campaign. The Anjuman, however, was in no mood to oblige as Mian Fazl-i-Husain and his friends were in favour of continuing with the affiliation and the government grant-in-aid.[139] However, Muhammad Ibrahim of Sialkot and his associates wanted to maintain the *status quo* until the matter was decided by an assembly of the *'ulama*. Dr Kitchlew urged an immediate withdrawal of co-operation from the government though later he agreed to abide by the verdict of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama which was about to meet in Delhi.[140] Mohammed Iqbal, who had earlier that year taken over as the honorary general secretary of the Anjuman after resigning from the Punjab Khilafat Committee either under official pressure or because of disenchantment with its leaders,[141] hedged and fidgeted and advised the Anjuman to solicit *'ulama*'s opinion before taking a decision.[142] At the crucial meeting of the Anjuman

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[138] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 42/42, 30 Oct. 1920, paras. 2010 14.

[139] *Zamindar*, 21, 26 and 29 Oct. 1920; Ahmad Saeed, 'Islamiyya kalig ki sad sala tarikh', ii, unpub. MS, 64 9. Among Fazl-i-Husain's friends were Justice Abdur Rauf, Maulawi Fazal Din, Chaudhry Shahab-ud-din, Munshi Din Muhammad, Nawab Sir Rahim Bakhsh, Nawab Khuda Bakhsh, Sheikh Inam Ali, Mahboob Alam of the *Paisa Akhbar*, Sheikh Abdul Qadir, Maulawi Inshallah Khan of the *Vatan* and Khwaja Ghulam Sadiq.

[140] Muhammad Hanif Shahid, *Iqbal aur Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam* (Lahore, 1976), 96 ff.

[141] See ch. ii, 132 3. Malik Lal Khan in his interview gave more weightage to official interference. But Iqbal himself maintained that he resigned because he considered the committee's existence 'dangerous' for Muslim interests. See Iqbal to Khan Muhammad Niaz-ud-din Khan, 11 Feb. 1920, in *Makatib-i Iqbal banam Niazu'd-Din Khan* (Lahore, 1954), 27. Niaz-ud-din Khan (1865 1929) was a close friend of Iqbal. Also see Faqir Sayyid Wahid-ud-din, *Rozgar-i Faqir*, ii, 2nd edn. (Karachi, 1965), 180; and Javed Iqbal, *Zinda rud*, ii (Lahore, 1981), 248 9. Maulana Abdul Qadir Girami (1856 1927), a poet and writer of Persian literature and a friend of Iqbal, was unhappy over his resignation from the committee. See Iqbal to Niaz-ud-din Khan, 11 Feb. 1920, above. Parveen Shaukat Ali's view that Iqbal relinquished office due to his differences with the Khilafatists' over 'Congressite methods of political protest' (*The Political Philosophy of Iqbal*, 317) does not seem tenable.

[142] Shahid, *Iqbal aur Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam*, 61. In an unexpected move he issued a statement, together with Haji Shams-ud-din and Maulawi Ghulam Mohy-ud-din, that for them the *'ulama* were the real arbiters and as such would abide by the Jam'iyyat's decision. See *Zamindar*, 16 Nov. 1920.

on 14 November 1920 under the chairmanship of Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Iqbal informed the assembly that several *fatawa* had been received from various *'ulama*, including those from Farangi Mahal, Delhi and Kanpur and one from Mahmud Hasan and all of them had supported non-co-operation. Only Maulawi Hakim Ali (1869–1944), the vice-principal of the college, and Asghar Ali Ruhi had struck discordant notes while Pir Mihr Ali Shah of Golra had not responded at all.[143] It also transpired that Hakim Ali, in an attempt to gather support, had personally travelled to Bareilly to obtain Ahmad Raza Khan's support.[144] Unfortunately, the latter's *fatwa* was laced with such vilification of the Deobandis and the likes of them that even those who might have been willing to attest it, refused to do so. Ashraf Ali Thanawi was particularly furious and when Fazl-i-Husain interceded with the Barelwi *'alim* to withdraw his remarks, the latter refused point blank.[145] The Anjuman's meeting of 14 November had to be adjourned for disorderly behaviour but not before it decided to reject non-co-operation. For his part in the affair, Hakim Ali was suspended while Principal Henry Martin, who had in the meantime a better offer from the Peshawar Islamia College, was allowed to resign.[146]

Iqbal's attitude during the whole proceedings was awkward and he shrank from coming openly on either side. Ambivalence apart, he was by temperament over-cautious and would not commit himself to an irrevocable course. Besides, the knowledge that he was under police surveillance might have compelled him to adopt this posture.[147] In a letter to the *Zamindar*, he declared that contrary to his suggestion the Anjuman had created confusion on important issues concerning the *shari'at* by consulting a few *'ulama* on individual basis. The need of the hour was to approach the *'ulama* collectively as a body to obtain consensus. The Muslims had their own code of life and neither Gandhi's nor any one else's conduct could serve as a model for

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[143] Shahid, *Iqbal aur Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam*, 97; and *Zamindar* 16 and 18 Nov. 1920.

[144] Ahmad Raza Khan, *al-muhjatu'l-mu'tamina*, in Jafri, *Auraq*, 226–30.

[145] See Hanif Shahid, *Iqbal aur Anjuman-i Himayat-i Islam*, 99–100.

[146] Ibid., 61–3.

[147] Ibid., 96–8; S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, 2nd edn. (Lahore repr. 1987), 183; Manochehr Dorraj, 'The Intellectual Dilemmas of a Muslim Modernist: Politics and Poetics of Iqbal', *Muslim World*, 85/3–4 (1995), 266 79; and Javed Iqbal, *Zinda Rud*, iii, 676, n. 6, citing Hafeez Rumani, "Allama Iqbal ki sha'iri khufiyya riporton ke a'ine men', *Nawa-i Waqt*, 21 Apr. 1983.

them. He would have accepted the *'ulama*'s decision if they had given it as a body.[148] Obviously, Iqbal did not think that Azad's *fatwa* or the Jam'iyyat's verdict on non-co-operation were enough.[149] He was not yet clear, as he admitted to Gandhi, about the religious import of the non-co-operation experiment in educational institutions, but hoped that notwithstanding their difficulties the *shari'at* would not fail to guide them through suitably.[150] Gandhi's reaction is not known but Mohamed Ali was definitely disappointed with Iqbal's strange behaviour.[151]

At Amritsar the non-co-operators faired better. The students of the Islamia School and Dayanand Anglo-Vedic and Khalsa colleges went on an all-out strike.[152] A meeting of the Islamia school students on 22 October pleaded with the controlling *anjuman* that it should, in deference to the decision of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind, stop accepting the government grant-in-aid. The students threatened that if their demands were not accepted they would follow the Aligarh and Lahore students and take necessary action. Under popular pressure the *anjuman* relented and accepted the demands.[153] The managing committee of the Khalsa College was also in favour of doing away with government control in management but when it failed to renounce the government aid twelve professors resigned *en bloc* as a protest.[154] The campaign was also strong in Bombay. At Nadiad one aided school and at Ahmedabad three unaided but recognized schools renounced connections with the government. At the latter place a national college was opened in the middle of November with Gandhi

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[148] *Zamindar*, 18 Nov. 1920. Also see corr. between Iqbal and Kitchlew in *Zamindar*, 12 Dec. 1920.

[149] For Azad see Majlis-i Khilafat Punjab, *Tahrik-i 'adm-i ta'awun*, 12. The Jam'iyyat's resolution of 19-21 Nov. 1920, is available in Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, i, 76-7.

[150] Iqbal to Gandhi, 29 Nov. 1920, Gandhi Papers, cited in Sheila McDonough, 'Iqbal, Gandhi and Muhammad Ali', in Little (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Civilization*, 212; and Siddiqi, *Iqbal*, 90.

[151] Muhammad Sarwar (ed.), *Mazamin-i Muhammad 'Ali Jauhar* (n.p. 1940), 425, cited in Muhammad Hanif Shahid, *'Allama Iqbal aur Qua'id-i A'zam ke siyasi nazriyat* (Lahore, [1975]), 86–7.

[152] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 905, 20 Nov. 1920 IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[153] *Zamindar*, 28 Oct. 1920. Also see Ahmad Saeed, *Anjuman-i Islamiyya Amritsar*, 198-200.

[154] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 905, 20 Nov. 1920 IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

as chancellor and Gidwani as principal.[155] Another national school, called Tilak Mahavidayalaya, was opened at Poone. A strike was also reported in the Calcutta Madrasa.[156] Elsewhere, the campaign was not much of a success and few students left their institutions.

Meanwhile, preparations were underway for the elections to the eight provincial councils and two chambers of the Indian legislature. As the elections approached, the non-co-operators intensified their pressure on the candidates to withdraw their candidatures and the voters to abstain from voting. Every kind of tactic—from gentle persuasion to coarse ostracism—was used to achieve the object and extended right into the villages.[157] Leaflets were circulated warning Muslims that anyone standing for councils or voting for them would cease to be a Muslim.[158] Hindu mendicants were reported to be going up and down the country warning the Hindus that failure to boycott the elections was equal to killing one hundred kine.[159] Gandhi issued a manifesto to the voters that they should sign a declaration that, until the Khilafat and the Punjab 'wrongs' were righted and *swaraj* obtained, they did not wish to be represented.[160] The government countered the boycott by rallying together the moderates, the loyalists, the landed aristocracy and the Europeans. To guard against intimidation by the non-co-operators it publicized widely the penal sections providing penalties for undue pressure on voters or candidates.[161] But in spite of these, the non-co-operation propaganda was fairly effective. Finding that the CKC and the Congress were unyielding, few nationalists could dare to stand for elections. Others who had wished to contest stepped down out of deference to these bodies. Yet others who had little chance of success at the polls were glad to retire with dignity.[162] The province-wise withdrawal of candidatures has been given in Table VI.

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[155] Ibid.

[156] *Hindu*, 4 Nov. 1920.

[157] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 871 and 952, 30 Oct. and 13 Dec. 1920 IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[158] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 952, 13 Dec. 1920, ibid.

[159] Parl. Papers, 1921, (202), *Statement Moral and Material Progress, 1920*, 65.

[160] *Bombay Chronicle*, 25 Sept. 1920.

[161] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no.—, 8 Nov. 1920 IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[162] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 819 and 836, 9 and 16 Nov. 1920, in ibid. Also see Rajendra Prasad, *At the Feet of Mahatma Gandhi* (London, 1961), 91.

Table VI

Statement showing the number of persons in different Provinces who withdrew candidature for election in the Assembly and Councils up to the end of December 1920

Province	Number
Madras	41
Bombay	27
Bengal	35
UP	21
Punjab	21
Bihar & Orissa	8
Burma	3
CP	0
Assam	4
NWFP	No candidates
Delhi	0
Total:	160

Source: IOL&R, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1921, Proc. no. 234

The result was that out of 774 contested seats 239 went uncontested and, in six cases, there were no candidates at all and the seats had to be filled through bye-elections. However, the position varied considerably from province to province, the largest number of uncontested seats and the smallest total number of candidates being in the CP. It is significant that in all the provinces the absence of candidates was most conspicuous in Muslim constituencies, particularly in the urban areas, more especially in the Punjab and Bombay.[163] The same variation existed in the voting pattern, though non-co-operation was not the only reason. Other factors, such as the floods in Madras and the widening of the franchise generally, had also affected the turnout. In any case, the pattern of voting varied from constituency to constituency—from 8 per cent in Bombay city, where the non-co-operators were most successful, to 70 per cent in some urban constituencies of the Madras presidency. Here again the lowest polls were generally recorded in the urban rather than in rural constituencies and, more particularly, in Muslim constituencies.[164] In

[163] Parl. Papers, 1921, Cmd. 1261, *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India*, iii.

[164] Ibid., iii–iv; and Parl. Papers, 1921, (202), *Statement Moral and Material Progress*, 1920, 65. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1008, 29 Dec. 1920 IOL&R,

some constituencies—in about half a dozen to a dozen cases—the non-co-operators were successful in hurling ridicule at the government by electing to the councils men of straw, like an illiterate coolie in Madras, a sweetmeat-seller in Delhi and a *mochi* in the Bengal presidency.[165] But the non-co-operators failed to prevent the councils from being filled. In all, there were 1,718 candidates for the 535 contested seats—an average of over three per seat. There were still many Indians who had come to the rescue of the government. The more important among those who sought the elections successfully were: Pandit Hridayanath Kunzru (1887–1978), C. Y. Chintamani, Syed Reza Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad in the UP, Fazl-i-Husain, Sardar Mehtab Singh, Umar Hayat Malik, Chaudhri Shahab-ud-din (d. 1949), Sikandar Hayat Khan (1892–1942), Firoz Khan Noon (1893–1970) and Mian Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana (1896–1940) in the Punjab, Surendranath Banerjea, Nawab Ali Chowdhuri, Fazlul Haq, the Nawab of Dhaka and Abdullah al-Mamun, Hassan (1884–1946) and Huseyn Shaheed (1893–1936) of the Suhrawardy family in Bengal, C. Ramaswami Aiyer (1889–1966), Sivaswami Aiyer, Srinivsa Sastri, K. V. Ranga Swami Iyengar (b. 1886) and R. Srinivasa Iyengar in Madras, S. Sinha in Bihar and Orissa, Dr H. S. Gour (1866–1949) and G. S. Khaparde in the CP, and Sir Chimanlal Hirlal Setalvad (1866–1947), Jamnadas Dwarkadas, G. M. Bhurgri, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Ebrahim Haroon Jaffer and Ghulam Husain Hidayatallah (1878–1948) in Bombay (including Sind).[166]

In its policy, the Government of India was still cautious. It believed that the people would themselves realize the 'folly' of non-co-operation. At any rate, it was anxious to keep things quiet until after the elections. Then if the government used force 'it will have at least the acquiescence of the Moderates' who would be in possession of the councils. The lesson of the Punjab 'wrong' had also made the government a little cautious. Therefore, Chelmsford, ignoring all pressure, hesitated to proceed against Gandhi lest it should alienate the moderates.[167] As regards the executive of the CKC, the proposed

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Chelmsford Papers. The smallness of vote was also confirmed by a later enquiry into the working of the Reforms. See Parl. Papers, 1925, Cmd. 236, *Report of the Reform Enquiry Committee, 1924*, Minority Report, 174.

[165] IOL&R, P/Conf./64, ICH(P)P, Jan. 1921, Procs. nos. 61–9.

[166] Parl. Papers, 1921, Cmd. 1261.

[167] Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 and 27 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. —, and 917, 24 Oct. and 24 Nov. 1920, in ibid.

prosecutions were once again opposed by the advice of the advocate-general, Bombay.[168] However, in view of the unexpected spread of the non-co-operation campaign, the government had felt it necessary to make a fresh declaration of its policy. On 6 November 1920, the home department issued a resolution which declared that although the campaign was 'unconstitutional' they had hitherto refrained from taking proceedings against those of its promoters 'who have advocated simultaneously with non-co-operation abstention from violence'. However, action was to be taken against those who had 'gone beyond the limits originally set up by its organizers and have by speech or writing openly incited the public to violence or have attempted to tamper with the loyalty of the army or the police'. At the same time, the government called upon those who had 'the good of India at heart' to organize themselves and 'assist the cause of law and order by active opposition to [the non-co-operation] movement'.[169]

Indeed, there was in existence a strong body of opinion which was frightened by the increasing militancy of the non-co-operation campaign. The moderates had kept up a fairly constant fusillade in the press: Raghunath Purshottam Paranjpe (1876–1966), C. R. Ramaswami Aiyer and Mrs Besant in the *Servant of India*; A. C. Mozumdar, Sir A. Chaudhuri (1860–1924), S. Bose, J. N. Roy, J. Chaudhuri (b. 1895) and B. C. Chatterji in the *Bengalee*; G. A. Natesan (1873–1949) in the *Indian Review*; and N. M. Samarth in the *Asiatic Review*.[170] The opposition to non-co-operation even among Muslims was still quite strong. Men like Jinnah, Hasan Imam, G. M. Bhurgri, Reza Ali, Fazlul Haq, the Nawab of Dhaka, Nawab Ali Chowdhuri, Mirza Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad of Qadian, the *taluqdars* of Awadh and certain Muslim associations were, as usual, actively opposing the campaign.[171] There would have been an even stronger mobilization

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[168] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1696, file 5273/1920.

[169] *Gazette of India*, 6 Nov. 1920, Resolution 4484, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1719, file 8442/1920.

[170] Besant, *Gandhian Non-co-operation*, x.

[171] For Jinnah see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 767, 18 Sept. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and M. H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, 3rd edn. (Lahore, 1962), 134–5. For Hasan Imam see his letter to Sir E. Gait, 21 Oct. 1920; and Gait to Vincent, 5 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Montagu Papers. For Bhurgri see Besant, *Gandhian Non-co-operation*, x. For Reza Ali see *Pioneer Mail*, 8 Oct. 1920. For Fazlul Haq see *Englishman*, 15 and 17 Dec. 1920; and *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 330. For the Nawab of Dhaka see *Bombay Chronicle*, 30 Oct. 1920. For Nawab Ali Chowdhuri see *Bengalee*, 31 Oct. 1920. For Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad see

of the anti-non-co-operation elements to the side of the government if a bridge had been provided in the form of a reasonable modification of the Turkish treaty (signed at Sèvres in August 1920 in the ceramic museum of a famous porcelain factory) and a more emphatic pronouncement regarding the lingering Punjab 'wrong'. Mrs Besant, Setalvad and other moderates, in an attempt to combat non-co-operation propaganda, tried to strike a bargain with Chelmsford through Governor George Lloyd of Bombay.[172] But the terms for a compromise, which they advanced,[173] were turned down by Chelmsford as 'disappointing'[174] and thus he lost the opportunity of playing his cards well.

During December 1920, the focus of attention was the Congress session at Nagpur, for on its outcome depended the future attitude of the bulk of the Hindu community towards the Khilafat movement. The majority of the moderates, however, chose to stay away from Nagpur and, instead, decided to meet hundreds of miles away in Madras under the 'maternal' wings of Mrs Besant.[175] The 'extremists' among the opponents of non-co-operation, the Bengalis and the Maharashtrians in particular, came determined to reverse the Calcutta special Congress decision of September 1920. The non-co-operators had not been sitting idle either. They had been concentrating on the opposition, especially the Bengal contingent. The Bengal Provincial Khilafat Committee had even provided a special train for the delegates' trip to Nagpur.[176] Mohamed Ali successfully used his personal influence with a compliant C. R. Das and 'proselytised' him to non-co-operation.[177] A compromise was reached in the subjects committee whereby Das undertook to support non-co-operation not so much as a sell-out to a 'Guzarati Bania' but really to checkmate Gandhi from inside by associating himself with his programme. On his part, Gandhi

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his *Non-co-operation and Islam* (Qadian, n.d.); and *Tark-i muwalat aur ahkam-i Islam* (Qadian, 1920). For the rest of the information see Bamford, *Histories*, 164.

[172] See George Lloyd to Chelmsford, 12 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[173] Encl., Lloyd to Chelmsford, 10 Dec. 1920, in ibid. The proposals were drafted by Setalvad.

[174] Chelmsford to Lloyd, 16 Dec. 1920, in ibid.

[175] For the proceedings of the National Liberal Federation see *Bombay Chronicle*, 31 Dec. 1920, 1 and 3 Jan. 1921.

[176] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 40, 15 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[177] Mohamed Ali to Dr Said, [May 1920], encl., Montagu to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

agreed to whittle down the boycott of schools and the surrender of practice by lawyers if it could bring down a powerful adversary.[178] The boycott of the councils was already a dead issue after the elections. Das himself then moved on 30 December, the non-co-operation resolution in the open Congress. Other opponents had already been silenced without much difficulty. The moderates of Nagpur were not heard, Malaviya's efforts were nugatory, G. S. Khaparde and Dr B. S. Moonje (b. 1872) were brushed aside and Lajpat Rai wobbled and then became silent.[179] Only Jinnah offered some resistance but he, too, was howled down amidst taunts and ridicules.[180] In disgust he stormed out of the session, never to return to the Congress fold again. This was the end of a long association. The rest was easy for the non-co-operators. The resolution was passed with an overwhelming majority which reaffirmed the Calcutta Congress advice on non-co-operation with intention to enforce whole or any part of the programme at a time to be determined by the Congress or the AICC.[181] At Motilal's instance, the Congress creed was remodelled to harmonize it with the spirit of the new movement. The objective of the Congress now became the attainment of *swaraj* 'by all legitimate and peaceful means' with or without British connections.[182] The more militant among the Muslims wanted to go even further and, with the full sympathy of the Ali brothers, tried to introduce proposals such as complete independence and the establishment of a republic, but were checked by Gandhi.[183]

With the Congress solidly behind them and the Muslim League firmly under their control,[184] the Khilafatists' position became remarkably strong. The proceedings of the Khilafat Conference, which

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[178] *Hindu*, 6 Jan. 1921; and S. C. Roy, *The Story of My Times*, 223 4.

[179] Sir Frank Sly to Chelmsford, D.O. no. G.C./1, 1 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[180] For the debate on the non-co-operation resolution see *Report of the Thrity-Fifth Session of the Indian National Congress, held at Nagpur, on the 26th, 28th, 30th and 31th December 1920* (Nagpur, 1920), 46 70.

[181] Ibid.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 40, 15 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[184] On 30 Dec. 1920, the Muslim League session at Nagpur, under Ansari's chairmanship, had reaffirmed its faith in non-co-operation and changed its creed to incorporate the attainment of self-government with or without British connection as its goal. See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, lxxxix, 43 ff. Also see *Madras Mail*, 1 Jan. 1921; *Times of India*, 3 Jan. 1921; and *Bombay Chronicle*, 31 Dec., 1920, and 1 and 3 Jan. 1921.

opened on 29 December 1920 under Abul Kalam Azad, were defiantly uncompromising. Sir Frank Sly (1866–1928), governor of the CP, reported that the Muslim delegates at Nagpur were exceedingly bitter and their speeches 'considerably more violent than even those at the Congress', and those of the Ali brothers were 'practically veiled threats of rebellion'.[185] The Khilafat Conference reiterated its previous stand and refused to modify its original demands.[186] The net result of the Nagpur proceedings was that the Khilafatists were able to capture the vast machinery of the Congress and all its funds for the cause of the Khilafat, including the Tilak Swaraj Fund. A period of intense campaigning followed the Nagpur sessions. In the beginning of the new year, Chotani addressed a letter to the Congress and the Muslim League leaders urging 'the necessity of these two bodies ceasing to be merely deliberative and of forming themselves into executive organisations'.[187] He suggested the appointment of standing committees with sub-committees or boards to control finance, national education, national industries and commerce, and propaganda.[188] It is not known what response Chotani invoked on these specific proposals but soon a massive drive towards non-co-operation was underway. On 23 January 1921, Chelmsford gloomily reported to Montagu that the situation had 'undoubtedly worsened' in many parts of the country.[189] And a government report admitted that non-co-operation had expanded into 'a formidable and complex system'.[190]

The first result appeared in the form of renewed non-co-operation among the students. The activity was fairly strong in the Punjab, Bombay, Bihar and Orissa and the CP. At some places, like Nadiad and Ahmedabad, even the municipalities renounced government grants for education.[191] But it was most intensive in Bengal, due largely to the personal influence of C. R. Das.[192] At his bidding practically all students in Calcutta deserted their schools and colleges, but mostly

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[185] Frank Sly to Chelmsford, DOs nos. G.C./1 and G.C./4, 1 and 14 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[186] *Bombay Chronicle*, 1 and 3 Jan. 1921.

[187] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 40, 15 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[188] Ibid.

[189] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no, 79, 23 Jan. 1921, in ibid.

[190] Govt. of the Punjab, *A History of Non-co-operation in the Punjab*, 32.

[191] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 198, 21 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[192] For his appeal to the students see C. R. Das, *India for Indians* (Madras, 1921), 164–75.

from private institutions. University examinations were also interfered with and out of 600 law candidates only about 150 sat.[193] But though the whole of Bengal was affected, the campaign was more intense in Hindu-majority western Bengal than in Muslim-dominated eastern Bengal.[194] In Rajshahi and Chittagong, in particular, the Muslims resisted the non-co-operators. The experience of the 1906–1908 agitations seems to have made them wiser.

Before long the storm blew itself over. The closure of the institutions was to a great deal responsible for defeating the boycott. The government also tried to solidify the anti-non-co-operation feelings of the parents, roused as a result of the closure of schools and colleges.[195] The more serious among the students themselves began to realize the effects of the boycott on their careers. As regards the number of students actually withdrawn, the report on Indian education for 1920–21 shows a marked decrease in the total number of students in the public institutions. The percentage of decrease in English arts colleges and high and middle schools were 8.6, 5.1 and 8.1, respectively, against increases of 3.3, 2.4 and 2 of the preceding year. The total loss was 1.7 per cent as compared with the 1919–20 figures.[196] But it is almost impossible to establish a precise numerical figure because the fall in attendance, though primarily due to non-co-operation, was also affected by various other factors, particularly the high cost of living. Moreover, the girls' schools were almost entirely unaffected. However, an assessment can be made from Table VII. The position becomes even clearer when one compares these figures with the improved attendance in 1922–23 as shown in Table VIII which signifies a sharp recovery from the effects of non-co-operation. So far as the national schools are concerned no exact assessment of their number or financial position is possible. But some idea can be formed from Table IX which shows the number of the national schools and colleges, the number of students in attendance, and the approximate effect of non-co-operation on certain recognized institutions. The CKC, besides supporting the Jami'a Milliyya, financed a number of schools and colleges throughout the country.[197] So did the Congress

[193] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 67, 20 Jan. 1921, IOI&R, Chelmsford Papers.
[194] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 301 Edu., 24 Feb. 1921, in ibid.
[195] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 105, 27 Jan. 1921, in ibid.
[196] *Indian Education in 1920–21*, 1.
[197] Khilafat funds report, *Statesman*, 17 Mar. 1923.

Table VII

Statement showing withdrawal of students from Government and -aided schools and colleges

Year	Arts Colleges		Secondary Schools				Total		Primary Schools	
	Institutions	Scholars	High Schools	Scholars	Middle Schools	Scholars	Institutions	Scholars	Institutions	Scholars
1919–20	150	52,482	2,113	632,032	6,595	649,778	8,708	1,281,810	155,844	6,133,521
1920–21	160	48,170	2,184	600,583	6,739	653,942	8,923	1,254,525	159,345	6,327,973
1921–22	167	45,933	2,248	594,910	6,739	644,614	8,987	1,239,524	160,072	6,310,451

Source: J. A. Richey, *Progress of Education in India, 1917–22. Eighth Quinquennial Review*, i (Calcutta, 1923).

Table VIII

Attendance at Government and -aided schools and colleges in British India during 1922–23

Year	Arts Colleges		Secondary Schools				Total		Primary Schools	
			High Schools		Middle Schools					
	Institutions	Scholars	Institutions	Scholars	Institutions	Scholars	Institutions	Scholars	Institutions	Scholars
1922	170	47,632	2,246	595,402	6,731	643,839	8,977	1,239,241	159,889	6,304,457
1923	174	52,639	2,312	632,943	6,732	698,462	9,044	1,331,405	162,015	6,600,116

Source: Bureau of Education, Government of India, *Indian Education in 1922–23* (Calcutta, 1924).

Table IX

Table showing the approximate impact of non-co-operation on national and recognized institutions during 1921-22

Province	National Schools and Colleges in 1921 22		Approximate effect of Non-Co-operation on certain recognized institutions up to March 1921		
	Institutions	Scholars	Scholars	Withdrawn	Returned
Madras	92*	5,072*	1,71,111	820	+
Bombay	189	17,100	42,416	2,350	239
Bengal	190	14,819	1,03,107	11,157	...
United Province	137*	8,476*	49,171	2,626	789
Punjab	69	8,046	1,11,078	1,309	481
Burma	92	16,218	36,875	13,031	747
Bihar & Orissa	442	17,330	23,190	1,826	+
Central Provinces	86* 454		6,338*	71,759	1,824
Assam	38	1,908	12,186#	1,139	356
NWFP	4*	120*	41,342	Nil	...
Minor Admins.	10	1,255	45,508	571	70

* Opened till 31st July 1921.
\+ There was a general tendency to return.
\# Till January 1921.
Source: J. A. Richey, *Progress of Education in India, 1917 22. Eighth Quinquennial Review*, i (Calcutta, 1923).

and a number of individual wealthy businessmen. One Bengali enthusiast was said to have collected Rs. 1,000 by begging in the streets of Calcutta.[198] Though the number of political resignations among the educationists was relatively small, a number of teachers, professors and professional men like lawyers and doctors offered themselves to lecture in the national colleges. The attempt was not altogether unsuccessful as the government was compelled to recognize the defects of its own education system and to suggest improvements.[199] But the practical difficulty of effectively replacing the 'imported' system of education contributed, to a large extent, to shattering the non-co-operators' dream. They had been able only to make a dent and

[198] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 301-Edu. and 908, 24 Feb. and 23 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.
[199] *Indian Education in 1920-21*, 6-7.

cause some financial loss to the government,[200] but otherwise they were themselves disappointed with the unsatisfactory results.[201]

The increased political activity in the early months of 1921 was not limited to the students. The non-co-operators showed great astuteness in exploiting the genuine economic grievances of the peasantry. The lot of the peasant in India had never been good but in Malabar and Awadh it had been particularly desperate. Here, *zamindari* oppression—burdensome rent, high exactions and exorbitant *nazranas*—was present in its worst form.[202] Half-hearted attempts by the British, as in 1912 and after, to improve the system and protect the tenant, had foundered as the government was reluctant to antagonize the *zamindars*, the only class that was solidly behind them.[203] In some provinces, as in the Punjab, the situation had been rendered even worse by, among other factors, the return to villages of a large number of disbanded soldiery. Crop failure, plague and disease were other contributory factors.[204] Thus, besides a general desire for tenancy reform, there was considerable unrest prevailing among the rural masses which had led early in 1920 to the establishment of Kisan sabhas or peasant associations.[205] Though young Jawaharlal Nehru had been taking interest in the Kisan sabhas since the summer of 1920,[206] it was not until the end of that year that the non-co-operators had turned their attention towards the rural masses. Consequently, they were reported to be working up anti-government feelings with exaggerated promises, such as free railway travel passes, rent-free land, cheap clothes, and cheap food.[207] Gandhi and the Ali brothers visited the UP a number of times to stir up the sabhas. The sabhas were at first divided about non-co-operation, but the

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[200] The Calcutta University alone estimated a loss of exam. fee income of Rs 2,63,000. The CP govt. had to pay a sum of Rs 18,000 to a comparatively small number of schools as a compensation for the loss of income. See ibid., 4.

[201] Mohamed Ali to Dr Said, [May 1921], encl., Montagu to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[202] For Malabar see app. (d) below. For Awadh see note by J. W. Hose, 8 Feb. 1921, encl., Montagu to Chelmsford, 16 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and S. J. Singh, 'The Agrarian Problem in the United Provinces and Oudh', *Pioneer*, 10 Apr. 1921.

[203] See Hose's note of 8 Feb. 1921, Chelmsford Papers.

[204] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 143, 8 Feb. 1921, in ibid.

[205] See Hose's note of 8 Feb. 1921, in ibid.

[206] Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London, 1936), 56–8.

[207] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel no. 155, 9 Feb. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers. This refers to earlier events.

failure to get their representatives elected to the councils had made them more receptive.[208] The Kisan Congress, which was held in December 1920, accepted non-co-operation and pressed for the complete deletion of the ejectment laws from the statute-book, repeal of mortgage and sole right in peasant holdings.[209] This was the first significant attempt to turn the peasant movement to political advantage.

The strength of the revolutionary agrarian movement was fully demonstrated in the post-Nagpur period when at many places the government servants, while on tour, were socially boycotted and refused supplies.[210] The trouble culminated in the violent anti-*zamindar* and anti-government riots in Bareilly and Fyzabad in the UP.[211] The provincial authorities answered the riots by repression and countered non-co-operation by launching an active anti-non-co-operation campaign with the help of the *zamindars* and the Liberals. Aman sabhas, which were in a way 'anti-revolutionary leagues', were established to whip up support for the government against the non-co-operators.[212] But the experiment was short-lived and before long the Liberals withdrew their support as a protest against the government's repressive policy. It was also the beginning of the end of the notion that the landlords were central to the provincial political system.[213] On the other hand, the success of the non-co-operators was exhibited by the fact that an anti-*zamindar* movement was turned into an anti-government movement.[214] The non-co-operators' success is also evident from the fact that the Kisan sabhas established their own *panchayats* and, except in a few cases, settled the disputes themselves.[215] More importantly, the *zamindars* and the government were compelled to recognize that they would have to make concessions to the peasants and to revise the Oudh Rent Act of 1886.[216]

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[208] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no.– , 8 Nov. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[209] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1008, 29 Dec. 1920, in ibid.

[210] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 202, 24 Feb. 1921, ibid.

[211] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1729, file 275/1921.

[212] Peter D. Reeves, 'The Politics of Order', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 25/2 (1966), 265 74.

[213] See on this subject Peter Reeves, *Landlords and Governments in Uttar Pradesh* (Bombay, 1991), *passim*.

[214] *Fatawa* were issued to counter the Aman sabhas. See e.g. Muhammad Mubin, *nazim*, Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat, *Libral lig aur aman sabhaon ke muta'alliq Islami fatwa* (Deoband, n.d.).

[215] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 202, 24 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers. Almost 3,000 *panchayats* were functioning though as many as 7,000 had been suppressed in north-eastern Awadh by the govt. See S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, i (London, 975), 59.

[216] See note by Hose, 8 Feb. 1921, Chelmsford Papers.

Next on the list were the industrial workers whose importance the non-co-operators fully realized and who, unlike the April 1919 agitation days,[217] seemed to be quite responsive. A little more effort was needed to pull them in. The rank and file of the labour movement were led by their own leaders—Fabians N. M. Joshi (1879–1955) and Joseph Baptista and Communist S. A. Dange (b. 1899)[218]—but the non-co-operators like Lajpat Rai had also taken a leading part in organizing them in the All India Trades Union Congress (AITUC).[219] As early as October 1920, the Bombay government had reported that the labour disputes were likely to be utilized by the non-co-operators through the AITUC at the end of that month.[220] Shortly afterwards, the AITUC pressed for the claim of the labour to have its representatives in the reformed councils so as to counter the effect of the business community.[221] Then came the utilization of the labour unrest for political purpose. Early in 1921, the government received a joint ultimatum from the Indian Telegraph Association and the Railway Workmen's Association stating that unless their demands for fresh revision of pay were accepted by 28 February, they would not be responsible for the disruption of the services.[222] Similarly, the tramway workers decided that in order to obtain the recognition of their unions they would, if necessary, go on general strike. The Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway workmen went on strike and the one at the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway resulted in disorders.[223] There was also trouble in sugar mills in Samastipur in Bihar leading to a riot in Giridih.[224] In Assam, the non-co-operators excited the labour in the tea gardens.[225]

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[217] Kumar, *Essays on Gandhian Politics*, 6–7.

[218] Imam, *Colonialism*, 63–5.

[219] This was in July 1920. See All India Trades Union Congress, *Report of the First Session (held at Bombay, 1920)* (Bombay, 1921), 1–2. For a brief history of the Labour unions in India see Parl. Papers, 1931, Cmd. 3883, *Report, Royal Commission on Labour in India*, 317–18.

[220] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 819, 9 Oct. 1920, IOL&R. Chelmsford Papers.

[221] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 881, 14 Nov. 1920, in ibid.

[222] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1745, 26 Feb. 1921, in ibid.

[223] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 202, 24 Feb. 1921, in ibid.

[224] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 112, 29 Jan. 1921, ibid. For details of non-co-operation in Bihar see Md. Muzaffar Inam, *Role of Muslims in the National Movement (1912–1930) (A Study of Bihar)* (Delhi, 1987), esp. 121–66.

[225] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 202, 24 Feb., 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

There is no direct evidence as to how far the non-co-operators were helped by the Bolshevik agents in their efforts to arouse the labour movement. In February 1921, the Director of Intelligence Bureau in Delhi reported that Bolshevik propaganda literature was on its way to India from Afghanistan through various routes. Of particular interest were the copies of the Urdu weekly, *Azad Hindustan Akhbar*, which was in circulation among the British Indian forces in Iran.[226] Shaukat Usmani and his colleagues were not the only Bolshevik agents who had been trained and sent back by Moscow.[227] There was a large proportion of them among the *muhajirin* arriving back from Bukhara and other places. Some of them had even served in the republican militia.[228] But their impact was minimal as the middle class Khilafat-Congress leadership was inimical to Communism. This was despite the fact that some of the front rank leaders, like Hasrat Mohani and B. C. Pal, were serious Bolshevik sympathizers.[229] In the final analysis, therefore, the Indian nationalist movement, during the period under review, seems to have 'remained largely unaffected in its actual policies and progress by the October Revolution'.[230] The reasons for the failure of Communism in India must be sought in the Comintern's inability to comprehend the force of national ideology, an implicit reliance on armed struggle and unnecessary over-centralization.[231]

The non-co-operators also exploited the Akali Sikhs who were incensed at the government for supporting the hereditary *mahants* in their dispute over the control of *gurdwaras*. Though it gained momentum in 1920, the genesis of the *gurdwara* reform movement lay in the politicization of the Sikh masses following the enthusiasm generated by the Ghadr militancy and the nationalist agitation. The idea behind the *gurdwara* movement was to acquire the management of the Sikh temples from the corrupt *mahants* who were intent on holding on to

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[226] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/8, 26 Feb. 1921, para. 301. The material was later intercepted and proscribed by the police. See ibid., 43/10, 12 Mar. 1921, para. 505.

[227] Usmani, *I Met Stalin Twice*, 21 2.

[228] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/38, 1 Oct. 1921, para. 2019.

[229] For Pal see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/887, file 1847/1920. For Mohani see Abdul Shukur, *Hasrat Mohani*, 3rd edn. (Lucknow, 1954), 22 3; and A. Q. Desnawi, *Hasrat ki siyasi zindagi* (Desna, n.d.), 58 61.

[230] Imam, *Colonialism*, 83.

[231] For details see Dushka H. Saiyid, *Exporting Communism to India: Why Moscow Failed* (Islamabad, 1995), esp. 161 79.

the fabulous wealth associated with them. Since the stakes were high the movement brought the Akalis into conflict with the Punjab Hindus and the British Indian government who supported the *mahants*.[232] As a result, the radicals among the Sikhs, meeting in December 1919 at Amritsar under the presidency of Sardar Gajjan Singh, organized themselves into the Sikh League and demanded self-government and the transfer of the Golden Temple management to an elected body of the Sikhs.[233] Gandhi and other Hindu and Muslim leaders, who had gathered at Amritsar for the annual sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League, also attended the inaugural meeting. With the adoption of the non-co-operation experiment by the Sikh League at its second meeting in October 1920 at Lahore, the movement for the control of educational and religious institutions by the Sikhs themselves obtained considerable publicity and some success.[234] The formation of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) in December 1920 at Akal Takht in Amritsar centralized the movement which continued the struggle well into the 1920s.[235] In the same meeting, the Akali Dal or the 'Army of Immortals' was formed to spearhead the movement. The Punjab government also reported dissemination of political propaganda amongst the rural classes, particularly in the recruiting areas. The job had been done mainly by a committee under Lajpat Rai.[236] But the militant spirit of the Sikhs did not remain confined to anti-British channels. They also clashed among themselves over the possession of the *gurdwaras*, resulting in such tragedies as at Nankana Sahib in February 1921, when about 150 Akali 'Reformers' were butchered and burnt to death by the rival group.[237]

The rapid progress of the Khilafat movement with its multipronged non-co-operation campaign had already begun to stagger the Government of India. Its anxiety was enhanced by the fact that the movement had penetrated the lower strata of the Muslim population

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[232] Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, ii (Delhi, 1977), 193 ff.

[233] *The Indian Annual Register, 1920*, i, 463–4.

[234] *The Indian Annual Register, 1921–22*, i, 158; and Ram Narayan Kumar and George Sieberer, *The Sikh Struggle* (Delhi, 1991), 106.

[235] Kumar and Sieberer, *The Sikh Struggle*, 106–7.

[236] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 143, 8 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[237] See the Punjab govt. report dated 2 Mar. 1921, in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 227, 4 Mar 1921, IOL&R, ibid.; and *Indian Annual Register, 1921–22*, i, 158–9.

which hitherto had been apparently unaffected. From this the government concluded that the 'virus' of the Khilafat movement must ultimately infect the army and the police.[238] It also apprehended that in their bitterness the Khilafatists might accept even the Amir of Afghanistan as caliph should the office be offered to him in accordance with the reported suggestion at the Bolshevik-sponsored Baku conference (September 1920).[239] Additionally, there were reports of collusion between the Turkish nationalists and the Arabs, and of Kemal having addressed King Husain as caliph.[240] As a precaution the government had already sounded the Deoband *'ulama*, including Mahmud Hasan and, after him, his successor Habibur Rahman Ludhiyanawi, on various issues. And the feedback from them indicated that if the freedom of the holy places was secured and Husain persuaded to accept the caliph's suzerainty over Arabia they would be willing to make peace with the government.[241] This was possible because the Deoband *'ulama* seemed to have been annoyed with the political leaders for their supposed subordination of religion to Hindu-Muslim unity. As an example they cited Shaukat Ali's wearing of the Hindu *tilak* mark on his forehead at Madras and the proposal to abandon cow slaughter altogether.[242]

In addition to the depressing situation in India, some external factors, too, were causing anxiety to the government. A particular item of disquiet was the rise of the Turkish nationalists who had gradually consolidated their power and position under Mustafa Kemal. This had changed the whole Near Eastern scenario. From April 1920 onwards, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) with Kemal as its

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[238] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1347 S., 23 Nov. 1920, ibid.

[239] Ibid. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1276 S., 2 Nov. 1920 in ibid. For the Bolsheviks' attempts to stir up the Muslim world against the Allies, see ch. iii. Also see Ivor Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917–1958* (Seattle, 1959), esp. 64–81; and D. L. O'Leary, *Islam at the Cross Roads* (London, 1923), 183–6. In Mar. 1921, the Bolsheviks had also concluded a treaty of friendship with the Turkish nationalists. See Jane Degras (ed.), *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, i (London, 1951), 237–42.

[240] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 2550, 14 Oct. 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[241] See the accounts of their interviews with the Collector of Saharanpur (UP) in Note by C. A. Silberrad, 1 Nov. 1920, encl., Chelmsford to Montagu, 17 Nov. 1920; and Silberrad to Pert, 16 Jan. 1921, encl. Chelmsford to Montagu, 2 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[242] See encl. 'A' to Silberrad to Pert, 16 Nov. 1921, in ibid. For the reaction of other *'ulama* see e.g. Abul Kamal Muradabadi, *Farman-i Islam* (Benares, 1921), 4–6; and M. M. Qadiri, *Khutba-i sadrat* (Marhara, 1922), *passim*.

president had come to be portrayed as the symbol of the will of the Turkish nation. The nationalists were fighting against the Greeks, the Armenians, and the French with their backs against the wall. But the acceptance of the Treaty of Sèvres by the sultan-caliph had created such revulsion of feelings against the Istanbul government that it gave Mustafa Kemal a God-sent opportunity to strengthen his position by judicious separate negotiations. The war with the Greeks turned him and his followers into national heroes. By January 1921, with a new constitution giving him the desired legitimacy and the victory at Inönü the much-needed confidence, Mustafa Kemal could rightfully claim the sole leadership of the Turks. This compelled the Allies to reconsider their position, *vis-à-vis* the nationalists. At long last, it was realized that the Treaty of Sèvres was stillborn and some of its provisions had to be modified before the Turks could be made to accept it. Kalogeropoulos, the successor of Venizelos as the Greek prime minister, was unable to arouse the same kind of response as his predecessor. But since the invitation to the conference in London (scheduled from 2 February 1921) was sent to Kemal indirectly, he refused to accept it. In the end, however, a delegation from Ankara was persuaded to sit at the conference table in London.[243]

Compelled by these multiple developments, and perhaps by the radicals' boycott of the visit of the Duke of Connought (1850–1942) early in January 1921,[244] the Indian government opened fresh discussions with Whitehall for a revision of the Turkish treaty. Chelmsford, in spite of his recent failures in that direction,[245] lost no time in pressing Montagu to secure permission for a small delegation of non-official Indian Muslims at government expense to place their views before the forthcoming peace conference in London.[246] Chelmsford's

[243] For the rise of Kemal see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London, 1961), esp. 246–8; E. D. Smith, *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919–1923)*, (Washington, 1959), *passim*; Halidé Edibe, *The Turkish Ordeal* (London, 1928), *passim*; and Igdemir, *Atatürk*, 71–92. For its impact on British policy see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/852, files 4634/1921, and 943/1921.

[244] For the Duke's visit to India to inaugurate the reformed councils and the subsequent boycott see Parl. Papers, 1922, (171), *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1921, Fifty-Seventh Number*, 46–49; *Hindu*, 13 Jan. and 3 Feb. 1921; and Marquess of Zetland, *'Essayez'* (London, 1956), 135, and 138–39.

[245] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 1276–S., 1347—S., and 96, 2 and 3 Nov. 1920, and 26 Jan. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[246] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 133, 6 Feb. 1921, in ibid.

intention, as he later explained to Montagu, was to prompt 'a split between the Extremist Mahomedans and Gandhi'. 'The former', he argued, 'would then find themselves isolated and detested by both their Hindu allies and all Moderate and sensible Mahomedans'.[247] Montagu at once obtained Lloyd George's approval and hurriedly on 19 February a delegation, consisting of Chotani (leader), Hasan Imam (spokesman), and the Aga Khan, was dispatched from India.[248] Dr Ansari accompanied the delegation as Chotani's adviser and interpreter and Abdul Ghaffar as his secretary. Later, Ansari, too, was given official status and made a full member of the delegation in order to eliminate the Shi'a majority of two to one. Kidwai also joined to assist them.[249] George Lloyd, governor of Bombay, coaxed by Ibrahim Rahimtoola and the Aga Khan, pleaded with Chelmsford to send him to London, too, as India's official delegate or ambassador in addition to the non-official delegation. Lloyd argued that he had enough personal influence with the prime minister 'to make him see reason on the Eastern Question'. He maintained that it would also afford a dramatic proof of 'their best co-operation with the Indian feeling on a matter affecting them so deeply—and a complete answer to non-co-operation'. But Chelmsford was disinclined to spare Lloyd at an anxious moment and despite the latter's pressure did not agree.[250]

The Indian delegation was a diverse group holding different shades of opinion and chosen and paid for by the government.[251] But the mere fact that the British government had consented to receive a delegation was viewed by the Khilafatists as a victory. They increased their pressure to drive home the advantage. A series of Khilafat conferences were held at several places emphasizing that if the settlement was inconsistent with their demands it would be unacceptable to them. At Fyzabad, Mohamed Ali even threatened to sever connections with

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[247] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 195. 19 Feb. 1921, in ibid.

[248] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 180, 7 Feb. 1921, in ibid.

[249] See Mohamed Ali, *My Life*, 149–50; and Gandhi to Chotani, Tel. n.d. [before 18 Feb. 1921], text in Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 243, 18 Feb. 1921; Pte. Sec. to Gov. of Bombay to Pte. Sec. to Viceroy, Tel. no. 244, 18 Feb. 1921; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 200, 23 Feb. 1921; and Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 310, 4 Mar. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[250] See Lloyd to Chelmsford, 13 Feb. 1921; Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 235, 17 Feb. 1921; Viceroy to Gov. of Bombay, Tel. no. 186, 18 Feb. 1921; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 169, 15 Feb. 1921; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 183, 18 Feb. 1921, ibid.

[251] Abdul Ghaffar, *Naqsh-i Farang* (Lahore, 1924), 13–14.

the British government.[252] This may have been a hollow threat but on the Turkish issue the Khilafatists were fully supported by, besides Hindus, the loyal and moderate Muslim opinion. The matter was raised in the Council of State by Bhurgri and a joint representation of the Muslim members of the two Houses of the central legislature was conveyed to the prime minister in London.[253] Deputations of the Muslim members of several provincial legislatures waited upon the authorities and the Shi'as expressed their solidarity with the Sunnis.[254] The Begum of Bhopal also urged on Chelmsford the importance of dealing with the Khilafat question in accordance with the wishes of the Muslim community.[255]

The Indian delegation arrived in London on 6 March 1921, when the conference was nearing its end. Nevertheless, it was given the opportunity to present its case to the British government. The members of the delegation met Montagu at the India Office on 11 March and, on 12 March, they had an interview with the prime minister at 10 Downing Street. On the latter occasion, Montagu and Bonar Law were also present. Apparently, Lloyd George was impressed by Hasan Imam's presentation of the case on behalf of Chotani but the interview did not last longer than 45 minutes. He was imperious and abrupt in manners and openly weary of the proceedings. Instead of listening to the delegation's point of view he just stated the policy which his government had decided to follow. However, the delegation was asked to furnish a memorandum explaining the objections to the Treaty which they wanted to put before the Supreme Council of the Allies.[256] But the fact of the matter is that the proposals for the modification of the treaty, known as the London Proposals, had already been approved by the Allies on 10 March, and were handed to the Turkish and Greek delegations at St James's Palace on the very day

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[252] Bamford, *Histories*, 54 and 164–5.

[253] *Council of State Debates*, 1921, i, 197–206 and 376. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 354-Pol., 23 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Montagu to Lloyd George, 25 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/852, file 1196/1921.

[254] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 5-C. and 224, 25 Feb. and 3 Mar. 1921; IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and L/P&S/10/852, files 1592/1921, 1637/1921 and 1874/1921; and S. Muhammad Nawab, *Pamflet minjanib Anjuman-i Khuddam-i atibbat-i aliyat* (Lucknow, 1921).

[255] Begum of Bhopal to Chelmsford, 6 Mar. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[256] Ghaffar, *Naqsh-i Farang*, 36 and 48–52. For the official report of interview with Lloyd George see F/172/1/10(b), Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers. For the text of the belated memo see *Islamic News*, 21 Apr. 1921.

that the Indian delegation had its interview with the prime minister.[257] The proposals were substantial concessions, especially with regard to Capitulations, finances and armed forces, but unfortunately they did not at all cover the points by which alone the Muslims of India could be satisfied, i.e. restoration of Izmir and Thrace to Turkey and the sultan-caliph's suzerainty, no matter how nominal, over the holy places in the Hijaz. Of the last two not even a mention had been made. On the other hand, the French scored a diplomatic point by almost simultaneously announcing the evacuation of Cilicia in vivid contrast to the failure of the British to fulfil their pledges.

Naturally, the Indians were not at all happy. At a dinner at the Savoy Hotel in London on 15 March, which they hosted in honour of the Turkish delegations from Ankara under Beker Sami Bey and from Istanbul under Reşid Paşa, Hasan Imam bitterly attacked the proposals. The position could have been retrieved if Ankara had been inclined to accept them. Quite the contrary the proposals were far from the nationalists' expectations.[258] But so far as the Indians were concerned the matter had not been closed. Montagu flew his kite for a compromise but Hasan Imam would not agree to any surrender of their demands.[259] Nevertheless, on 24 March, after much effort and waiting, the Indian delegation was given another opportunity to explain their case to the prime minister at his chamber in the House of Commons. This time round, Lloyd George was even more peevish and fretful. The discussion centred on the memorandum that the delegation had submitted to him earlier. The Indians argued that their demands, having the support of the entire Subcontinent, were based on the pledges of the British government and the requirements of the *shari'at*. Therefore, in the revised Turkish treaty the caliph must be restored his *religious* suzerainty over Muslims of territories of which he was not the sovereign. As such the Arab lands must be shorn of the mandates and Palestine be kept out of the reach of the Jews. But Lloyd George avoided being drawn into any discussion and chose to talk about only those things which suited him. He was totally unyielding on any point with the possible exception of the evacuation of Istanbul. He talked about the pledges to the Jews but conveniently forgot his own pledges to the Indian Muslims. He refused to accept that the caliph of the Muslims was no Pope

[257] For the London Proposals see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/852, file 4634/1921.
[258] *Hindu*, 24 Mar. 1921. Also see Ghaffar, *Naqsh-i Farang*, 62–4.
[259] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 496, 12 Apr. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

of Rome and that his status was quite different from that of the Christian Pontiff. He kept on repeating that the British had no intention of interfering in religious matters but would not concede on any point, and ended the interview the moment he heard that his presence was needed in the Commons. Before leaving, however, he commended Hasan Imam again for his presentation of the case though the members of the delegation themselves were not so sure of it. Abdul Ghaffar, in particular, was not happy with Imam's assurance to the prime minister that if their demands were accepted they would call off the agitation.[260]

The members of the sterile delegation were utterly disappointed and considered the visit futile.[261] 'It was a *tamasha*', wrote Abdul Ghaffar later, '[and] it ended [like one]'.[262] They were even more resentful when King Husain's son, Emir Faisal (1883–1933), pretended to them that the Arabs were quite willing to accept Turkish suzerainty over the holy places but that Lloyd George would not agree to it.[263] Hasan Imam returned to India immediately while Ansari and Abdul Ghaffar followed him a few weeks later. The Aga Khan went to the continent for eye treatment but Chotani and Kidwai, in spite of the disappointing results, stayed back to continue their efforts. With the help of Ispahani, Jinnah and other Muslims in Britain, as well as the British Turcophiles, they launched a publicity campaign. A small committee with Ispahani (honorary secretary), Syud Hossain (secretary), the Aga Khan, Aftab Ahmad Khan and Abdulla Yusuf Ali was appointed to do the job. The Aga Khan promised a modest monthly allowance while Chotani agreed on behalf of the CKC to bear other expenses.[264] To rally support, Kidwai turned to Montagu whom he considered 'the most useful friend among the English'.[265] Two days after their meeting (28 May), Jinnah also went to see him. Montagu

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[260] For details see F/172/1/10 & 10(a), Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers; and Abdul Ghaffar, *Naqsh-i Farang*, 70–88.

[261] See Chotani's Tel. to Khatri in *Hindu*, 31 Mar. 1921; and the delegation's letter to Montagu dated 26 Mar. 1921, in F/172/10/(e), Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers. Also see *Islamic News*, 21 Apr. 1921.

[262] Abdul Ghaffar, *Naqsh-i Farang*, 88.

[263] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 321 25 Apr. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and *Islamic News*, 26 May 1921.

[264] See the notice dated 6 June 1921 in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat—i. Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan rendered valuable service to Chotani and also passed on useful notes to the Ankara delegation. See Habibullah Khan, *Hayat-i Aftab* (Aligarh, 1948), 209.

[265] He called on him on 26 May 1921. See Kidwai to Sheikh Shaukat Ali, 7 June [1921], in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat—i.

told Jinnah that in his opinion the Turkish problem was about to be solved as the British government had decided to sever its relations with Greece. Therefore, there was no need to worry much about Turkey. But Kidwai did not think that the solution of the problem was that easy.[266] For his part, Chotani, a businessman by profession, tried to establish contacts with the business community in Britain and sought to enlist its support.[267] But in effect, these efforts were not much of a success. Moreover, back home the opinion was divided as to whether the CKC should commit itself to support these efforts. Shaukat Ali, in particular, opposed the idea thinking that the work in Britain, being conducted by persons opposed to non-co-operation might not be useful.[268] But Kidwai came out forcefully against such misgivings. He resented the unwarranted suspicions entertained by the Ali brothers and Azad about the Aga Khan and deprecated the proposal to give preference to *swaraj* over the Khilafat issue as was suggested by Sulaiman Nadwi and vigorously pushed by Mohamed Ali.[269] This only shows how ignorant the Khilafatists were about the contributions of their well-wishers in Britain, particularly those of the Aga Khan and Kidwai.

The failure of Chotani's mission frustrated the intentions of the Government of India to split the Khilafatists and Hindus by detaching the amenable section of the Muslim opinion from the agitation. On the contrary, it increased their bitterness and they did not conceal that their acceptance of non-violence had been only a matter of policy and would prefer to take up *jihad*. The *'ulama* were restless owing to the persistent threat of non-Muslims making a bid for the control of the Hijaz.[270] This left no room for a compromise. The Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama drove the last nail when, meeting at Bareilly on 24 and 26 March under Azad's presidency, it declared for the complete independence of India. It also resolved to concentrate all efforts to achieve this objective and to punish the opponents of non-co-operation through religious tribunals and other means.[271] The latter decision was directed primarily against the Barelwis who had the audacity to challenge the

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[266] Ibid.

[267] *Islamic News*, 21 Apr. and 5 May 1921; PRO, FO 800/151; and *Bombay Chronicle*, 22 June 1921.

[268] See notice dated 6 June 1921 in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat—i.

[269] See Kidwai to Sheikh Shaukat Ali, 7 June [1921], in ibid.

[270] See the weekly tels., from Viceroy to Sec. of State for Mar. and Apr. 1921, in IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers and Reading Papers.

[271] *Hindu*, 31 Mar. 1921.

non-co-operating 'Deobandi' *'ulama* to a *munazara*. Their seventy-point 'charge-sheet' alleged deliberate circumvention of Islamic tenets for political motives and a tame submission to Hindus, including inviting them to mosques, wearing of *tilak* mark on the forehead, prohibiting cow slaughter and promoting Gandhi as if he were an *imam*.[272] Abdul Majid Badauni, the *nazim* of the Jam'iyyat, hedged on the issue but Azad, knowing fully well that the challenge had come from the second rung of the Barelwi leadership, just ignored the 'charge-sheet'. Instead, he invited Ahmad Raza Khan to the Jam'iyyat moot hoping to get even with him.[273] Ahmad Raza Khan was too ill to respond but the Barelwis were in no mood to let off Azad lightly. Sayyid Sulaiman Ashraf, the well-known former head of Islamic studies at Aligarh, attended the Jam'iyyat moot to explain the Barelwi point of view. In a hard-hitting speech he accused the Khilafatists of subservience to Hindus and lamented that for the Muslims the real ideal was their faith and if that was gone then 'cursed be the sultanate which is traded for *iman* and a thousand curses on the rule that is obtained at the cost of Islam'.[274] Azad was visibly unnerved and was apologetic and incoherent throughout the proceedings. He denied knowledge of non-co-operators doing anything un-Islamic and disowned actions which might be interpreted otherwise.[275] Of course, there were instances of the Khilafat workers over stepping the limits—not an unusual sight in the rough and tumble of politics—but no one was prepared to admit it. The government reaction, on the other hand, was not so restrained. The local governments, in response to the Government of India's instructions of January 1921, had resorted to a more vigorous action. Section 144 was frequently invoked

[272] See Muhammad Jalal-ud-din Qadiri, *Abu'l-Kalam Azad ki tarikhi shikast* (Lahore, 1980), 54–9 and 74–81. The 'charge-sheet' was prepared by Muhammad Amjad Ali Qadiri and delivered to Badauni on 20 March 1921 by a delegation under Husnain Raza (1892–1981), a nephew of Ahmad Raza Khan, on behalf of the Majlis-i Raza-i Mustafa (founded 17 December 1920). The list of charges included: (a) Zafarul-Mulk Alawi's alleged statement that if prophethood had not ended Gandhi might have been a prophet; (b) Shaukat Ali's declaration that by embracing Hindus, the Muslims would please the Almighty himself; (c) Mohamed Ali's utterance that he considered it a duty to carry out the commandments of Gandhi after those of the Prophet; and (d) Abdul Bari's confession that he had accepted Gandhi as his leader and would carry out whatever he commanded. See Sayyid Nur Muhammad Qadiri's preface to Sulaiman Ashraf, *ar-Rishad*, iv–v.

[273] Jalal-ud-din Qadiri, *Abu'l-Kalam Azad ki tarikhi shikast*, 88–90.

[274] Sulaiman Ashraf, *ar-Rashad*, 20 and 23. Eng. tr. mine. For the controversy also see Jamaluddin, 'The Barelvis and the Khilafat Movement', 404–5.

[275] For details see Jalal-ud-din Qadiri, *Abu'l-Kalam Azad ki tarikhi shikast*, 107–26.

to prohibit public meetings. The police and military were often used to break up processions and moveable columns of the army were paraded through towns to strike terror. The nationalist press was gagged and leaders were put in jail or threatened with prosecution.[276]

In this atmosphere of repression and agitation ended the term of office of Lord Chelmsford, one of the most unpopular viceroys of India. With his lack of charm and geniality, he was unable to get through to people. He was, in the words of a contemporary, 'too much of a machine'.[277] The feeling against him had become so intense that few Indians were willing to give him a public farewell. On top of this he got an unfavourable press. Dejected and heart-broken, Chelmsford left India on 2 April 1921, 'unwept, [and] unsung', as Butler noted.[278] The same day the Marquess of Reading (1860–1935), the new viceroy, arrived in India. The son of a London fruit merchant he had risen to be England's Lord Chief Justice, becoming an Earl from a commoner. He was also Jewish like Montagu. His Semitic background was expected to produce a certain bond between him and the eastern people.[279] Despite the government repression and, notwithstanding the desire of the more desperate Muslims to offer active resistance, the non-co-operation leaders decided that time was not yet ripe for civil disobedience. They were willing to give the new viceroy a trial. This, it seems, was motivated as much by their unpreparedness to shore the agitation as by expediency.[280] They allowed him time to evaluate the situation. The AICC which met at Bezwada on 1 April, and the Khilafat Conference which was held at Meerut from 7 to 10 April, both seemed to agree on this. As an alternative

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[276] The day to day record of the cases instituted against the non-co-operators was published by the nationalist press, particularly the *Independent* (Allahabad) under the daily headline 'Tide of Repression'. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 228, 259 and 285, 6, 17 and 29 Mar. 1921, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers.

[277] Quoted in Bence-Jones, *The Viceroys of India*, 223.

[278] Ibid., 228, n. 37. Also see Lloyd to Montagu, 18 Mar. and 8 Apr. 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[279] Ibid., 229–30.

[280] Mohamed Ali to Dr A. H. Said, [May 1921], encl., Montagu to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. It was presumed in some circles that Reading had been sent to India to affect a round table conference. Bomanji and Reza Ali were already urging Gandhi to suspend non-co-operation for some months in order to let Reading assess the situation. Shaukat Ali had even instructed the CKC not to enforce any *hartals* or hold demonstrations on Reading's arrival. See *Hindu*, 31 Mar. 1921; *Times of India*, 5 Apr. 1921; *Englishman*, 4 Apr. 1921; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 330, 28 Apr. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

to civil disobedience, they decided to concentrate on the task of strengthening the movement before the end of June 1921. The new programme included the enlistment of ten million members each for the Congress and the Khilafat organizations, the collection of ten million rupees for the national cause, and the introduction of two million *charkhas* into Indian homes.[281] To strengthen the appeal, an increasing stress was laid on Hindu-Muslim unity. A typical example was how at a meeting in Ferozepur, the Qur'an, the Granth Sahib and the Vedas were placed side by side on a table and Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were employed to keep flies off each other's holy book. They also drank from the same cup to demonstrate unity.[282]

But with the change in viceroyalty there was no obvious change of policy. Reading's assessment of the situation was based on the assumption that the agitation was largely concentrated upon the demand of complete *swaraj* and that it was 'an attempt to create a spirit of nationalism which will make for independence'.[283] His policy, therefore, as he explained to Montagu, was 'to detach the more reasonable of the non-co-operationists and to weaken the movement'.[284] It was basically the same as Chelmsford's. The Khilafatists, who were expecting a change of heart with the coming of the new viceroy, approached Reading to call a round table conference for a suitable settlement.[285] But Reading did not agree thinking that such a conference would lead to nothing unless the non-co-operators made very substantial changes in their programme.[286] The leaders were disappointed and decided to redouble their activities. Consequently, the reports from the provincial governments for the months of April and May showed a marked increase in agitation, leading to 'a stampede' of many thousands of oppressed coolies from the tea gardens of Assam and a simultaneous strike in the Assam-Bengal Railway.[287] But this increased activity often resulted in outbreaks of mob violence,

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[281] *Madras Mail*, 2 Apr. 1921; *Hindu*, 7 Apr. 1921; and Bamford, *Histories*, 166.

[282] See Ferozepur Report, 16 Apr. 1921, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/17, 30 Apr. 1921, para. 1304.

[283] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 330, 28 Apr. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[284] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 36-C, 19 Apr. 1921, in ibid.

[285] The suggestion was conveyed to Reading by Mohamed Ali through Hasan Imam who with his wife was going to Simla as the viceroy's guest. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 321, 25 Apr. 1921, ibid.

[286] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 330, 28 Apr. 1921, in ibid.

[287] See the fortnightly reports for Apr. and May 1921, in ibid., vol. 10. Also see *Hindu*, 19 and 26 May and 30 June 1921.

as at Malegaon in Bombay and Giridih in Bihar, causing great racial bitterness.[288]

The government retaliated by increasing repression and gave *carte blanche* to its officials to fight non-co-operation and rally the moderates to their side.[289] But Reading was extremely worried about the Muslim attitude and the leadership of Mohamed Ali whose growing influence was very disquieting to him. As he later informed Montagu:

> It is idle to underrate the importance of Mahomed Ali's position as the head of the Khilafat movement; it is useless merely to denounce him as a braggart and a wily unscrupulous politician and a hater of the British. He is a real factor in the situation; he is the ostensible link between Mahomedan and Hindu. If trouble comes between him and Gandhi it means the collapse of the bridge over the gulf between Hindu and Mahomedan. . . . My survey of the position on my behalf and as the result of advice is that he is at the moment a far more dangerous factor to peace than Gandhi. . . . I prefer the power to be in his [Gandhi's] hands to the hands of Ali brothers.[290]

In order to create rift between Gandhi and the Ali brothers, or between Hindus and Muslims in general, the government exploited the Hindu fear of an Afghan invasion. Efforts in this direction had already been afoot under Chelmsford when Sir William Vincent (1866–1941), the home member, started the Afghan hare by digging up the old accusation that the Ali brothers wanted Afghanistan to invade India and desired a Muslim rule in the Subcontinent.[291] In reply, on 2 April 1921, Mohamed Ali, with Gandhi's approval and in his presence, tried to clarify his position in a speech at Erode in Madras. But in doing so he muddled up the whole thing. Whereas he offered to oppose an Afghan invasion if it was intended to subjugate India he was also willing to assist the invaders in every possible way, including the use of force, if the purpose was a *jihad* against the British.[292]

Mohamed Ali's argument reflected the familiar issue of primary

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[288] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1748, file 2778/1921 and L/P&J/6/1749, file 2941/1921.

[289] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 339, 30 Apr. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Consequently, a number of 'Reform Conferences' were stage-managed under prominent Moderates and district officials.

[290] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 414, 19 May 1921, in ibid.

[291] *Legislative Assembly Debates*, i, part 2, 1525.

[292] *Zamindar*, 29 Apr. 1921. Also see *Daily Telegraph*, 2 May 1921, IOL&R, L/R/5/202.

loyalty to India or to Islam which kept recurring during the Khilafat movement. But taken in conjunction with the declared objectives of the *hijrat*, the mounting *'jihad'* raids of the Frontier tribes on the Indian territory, the slow progress of the Anglo-Afghan talks on a treaty of friendship and the increasing Bolshevik and Turkish influence in Afghanistan, the speech created alarm in some Hindu circles. Speculation arose as to what might happen if the Afghans really invaded India. A section of the Anglo-Indian and the moderate press took pains to spread alarm and suspicion.[293] Much was made also of a story by Shradhanand about an alleged Afghan spy meeting the Ali brothers and getting from them an assurance of support in case the Afghans invaded India.[294] In spite of Mohamed Ali's assurances that he had not meant what had been insinuated and despite Gandhi's explanation that the speech had been misunderstood, some of the Hindu leaders like Malaviya, B. C. Pal and Lajpat Rai were not satisfied.[295] Even C. F. Andrews (1871–1940), who defended the principle of non-co-operation, thought that Gandhi was unwittingly inviting the Afghans to invade India and condoning violence.[296]

As soon as signs of rift appeared, the government decided to prosecute Mohamed Ali. Harcourt Butler was persuaded to 'bell the cat'.[297] But Muhammad Shafi, the education member, advised Reading that the proposed action was 'entirely inopportune', likely to start a chain of violent disturbances in the country and that they should wait for a psychologically suitable moment.[298] All the three Indian members of Reading's executive council—Sapru, Shafi and Sarma—counselled him that there was just a possibility that Gandhi might be

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[293] *Leader*, 30 Apr. 1921; *Daily Pratap* (Kanpur), 7 May 1921; *Aj* (Benares), 8 and 11 May 1921, *Swadesh* (Agra), 9 May 1921; *Oudh Akhbar* (Lucknow), 13 May 1921, IOL&R, L/R/5/96. Also see *Paisa Akhbar*, 11 May 1921; and *Pratap* (Lahore) 5 May 1921, L/R/5/202.

[294] *Shradha* (Kangri, Bijnor), 29 Apr. 1921, IOL&R, L/R/5/96; and *Hindu*, 19 May 1921.

[295] For Mohamed Ali see his interview to *Independent*, 11 May 1921, IOL&R L/R/5/96; and his speech at the Allahabad District Conference on 12 May 1921, in *Pioneer*, 13 May 1921. For Gandhi see *Collected Works*, xx, 59–60 and 100–3; and *Bombay Chronicle*, 15 and 17 May 1921. The fears of the Hindu leaders can be traced in *Bombay Chronicle*, 26 May and 2 June 1921; *Collected Works*, xx, 155–58; and *Bande Matram*, 17, 18 and 19 May 1921, L/R/5/202.

[296] *Collected Works*, xx, 108.

[297] Reading to Montagu, 12 May 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[298] See Shafi's memo, dated 30 Apr. 1921, encl., Shafi to Reading, 30 Apr. 1921, in ibid.

desirous of coming to some arrangement.[299] Reading agreed. Gandhi was persuaded through Malaviya to come to Simla.[300]

There were six interviews beginning with the first on 13 May, all together lasting about thirteen hours. During the discussions Reading brought up the subject of the Ali brothers and the proposed prosecutions. Gandhi was emphatic that he had never heard Mohamed Ali urge violence in any form, otherwise he would have confronted him. Reading told Gandhi that he was determined to proceed with the prosecutions, which could be withheld if a satisfactory assurance was given that speeches inciting to violence and defying authority would not be repeated, and an expression of regret was also tendered for the past. But Gandhi found himself in a dilemma. He had risen to the heights of leadership through the Khilafatists under the Ali brothers and could ill-afford to risk that unless he was going to give up the movement altogether. On the other hand, if he secured a pardon for them in return for an apology it would certainly be taken as Simla-inspired. But this was the only alternative he had. Gandhi promised Reading that he would get an assurance from the Ali brothers. But in order to make his task easier, Gandhi drafted the proposed statement in the form of a declaration of the non-co-operation policy. Reading at once objected to the draft, emphatically demanding a document purporting to be a public expression of regret and a promise of good conduct for the future. Thereupon, Gandhi redrafted the statement in accordance with Reading's wishes and took it to the Ali brothers.[301]

The Ali brothers accepted Gandhi's advice and signed the document with some minor alteration. On 30 May 1921, the 'apologia' appeared in the national newspapers.[302] The same day a government

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[299] Reading to Montagu, 28 Apr. 1921, in ibid.

[300] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 362 and 366, 5 and 6 May 1921; in ibid.

[301] The account of the interviews is based on: Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 404, 409, 414, 433 and 444, dated 14 19, 19, 25 and 29 May 1921; in ibid.

[302] The statement declared: 'Friends have drawn our attention to certain speeches of ours which in their opinion have a tendency to incite violence. We desire to state that we never imagined that any passages in our speeches were capable of bearing the interpretation put upon them, but we recognise the force of our friends' argument and interpretation. We, therefore, sincerely feel sorry and express our regret for the unnecessary heat of some of the passages in these speeches, and we give our public assurance and promise to all who may require it that *so long as we are associated with the movement of non-co-operation*, we shall not directly or indirectly advocate violence at present or in the future nor create an atmosphere of preparedness

communiqué announced that in view of the 'apology' the prosecutions pending against the Ali brothers had been suspended. Should the undertaking be flouted, the Government of India would be at liberty to prosecute them for their past speeches.[303] The same evening, Reading, at a dinner given in his honour by Muhammad Shafi at the Simla Chelmsford Club, gloated over his achievement in securing the 'apologia'.[304] Indeed, Reading was reported to be 'over-optimistic' about the result of his interviews.[305] The Anglo-Indian press made the most of the incident and advertized it as the Ali brothers' surrender and collapse.[306] It is not known what Gandhi had told the Ali brothers when he got them to sign and issue the statement. The evidence,[307] however, suggests that he had accepted Reading's interpretation of the 'apologia' as an unconditional apology but played it down to the Ali brothers. The latter had definitely taken the document in a light different from that intended by Reading. They held that they had accepted Gandhi's advice 'without accepting his interpretation of even unintentional incitement' and that the document was intended merely to allay the 'unwarranted' suspicions of certain Hindu leaders.[308] Therefore, when the news of Reading's speech reached Mohamed Ali at Baroach, he immediately repudiated the 'apology'.[309]

The repercussions were far reaching. For weeks together the Indian press was full of articles and references to the incident. Gandhi's position became extremely difficult. On the one hand he was sneered at by Hindu leaders like C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru for his interviews with Reading as being a direct negation of the principle of non-co-operation,[310] and on the other, he was assailed by Muslims

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for violence. Indeed, we hold it contrary to the spirit of non-violent non-co-operation to which we have pledged our work.' *Bombay Chronicle*, 30 May 1921. The Italics in Gandhi's original draft did not appear in the press release. See *Collected Works*, xx, 93.

[303] Ibid. Also see IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1745, file 2533/1921.

[304] *Englishman*, 1 June 1921.

[305] Denis Judd, *Lord Reading, Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading, Lord Chief Justice and Viceroy of India, 1860–1935* (London, 1982), 209.

[306] *Madras Mail*, 31 May 1921; *Englishman*, 1 June 1921; and *Pioneer*, 1 June 1921. For the comments of other papers see exts. in *Pioneer*, 3 June 1921.

[307] See the sources mentioned above in n. 301.

[308] Mohamed Ali to Dr Said, 23 July 1921, encl., Montagu to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[309] *Bombay Chronicle*, 4 June 1921.

[310] Motilal to Gandhi, 3 June 1921, in Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, 20–2; Kanji Dwarkadas, *Gandhiji*, 169; and *Collected Works*, xx, 216.

for giving away their leaders.[311] The anger in Muslim circles over Gandhi's 'betrayal' was so intense that at a secret meeting of the CKC at Bombay in June 1921, a motion was proposed that the Committee should part company with Gandhi and the Hindus. It was with great difficulty that the Ali brothers succeeded in preventing the resolution from being passed.[312] Gandhi knew that he had landed himself in trouble and did his utmost to regain his position. He even repudiated the 'apology' and began to support the Ali brothers' interpretation of the document.[313] Gandhi's volte-face was puzzling to Reading and to Malaviya, who had acted as intermediary.[314] But if Gandhi were to save his position as a leader and keep the Muslims at his side he had to do this. Nevertheless, Reading's manoeuvring nearly succeeded in splitting the Khilafat/non-co-operation leadership. A contemporary opinion regarded the incident as the first break in the non-co-operation solidarity.[315] Mohamed Ali himself admitted that for some time Reading's plan of discrediting them had succeeded and it was with difficulty that the people were convinced of 'the pettifogging lawyer's chicanery'.[316]

One result of the Gandhi-Reading talks had been that Gandhi was mellowed. His subsequent speeches were despondent and without a reference to the 'satanic government'. As promised to Reading, he directed his attention to completing the Bezwada and Meerut programmes before the end of June. But Reading, inexperienced in Indian affairs as he was, negatived his advantage by pressing his victory too hard. This prevented any further attempts for a compromise. Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari, who were expected to meet Reading, decided not to do so.[317] Further, the repression that he had unleashed hardened the opponents. But what stirred the Khilafatists most was the rumoured possibility of the British government rendering military assistance to the Greeks against their hero Mustafa Kemal in

[311] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 533, 23 June 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[312] See Lloyd to Montagu, 24 June 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[313] *Collected Works*, xx, 1590 61, 188 and 216.

[314] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 533, 23 June 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and *Collected Works*, xx, 285.

[315] K. Natranjan, *Mahatma Gandhi and Non-co-operation* (Bombay, 1923), 15.

[316] Mohammed Ali to Dr Said, 23 July 1921, encl., Montagu to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. For the impact of the 'apology' also see SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/26, 9 July 9121, para. 1706.

[317] Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal*, 245.

the renewed Graeco-Turkish hostilities.[318] A scandal was also created about this time by the capture and later execution in Anatolia of Mustafa 'Saghir', an Indian Muslim said to be on the pay roll of the British foreign office and military intelligence, which revealed that foreign spies had penetrated the stronghold of the Turkish nationalists.[319] Opinion was expressed by the *'ulama*, notably Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari, that it had become religiously imperative to help save the Kemalist party. They maintained that non-violent non-co-operation was a useful weapon but they had never committed themselves to adhere to this principle at all times. Therefore, they must reconsider and revise their policy.[320] Evidently, the *'ulama* and the radicals were getting weary of Gandhi's irritating condition of non-violence.

This encouraged the CKC to action. On 16 June 1921, it met in Bombay and directed its standing non-co-operation committee to submit a report at the Khilafat Conference at Karachi early the next month on the steps to be taken in the event of the British involvement in the war.[321] In the meantime, some efforts were made in Britain by Chotani, Jinnah and other Indian and British sympathizers to dissuade the British cabinet from helping Greece.[322] Reading, whose intervention had also been solicited by Chotani,[323] in view of

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[318] See *Morning Post*, 13 May 1921; *Islamic News*, 9 June 1921; *Bombay Chronicle*, 11 June 1921; and Abdul Majid Atiqi, *Tarkan-i Ahrar*, 8th edn. (Lahore, n.d.), 63–5.

[319] Mustafa Saghir was reportedly deputed to assassinate Mustafa Kemal. He posed himself as a rep. of the CKC and was personally received by the Turkish leader. The plot, however, was discovered in time and after a trial, at which he admitted that he was a spy, he was hanged in May 1921. The British high com. in Istanbul, while informing his superiors in London, affirmed that since Saghir's identity had been discovered 'his hanging is not [all] that terrible'. For this affair see Aybek, *Ap biti*, ii, 125 8; Mim Kemal Öke, *Güney Asiya Müsalmänlari'nin* (Ankara, 1988). Urdu tr. *Tahrik-i Khilafat* (Karachi, 1991), 137 and 158, n. 29, citing M. Serdoğlu, *Mustafa Saghir* (Istanbul, 1963); and E. Eybars, *Istiklal Mahkemeleri* (Ankara, 1975), 98–103; Bulent Gökay, 'Ankara'da Bir Ingiliz Casusu', *Tarikh Toplum*, 17/98 (Feb. 1992), 222 3; *Islamic News*, 9 June 1921; and Rattigan to Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs, Tel. 29 May 1921, PRO, FO 371/6473.

[320] See the statements of Abul Kalam Azad and Abdul Bari in *Bombay Chronicle*, 10 and 13 June 1921, respectively. These views were echoed by other Khilafatists like Ajmal Khan and Mohamed Ali and repeated at several meetings and conferences at various places. *Bombay Chronicle*, 13 June 1921; Bamford, *Histories*, 168; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 517, 21 June 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[321] *Islamic News*, 21 July 1921. This refers to the events of June 1921.

[322] Ibid., 30 June 1921; *Bombay Chronicle*, 22 June and 22 July 1921.

[323] Text of Chotani's Tel. to Reading dated 21 June 1921, in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 532, 23 June 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

the forthcoming Karachi Conference, lost no time in urging on his superiors in London the necessity of avoiding involvement. 'For then', he warned, 'we should have to face very troublesome agitation'.[324]

Apparently, the British did not help the Greeks. Nor was the non-co-operation committee able to furnish its recommendations on time. But, as planned, the Karachi Conference took place on 8 July 1921, under Mohamed Ali's presidency. It was generally expected that the Ali brothers would do something reckless in an attempt to rehabilitate themselves in the public eye. Therefore, Gandhi, with the more cautious Khilafatists like Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari, had chosen to stay away from Karachi. As expected, the proceedings of the Conference were wilfully uncompromising. On Mohamed Ali's motion, the Conference, on 9 July, passed the fateful resolution emphatically declaring that it was religiously unlawful for any Muslim to serve in the army or help or acquiesce in the recruitment. It further decided that 'if the British Government directly or indirectly, openly or secretly fight the Angora Government, the Muslims of India will start civil disobedience and establish their complete independence at the next sessions of the Indian National Congress to be held at Ahmedabad and hoist the flag of the Indian Republic'.[325]

The declarations in the resolution, contingent as they were on the reopening of hostilities by the British against Ankara, had already been voiced at Belgaum and at Bombay less than a month before.[326] The clause on the army was just a repetition of the *muttafiqa fatwa* issued as early as November 1920. But its acceptance by the Khilafat Conference, at a time when Gandhi and the cautious Khilafatists were unwilling for a confrontation with the government, was a victory for the radicals. It was the first of a series of attempts to revoke non-co-operation on strictly Gandhian lines. Gandhi was unnerved. He was also under pressure from certain Hindu sections for an assurance against any departure from the policy of non-violence.[327] Gandhi did issue a re-assurance[328] but bided his time. His chance to channel Muslim fury came when the non-co-operation committee of the CKC

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[324] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 531, 23 June 1921, in ibid.

[325] *Hindu*, 14 July 1921.

[326] See R. V. Thadani (ed.), *The Historic State Trial of the Ali Brothers and Five Others* (Karachi, 1921), app. 'A', 52–3; and *Bombay Chronicle*, 5 July 1921.

[327] See letter from 'an esteemed correspondent' in *Collected Works*, xx, 345.

[328] *Young India*, 13 July 1921 in ibid., 354–5.

met to consider the adoption of civil disobedience. He took advantage of the loophole that the committee had been appointed to deal with non-co-operation matters only and had no authority to consider any other means outside it. Consequently, he was able to prevail upon the other members of the committee—Shaukat Ali, Kitchlew and Khatri—to await a decision by the AICC,[329] where he hoped to circumvent the issue easily. And it happened exactly like that. When the AICC met at Bombay in the last week of July 1921, it obediently accepted Gandhi's directions and postponed the initiation of civil disobedience until after the successful completion of boycott of foreign cloth and promotion of *swadeshi*. However, as a concession the AICC allowed the right of individual civil disobedience, provided the working committee approved of it.[330]

If the radical section of the Khilafatists was angry at Gandhi's retarding manoeuvres, it did not express its feelings in public. For the moment, the cautious counsels seemed to have prevailed and the attention was diverted to the crusade against alcohol and boycott of foreign cloth.[331] All other items of non-co-operation were relegated to the background. The diversion had been the result partly of a realization that the campaign of non-co-operation was failing. Several non-co-operating lawyers, including Mushir Kidwai, had resumed practice. Kidwai had come to believe that the triple boycott had been a mistake as it did not produce the desired effect on the British.[332] Arbitration courts had almost vanished. Attendance at government schools and colleges was also returning to normal. But a positive impetus to the *swadeshi* campaign had come from the successful collection of over a crore (ten million) of rupees for the Tilak Swaraj Fund before the target date of 31 June 1921.[333]

The boycott of foreign cloth was already underway but officially it was launched on 1 August, the first anniversary of the non-co-operation campaign. An appeal was issued to merchants to give up

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[329] *Bombay Chronicle*, 18 July 1921.

[330] Ibid., 30 July 1921.

[331] For the course of the temperance and *swadeshi* campaigns see *Bombay Chronicle*, 13, 14, 15, 18 and 20 July 1921.

[332] See Kidwai to Sheikh Shaukat Ali, 7 June [1921], in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat—i.

[333] Some of the contributions had been especially earmarked for *swadeshi* or temperance.

trading in foreign cloth and take to selling *khaddi*, the Indian spun and woven cloth.[334] But they were given two months to clear stocks of foreign cloth and cancel purchase orders, after which their shops were to be picketed.[335] The Indian piece-goods merchants, who had incurred heavy losses as a result of the fall in the exchange rate, eagerly joined the campaign.[336] It is difficult to establish the extent to which non-co-operation affected the imports, as several other factors were responsible for the general depression in trade.[337] But the importation of foreign cloth fell considerably.[338] The consumption was limited almost entirely to minimum clothing requirements and even there the bulk of the goods bought was of grey (unbleached) variety. Table X explains the situation by comparison with earlier and later statistics. The total imports of cotton manufactures decreased in value from Rs 102 crore in 1920–21 to Rs 57 crores in 1920–22. The decrease and its subsequent recovery in the following years are shown in Table XI and the Graph. On the other hand the campaign for *swadeshi* spread swiftly, helped by the seriously reduced purchasing power in the country generally. This aspect was also reflected in the increased importation of the type of yarn more suitable for hand weaving than yarn spun from Indian cotton.[339] Though the effect of *swadeshi* and boycott of foreign cloth was felt throughout India, the campaign was more successful in Bombay, Madras, Bengal and the UP.[340] A feature of this campaign was the 'sacrificial fires' of foreign cloth, wearing apparel and piece-goods all over the country

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[334] *Collected Works*, xx, 383. V. J. Patel and J. K. Mehta endeavoured to prove with the help of statistical data that the boycott of foreign piece-goods was not only possible but also practicable. *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 July 1921. Also see S. Saraladevi Chaudarani, *At the Point of the Spindle* (Madras, 1921).

[335] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, no. 677, 27 July 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see *Hindu*, 14 July 1921.

[336] Since the Indian contributing centres were already overstocked the shipments of goods purchased at high prices seriously affected the situation. The leading piece-goods merchants' associations, hoping that the rupee would still rise to a two-shilling level, refused to buy and even imposed fines on the recalcitrant merchants. See Commercial Intelligence Department, India, *Review of the Trade of India in 1921–22* (Calcutta, 1923), 2.

[337] For the causes of the depression see *Report of the Indian Tariff Board (Cotton Textile Industry Enquiry), 1927* (Bombay, 1927), i, 29–32.

[338] Already, by autumn 1920, eastern Lancashire was reported to have been feeling the pinch due to lack of trade. See *Aftab*, 25 Sept. 1920.

[339] *Review of the Trade of India in 1921–22*, 2.

[340] Bamford, *Histories*, 101. The progress of *swadeshi* can be traced from All India Congress Khaddar Department, *Khaddar Work in India* (Bombay, 1922); and Director, All India Khaddi Information Bureau, *Khaddi Bulletins* (Sabarmati, 1923).

Table X

Table comparing the imports of the three classes of piece-goods during 1913–23 in million yards

	Grey (Unbleached) Million yards	White (Bleached) Million yards	Coloured, Printed or Dyed Million yards
1913-14	1,534.2	793.3	831.8
1914-15	1,320.2	604.2	494.8
1915-16	1,148.2	611.4	358.7
1916-17	847.0	589.8	454.9
1917-18	625.5	502.3	395.6
1918-19	583.4	286.6	227.3
1919-20	533.3	322.0	208.3
1920-21	580.2	421.8	489.3
1921-22	635.6	306.2	1387.3
1922-23	931.0	402.5	243.8

Source: Commercial Intelligence Department, India, *Review of the Trade of India in 1922–23* (Calcutta, 1924), 4.

Table XI

Particulars of the different classes of cotton manufactures and their values during 1920–23 and the pre-war year

Imports	1913-14 (Pre-War year)	1920-21	1921-22	1922-23
Twist and yarn	Rs (lakhs) 4,16	Rs (lakhs) 13,58	Rs (lakhs) 11,51	Rs (lakhs) 9,26
Piece-goods:				
Grey (unbleached)	25,45	26,45	22,65	30,44
White (bleached)	14,29	21,90	12,67	15,01
Coloured, printed or dyed	17,86	34,57	7,59	12,60
Fonts of all descriptions	54	86	25	46
Total piece-goods	58,14	83,78	43,16	58,51
Hosiery	1,20	1,91	63	80
Handkerchiefs and shawls	89	47	10	16
Thread	39	91	72	70
Other sorts	1,52	1,47	82	70
Grand total	66,30	1,02,12	56,94	70,13

Source: Commercial Intelligence Department, India, *Review of the Trade of India in 1922–23* (Calcutta, 1924), 3.

Graph

Variations in the values of cotton manufacturers in the import trade of British India during 1920–23 as compared with averages of the pre-War and War periods



Source: Commercial Intelligence Department, India, *Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade of British India with the British Empire and Foreign Countries for the fiscal year ending 31st March 1923*, i (Calcutta 1924).

'as a token of our determination never to touch foreign cloth'.[341] The Muslims were, however, allowed to collect foreign cloth and, instead of making bonfires, send it to the Izmir sufferers. Gandhi

[341] *Collected Works*, xx, 458.

agreed that the purpose would be served even if the Hindus handed over their stock to be sent along with it.[342] He was confident that the campaign was 'the sole remedy for the Khilafat, for removing evils and for helping Angora'.[343] But like other items of non-co-operation, it could not achieve the desired target. Its effect on Lancashire was not very deep.[344] The burning of imported cloth before India was able to replace it by local manufacture had considerably reduced the chances of the campaign being a success.

In their impatience, the radicals once more demanded an immediate initiation of civil disobedience by the CKC and the Congress. A particular pocket of hard-liners was in Lucknow where Salamatullah of Farangi Mahal voiced discontent about the British attitude over Ankara.[345] Gandhi admitted the force of the demand but retorted that *swaraj* was the quickest method of righting the Khilafat 'wrong'. Any thoughtless outburst of pent-up rage and violence would bring no relief to Turkey, while repression might arrest the progress of the movement. He was convinced that the country was not yet ready for the adoption of civil disobedience on an extensive scale. The non-co-operators must first work for a complete boycott of foreign cloth and promote *swadeshi*.[346] It was partly to check this impatience and partly to eliminate all political organizations in the country other than the Congress that Gandhi had been trying to transfer the control of the non-co-operation campaign and the *swaraj* movement from the CKC to the Congress.[347] Already, the Bengal Congress leaders had attempted a merger of the Khilafat and Congress committees at district level but the Khilafatists had refused.[348] Thus Gandhi's manoeuvre failed. On the contrary, the Congress was compelled to acquiesce in the Khilafatists' organized campaign of tampering with the Indian army.

The Khilafatists had been busy in this connection for quite some time. As early as summer 1920, intercepted letters from Indian Muslim soldiers serving in Iraq to Chotani and Shaukat Ali had revealed

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[342] Ibid., 382.
[343] Speech at Lucknow on 7 Aug. 1921, ibid., 477.
[344] See Montagu to Reading Aug. 3 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.
[345] *Collected Works*, xx, 522.
[346] Ibid., 522–4.
[347] The proceedings of the AICC at Bombay on 28–30 July 1921, clearly point towards that direction. *Bombay Chronicle*, 30 July 1921.
[348] Broomfield, *Elite Conflict*, 207.

that the propaganda had travelled beyond India.[349] Reports had also indicated that the troops were responding to the campaign.[350] The record book of the CKC, seized by the police in September 1921, showed that copies of the *muttafiqa fatwa*, declaring service in the army *haram*, had been secretly distributed during the months from February to May 1921.[351] Now this *fatwa*, which had been proscribed by the government, was reissued in the form of leaflets with the signatures of nearly five hundred *'ulama* and distributed among units of the Indian army.[352] It was in the usual question-answer form and highlighted the duties of a good Muslim towards the government in accordance with the dictates of the *shari'at*.[353] The local governments tried to stop its circulation and in August the offices of the Jami'yyatu'l-'Ulama in Delhi were searched and over 800 copies confiscated.[354] It was also reported that a huge amount of the Khilafat fund was being spent on inciting the soldiers.[355] Shaukat Ali later bragged that he had won over so many sepoys that he could spend a lakh of rupees every month on their salaries.[356] There were indications that at certain places the Indian troops were displaying their sympathy with the non-co-operating mobs against the police.[357] The government was forced to deploy British soldiers more often and even to shelve the reduction of the British troops as recommended by the Military Requirements Committee.[358]

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[349] IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Sept. 1920, Proc. no. 100; Nov. 1920, Procs. nos. 19, 27 and 29.

[350] Ibid.

[351] Statement of A. Kelly, DC Police, Bombay, during the Karachi trials. See Thadani, *Historical State Trial*, 52 3.

[352] See app. (c), below. Also see the pamphlet issued by the propaganda depts. of Agra and Meerut provincial Khilafat committees, *Tark-i muwalat par 'ulama-i kiram Deoband, Saharanpur, Farangi Mahal Lucknow, Dehli wa Badaun waghaira ke fatwe* (Agra, 1921).

[353] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/38, 1 Oct. 1921, para. 2036 and app.

[354] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 891, 9 Sept. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Even then the *fatwa* found its way to the soldiers in one form or the other. At the Karachi trails some Indian soldiers testified to the fact that they had received copies of the *fatwa* during July and Aug. 1921. See Thadani, *Historical State Trial*, 49–50.

[355] The information was supplied to the Bombay govt. by Billimoria, the Parsi chartered accountant, whose firm were the accredited auditors to the CKC. See Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 1195, 27 Aug. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[356] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/29, 30 July 1921, para. 1801.

[357] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1397, 3 Aug. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[358] Ibid. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 709, 3 Aug. 1921, in ibid.

The Khilafatists did not leave the matter there. Apart from attempting to dissuade Muslim soldiers from fighting Ankara in any future war, they tried, on Chotani's instructions from London, to raise a loan of about 3 crore rupees to purchase arms for Mustafa Kemal.[359] The scheme had been prompted by the Supreme Council's decision in Paris on 10 August 1921, to lift the arms embargo on the Turkish and Greek belligerents.[360] The collection of such a colossal amount was too ambitious,[361] but, nevertheless, a regular Angora Fund, ostensibly for the relief of Turkish sufferers, was created. Eventually, by early 1923, the remittances to Ankara amounted to about £ 160,000 sterling,[362] most of which was utilized to set up the İş Bank or to pay for Mustafa Kemal's nationalist army.[363]

The British and the Indian governments were disinclined to interfere with the arms purchase scheme,[364] but they could hardly ignore the tampering with the Indian troops even though the number of disaffections in the armed forces for various reasons had been small—30 in 1920 and 82 in 1921.[365] Early in August 1921, the Bombay government, in consultation with the Government of India, decided to push the prosecution of the Ali brothers along with that of Dr Kitchlew, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid, Husain Ahmad Madani, Nisar Ahmad and a Hindu called Shankar Achariya of Shraddhappidh, for their support of the resolutions passed at the Karachi Khilafat Conference declaring enlistment or service in the Indian army *haram*.[366]

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[359] Substance of tel. from Chotani, Aga Khan, Kidwai and Ispahani to Shaukat Ali in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 890, 9 Sept. 1921, in ibid.

[360] *The Times*, 11 Aug. 1921. Also see Lloyd George's announcement in the House of Commons on 15 Aug. 1921, allowing British firms to supply arms to Turkish forces. Parl. Papers, 1921, *Hansard*, 146 H.C. Deb. 5s., col. 937.

[361] Even Mohamed Ali was doubtful about its realization unless the ruling chiefs contributed. See Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, Tel. 1 Sept. 1921, in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 906, 11 Sept., IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[362] *Hindu*, 12 July 1923.

[363] Mustafa Keskin, *Hindistan Müslümanlarının Milli Mücadelede Türkiye'ye Yardımları, 1919–1923* (Kayseri, 1991), 105; and Lord Kinross, *Ataturk* (London, 1964), 298. His figures, however, are incorrect. See ch. v, 358–9.

[364] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 890, 9 Sept. 1921; and Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 1350, 27 Sept. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[365] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no.—, 22 Jan. 1923, ibid.

[366] Sapru, the law member, especially went down to Bombay to consult the local govt. and its legal advisors. Rahimtoola and his other Indian colleagues in the council, as well as the Indian ministers, opposed the prosecutions. They did not think that it was the right moment. But their objections were overruled and on 28 Aug. 1921, the viceroy's council unanimously approved the decision. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 736, 9 Aug. 1921; Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 1171,

Consequently, Mohamad Ali was arrested at Waltair in Andhra on 14 September when he was heading for Malabar with Gandhi to pacify the Mappila rioters, who had nearly wrecked the Hindu-Muslim *entente*.[367] On 17 September he was released but at once re-arrested by the Bombay police who had, in the mean time, arrived with a proper warrant. The other accused were rounded up at different places and by the 20th all were in custody at Karachi.[368]

The arrest of half a dozen front-rank Khilafat leaders for endorsing the *muttafiqa fatwa* of the *'ulama* was a tactical error on the part of the government. Apprehensions arose in Muslim circles that the government which had so blatantly disregarded and proscribed the *muttafiqa fatwa*, attested by nearly five hundred *'ulama*, could also one day invent an excuse 'to suppress the Qur'an itself'.[369] When on 21 September 1921, the CKC and the Jami'yyatu'l-'Ulama met at Delhi *in camera*, angry speakers led by Hasrat Mohani demanded an immediate adoption of civil disobedience as the only course left open to them.[370] The Jam'iyyat, in particular, resolved that the dictates of *shari'at* required that they should continue to publish and distribute the *fatwa* irrespective of the government ban.[371] Ajmal Khan, who had always been opposed to taking any action independent of the Hindu compatriots, pleaded with the militant Khilafatists to wait for the Congress decision. He reasoned with them successfully that action by one community was bound to fail unless supported by the other. If they were to achieve success then they must first secure the Hindu support.[372] But the Congress was not prepared to run the risk. Gandhi had made up his mind that civil disobedience had better be postponed and should be adopted only 'when we are ready to carry it to the bitter end'.[373] On 24 September 1921, he issued an appeal to the Muslims to remain patient and non-violent, though not passive,

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22 Aug. 1921; Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 1190, 26 Aug., 1921; and Viceroy to Gov. of Bombay, Tel. no. 835, 29 Aug. 1921, in ibid.

[367] See app. (d), below.

[368] *Hindu*, 22 Sept. 1921. Also see *Bombay chronicle*, 21 Sept. 1921.

[369] This opinion was expressed at the meeting of the Punjab Khilafat Committee on 20 Sept. 1921. See *Indian Annual Register, 1922* (ed.), H. N. Mitra (Calcutta, 1922), i, 269.

[370] Bamford, *Histories*, 177; *Times of India*, 23 Sept. 1921; and S. Muhammad Tonki, *Yad-i raftagan* (Madina, 1965), 3.

[371] Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, i, 129.

[372] Bamford, *Histories*, 177; *Times of India*, 23 Sept. 1921; and Tonki, *Yad-i raftagan*, 3.

[373] Gandhi to V. Patel, 5 Sept. 1921, *Collected Works*, xxi, 59.

and maintained that boycott of foreign cloth and *swadeshi* could yet achieve *swaraj* within the year.[374] But anxious to demonstrate to the Muslims that he stood by their arrested leaders, Gandhi on 4 October, arranged a meeting of Hindu-Muslim leaders at Bombay where, in spite of some Hindu opposition, a manifesto supporting the Karachi resolution was drafted and issued the following day under forty-eight signatures.[375] But it was evident that the Congress was not prepared to agree to the launching of civil disobedience, except on individual basis under the strict supervision of the provincial committees.[376] Thus, the CKC was pre-empted from taking action, even though the provincial Khilafat committees were pressing for permission to launch civil disobedience.

The trial of the Karachi accused began on 26 September 1921. The same night a mass meeting was held at Karachi where the mother of the Ali brothers also spoke. 'The time of sacrifice is come', she said, 'learn to die with smiling faces. . . . I have thrown [up the] veils and [have] come as a man before you who are men, but I wonder why are you becoming women?'[377] This was a clear message to the Muslims to do something. But nothing extraordinary resulted. On the other hand when the trial ended on 1 November, the accused were convicted except Shankar Achariya who was acquitted. All were given two years' rigorous imprisonment.[378] With various other Khilafat leaders already in jail, the trial and conviction of the Ali brothers embittered the Muslim feelings still further. Jinnah and Shafi, independent of each other, pressed Reading for an effective settlement of the issues which were agitating the Indians. But Reading categorically declined to commit himself in any shape or form, save an expression of sympathy with the Muslims on the Turkish question which

[374] *Hindu*, 29 Sept., 1921.

[375] *Bombay chronicle*, 5 Oct. 1921. The signatories included Gandhi, Abdul Bari, Azad, Motilal Nehru, Dr Ansari, Ajmal Khan, Yakub Hasan, Lajpat Rai, Chotani, B. S. Moonje, Stokes, Rajagopalachari, Kidwai, Azad Subhani, Kelkar, Mrs Naidu, Abbas Tyabji, V. J. Patel, V. Patel, Jayakar, Omar Sobani, Rajendra Prasad, Hasrat Mohani, Jamnalal Bajaj, Khaliquzzaman, Jawaharlal and Deshpande. For the meeting also see Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, i, 449.

[376] See the resolutions of the AICC passed at Bombay on 5 Oct. 1921 in *Bombay Chronicle*, 6 Oct. 1921.

[377] Anon., *Message of the Martyrs* (Madras, 1922), 63-4.

[378] For details see Thadani, *The Historical State Trial, passim; The Historic Trial of Ali Brothers, Dr. Kitchlew, Shri Shankaracharya, Maulana Husain Ahmed, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid and Maulana Nisar Ahmed*, part 1 (Karachi, 1921); and Abdul Aziz Siddiqui (ed.), *Muazana mazhab wa qanun* (Delhi, 1922).

he had already publicly made. Reading saw little, if any, prospect of agreement between himself and Gandhi, and was, therefore, not prepared to make any substantial sacrifice to arrive at a settlement. Above all, in spite of his admiration for Jinnah's sensibility and subtlety, Reading still regarded him as strongly anti-British.[379] The Muslim anger was thus turned against Gandhi for remaining free while their leaders were in jail.[380] To satisfy Muslim and Hindu hot-heads Gandhi had to do something. On 4 and 5 November 1921, a meeting of the AICC was convened at Dr Ansari's house in Delhi. After a heated debate in which Gandhi's hesitancy and timidity to launch civil disobedience was questioned, the AICC passed a resolution, hedged round with various conditions, allowing the provincial committees to undertake on their own responsibility restricted civil disobedience, including non-payment of taxes.[381]

The watering down of civil disobedience was liked neither by the radical Khilafatists under Hasrat Mohani nor by the Congress 'extremists' like the Maharashtrians or the Communists such as M. N. Roy.[382] But the fact that Gandhi announced his intention of starting civil disobedience under his own direction in the Bardoli *taluk* of the Surat district in Bombay presidency for others to imitate, helped ease the situation.[383] Fortunately also for Gandhi, the Khilafatists who were guiding the affairs of the CKC after the Ali brothers' imprisonment, namely Chotani, Ajmal Khan and Ansari, were cautious men and kept the radicals in restraint. The Government of India, for its part, bound by the advice of the standing counsel and the advocate-general, Bengal, was withholding action until a definite move by some party of the civil disobedience resolution.[384]

In this charged atmosphere, Edward (1894–1972), the Prince of Wales, later King-Emperor Edward VIII, came to India on a visit. Since May 1920, the Khilafatists had been threatening to boycott the prince's visit.[385] They thought that it would make the authorities

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[379] See the account of Jinnah's interview on 1 Nov. 1921, and Reading's reply in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1061, 2 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. For Shafi, see his memo, encl., Reading to Montagu, 3 Nov. 1921, ibid.

[380] See Lloyd to Montagu, 5 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[381] *Hindu*, 10 Nov. 1921.

[382] Ibid.; and M. N. Roy and Evelyn Roy, *Selections from One Year of Non-co-operation: From Allahabad to Gaya* (Calcutta, 1923), 37.

[383] *Hindu*, 10 Nov. 1921.

[384] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1781, file 7797/1921.

[385] See Kidwai to Montagu, Tel. 5 May 1920, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798.

'more nervous than other forms of non-co-operation, for they [the British] are very touchy where the king's son is concerned'.[386] The government did not postpone the visit lest it should be taken as a victory by the non-co-operators.[387] But it had endeavoured through Maharaja Scindhia (1876–1925) of Gwalior and other influential men to obtain a promise from Gandhi that he would not bring the visit in the domain of non-co-operation.[388] Gandhi refused any undertaking. He was adamant, and quite justifiably, because the prince was being used by the government as a pawn 'for advertising the "benign" British rule in India'.[389] As expected, when on 17 November 1921, the prince landed at Bombay, his arrival was heralded by complete *hartals* in several important cities of India.[390] At Bombay it resulted in a collision between the co-operators and the non-co-operators—mostly Muslim—which led to many casualties.[391] Gandhi, always averse to launching civil disobedience, found in the Bombay riots an excuse to suspend his projected inauguration of the campaign in Bardoli.[392] Hurriedly, on 23 November, he called a meeting of the AICC at Bombay and manoeuvred it into accepting the postponement.[393] The Khilafatists were left high and dry, but realizing the futility of going ahead on their own, acquiesced in the decision of the majority community.

But in spite of the decision to call off civil disobedience, the situation remained tense. The Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind, meeting at Lahore from 18 to 20 November 1921, had vowed that it was the religious duty of every Muslim to free himself of the shackles of the

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[386] Yakub Hasan to Shaukat Ali, 23 May 1920, IOL&R, P/Conf./59, ICH(P)P, Nov. 1920, Proc. no. 19.

[387] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 456, 3 June 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[388] See Gawalior to Chelmsford, 2 July 1920, IOL&R, Chelmsford Papers; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 581, 6 July 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[389] *Collected Works*, xxi, 350. There is no doubt that the govt. used the prince to further their political ends. For instance, the opening of the Shivaji Memorial by him at Poone was designed to encourage the Marathas to breakaway from Gandhi. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 49-C., 28 Oct. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see Lloyd to Seton, 13 Jan. 1922, IOL&R, Seton Papers.

[390] *Hindu*, 24 Nov. 1921.

[391] *Times of India*, 18, 19 and 21 Nov. 1921. For details of the prince's visit see L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *The History of the Indian Tour of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, 1921–22* (Calcutta, 1922); Sir Herbert Russell, *With the Prince in the East* (London, 1922); and The Duke of Windsor, *A King's Story* (London, 1951).

[392] See his statement in *Times of India*, 19 Nov. 1921.

[393] *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 Nov. 1921.

Indian government and continue the struggle until the objective was achieved.[394] On 3 November, Butler of the UP reported to Reading:

> I think it is quite clear that non-co-operation movement will not die down. Gandhi has no doubt called off civil disobedience; but the matter is now largely in the hands of Musalmans, and they are determined to go through with it. . . . My ministers think that a Musalman rising is imminent.[395]

Even Gandhi lamented that he could wield no influence over the Muslims and acutely felt the absence of Shaukat Ali.[396] His own co-religionists, C. R. Das and the Maharashtrian leaders in particular, were chafing under his leadership and were angry at his apologies and tergiversations. They were reported to be manoeuvring a collision with the government which would compel Gandhi either to retire or to be arrested. They would then be free to recast the whole Congress policy, adopting Tilak's 'violent co-operation' by entering the councils and making the government impossible from within.[397] Here were the germs of the future Swaraj Party, though for the present the faction was suppressed under Gandhi's overwhelming power.

In spite of this apparent change of tactics on the part of the leaders, the government was not satisfied with the trend of events. Specially irritating to them were the volunteer organizations which had imparted cohesion and discipline to the movement. Their power had been demonstrated by the success with which they had effected the *hartals* on 17 November, especially in Calcutta. The humiliation felt by the government at their success, and the outcry in Anglo-Indian and European circles for severe action convinced Reading that the time had come 'when we must really exert a firm hand to maintain authority'.[398] The local governments were accordingly given a free hand.[399] The Bengal government had already reacted by declaring unlawful the volunteer associations of the Khilafat and Congress. The police swooped upon the provincial Khilafat offices in Calcutta and made

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[394] Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, i, 130–1, esp. resolution iv of the proceedings.

[395] Butler to Reading, 23 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Butler Papers.

[396] *Collected Works*, xxi, 479.

[397] See Lloyd to Montagu, 3 and 23 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers; and Lloyd to Reading, 8 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, i, 472–85.

[398] Reading to Montagu, 24 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[399] See the Govt. of India's letter to the Local Govts., no. 1223, 24 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1781, file 7797/1921.

hundreds of arrests.[400] This led to more trouble. The Congress decision of 23 November to weld all volunteer corps—Khilafat, Congress and Akali—into one National Volunteer Corps came in handy.[401] The Bengal leaders decided to defy the government notification and to continue the volunteer corps and thus force arrests in access of jail accommodation. Appeals were issued to the public to enrol as volunteers[402] eliciting increasing government repression. Hundreds were arrested each day who, in turn, were replaced by others pledged to disobey government orders and to court arrest.[403]

Following Bengal's example the governments of the Punjab, the UP, Bihar and Assam (and later the Frontier) issued similar restrictions on the volunteers,[404] and reacted angrily when challenged. People were arrested on flimsy charges. Wearing of *khaddar* became an offence. Then began the weeding out of all tall poppies—Abul Kalam Azad, Akram Khan and C. R. Das in Bengal, Asaf Ali and Shankarlal Banker in Delhi, Salamatullah, Har Kishan Nath Misra, Mohanlal Saksena and Khaliquzzaman in Lucknow, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Abdul Halim Sharar, Purshottamdas Tandon (d. 1962) and George Joseph in Allahabad, Muin-ud-din and Abdullah in Ajmer, and Lajpat Rai, Agha Safdar, Dr Satyapal (d. 1954) Malik Lal Khan and S. E. Stokes in Lahore. In Calcutta, even women were arrested but when it created a tumult they were quickly released.[405] There were cases of abuse of power, of 'regrettable action', ill-treatment by the military and the police.[406] Even Reading admitted that 'the tendency is to swing the pendulum too far in the direction of enforcing law'.[407] During the last half of December 1921, in Calcutta alone the total number of arrests, since 17 November, had reached 3,230, out of which 1,515 were affected in the week ending Christmas Day.[408]

[400] *Englishman*, 21 Nov. 1921. Also see IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1731, file 570/1921.

[401] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1731, file 570/1921. The proposal had come quite accidentally. See *Collected Works*, xxi, 514.

[402] *Bombay Chronicle*, 3 Dec. 1921.

[403] This can be followed in the nationalist press.

[404] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1731, file 570/1921.

[405] *Collected Works*, xxii, 1-21; and Ronaldshay to Montagu, 24 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Zetland Papers.

[406] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 97-C., 15 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[407] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 106-C., 17 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, in ibid.

[408] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 23, 12 Jan. 1922, in ibid. Also see Indian National Congress, *Report of the Enquiry Commission on the National Volunteers in Lahore* (Lahore, 1922).

The repression had just the opposite effect than that intended. Instead of strengthening, it weakened the government position. Many moderates shocked by the repression placed themselves in opposition to the government. Syed Reza Ali was the first to protest to the viceroy against his policy and advised him to use conciliation.[409] Reading's own close Indian councillors – Shafi, Sapru and Sarma—pressed him to stop prosecutions and call a round table conference.[410] Similar pressure came from other prominent moderates and several Liberal organizations.[411] Reading was staggered at the outcry evoked by his policy in Indian circles. He was bewildered at the success with which the non-co-operators had organized the boycott of the Prince of Wales' tour in the UP.[412] In Allahabad, in particular, the prince had been greeted by 'shuttered windows and ominous silence along the troop-lined deserted streets'.[413] Reading was bitter and depressed and almost had a nervous breakdown. He became desperately anxious to stop all trouble while the prince was in Calcutta. An unpleasant reception there was likely to affect the public mind in Britain and in India more than the Allahabad incident. He started a two-way effort. On the one hand he begged Montagu to secure a definite announcement of British intentions towards the Turkish problem in order to detach the Muslim element from the agitation, and on the other, he started a hectic bargaining with the non-co-operators.[414] He himself moved to Calcutta. Sapru was directed to bring the 'extremists' to the conference table. If they agreed to call off the boycott of the Prince's visit, Reading would withdraw the notifications against the volunteers and release all the prisoners convicted under that order. He was also said to have made a verbal promise to concede considerable constitutional changes.[415]

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[409] *Englishman*, 12 Dec. 1921.

[410] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. 111-C., 18 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[411] *Statesman*, 21 Dec. 1921; and *Hindu*, 22 Dec. 1921.

[412] Viceroy to Local Govts., Tel. no. 115, 19 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[413] Duke of Windsor, *A King's Story*, 170.

[414] Reading wired to Montagu: 'The Moslem religious fervour is what the Hindu is playing upon, and always with success, and it is this instrument we must take out of the non-co-operators' hands'. Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 108-C., 17 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. My version of the events and the arguments advanced are different from those given by D. A. Low. See his 'The Government of India and the First Non-Cooperation Movement—1920–1922', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 25/2 (1966), 249–51. Also see Kanji Dwarkadas, *Gandhiji*, 26.

[415] Viceroy to Gov. of UP, Tel. no. 127-C., 23 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers; Ronaldshay's speech in the Bengal Legislative Council in *Englishman*, 20 Dec. 1921; Kanji Dwarkadas, *Gandhiji*, 27; and Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, i, 504.

Sapru, with Reading's full authority, elicited the help of a much-mellowed Mrs Besant and Malaviya. They then dispatched Jamnadas Dwarkadas and Hridayanath Kunzru to Gandhi in Ahmedabad either to persuade him to attend a conference with the viceroy at Calcutta on 21 December, or at least to find out his conditions for taking part in the discussions.[416] But the plan misfired. Gandhi first agreed but later became impervious under pressure from some *'ulama* and such Hindu leaders as Motilal Nehru, Lajpat Rai and Vithalbhai Patel. Perhaps the experience of the failed Simla talks with Reading was a bitter reminder. He refused to suspend non-co-operation or to waive the *hartal* until the *fatwa* prisoners, including the Karachi ones, were released.[417] Malaviya and Jamnadas Dwarkadas were bewildered at Gandhi's volte-face and pleaded with him to come to terms.[418] But Gandhi declined to give any undertaking and declared that non-co-operation could cease only after a successful conference.[419]

Reading's position, as he himself later admitted, was very difficult. When on the morning of 21 December, a deputation led by Malaviya waited on him he made no promise of a conference. However, the negotiations continued and when Malaviya met Reading again on the following day, he had with him a document signed by C. R. Das and ten other leading Bengal non-co-operators making reasonable terms for a settlement.[420] But by this time the British cabinet had vetoed Reading's idea of a conference and the majority of the local governments had also advised against it.[421] On the pretext that Gandhi had rejected the overtures, Reading broke off the negotiations.[422]

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[416] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 106-C., 17 Dec. 1921; Mrs Besant to Reading, 17 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[417] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 111-C., 18 Dec. 1921, in ibid.; Kanji Dwarkadas, *Gandhiji*, 28; *Collected Works*, xxii, 124; Gandhi to Malaviya, Tel. 19 Dec. 1921, in ibid., 54; and Gandhi to C. R. Das and Azad, Tel. 19 Dec. 1921, in ibid., 55.

[418] See Malaviya to Gandhi, Tel. 20 Dec. 1921, ibid., 59, n. 1; and Malaviya to Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Tel. 21, Dec. 1921, in ibid., 60, n. 2.

[419] Gandhi to Malaviya, Tel. 20 Dec. 1921, ibid., 59; and Gandhi to Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Tel. 21 Dec. 1921, ibid., 60–1.

[420] Reading to Montagu, Pte. Tel. 24 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 131-C., 24 Dec. 1921, in ibid.; and *Statesman*, 22 Dec. 1921.

[421] Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 1838, 20 Dec. 1921; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 131-C., 24 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[422] Ibid. It is said that Gandhi's telegram to Shyam Sundar Chakravarti of 21 Dec. 1921, or after (*Collected Works*, xxii, 60), showing inclination to agree for a conference was delayed in transit. See Malaviya's statement in Jayakar, *The Story of My*

Attempted clandestine arrangements between the Bengal non-co-operators and Governor Ronaldshay also proved abortive.[423] In the meantime, the government's position had improved. Reading's assurances to the moderate deputationists at Calcutta on 21 December had steadied their slide towards the non-co-operators. When the prince arrived in Calcutta on 24 December the government managed to secure a reasonable reception.[424] This made Gandhi's position extremely delicate as he was assailed from many quarters. C. R. Das, in particular, was furious at losing 'the chance of a lifetime'.[425] Gandhi displayed signs of an irritated man under pressure but his firmness was undoubtedly prudent. The proposed conference was negative in purpose, intended to hear arguments only and would have achieved nothing. Reading was not prepared to recommend any immediate advance for political concessions.[426]

Towards the closing days of the year 1921, the scene shifted from Calcutta to Ahmedabad where the Khilafat Conference, the Congress and the Muslim League were holding their annual sessions. The radicals among the Muslims and Hindus, led by Hasrat Mohani, came to Ahmedabad determined to force a clash with the government. Thus the chief worry of the more cautious leaders was to try to pacify the militants. When the Khilafat Conference opened on 26 December, Ajmal Khan, the president, made a determined effort to catch the moderate support[427] but he found himself completely out of tune with the majority. The defiance was exhibited when Mohani's motion was adopted by the subjects committee by a majority urging Muslims and other communities to endeavour conjointly 'to destroy the British imperialism' and obtain complete independence 'to secure permanent safety of the Khilafat and the prosperity of India'.[428] It was reminiscent of Azad Subhani's 'Declaration of Independence' that had been

Life, i, 516. But even if the telegram had reached earlier it would hardly have made any difference.

[423] Ronaldshay to Reading, 26 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[424] See Ronaldshay's report to King George V, 1 Jan. 1922, IOL&R, Zetland Papers.

[425] Subhas C. Bose, *The Indian Struggle, 1920 1934* (London, 1935), 83; C. Ray, *Life and Times of C. R. Das* (London, 1927), 191 2; and B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi* (London, 1958), 227–8.

[426] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 111-C., 18 Dec. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[427] See Ajmal Khan's presidential address. *Bombay chronicle*, 27 Dec. 1921.

[428] *Bombay chronicle*, 29 Dec. 1921.

adopted recently at the forum of the Anjuman-i 'Ulama of Bihar.[429] Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari endeavoured to defeat the motion in the open session. During the night they manoeuvred to muster support and in the session the next morning, they managed to effect a split with the help of Gandhi and other Hindu leaders. When Mohani stood up to move his resolution, a member of the subjects committee, as arranged, raised an objection that constitutionally a change in the creed could not be taken up unless approved by the subjects committee by a two-thirds majority. Ajmal Khan at once upheld the objection and ruled the independence motion out of order. Mohani was furious and protested without avail that the president had disallowed a similar objection by the same member in the subjects committee while he had upheld it in the open session. Ajmal Khan's ruling created such angry scenes and bitter criticism that he left the *pindal*. At the conclusion of the Conference, Mohani appealed to the delegates to stay and pass his resolution. About half the number stayed and declared full support for complete independence.[430]

The mooting of the independence question and the support it aroused indicates the depth of Muslim feelings. Mohani did not leave the matter at that and alternatively tried to get his resolution accepted by the Congress and the Muslim League. At the latter platform, his speech, from the beginning to the end, was a plea for a declaration, on 1 January 1922, of an Indian Republic called the United States of India.[431] And though he had a formidable group of 52 with him, which comprised mostly delegates from Andhra, Bengal, the CP, the UP, Bombay and the Sikh representatives, Mohani did not succeed. The Congress was hedging in to win the moderates and was, therefore, hesitant to take an extreme step.[432] The Muslim League, which had earlier made an unsuccessful bid for Abul Kalam Azad's presidency,[433] did not wish to adopt a step which the Khilafat Conference

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[429] See Azad Subhani, *Khutba-i sadarat* (Meerut, 1921), 45–46.

[430] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, xcvii. Also see *Bombay Chronicle*, 29 Dec. 1921. Mohani alleged that 'Gandhi was out to make the Muslims the followers of Jainism.' See Adil Abbasi, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 238. When the attempt failed the anger turned against Ajmal Khan. Some Muslim papers wondered whether he had become a moderate. See *Madina*, 5 Jan. 1922, and *al-Aman*, 7 Jan. 1922, IOL&R, L/R/5/97. Also see Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal*, 263.

[431] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, xcvii, esp. 31–43, 56–57 and 59–70. Also see *Bombay Chronicle*, 29 Dec. 1921.

[432] *Report of the Thirty-Sixth Indian National Congress held at Ahmedabad on the 27th and 28th December 1921* (Ahmedabad, 1922), 48, 50–60.

[433] See Abdur Razzaq Malihabadi to Syed Zahur Ahmad, 11 Nov. 1921, con-

and the Congress had rejected.[434] The fact, however, remains that Mohani carried many with him and the resolution, even in the Congress, was rejected, not for any inherent flaw, but on the ground of its being inexpedient. A good number of leaders was evidently tired of non-violence and wished to precipitate a direct clash with the government. But with the radicals defeated, the Khilafat Conference and the Congress confined themselves to reaffirming their previous policies—the continuance of the agitation to the bitter end, the enlistment of volunteers and collection of funds. But they did allow the initiation of civil disobedience provided the provincial and the central organizations were satisfied that there would be no breach of peace.[435]

As the year 1921 closed, *swaraj* was as distant as ever and most of the prominent leaders, except Gandhi, Abdul Bari, Chotani, Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and Hasrat Mohani, were in jail. Yet the progress of the movement had been beyond the expectations both of the nationalists and the government. At the dawn of the new year the agitation stood at its zenith. Its main achievement, from the nationalists' point of view, had been the elimination of the fear of government and the inculcation of national self-respect among Indians.

In the early days of 1922, the non-co-operators concentrated their energies on executing the Ahmedabad resolutions. The main activity was centred round recruitment to the outlawed volunteer corps and picketing of liquor shops, as it was almost the time for the annual auction of excise licenses. Side by side, they attempted to secure a unity of action in view of the impending arrests of the leaders. The Congress had already vested Gandhi with full powers of the working committee.[436] When on 12 and 13 January, the CKC met at Bombay it also decided to empower its working committee, of which Gandhi was a member with five others, to exercise in urgency, all the powers of the CKC in addition to those already vested in it.[437] A manifesto

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veying Azad's regrets that owing to 'some strong compulsions' he would not be able to preside over the League sessions. Later, Mohani was asked to preside who complied. See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, xcvii.

[434] See the proceedings of the fourteenth Session of the All India Muslim League in *Hindu*, 5 Jan. 1922. Also see *Madras Mail*, 31 Dec. 1921.

[435] *Hindu*, 29 Dec. 1922; and *Madras Mail*, 30 Dec. 1921.

[436] *Report of the Thirty-Sixth Congress*, 31–48 and 114.

[437] *Bombay Chronicle*, 14 Jan. 1922. Only in matters concerning the change of creed or settlement regarding the Khilafat, *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* and the holy places, was a prior sanction of the CKC needed.

issued about this time under the signatures of Chotani, Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Dr Syed Mahmud (1889–1971) and Khatri, advised Muslims to remain unshaken in their endeavours. Together with 'our Hindu brethren', it stated, 'we will win Swaraj—a Swaraj that will enable us to secure justice for Islam'. Until such time, they must concentrate on the collection of fifty lakh rupees for the Angora Fund, court arrest, preserve non-violence and Hindu-Muslim unity, and follow Gandhi 'unflinchingly'.[438]

But the radicals, though temporarily overshadowed at Ahmedabad, had not been sitting idle. Early in January 1922, Butler had warned Reading that: 'Gandhi may relent and avoid the final plunge. But Mussalman fanaticism will not be held back by any political considerations'.[439] In fact, the feelings against the British at this time were at their worst. The exacerbation was partly the result of the facilities which the British government was reported to have been giving the Greeks for floating a loan in Britain and the rumoured British intention of controlling or purchasing the Hijaz Railway.[440] The Muslim press became more irate than ever and constantly harped on its favourite theme of the destruction of the 'enemy of Islam'.[441] The Muslim women, notably 'Bi Amman', her daughter-in-law, Amjadi Bano Begum Mohamed Ali (1885–1947), and Turkish-born poetess-littérateur, Atiyya Begum, later Atiyya Faizi (1881–1966), also became prominently active, adding strength to the movement.[442] Their involvement was not a part of any female emancipation programme. It was an exercise in political mobilization for the specific purpose of strengthening the Khilafat movement.[443] Of course, women of politically motivated Muslim families of Bengal, Bombay, the UP and the Punjab had been active from around the turn of the century in arranging meetings of various women organizations but the latest ebullition was directly concerned with the non-co-operation experiment. 'Bi Amman' and other women of her family, joined by Begum Hasrat Mohani, her daughter and others, attended public meetings in *chadar*s and co-

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[438] *Bombay Chronicle*, 12 Jan. 1922.

[439] Butler to Reading, 5 Jan. 1922. IOL&R, Butler Papers.

[440] *Hindu*, 5 and 12 Jan. 1922. The Govt. of India later issued a denial. See ibid., 2 Feb. 1922.

[441] See *Mansur* (Bijnor), 16 Jan. 1922; and *Najat* (Bijnor), 15 Jan. 1922, IOL&R, L/R/5/97.

[442] *Hindu*, 26 Jan. 1922. Also see Bamford, *Histories*, 187–88.

[443] See Gail Minault, 'The Role of Indian Muslim Women in the Freedom Movement 1911–1924', *South Asian Papers*, 1/3 (1977), 21–2.

operated with the Hindu women activists to strengthen the movement.[444] Their impact was such that even the moderate CKC leaders, under militant pressure, began to threaten the government with abandoning non-violence and repudiating loyalty.[445]

It was disquieting for Gandhi to see the movement slipping out of his control. The local Khilafat and the Congress committees were the only ones that counted, but their restraining influence was uncertain. It became almost impossible to preserve non-violent atmosphere. From the UP, Butler reported that the assassination of Europeans was openly preached and they were afraid of attacks by night. The European superintendent of police at Hardoi was shot at but escaped with a flesh wound. 'There is no doubt', Butler concluded, 'that the Musalman rowdy element is out for murder and any kind of violence'.[446] Noisy demonstrations had become a daily occurrence and at some places as numerous as a hundred a week. The spirit of defiance led to collisions at various places between mobs and the police, especially in the UP and Bengal. Police stations and other government buildings became special targets of attack.[447] Though there had been as yet no systematic inauguration of civil disobedience in any definite area, preparations were afoot in many parts of the country. The most likely places were Chittagong, parts of Assam, many districts of south India, notably Guntur, and more especially, Bardoli in Surat, where Gandhi was personally supervising the preparations. Non-payment of taxes was openly preached. In Assam the *swaraj* programme placed before the villagers in Kamrup, included abolition of all taxes except land revenue which was to be reduced by 75 per cent.[448] In the UP assurances were given to people that under *swaraj* peasants would have to pay no tax whatever.[449] Naturally, the collection of revenue became a matter of great difficulty for the government. In Bengal, the campaign against *chaukidars* and non-payment of *chaukidari* tax was a serious feature of the situation in the mufassil and three districts reported that their police could not be relied upon in an emergency.[450]

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[444] Ibid., 24 ff. Also see Adil Abbasi, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 192 3.
[445] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 177, 12 Feb. 1922, IOI&R, Reading Papers.
[446] Butler to Reading, 12 Jan. 1922, IOI&R, Butler Papers.
[447] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 212, 28 Jan. 1922, IOI&R, Reading Papers.
[448] Ibid.
[449] *Hindu*, 17 Feb. 1922.
[450] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 177, 12 Feb. 1922, IOI&R, Reading Papers.

Amidst the mounting excitement, Jinnah and M. R. Jayakar (1873–1959), who had earlier made an abortive attempt at Ahmedabad to bring the non-co-operators and the government to conference table, tried once more to do that.[451] Gandhi also seemed receptive. They got in touch with Malaviya and some other Liberals and together they wrote to important Indian leaders, pointing out that in spite of the failure of the government to satisfy popular demands regarding the Punjab, the Khilafat and *swaraj*, it was still possible 'to achieve full national development within the orbit of the British Commonwealth'. The letter pleaded with the leaders 'to confer together and devise means whereby it will be possible to open wide the door to an honourable settlement'.[452] The response to the invitation was encouraging and, consequently, on 14 January 1922, a leaders' conference was held at Bombay. Gandhi and other non-co-operators attended only as 'observers'. Nevertheless, a compromise was reached whereby the non-co-operators agreed to attend a round table conference on their own conditions. As a concession, Gandhi agreed to suspend the contemplated civil disobedience and other obstructive activities, including *hartals* and picketing, until 31 January, and if a conference was called, till the negotiations came to a close. The AICC also condoned the compromise and on 28 January, Jinnah and the secretaries of the conference approached Reading for a round table conference. But the negotiations with the viceroy broke down.[453] Convinced of a moderate support, Reading was in no bargaining mood. The cabinet had also left Reading with no other alternative and most of the provincial governors, particularly Lloyd, were pressing against the holding of such a conference.[454] Gandhi, disappointed by the government and pushed by the militants, reluctantly decided to go ahead with civil disobedience. On 30/31 January 1922, the AICC met at Surat under the presidency of Ajmal Khan and authorized Gandhi to start the campaign.[455] On 1 February, Gandhi sent an 'ultimatum' to Reading couched in minatory terms that if within seven days of the

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[451] *Madras Mail*, 29 Dec. 1921; and Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, i, 517.

[452] Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*, i, 518–20.

[453] Ibid., 521–53.

[454] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 49, 20 Jan. 1922; Hignell to the Secs., Bombay Conference, 26 Jan. 1922; n. 247, above; Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy, Tel. no. 187, 3 Feb. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and Lloyd to Seton, 13 Jan. 1922, IOL&R, Seton Papers.

[455] *Bombay Chronicle*, 1 Feb. 1922.

publication of the manifesto the government did not retract its policy, he would launch civil disobedience. At the request of Jayakar, Gandhi waited for three days before releasing it to the press.[456]

In reply, the Government of India issued a communiqué on 6 February explaining its position and maintaining that the contemplated civil disobedience was a choice between lawlessness and law and order.[457] The following day (7 February), Gandhi issued a rejoinder from Bardoli that the alternative was not, as the government maintained, between lawlessness and repression but 'between mass civil disobedience with all its undoubted dangers and lawless repression of lawful activities of the people'.[458] But hardly had the rejoinder been dispatched to the press than the dreadful news was received of violent collision between the police and the mob on 4 February at Chauri Chaura, a small district in Gorakhpur in the UP, which resulted in the death of 21 policemen and *chaukidars*.[459] The Chauri Chaura massacres and, to a lesser extent, the serious rioting that occurred in Bareilly on the following day,[460] shocked the opinion in the country. Azad Subhani and Jagat Jivan Lal, who had hastened

[456] The letter was published on 4 Feb. 1922. See *Madras Mail*, 4 Feb. 1922. Also see Jayakar, *The Story of My Life*. i, 556.

[457] *Statesman*, 7 Feb. 1922.

[458] *Hindu*, 17 Feb. 1922.

[459] On 4 Feb. 1922, following a period of police intimidation and provocation in the district, a mob of villagers and national volunteers between three and five thousand strong marched in protest to the police station. In the collision that took place the mob brickbatted the police who first fired blank and then into the crowd. When the mob realized that the police were running short of ammunition it rushed and forced some to flee into the fields and others into the building. The *thana* building was set on fire. In all 21 police and *chaukidars* were killed. A little boy servant of the sub-inspector was also murdered. Only one constable and one *chaukidar* managed to escape. Enquiry by the IG of Police showed that most of the policemen were battered to death with sticks and brickbats and many dead bodies bore marks of spear thrusts. Most of the bodies were found at varying distances from the police station, one at least a mile away. Only one corpse was found actually in the police station. After the tragedy the mob tore up the railway line between Chauri Chaura and Gorakhpur, cut the telegraph wires and fled and scattered, deserting the town. See the statement of the escaped constable and the report on the enquiry held by the IG Police in *Hindu*, 17 Feb. 1922; Joint report of enquiry held by Pandit Kunzru, Maulvi Subhanali, C. K. Malaviya in *Hindu*, 3 Mar. 1922; *Leader*, 10 Feb. 1922; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 329, 9 Feb. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers; *The Times*, 14 Feb. 1922; the proceedings of the Chauri Chaura trial in *Hindu*, 6 Apr. 1922; and Parl. Papers, 1922, Cmd. 1586.

[460] At least three rioters were killed and the district magistrate was injured. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 329, 9 Feb. IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see *Hindu*, 17 Feb. 1922.

to Gorakhpur, at once disbanded the volunteers and stopped all non-co-operation activities elsewhere in the district. Kidwai telegraphed to Gandhi urging him to postpone mass civil disobedience or else be prepared for more violent outbreaks. Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and Devdas Gandhi (1900–1957) were also reported to have wired Gandhi to the same effect.[461] The civil disobedience was to start on 12 February, when the 'ultimatum' to the viceroy expired. With all the reports that Gandhi had received from different parts of the country about the violent attitude of the people, the Chauri Chaura news acted as the last straw.[462] Gandhi had always hesitated to take the final plunge and when he was driven into it, he immediately pulled back and called off the projected civil disobedience *sine die*. Probably he had felt that the response was not strong enough to achieve success. The matter was referred to the working committee.[463] On 11 and 12 February 1922, the AICC met at Bardoli. Opposition to Gandhi was strong but, with Malaviya's help, he was able to persuade the committee to suspend mass civil disobedience, courting of arrests and other negative activities and to substitute these with a 'constructive programme' of spinning, temperance and social and educational work.[464]

The Bardoli decision accentuated feelings of extreme resentment against Gandhi, who was assailed from all sides by civil disobedience enthusiasts, especially the younger people whose disappointment was really great.[465] On 17 February 1922, the executive of the Kanpur Khilafat Committee unanimously resolved to urge the CKC to adhere to the non-co-operation programme, irrespective of Gandhi or the Congress decision, until a satisfactory settlement of the Khilafat question was secured.[466] The Bengal and the Maharashtra leaders were also reluctant to accept the decision.[467] Lajpat Rai and Motilal sent

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[461] *Hindu*, 17 Feb. 1922.

[462] Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 19 Feb. 1922, in Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, 23–4.

[463] See Gandhi's confidential letter to the members of the AICC dated 8 Feb. 1922, *Collected Works*, xxii, 350–1.

[464] *Statesman*, 14 Feb. 1922.

[465] See Salamatullah to Abdul Bari 31 Jan. [*sic* for Feb.] [1922], *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 172. Also see Krishnadas, *Seven Months with Mahatma Gandhi*, i (Madras, 1928), 371 ff.; and Yajnik, *Gandhi as I Knew him*, 220–30.

[466] *Hindu*, 24 Feb. 1922.

[467] Ibid.

Gandhi angry letters from prison for taking action on the basis of a single incident.[468] The intensity of criticism grew so strong that it was felt that the Bardoli decision might be thrown over.

Gandhi was considerably affected by the excessive strain put on his health by the events and was reported to be 'much depressed'. But he remained firm in his decision and summarily dismissed the criticism of his action.[469] As always, when in a tight corner, Gandhi sheltered himself behind a penance fast of five days. To his good fortune many leaders came forward to his rescue. On 17 February, Ajmal Khan issued a statement declaring that the Bardoli decision was in the best interest of the country.[470] The Ali brothers and Dr Kitchlew, who were in jail, declared their full support for the postponement.[471] From Calcutta jail, Abul Kalam Azad advised the Muslims to adhere loyally to the lead given by Gandhi.[472] The provincial Khilafat and Congress committees had also decided to issue orders to stop all activities (such as public meetings and picketing) except *swadeshi*.[473] When on 24 and 25 February, the AICC met at Ajmal Khan's residence in Delhi, despite strong opposition, the Bardoli resolutions were confirmed though Gandhi had to make a compromise and allow the right of individual civil disobedience. Non-co-operation was, however, to continue unabated.[474] The CKC, which met at Delhi on 25 and 26 February under Chotani's presidency, also accepted the *fait accompli* and reaffirmed its adherence to non-co-operation as being the only means of securing the Khilafat demands. In a bid to preserve Hindu-Muslim unity and save the Khilafat movement from collapsing, the CKC advised the Muslims to work in co-operation with the Congress and fixed a line of action. Henceforth, the CKC

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[468] See Lajpat Rai's interview from jail published in *Bande Matram* and reported in *Hindu*, 3 Mar. 1922. Also see his letter to the members of the AICC in V. C. Joshi (ed.), *Lala Lajpat Rai. Writings and Speeches*, ii (Delhi, 1966), 88–96.

[469] Krishandas's eyewitness account has been quoted in Iqbal Singh, *The Indian National Congress: A Reconstruction*, ii (Delhi, 1988), 331; Gandhi to Devdas, 12 Feb. 1922. He wrote: '[To start civil disobedience] in an atmosphere of incivility is like putting one's hand in snake pit'. See *Collected Works*, xxii, 397. Also see Gandhi to Jawaharlal, 19 Feb. 1922, in Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, 23–4; and Gandhi's interview in *Hindu*, 3 Mar. 1922.

[470] *Hindu*, 24 Feb. 1922.

[471] *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 Feb. 1922.

[472] Ibid., 28 Feb. 1922. Also see Abul Kalam Azad, *Paigham-i Azad* (Bijnor, 1922), 16–18.

[473] *Hindu*, 24 Feb. 1922. Also see *Bombay Chronicle*, 17 Feb. 1922.

[474] *Bombay Chronicle*, 27 and 28 Feb. 1922. Also see *Hindu*, 3 Mar. 1922.

was to confine its activities to the 'religious duty' of upholding the caliphate. The emphasis was to be on the collection of the Angora Fund, the enlistment of Khilafat members, the boycott of British goods, and if possible, the revival of *hijrat* in consultation with Mustafa Kemal.[475]

The Government of India had so far been withholding action against Gandhi for reasons of political expediency.[476] But it could ill-afford indefinitely to ignore public outcry in England and in Anglo-Indian circles.[477] Nor could Reading disregard his senior governors, Lloyd and Willingdon in particular, who were threatening to resign if Gandhi was not arrested.[478] The India Office and the cabinet, too, were anxious.[479] The Delhi decision of the leaders to continue non-co-operation had made it easier for the government to proceed against Gandhi. Consequently, on 10 March, Gandhi was arrested at Ahmedabad and on 18 March he was sentenced to six years' simple imprisonment.[480] With Gandhi safely in jail, the Government of India instructed the local governments to institute proceedings without hesitation against other leading non-co-operators, if prosecutions could

[475] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 277, 11 Mar. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see Bamford, *Histories*, 191–2.

[476] See e.g. Reading to Montagu, 5 Jan. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Reading was waiting for secure and sure evidence to prosecute Gandhi, such as civil disobedience, which he regarded as 'the best battleground for us'. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 73 and 186, 25 and 14 Feb. 1922, in ibid.

[477] For the comments of the British papers see *Hindu*, 9 Feb. 1922. The hardening of the British public opinion was partly due to the treatment of the Prince of Wales. See Lord Islington's speech in the House of Lords on 8 Feb. 1922. Parl. Papers, 1922, *Hansard*, H.L., I, cols. 61–2. Also see the debate on India in the House of Commons on 14 Feb. 1922. Parl. Papers, 1922, *Hansard*, 150 H.C. 5 s., cols. 865–972. For the European opinion in India see the proceedings of the European Association at Calcutta on 14 Feb. 1922, and the proceedings of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta on 2 Feb. 1922. *Englishman*, 15 and 1 Mar., 1922.

[478] See Gov. of Bombay to Viceroy , Tel. no. 235, 14 Feb. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers; Lloyd to Montagu, 17 and 3 Mar. 1922, IOL&R, Montagu Papers; Willingdon to Butler, 15 Feb. 1922, Willingdon Papers; and Willingdon to Montagu, 22 Feb. 1922, in ibid. Lloyd was particularly sensitive on this issue thinking that his prestige as governor had been affected by the viceroy's action. His ill health accentuated these feelings still further. See John Charmley, *Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire* (London, 1987), 99 and 101.

[479] Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 198, 6 Feb. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[480] *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 Mar. 1922. For Govt. of India's policy towards Gandhi and his subsequent arrest and imprisonment also see *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 475–580; *The Historical Trial of Mahatma Gandhi* (Karachi, 1922); E. S. Hadley (ed.), *The Trial of Mahatma Gandhi* (London, [1922]); and Low, 'The Government of India . . .', 254–5.

be secured.[481] In this way it expected to see an immediate collapse of the agitation. The prospects in this direction, however, were still remote.

In the final analysis the non-co-operation experiment, as envisaged by its *gurus*, was a political failure. The Treaty of Sèvres remained unchanged, the Punjab 'wrong' was still unrighted, and *swaraj* nowhere near realization. Nothing could be a more befitting epitaph than what Mrs Besant wrote sometime in 1922: 'It is the queerest Revolution that ever was, . . . has had the queerest leader, and has now the queerest collapse'.[482] The non-co-operation experiment succumbed to its own contradictions. As M. N. Roy has pointed out, Gandhism and its socio-economic philosophy with its negative bearings could not prove of any avail in the context of diverse pulls of a plural society.[483] To be successful against a government which was firmly entrenched, the programme required the united support of the whole country. This was never gained. Opposition, either to the whole programme or its specific items, was strong and persistent. First, the Hindus stood aloof and had to be coaxed and manoeuvred into accepting it. Then there was a constant tussle between Gandhi and the militant Khilafatists over violence and non-violence, as well as over the question of civil disobedience. Further, there was no inherent unity of purpose. The Khilafatists utilized Gandhi as much as Gandhi utilized the Khilafatists. The only thing that bound them together was synchronism of interests. Such alliances, however, as is the case with most coalitions, are destined not to last for long. The Government of India first watched and waited, then capitalised on the nationalists' mistakes, and, finally, by a policy of repression, brought them down. But in spite of all the drawbacks and failings, the Khilafatists and Gandhi had been able to build up an agitation never before experienced in India.

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[481] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 315, 24 Mar. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.
[482] Annie Besant, *The Future of Indian Politics* (Adyar, 1922), 259.
[483] Roy and Roy, *Selections*, 37.

CHAPTER FIVE

DECLINE OF THE MOVEMENT

The Congress decision of February 1922 to postpone the contemplated civil disobedience, took the sting out of the non-co-operation campaign and weakened the Khilafat movement. But there was no immediate Hindu-Muslim breakaway or cessation of political activity. The CKC still professed the same course as the Congress, and Hindu-Muslim unity was even now the declared basis of the nationalist struggle for *swaraj*. However, there is no denying the fact that disappointment was general. The reports from various provinces for the month of February showed that the Indians, Muslims in particular, were sullen and discontented.[1] The despondency was not limited to the radicals. Even the moderate and loyal Muslims were equally agitated over the Turkish question and wanted the British government to settle it as soon as possible.[2] The fluid political situation in the country, together with the worsening Graeco-Turkish relations in the Near East, had been causing grave anxiety to the Indian government. There were indications that the recurring violent disturbances in the country were largely due to 'the fanatical and turbulent element among the Mahomedans'.[3] Of the total political prisoners, at least 75 or 80 per cent had been Muslims.[4] This was enough to convince Reading that the Muslim attitude in relation to the Treaty of Sèvres was of the utmost importance. Therefore, he was anxious to impress upon them that his government was doing all in its power to present their views to the British government as forcibly as possible.[5]

Early in February 1922, when Reading learnt that an Allied foreign ministers' conference was to be held at Paris the next month, he at

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[1] See the weekly tels. on the internal political situation in India from Viceroy to Sec. of the State during Feb. and Mar. 1922 in IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[2] This was evident even in the outlying areas of Baluchistan. See IOL&R, L/P&S/10/853, file 1695/1922. Also see J. T. Gwynn, *Indian Politics* (London, 1924), 19-20.

[3] Viceroy to Sec. of State (for the Prime Minister), Tel. no. 282, 13 Mar. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[4] See Reading to Peel, 8 June 1922, IOL&R, in ibid. This refers to earlier events.

[5] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 282, 13 Mar., 1922, in ibid.

once suggested to Montagu that a joint representation from him and the provincial governments about a 'reasonable' modification of the treaty might strengthen the secretary of state's hand.[6] Accordingly, on 28 February 1922, with the concurrence and support of the provincial governments,[7] Reading sent his fateful telegram to Montagu, formally requesting the British government for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. The grounds of his request were the intensity of Muslim resentment and the services they had rendered during the last war. With due provisions for safeguarding the neutrality of the Straits and the security of the non-Turkish population, Reading urged for the evacuation of Istanbul, the recognition of the sultan's suzerainty over the holy places, and the restoration of Izmir and Thrace to Turkey, including Edirne (Adrianople). With this representation the viceroy added a stern warning that 'the bitter and sullen resentment, which has already led to serious disorders and bloodshed, will be intensified by failure to allay Muslim feeling over the revision of the Treaty and will lead to dangerous results in India'.[8]

The telegram reached Montagu on 1 March. He sent it at once to the cabinet for circulation as Reading had asked for permission to publish parts of the dispatch. Unfortunately, however, the telegram was not circulated until 3 March. To make matters worse, on 4 March, when Montagu was out in the country for the weekend, he received another telegram from the Government of India pressing for an early reply.[9] Montagu, not realizing that the home department had sent this telegram without Reading's knowledge owing to its exaggerated anxiety over the possibility of a Muslim outbreak at Gandhi's imminent arrest,[10] convinced himself of the urgency of the matter and authorized its publication without consulting either Lloyd George or any of his cabinet colleagues.[11] When on 8 March, the pro-Muslim

[6] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 162, 9 Feb. 1922, in ibid.

[7] For the views of the provincial govts. see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/853, file 1695/1922. All, except Burma, concurred.

[8] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 266-S., 28 Feb. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[9] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 285-S., 4 Mar. 1922, in ibid.

[10] Viceroy to Sec. of State (for Lord Privy Seal), Tel. no. 292, 15 Mar. 1922 in ibid.

[11] Montagu maintained that in the meeting that took place on 6 March in the absence of Lloyd George, he had privately informed Curzon of his authorization. But the latter had maintained silence and the matter was not discussed at all. Thus, deliberately or otherwise, an ample opportunity of stopping the publication was lost. See *The Times*, 13 Mar. 1922.

dispatch was published in India, it won for Reading the gratitude of many but it embarrassed the British government in its conduct of negotiations at Paris. The French were already pro-Turkish and the differences between the British and Indian governments could make the Turks unduly intractable. In fact, the Italians had lost no time in protesting to the British for this indiscretion. Curzon was furious, as was Lloyd George who did not wait to sack Montagu. Reading, however, was spared.[12]

The Indian Muslims were shocked at the unexpected exit of Montagu who was probably their sole and consistent sympathizer in the British government. Erratic, mercurial and arrogant though he was, Montagu was a politician to his fingertips and quite charming and helpful.[13] The Indians felt the loss and protested against his forced exit alleging that he had been sacrificed to anti-Khilafat intrigues.[14] To counter Curzon's renewed anti-Turk bias at the Allied conference they brought more pressure to bear upon the British government.[15] But realizing that at least the Indian government was with them, the Muslims, the moderates in particular, concluded that there was much to be gained by supporting the ruling power.[16] Some of the Khilafatists, too, felt gratified. Abdul Bari, Mushir Kidwai and

[12] In this connection see Montagu to Lloyd George, 9 Mar. 1922; Lloyd George to Montagu, 9 Mar. 1922; Lloyd George to Curzon, 9 Mar. 1922; Curzon to Lloyd George, 9 Mar. 1922, Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George Papers; Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tels. nos. 376 and 388, 13 and 15 Mar. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers; Parl. Papers, 1922, *Hansard*, 151 H.C. Deb. 5s., cols. 1489–90, and H.L., XLIX, cols. 467–68; *Morning Post*, 10 Mar. 1922; *The Times*, 13 Mar. 1922; *Hindu*, 17 Mar. 1922: Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919–1925* (London, 1934), 267–8; Lord Beaverbrook, *The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George* (London, 1963), 154–5; Earl Winterton, *Orders of the Day* (London, 1953), 112; The Marquess of Reading, *Rufus Isaacs. The First Marquess of Reading*, ii (London, 1945), 227–9; S. D. Waley, *Edwin Montagu* (Bombay, 1964), 271–84; and S. Sardar Ali Khan, *The Earl of Reading* (London, 1924), 141–2.

[13] Bence-Jones, *The Viceroys*, 224.

[14] See the statements of Fazlul Haq and Dr A. Suhrawardy in *Statesman*, 11 Mar. 1922. Also see the ext. from the *Mahommedan* in ibid.; and the protest telegram from the Muslim members of the Indian legislature to Lloyd George, dated 11 Mar. 1922, in *Englishman*, 14 Mar. 1922.

[15] See the proceedings of a protest meeting held at Delhi on 19 Mar. 1922, *Englishman*, 20 Mar. 1922. Also see the telegram from the members of the Bombay provincial council to Sec. of State, dated 18 Mar. 1922, in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/853, file 1206/1922; and memorial from the official members of the Punjab legislative council in file 1672/1922 in ibid. The signatories included Muharram Ali Chishti (1864–1956), Firoz Khan Noon and Ahmad Yar Daultana.

[16] Note by Sir Muhammad Shafi, 20 Apr. 1922, encl., Reading to Peel, 26 Apr. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

Hasrat Mohani were among them. They had gradually begun to reflect on the relative merits of continuing the non-co-operation programme.[17] This compelled Gandhi to rush to Ajmer shortly before his arrest and beg Abdul Bari to reconsider his position.[18] The publication of the Government of India's dispatch further hastened the Muslims' disenchantment with the Gandhian programme. Abdul Bari and Kidwai pleaded with Chotani and the CKC to drop the agitation and achieve their objectives through 'constitutional methods'.[19]

The CKC, however, was less appreciative of the Government of India's efforts. In its opinion Reading's dispatch had fallen far below the minimum Khilafat demands and that the viceroy had failed to commit himself with regard to Arabia, Palestine and Iraq. The CKC was also anxious about the mandates and the status of Egypt, and it demanded the evacuation of Istanbul and Edirne before the Turks were asked to sign a new peace treaty.[20] Thus when the CKC working committee met at Bombay on 26 and 27 March 1922 to consider the situation, it confirmed its previous stand and advised the completion of the Bardoli-Delhi non-co-operation 'constructive programme' by the end of May 1922.[21] In spite of the decision, however, there was no resurgence of active agitation. The disorganized state of affairs following the imprisonment of top leaders and the despondency felt at the failure of the non-co-operation campaign had discounted any possibility in this direction. The Khilafatists' strategy was confined to sustaining such activity as would exert enough useful pressure on the government. Thus, when the Paris peace proposals (published in India on 29 March), in spite of being an improvement on the Treaty of Sèvres came nowhere near the declared Muslim demands, there was an immediate protest.[22] Chotani, in a telegram to Lloyd George, repudiated the proposals as being in direct variance with Muslim

[17] Ibid. For Mohani see *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 466.

[18] *Hindu*, 24 Mar. 1922; and *History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1, 466.

[19] Note by Shafi, 20 Apr. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see Kidwai's letter to the *Leader* quoted in Bamford, *Histories*, 193–5; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 373, 30 Apr. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[20] *Bombay Chronicle*, 21 Mar. 1922. The CKC's statement was issued in amplification of the one issued earlier by Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari. See *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 Mar. 1922.

[21] Ibid., 31 Mar. 1922.

[22] *Hindu*, 6, 14 and 20 Apr. 1922. For the Paris Proposals see Parl. Papers, 1922, Cmd. 1641, *Pronouncement by Three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs Respecting the Near Eastern Situation, Paris, 27 Mar., 1922.*

'religious obligations' and all wartime promises.[23] The working committee contemplated the dispatch of another delegation to Europe to represent the Indian Muslim view,[24] but it did not work out. Since the thrust of the British policy was still anti-Turk, the CKC decided that it would not let go the issue.[25] The Muslims remained anxious.[26]

But though the situation during April and May of 1922 stayed fluid, there was no active agitation until provocation came from the government in the form of renewed repression in several provinces.[27] By midsummer the number of political prisoners in India, exclusive of the Mappila 'rebels', had reached approximately four thousand.[28] Among those convicted were such prominent names as Dr Mahmud, Hasrat Mohani, Jawaharlal Nehru, Shoaib Qureshi, Dayalji Desai and many others.[29] This was enough to force the leaders to devise some means to counteract repression. A meeting of the CKC was convened from 7–9 June 1922 at Lucknow to coincide with the sittings of the Jam'iyyat and the CKC. The moot points were the right of retaliation, boycott, and complete *swaraj*. The majority of the delegates present at Lucknow, particularly the *'ulama*, were intent on taking up civil disobedience immediately. But the difficulty was that the AICC, owing to a very sharp difference of opinion in the Congress ranks on this issue, had decided to postpone the matter until its next meeting in August 1922. In the meantime, at the instance of Moonje, it had appointed a seven-man civil disobedience enquiry committee to ascertain the public mood.[30] Ajmal Khan reasoned with the radical Khilafatists that, without Hindu support, Muslims alone would not be

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[23] Chotani to Lloyd George, Tel. 31 Mar. 1922, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/853, file 1419/1922.

[24] *Hindu*, 6 Apr. 1922.

[25] Ibid., 20 Apr. 1922.

[26] Syud Hossain, 'What India Wants', *New York Times*, 9 Apr. 1922, in Blanche Watson (ed.), *Gleanings from the American Press* (Madras, 1923), 204–25.

[27] See the report prepared by Jawaharlal Nehru and Motilal Sexana on the allegations of courts of wards, the police and others in Sitapur and the Congress enquiry report on repression in the Santhal Parganas. *Hindu*, 8 June 1922. Also see K. K. Datta (ed.), *History of the Freedom Movement in Bihar*, i (Patna, 1957), 564–9.

[28] The exact figure was 3,815. See *Hindu*, 20 July 1922.

[29] Ibid., 20 Apr., 15 and 22 June 1922. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 164, 338 and 489, 10 Feb., 12 Apr. and 5 May 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[30] Report by K. B. Tasadduq Hussain, 19 June 1922, NAI, Home Poll. 868/1922, *Bombay Chronicle*, 9 and 10 June 1922. Also see *Pioneer*, 10 June 1922 and *Hindu*, 15 June 1922. The members of the Committee were: Ajmal Khan (chm.), Motilal, Rajagopalachari, Ansari, Vithalbhai Patel, S. S. Iyengar and Chotani (who was unable to take part).

able to take up civil disobedience successfully. This diminished the excitement and the CKC adopted a resolution similar to the one passed by the Congress.[31] Accordingly, a Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry committee, consisting of Chotani (president), Ashfaq Ali (secretary), Abdul Majid Badauni, Sulaiman Nadwi (later replaced by Nawab Ismail Khan (1886–1958) of Meerut), Abdul Qadir of Kasur, T. A. K. Sherwani, Moazzam Ali and Zahur Ahmad, was appointed to tour the country with the Congress deputation and submit its report on or before 15 August 1922.[32] Ajmal Khan and Ansari, who had been appointed to the Congress civil disobedience enquiry committee, were also requested to take part in the deliberations of the Khilafat enquiry committee.

The Lucknow decision, however, did not satisfy the champions of violence who lamented the inaction of the Congress and the CKC. Two of the *maulawis* were reported to have put forward a proposal to the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama that *fida'in* or secret assassins should be appointed on the system of Hasan ibn Sabbah of the Isma'ili sect in Alamut, a rocky promontory high in the Elburz mountains north-east of Qazvin (Iran) in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.[33] An unconfirmed report from the Punjab suggested the mooting of a similar proposal in that province.[34] But no reasonable leader was prepared to endorse such plans. The front rank Khilafatists, and not many of them had escaped imprisonment, were restrained in their criticism fearing that civil disobedience might develop into a suicidal policy. Some of them seemed to have been completely disillusioned with the Gandhian non-co-operation. They were partisans of Gandhi so long as his programme promised some results. When that failed they joined his critics and condemned him. The understanding arrived at between Gandhi and Abdul Bari during the preceding March had by now foundered. In June 1922, Abdul Bari wrote to Chotani:

> The goal before us is to give protection to the Turks and there are only two ways of doing this. Firstly, we should compel those who help the Greeks, to give up giving help by changing their opinion or by force, and secondly to give so much strength to Mustafa Kemal that he may defeat the Greeks and their supporters. I understand that Muslims of India have not got the power to strengthen the hands of

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[31] *Hindu*, 15 June 1922. Also see Bamford, *Histories*, 201–3.
[32] *Hindu*, 6 and 27 July 1922.
[33] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 522, 3 July 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.
[34] Ibid.

> Angora. A small amount is not enough to give them sufficient strength.... By means of Non-co-operation we cannot prevent the Allies from giving help to the Greeks.... So far no impression has been created on the Allies.... As far as I can make out the Non-co-operation movement is dying down. Many people think the same thing.... Let us see whether we have still to cling to this movement... or some other way is found out of the difficulty. In my opinion it would be far more beneficial if the Muslims improve their own status, Indians Muslims in India, Arabs in Arabia, Afghans in Afghanistan and Turks in Turkey. They should then unite. For the present whatever concessions could be obtained for the Turks they should be obtained, but we should not ruin ourselves for their sake.[35]

Kidwai's disillusionment was even greater. Writing to Chotani in August 1922 he ridiculed the *charkha* and attacked the inaction of the Congress-Khilafat leadership.[36] About the same time he warned Ansari:

> If such coldness is shown towards the Khilafate [*sic*] I will shortly raise a standard of revolt against the Khilafat Committee and the Congress. Even if the Hindus do not stand by us we would not give up the Khilafate [*sic*].[37]

In their disillusionment, Abdul Bari and Kidwai were joined by Sulaiman Nadwi, Sherwani, Zahur Ahmad, Ajmal Khan and Khaliquzzaman.[38] Some, like Abdul Majid Khwaja (1885–1962), supported them because they thought that the boycott of the councils by the Muslims alone might injure the interests of the community.[39] But since the dissatisfied Khilafatists considered an abrupt breakaway from the Congress harmful to the Muslim community,[40] they joined that section in the Congress whose ideology also sprang from dissatisfaction with the Gandhian programme after Bardoli. Already, C. R. Das had expressed the need of a new approach and a change of tactics. He canvassed for the policy of applying non-co-operation from within the councils.[41] Lajpat Rai, too, was of the opinion that absolute non-co-operation

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[35] Quoted in Bamford, *Histories*, 204–5.

[36] Ibid., 206.

[37] Ibid. For Kidwai's views also see Edib, *Inside India*, 167–8.

[38] They expressed their views more clearly after the enquiry committees submitted their reports. See below, 331.

[39] Abdul Majid Khwaja, *Zaruri iltimas* (Aligarh, n.d.), 11.

[40] See Abdul Bari's letter to Chotani and Kidwai's to Ansari in Bamford, *Histories*, 204 and 206.

[41] V. P. S. Raghuvanshi, *Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought*, 2nd edn. (Agra, 1959), 173.

was an impossibility.[42] Similarly, among the Maharashtra leaders, a powerful group led by N. C. Kelkar openly favoured the late Tilak's policy of 'responsive co-operation'.[43] The idea caught on and many more leaders, notably Motilal Nehru and Vithalbhai Patel, began to lend their support.[44] M. A. Jinnah, who had continued his crusade against non-co-operation all this time, also threw his weight on the side of the 'pro-changers'. He declared that the time had come for a revision of the political strategy: they must enter the services, go to the schools, and fight for the councils.[45] However, he was opposed to the 'purely destructive programme' of obstructing the councils. To him the councils were the only place from where the struggle for Indian demands could be effectively sustained.[46]

The 'pro-changers' were quick to discern that the main hurdle for most Muslims seeking elections was the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama's *fatwa* of 1920 prohibiting council entry. The clause concerning the boycott had imposed restrictions on four counts: (i) the councils were geared to providing stability and permanence to the government and as such any succour in that direction would mean open co-operation; (ii) often laws were framed in the councils which were un-Islamic and acquiescence or silence in such cases was unlawful for good Muslims, especially if they were in a position to oppose them; (iii) the Englishmen also sat in the councils and since they were the oppressors and enemies of Islam, sharing seats with them was prohibited by the *shari'at*; and (iv) oath of fealty to the government being a pre-condition for the members of the councils, its affirmation was a mortal sin in accordance with the dictates of the *shari'at*.[47] These were emphatic sanctions and only the *'ulama* as a body could find a way round them. So they proceeded to bring pressure to bear on the Jam'iyyat to secure a revision of the *fatwa*. For this, Motilal Nehru solicited Abdul Bari's support. Nehru maintained that the *muttafiqa fatwa* had imposed the boycott of the councils only to prevent their

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[42] Lajpat Rai, *Ideals of Non-co-operation* (Madras, 1924), 1.

[43] Indra Rothermund, 'Gandhi and Maharashtra: Nationalism and the Provincial Response', *South Asia*, 1/1 (1971), 62–3. Also see *Indian Annual Register, 1923*, ii (ed.), H. N. Mitra (Calcutta, 1924), 52.

[44] Both Nehru and Patel were members of the Congress enquiry committee.

[45] See *Bombay Chronicle*, 3 July and 5 and 14 Aug. 1922.

[46] See Jinnah's interview to *Bombay Chronicle* quoted in *Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922*, app. ii, 151 3. Aso see *Madras Mail*, 3 July 1922; and *Zamindar*, 5 July 1922.

[47] *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 46 7. Eng. tr. mine.

being used as an excuse for co-operation with the government. But if the intention was to join them in order to thwart their working from inside, then that was a different matter. He informed Abdul Bari that several witnesses before the civil disobedience enquiry committee had endorsed the view that such an action was intrinsically within the orbit of non-co-operation. Nehru wanted to know whether the concerned clause of the *fatwa* was still a hindrance to joining the councils. As to the reservation regarding the oath of allegiance of the members-elect at the time of taking seats, Nehru thought that this should not be an impediment. The oath was an expression of allegiance to the king-emperor and not to the government as such. And since Hasrat Mohani's proposal for complete independence had been rejected by all the three organizations—the Congress, the Muslim League and the Khilafat Committee—the objection had lost its relevance.[48] Abdul Bari seemed to agree with him and replied:

> This humble self does not [normally] affix his signature on the *fatawa* [issued by others]. I had written a letter for the purpose of inducing action on the [*muttafiqa*] *fatwa* which the *'ulama* [on their own] appended with the same. It was better that an understanding had been developed with the *muftis*. Their directions would be [readily] followed. As to the affairs of the non-co-operation movement [I am of the opinion that] the withdrawal [of the ban] could be secured the same way that it was imposed [in the first place].[49]

What Abdul Bari meant was that a revision was possible and there was no religious ban on doing that. But the 'pro-changers' preferred to wait, until at least the results of the civil disobedience enquiry committees were known.

The date, 15 August 1922, came and went but the enquiry committees, owing to the insufficient time at their disposal, were unable to finish their reports. And though they did stir up some public enthusiasm during their tours the revival of the agitation was due to the events in the Near East rather than the affairs at home. Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy was primarily responsible for this. His assurances of support had led the Greeks to launch, on the night of 18/19 August, a fresh attack on the Turkish nationalists. But the plan backfired. The hostilities resulted in a complete rout of the Greek forces which were driven across the Straits into Europe. Within a fortnight Greece

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[48] Motilal to Abdul Bari, 23 Sept. [1922], ibid., 45–6.
[49] Abdul Bari to Motilal, n.d., ibid., 47. Eng. tr. mine.

was begging the Allies to negotiate an armistice. By 8 September, Mustafa Kemal's forces occupied Izmir and their pacification of Anatolia was practically complete.[50] The news of Mustafa Kemal's victory was received in India with great jubilation. Chotani, the president of the CKC, in his message of felicitations to Kemal Paşa hoped that his 'brave mujahidin' would succeed in driving out the Greeks and restoring peace in the Turkish homelands of Asia Minor and Thrace.[51] Ahmed Khatri, honorary secretary of the organization, issued directions that Muslim India should celebrate the Turkish victory on 24 and 25 September and pray for Mustafa Kemal and his warriors.[52] The celebrations were duly held throughout the country with great enthusiasm. In spite of the perfunctory participation of the Hindus and their complete aloofness in the Punjab, Muslims of all shades of opinion flocked together and vied with one another in lauding the services of Mustafa Kemal, 'a hero at the head of a band of heroes', who had saved the caliphate from ignominy and shame.[53] Poet Mohammed Iqbal commemorated Kemal's victory in verse and described his military feat as 'Mustafa's *ism-i a'zam*',[54] alluding thereby to the greatest of the ninety-nine names or attributes of God the utterance of which, Muslims believe, casts an irresistible spell over evil spirits.

But very soon the rejoicing turned into despair when news arrived of a possible British intervention on behalf of the Greeks. The main reason was that the nationalists' pursuit of the retreating Greek forces had brought them to the 'neutral zone' (protecting Istanbul, the Bosphorus and the Dardenelles) at Chanak which was held by the British troops. An Anglo-Turkish clash became imminent. The British

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[50] *Annual Register, 1922*, 208, 211–12.

[51] The message, dated 13 Sept. 1922, was conveyed through Ahmad Farid Bey, Kamal's diplomatic rep. in Paris. See Bilal N. Şimşir (ed.), *Homage to Mustafa Kamal Ataturk* (Islamabad, 1981), 14, citing Turkish embassy archives in Paris.

[52] *Khilafat*, 17 Sept. 1922.

[53] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 781, 796 and 872, 28 Sept. and 3 and 17 Oct. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers; *Times of India*, 20 Sept. 1922; and *Hindu*, 28 Sept. 1922. Kamal's stature grew rapidly among Indians in the following months. See e.g. Abdul Wahid Qadiri Badauni (ed.), *Salam* (Badaun, 1923); and *Samra-i shuja'at urf fatah Simarna* (Lucknow, 1923). The Afghan govt., which was in liaison with the CKC, probably encouraged these pro-Kamal feelings. See PRO, FO 371/8080 and 371/8084.

[54] He copied this verse in a letter to a friend. See Iqbal to Girami, 4 Oct. 1922, in Muhammad Abdullah Quraishi (ed.), *Makatib-i Iqbal banam Girami* (Karachi, 1969), 221–2. Another evidence of pro-Kamal feelings was highlighted by the appearance of favourable articles such as those in the *Humayun* of Lahore by Bashir Ahmad. See Bakhtiar Bano, 'Wazahati fehrist *Humayun*', MA thesis (Lahore, 1965), *passim*.

cabinet issued a strong warning to Mustafa Kemal, drawn up mainly by Winston Churchill (1874–1965) with the assistance of Lord Birkenhead (1872–1930), asking him to respect the 'neutral zone'. At the same time an appeal was addressed to the dominions to render assistance. The French, refusing to be drawn into the conflict, withdrew their forces from Chanak and the Italians assured the Turks of their neutrality. For a moment war and peace hung on a frail thread.[55]

The threat of British intervention in the Greaco-Turkish conflict infuriated the Khilafatists and the moderate Muslims alike.[56] Even a loyalist like Khwaja Hasan Nizami was driven to ridicule Lloyd George for, what he called, his 'insensitiveness to Muslim feelings'.[57] On 19 September, Chotani sent a telegram to Malik Abdul Qayyum (1892–1956), the influential editor of the *Islamic News* (London), expressing 'horror and indignation' at the news of British government's appeal to the dominions for help in the event of a war with Turkey. 'If England goes to war with Turkey', he warned, '. . . she never will be able to regain prestige in Asia'.[58] But since the Indians were conscious of their inability to put an effective restraint on the British policy they attempted to forestall the use of Indian troops against Ankara in any impending Allied operations.[59] On 20 September 1922, Abul Kasem, the ex-deputy leader of the Khilafat delegation to Europe in 1920 and now enjoying the confidence of the viceroy and

[55] Lloyd George later admitted that 'It was not a bluff. I certainly meant to fight and I was certain we should win'. See his *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, ii (London, 1938), 1350. For the Chanak crisis also see David Walder, *The Chanak Affair* (London, 1969); Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, iv (London, 1931), 418–37; Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, iii (London, 1928), 300–2; Lord Beaverbrook, *Politicians and the Press* (London, 1926), 47–71; Nicolson, *Curzon*, 271–6; id., *King George the Fifth* (London, 1952), 368; and Henry H. Cumming, *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East* (London, 1938), 174–85.

[56] For instance, on 19 Sept. 1922, Fazlul Haq declared in a speech at Calcutta: 'We cannot tolerate Mr. Lloyd George or his policy any longer. . . . If England takes any part in the disintegration of the last Muslim empire she will be taking the position of the enemy of Islam. She will then have to face the angered onslaughts of the whole Muslim world fighting the last battles of the faith'. *Statesman*, 20 Sept. 1922.

[57] *Khilafat*, 17 Sept. 1922.

[58] Encl., Malik to Farid Bey, Tel. 20 Sept. 1922, in Şimşir, *Homage to . . . Ataturk*, 21–2.

[59] See Abul Kasem's interview of 20 Sept. 1922, in *Hindu*, 28 Sept. 1922. According to the figures made available by the Govt. of India in Feb. 1921, approx. 74,700 Indian troops were still serving in Iraq and Iran and approx. 23,000 in Egypt and Palestine. See *Legislative Assembly Debates*, i, part 1, 1921, 310.

his government, tabled a motion in the Indian legislative assembly that the Indian forces should be removed from the territories that were formerly within the Turkish Empire. However, he withdrew the motion a few minutes before the assembly opened its deliberations and instead decided to take a deputation to the viceroy as a more expedient course.[60] The same evening a twenty-five-member deputation of the Muslim members of the Indian legislature met Reading at Simla and discussed with him informally the Near Eastern situation.[61] But Reading expressed his inability to do anything except lay their views before the British government. The deputationists well understood his predicament and in spite of their anxiety preferred to exercise restraint.[62] Among the moderates only G. M. Bhurgri went to the length of resigning his seat in the council of state.[63] The radicals were not so restrained. They forged a plan to raise a corps of Muslim volunteers to fight for the Turkish nationalists. An appeal was issued in the Indian press for the formation of an 'Angora Legion'.[64] Even a moderate like Chotani lost no time in hinting to Lloyd George that volunteering would proceed unless Istanbul and Thrace were immediately restored to Turkey.[65] Consequently, the CKC authorized the organization of the 'Angora Legion' and appealed to the country in general and Muslims in particular to join it as a 'sacred national and religious duty'.[66] Some headway was made and the efforts continued well into the early part of 1923, but enthusiasm generally evaporated when the Government of India took recourse to the Foreign Establishment Act 1870 which viewed such volunteering as illegal.[67]

To the great relief of all, the events in the Near East took a turn

[60] *Hindu*, 28 Sept. 1922.

[61] *Times of India*, 21 Sept. 1922.

[62] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 955, 21 Sept. 1922, IOI&R, Reading Papers.

[63] Bhurgri to Reading, Tel. 22 Sept. 1922, in *Hindu*, 19 Oct. 1922.

[64] *Times of India*, 20 Sept. 1922; and Vincent's letter to M. Fayyaz Khan in *Madras Mail*, 30 Oct. 1922. It refers to earlier events.

[65] *Hindu*, 12 Oct. 1922.

[66] *Times of India*, 20 Oct. 1922.

[67] Vincent's letter to Fayyaz Khan, *Madras Mail*, 30 Oct. 1922. Afterwards, the CKC was reluctant to take up the matter. See the proceedings of the working committee held on 27 Feb. 1923 at Allahabad, in *Kar rawa'i ijlas jama'at-i 'amila* (Bombay, 1923), 3. A few letters offering themselves to join the Legion are available in AFM, AIMLR, Misc./Khilafat— i. Also see SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/3, 20 Jan. 1923, para. 29.

for the better and hostilities were averted.[68] The Turkish nationalists were at long last persuaded to agree to a conference at Mudania which took place on 3 October 1922. After several breakdowns Ankara accepted the Allied terms and on 11 October, an armistice was at last signed. Under the terms of the agreement the Greeks were to evacuate Thrace but the Turks were not to occupy it until a final settlement. A conference for the negotiation of a treaty to replace the Treaty of Sèvres was then proposed to be held at Lausanne sometime in November 1922.[69] Meanwhile, the prospects from the Indian Muslim point of view had brightened still further when in the middle of October 1922, Lloyd George's coalition government fell, apparently as a result of the final debacle of the premier's Near Eastern policy. Of course, the issues involved in Lloyd George's downfall were far wider and must be sought in the nature of alliance originally formed between him and the Conservatives, but the coalition fell as a result of the Chanak affair. Lloyd George had staked everything on his pro-Greek adventure in Asia Minor.[70] His secret dealings with Sir Basil Zaharoff, the wily Hellenist financier who supported Greek war effort against Turkey, had also aroused indignation in many quarters. The result was that the Conservatives under Andrew Bonar Law (1858–1923) refused to support an unpopular war.[71] For four years Lloyd George had mismanaged foreign affairs,

[68] The dominions refused to help. Only New Zealand and Australia expressed lukewarm enthusiasm. Curzon, who had since become soft on Turkey, was angry at the cabinet decision which had been taken in his absence. Nevertheless, he moved to Paris and with great difficulty was able to persuade Poincaré to join with the British in arranging a meeting with the Turks. See L. S. Amery, *My Political Life* (London, 1953), 234; Mosley, *Curzon*, 217–29; and J. Connell, *The 'Office': A Study of the British Foreign Policy and its Makers, 1919–1951* (London, 1958), 40–3.

[69] *Annual Register, 1922*, 208–9. Also see Harold Armstrong, *Turkey in Travail* (London, 1925), 249–60.

[70] As early as July 1921, Francis Stevenson had noted in his diary that 'He [Lloyd George] has had a great fight in the Cabinet to back the Greeks.... He is perfectly convinced he is right over this, & is willing to stake everything on it'. See A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), *Lloyd George: A Diary by Francis Stevenson* (London, 1971), 230.

[71] See Robert Blake, *The Unknown Prime Minister: The life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858–1923* (London, 1955), 436–58; Eustace Percy, *Some Memories* (London, 1958), 86–9; Trevor Wilson, *The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–1935*, 2nd edn. (London, 1968), 238–9; and Donald McCormick, *The Mask of Merlin: A Critical Study of David Lloyd George* (London, 1963), 227–8. For a critical analysis of Lloyd George's policy and its effects also see Valentine Chirol, 'Four Years of Lloyd Georgian Foreign Policy', *Edinburgh Review*, 237/483 (1923), 1–20; and Ben Kendim, 'New Turkey', *Edinburgh Review*, 238/485 (1923), 198–208.

running his own little 'foreign office' on the side. He tolerated no opposition and bullied everyone around him. One of his colleagues who knew him well thought that Lloyd George was 'a vampire and a medium in one'.[72] The stocky little Welshman had dominated the scene for quite some time. Now he was gone, making way for the Conservative ministry of Bonar Law. The educated Muslims were frankly jubilant at his humiliation. They saw in his fall signs of the end of British pro-Greek policy. The Khilafatists welcomed the news as promising the termination of 'British Pan-Hellenism'.[73] The daily *Khilafat*, the organ of the CKC, jubilantly captioned its leading article on his exit as *'Zulm ka hashar'* ('The Nemesis of Tyranny')[74] which conveys the general feeling among Indian Muslims.

But the overall effect of the Near Eastern crisis on Muslim politics in India had been regressive. The advantages gained by the publication of the Government of India's dispatch of February 1922 were largely negatived. This also marred the chances of a compromise between the Khilafatists and the moderate Muslims—towards which Muhammad Shafi had been striving—to end the agitation and push their interests by constitutional means and co-operation with the government.[75] The viceroy was terribly disappointed. On 21 September, he had ruefully wired to Viscount Peel (1867–1937), Montagu's successor at the India Office, 'Had we had no Near East crisis at the moment, we might have expected a definite split between Mahomedan and Hindu extremists and difference of opinion among the former which would have weakened their potentialities for mischief.'[76]

The expected collapse of the Khilafat movement did not come. On the contrary, the CKC decided at its meeting at Delhi on 18 and 19 October to support Mustafa Kemal and continue the agitation until the fate of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* was settled.[77] But, fortunately for the government, the Khilafat-Congress leadership was so tangled in its own schismatic squabbles that it could take no advantage of the situation. This was revealed rather glaringly when a proposal was initiated in certain quarters that the offices of the CKC should be

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[72] Maynard Keynes, *Essays in Biography*, quoted by Roy Jenkins in *The Times*, 20 Mar. 1972.

[73] *Hindu*, 26 Oct. 1922. Also see Gwynn, *Indian Politics*, 228.

[74] *Khilafat*, 22 Oct. 1922.

[75] Note by Shafi, 20 Apr. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[76] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 756, 21 Sept. 1922, IOL&R, ibid.

[77] *Khilafat*, 21 and 22 Oct. 1922.

transferred from Bombay to Delhi and a financial committee appointed to oversee its money matters. A resolution was said to have been drafted to that effect for presentation at the forthcoming session of the CKC at Delhi.[78] Categorical denials were issued but evidently all was not well. The feud became even more apparent in late October and early November 1922, when the Congress and the Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry committees published their respective reports.[79] On the immediate issue of civil disobedience both the reports were tamely unanimous: its introduction was premature. As a face-saving tactic, however, they agreed to leave the right of individual and restricted mass civil disobedience to the discretion of the provincial committees. They also seemed to adopt a more or less identical hard-line attitude on the boycott of British goods, law courts and schools. But then these items had already been tried, found not very successful and relegated to the background. The real controversy centred on the council entry issue which let loose bitter factionalism.

In the Congress report a group of three, consisting of Ajmal Khan, Motilal Nehru and Vithalbhai Patel, was of the opinion that the non-co-operators should contest the election on the issue of the redress of the Punjab and the Khilafat 'wrongs' and immediate *swaraj*, and oppose the government from within the councils. On the other hand, Dr Ansari, Rajagopalachari (1878–1972) and Kasturi Ranga Iyengar (1859–1923) maintained that the frittering away of energies was useless and, therefore, there should be no change of the Congress programme in respect of the boycott of the councils. In the Khilafat report also there was a note of dissent by Sheikh Zahur Ahmad in favour of council entry, but unlike the Congress, in this case the report tried to cover up the differences. It declared that the council controversy was rather premature, especially when the leaders were in jail, and postponed the matter for the time being lest it should distract public attention. But the matter did not rest there. The enquiry reports had opened the floodgates of incessant controversy with almost all the old guard of the Congress, the CKC and the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama on one side and the 'pro-changers' on the other.[80]

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[78] Ibid., 21 Oct. 1922.

[79] For the Congress report, see *Hindu* (Spec. Suppl.), 5 Nov. 1922, and for the summary of the Khilafat report see *Times of India*, 13 Nov. 1922. The Khilafat enquiry committee had travelled approx. 6,799 miles in about fifty days and recorded evidence of 311 witnesses. See *Khilafat*, 11 Nov. 1922.

[80] See app. ii, in *Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922* (Madras,

The latter were also joined by leaders like S. E. Stokes, M. S. Aney (1880–1968), M. R. Jayakar and Malaviya who stood for co-operating where beneficial and obstructing where desirable.[81] Jinnah was though opposed to the 'purely destructive programme' of obstructing the councils, he threw his weight on the side of the 'pro-changers'.[82] This wide support in the country emboldened the 'pro-changers'. Through Abdul Bari and Sulaiman Nadwi they renewed their pressure on the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama to revise its *fatwa* against the council entry. Initially, the Jam'iyyat was not prepared to oblige but, in order to prevent a further split among the Khilafatists, it agreed to effect a compromise. On 12 November 1922, the working committee of the Jam'iyyat met at Delhi and permitted the contesting of the elections on the condition that the elected members, in conformity with the principle of non-co-operation and the policy of wrecking the councils, would vacate their seats without taking the oath of allegiance.[83] This was not exactly what the 'pro-changers' had wanted; but it encouraged them to continue their efforts. Towards the end of November 1922, the CKC and the Congress met at Calcutta to consider the reports of the enquiry committees. But still they were unable to reach a decision on council entry and the matter was deferred for the Gaya sessions in December 1922. They did, however, accept the recommendations of the enquiry committees with regard to the postponement of the re-introduction of civil disobedience. The younger leaders recently released from jail made impatient pleas for stronger measures but these were lost in the controversial exchanges between the 'pro-' and 'no-change' factions.[84]

Thus, the revival of the agitation in the autumn of 1922 proved to be short-lived. In effect, it had been dampened by the failure of its own leaders to sustain it. An equally damaging blow was delivered by external factors over which the Khilafatists had no control. During the time when the Khilafatists were trying to find some effective means to fight for the caliphate, the Turks in Ankara were busy depriving the institution of its temporal power. Behind this move lay the fric-

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1922). Also see Azad Subhani, *Kangras tahqiqati kameti ki riport par tanqid aur shirkat-i kaunsal ki mukhalifat* (Kanpur, [1923]).

[81] *Indian Annual Register, 1923*, ii, 52.

[82] *Zamindar*, 5 July 1922; and Jinnah's interview to the *Bombay Chronicle* in *Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, 1922*, app. ii, 151–3.

[83] *Hindu*, 16 Nov. 1922.

[84] *Bombay Chronicle*, 28 Nov. 1922; *Pioneer*, 29 Nov. 1922; and *Hindu*, 30 Nov. 1922.

tion between the puppet Sultan Vahideddin Mehmed VI at Istanbul and the *de facto* government under Mustafa Kemal at Ankara as to who really represented Turkey. The dispute revolved round two issues: first, the recognition of GNA as the supreme authority of the Turkish nation; and, secondly, the abrogation of the *fatwa* declaring the nationalists rebels against Istanbul. When the sultan refused he became the target of a widespread propaganda which culminated in the dropping of his name from the Friday *khutba*.[85] Mustafa Kemal had reached the conclusion that the time had come to clip the sultan's wings so as to put an end to his personal autocracy.[86] This had been precipitated by the Allied action on 30 October 1922 to extend separate invitations to Istanbul and Ankara to attend the forthcoming peace conference at Lausanne. The sultan's acceptance of the invitation gave Kemal his much-awaited excuse to settle the score. He decided to abolish the caliphate altogether. But even his closest friends, Kazim Karabekir, Rauf Bey (d. 1964) and Refat Paşa (b. 1881), were horrified and refused to go along. This made Kemal to rethink and muffle the blow.[87] On 1 November 1922, he manoeuvred the GNA to take over the ultimate powers of the government of the country. The institution of the caliphate remained in the House of Osman but it was shorn of all real authority. The sultanate was thus separated from the caliphate and state sovereignty vested with the assembly. To make it more palatable the government was made to appear as the chief bulwark of the caliphate.[88] This was the inevitable outcome of that clause of the constitution of January 1921 which stated that 'people control their destiny in person and in fact'.[89]

The official Turkish version of the proceedings in the assembly had declared a unanimous vote on the law of 1 November. But as it turned out the results were rather controversial. To begin with, the motion submitted by Dr Riza Nur and signed by 76 other deputies

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[85] NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.

[86] Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 252.

[87] Kazim Karabekir, *Pasalarin Kavgasi: Atatürk-Karabekir* (ed.), Y. H. I. Bözdag (Istanbul, 1991), 98–100. In fact, Kazim and Rauf suspected Kemal of wanting to obtain the sultanate for himself.

[88] 'Turkey. Annual Report, 1922', PRO, FO 371/9176. Also see *Madras Mail*, 4 Nov. 1922. For the text of the resolution see encl., Rumbold to Curzon, no. 1005, 14 Nov. 1922, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/895, file, 4744/1922. For Mustafa Kamal's speech in the Assembly see Lutfy Levonian, *The Turkish Press* (Athens, 1932), 16–19.

[89] Sylvia Haim, 'The Abolition of the Caliphate and its Aftermath', in Arnold, *Caliphate*, 209.

had evoked an unfavourable response from the department of religious affairs on both religious and political grounds. It was pointed out that to deprive the caliph of the control of his army was a violation of the *shari'at* and would also alienate the Indian Muslims who had hitherto believed that it was the British who had deprived the caliph of his powers.[90] In a House where the total number of deputies attending the proceedings seldom exceeded two hundred and twenty, the motion was opposed by a group of ninety-five independents led by Kara Vasif Bey who were pledged to turn down the proposal. They were joined by a small group of forty-five Unionists whose motive was to make political capital out of it. Therefore, whenever a division was announced for a vote, a number of deputies would deliberately leave the hall to create the problem of quorum. As a way out Mustafa Kemal arranged a snap vote by a show of hands which took place amidst the utmost confusion and uproar. The motion was thus declared passed unanimously without much further ado. But the fact remains that as much as half the assembly had not taken part in the voting and the opposition was quite strong. However, their dissenting voices were drowned in the vociferous 'ayes' of the overzealous Kemalists. The commissar of religious affairs, Abdullah Azmi, thought it wise to resign but was asked to continue pending the nomination of his successor.[91] It was clear that the nationalists were not going to relent in their struggle against the faltering caliph.

More concerned about his safety than the loss of power, the sultan, a fortnight after Refat Paşa took over the administration of Istanbul on 4 November, decided to run for his life. With the help of General Sir Charles Harington (1872–1940), the Allied commander-in-chief at Istanbul, and Nevile Henderson (d. 1942), the British high commissioner, he escaped through the palace backdoor and took asylum on board a British battleship, HMS *Malaya*. Reza Taufiq, who had signed the hated Treaty of Sèvres, and Mustafa Sabri, who like Dürrizade Abdullah had earned Mustafa Kemal's displeasure, also went with the caliph. He was escorted to Malta from where he proceeded to Makkah as the guest of King Husain.[92] On the contention that the fugitive monarch had forfeited his position by taking refuge with a

[90] NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.
[91] Ibid.
[92] 'Turkey. Annual Report, 1922', PRO, FO 371/9176. Also see Henderson to Curzon, no. 1024 A., 17 Nov. 1922, and its encls., PRO, FO 371/7962; and *Khilafat*, 23 Nov. 1922.

non-Muslim power, the GNA, on a *fatwa* from the commissar for religious affairs, proclaimed on 18 November the deposition of Mehmed VI as caliph and elected his cousin Abdülmecid (1868–1944), a 54-year old son of the late Sultan Abdülaziz, as his successor with 'spiritual' powers only.[93] Even though the nationalists had prepared the ground well in advance and the opinion in the country was also hostile to the ex-sultan, the Ankara government had difficulty in giving effect to their plans. In spite of Mustafa Kemal's efforts, less than half the members (162 out of 350) did not attend the controversial session. The *fatwa* justifying the resolutions was promulgated by *hoja* Vehbi Efendi who was a government official and not a well-known *'alim* and as such only a few *'ulama* outside his influence agreed to attest it. The approval for the *fatwa*, therefore, was obtained by a show of hands.[94]

Confronted by opponents and friends alike, Mustafa Kemal took pains to justify the changes that he had initiated, arguing that history was replete with instances where the caliphate and the sultanate had existed side by side. Far from hurting the country, he maintained, his measures would launch Turkey on a course towards achieving 'a *modern* prosperous society'.[95] The Ankara law of 1 November 1922 may have been defensible from the Turkish nationalists' point of view but it was, as the excaliph underscored in his proclamation issued from Makkah, misleading theologically because it suggested a dualism which does not exist in Islam. Nor did the caliph exercise any religious function or appoint priests or claim ultimate authority on dogma. Politically, it was risky, and, though in the end the gamble came off, it provoked strong reaction among Muslims everywhere, except perhaps in Albania, Morocco and the territories under the Sherifian family.[96] Within Turkey itself, though intellectuals like Zia Gökalp came out in its support, it initiated nevertheless a power struggle between the *'ulama* and the modernists as to whether the *shari'at* was supreme or the state shall be a modernized one. It also gave a chance to the opponents of Kemal—Rauf, Refat and Kazim Bey—to try and prevent him from taking control of the state apparatus.[97] Elsewhere

[93] Ibid. The investiture took place on 24 Nov. 1922.

[94] NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.

[95] Halil Inalcik, 'The Caliphate and Atatürk's *Inkilap*', *Belleten*, Turk Tarih Kurumu, 46/182 (1982), 354.

[96] For this argument see A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, i (London, 1927), 53–4.

[97] Inalcik, 'The Caliphate and Atatürk's *Inkilap*', 355–60. For Zia Gökalp see e.g.

in the Muslim world, its repercussions were more noticeable in Egypt and India. In the former country, the *'ulama* of al-Azhar immediately declared their allegiance to Abdülmecid but others like Rashid Rida struck to the classical theory of the caliphate, playing down the duality of functions in the affairs of the state.[98] It is significant that when the *Shaikhu'l-Islam* visited Alexandria in the middle of November 1922, he was the target of a hostile demonstration.[99] But it was in India that the controversy brought into focus the extreme contradiction between the Indian and Turkish points of view on the question of the caliphate. To the Muslims of India, the caliphate at Istanbul was an essential element of the Islamic polity and its preservation their primary duty. The three-fold claim, which the Khilafatists had formulated for the redress of the Khilafat 'wrong', was based apparently on the religious necessity of preserving an institution which blended both the temporal and spiritual powers.[100] For their part, the Turkish nationalists were fighting not for any higher religious principles but to sustain their corporate existence as a nation. Nor were they trying to restore the temporal power of the caliph but to establish their national sovereignty against all enemies, including Sultan-Caliph Mehmed VI alongside the Allies and the Greeks.[101] To achieve their objectives they had renounced, through the *Milli Misak* of January 1920, all claims to the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* and the holy places which formed an essential part of the Indian demands. What emerged in Turkey was the regime of a westernized military élite in place of the old Ottoman State that led to the birth of the Turkish republic.

The first reaction in India, therefore, was to disbelieve the news of the separation since it had emanated from western sources. The Indian Muslims could not accept that the Turks, who appeared to be fighting for the elevation of the caliphate, were instrumental in destroying it.[102] Therefore, not unnaturally, the idea of depriving the caliphate of its temporal power was received with consternation by the orthodox Indian Muslim opinion.[103] From the theological point

his *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization* (ed.), Niyazi Berkes (London, 1959), 223–7.

[98] Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 53; and E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State* (Cambridge, 1965), 77–9.

[99] NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.

[100] See ch. ii, 145–7.

[101] Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 49–50.

[102] See A. Suhrawardy's statement in *Madras Mail*, 6 Nov. 1922.

[103] See the reports from the provincial govts. in IOL&R, L/P&S/10/895, files 3740, 3822, 3920 and 4013/1923.

of view, their objection was not to the election of a new caliph—rather they welcomed the introduction of the elective principle which to them symbolized a return to the days of Islamic caliphate—but to the election of a caliph without temporal power which they thought was repugnant to Islam.[104] The consensus of the Indian Muslim opinion required the caliph, the 'defender of the faith', to be in his person not only the 'spiritual' leader, but also a strong and independent monarch, powerful enough to safeguard the prestige of Islam.[105]

The Ankara action, though neither unexpected nor paradoxical, was embarrassing to the Indian Khilafatists because its religious and political implications had touched the very basis of the Khilafat movement. Outwardly, they kept a stiff upper lip but secretly they approached the nationalists through other channels to obtain a reversal. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi (1887–1953) and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar were dispatched to Switzerland with a message for Ismet Paşa (1884–1973), then attending the Lausanne Conference, that he should intercede with Ankara on their behalf.[106] Ismet Paşa did pass on the message home after their meetings on 25/26 November 1922 but it had no effect.[107] Earlier, on 16–17 November, he had been seen in Paris by Malik Abdul Qayyum with the same object in mind,[108] who also followed him to London later that month when Ismet Paşa went there during a respite in the negotiations. But the Paşa had only a standard diplomatic answer to give: the caliphal office had been institutionalized and its authority transferred to the Turkish nation and the Muslims had better deal with the matter with equanimity and patience.[109] Celaleddin Arif Bey, Mustafa Kemal's man in Rome, who had also been approached, gave the same stock reply that there had been no change as the dignity of the caliphate and Islam was being maintained as before.[110] The message from Ankara was loud and clear and the Khilafatists knew it well. But since a quarrel with the nationalists

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[104] See the views of Khwaja Hasan Nizami and Bhurgri in *Statesman*, 10 Nov. 1922; and *Madras Mail*, 13 Nov. 1922; and the views of Ahmad Ali, Abul Kasem and Abdul Majid Sharar in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 907, 15 Nov. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and of Dr Hassan Suhrawardy in *Madras Mail*, 6 Nov. 1922; and *Statesman*, 7 Nov. 1922. Also see the editorial of *Khilafat*, 15 Nov. 1922.

[105] See Dr Abdullah Suhrawardy's view in *Statesman*, 7 Nov. 1922.

[106] PRO, FO 141/587. Also see Ghaffar, *Naqsh-i Farang*, 74–5.

[107] NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.

[108] *Khilafat*, 22 Nov. 1922.

[109] B. N. Şimşir, *Dis. Bsinda Ataturk ve Turk Devrimi*, i (Ankara, 1981), 156 62, in Öke, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 17.

[110] NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.

would have benefited none but their opponents, the Khilafatists quickly forged arguments to prove that the Ankara action in no way affected the prestige of the caliphate but rather would enhance it. Already, the daily *Khilafat* had set the pace when it declared editorially:

> From the Islamic point of view, . . . the religious authority of the *khalifatu'l-muslimin* was never intended to mean that he should become an unchecked despot who cared neither for the feelings of the Muslims of the world nor bothered about the *shari'at*. . . . The [Islamic] community has a right to depose a *khalifa* on some reasonable grounds.[111]

To satisfy the religious qualms of the devout Muslims, however, the Khilafatists took the line that the sultanate had not been abolished and the temporal power was still vested in the caliph, because the assembly had announced that the Turkish government would be the defender of the caliphate.[112] In other words the change was not at all inconsistent with the aims of the Khilafat movement and that they should tamely accept the decision.[113] The Muslims were advised not to waver and place reliance in the short and piecemeal news from the West deliberately distorted to create misunderstandings between them and the Turks. Instead, they should repose full confidence in the *'Mujahid-i Islam'*, i.e. Mustafa Kemal, who had made great sacrifices for the faith.[114]

The Khilafatists' volte-face was an example of undisguised political expediency because they had known all along that the tussle between the sultan-caliph and Mustafa Kemal was leading to an ugly show-down. Only a few days before the Ankara decree the CKC had expressed alarm at the reported speech of Refat Paşa suggesting dispossession of the temporal power of the caliphate.[115] If there were any illusions those must have been shattered by the new developments. Critics denigrated them for their apparent somersault,[116] but the Khilafatists' action was obviously aimed at achieving a semblance

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[111] *Khilafat*, 3 Nov. 1922. Eng. tr. mine.

[112] See the views of Maulawi Abdul Wahid Khan, vice-president of the Calcutta Khilafat Committee in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 907, 15 Nov. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[113] *Statesman*, 14 Nov. 1922.

[114] See the joint statement by Ajmal Khan and Ansari in *Khilafat*, 16 Nov. 1922. Also see its editorial dated 20 Nov. 1922.

[115] *Times of India*, 27 Oct. 1922.

[116] S. A. Ahmad Rizwi, *Mustafa Kamal Pasha aur Khilafat ki beuaqt maut* (Sitapore, 1922), 12.

of solidarity with Turkey as a bulwark of Islam. Moreover, they had, since the rise of Mustafa Kemal, committed themselves so firmly to the policies of Ankara that they could not now withdraw their support. This attitude was confirmed by Chotani in his interview with the Associated Press that whatever the assembly at Ankara decided 'must be conclusive for the Muslim world at large'.[117] Consequently, Chotani sent telegrams of support and devotion to the new caliph and Mustafa Kemal on behalf of the Indian Muslims.[118] Another was sent to Bonar Law demanding that Ankara be left to settle its own affairs independently in accordance with the dictates of the *shari'at* without any pressure from outside.[119]

Thus, in spite of the Turks' departure from the classical concept of the caliphate, the CKC and the Jam'iyyat not only endorsed the Ankara decision but also strained every nerve to reconcile the Indian Muslim opinion to the new situation.[120] On instructions from Turkey, they directed all subordinate Khilafat committees to arrange the substitution of Abdülmecid's name in the *khutba* along with the customary titles.[121] When Sanaullah of Amritsar raised objections, he was immediately snubbed and ordered to refrain from starting a controversy. Their first duty, he was told, was to defeat the British at their game and resolve the differences with the nationalists later.[122] And in spite of the fact that the orthodox opinion was reluctant to abandon the traditional doctrine and to accept the divorce of the sultanate from the caliphate, the instructions were carried out.[123] The reports from the provincial governments indicated that Abdülmecid II was accepted as caliph with his new status. Only in Bombay did the CKC face some difficulty. Those who interpreted the *shari'at* in stricter terms, while not raising any specific objections to the election of the new caliph, overcame the problem by omitting the name of the caliph

[117] *Madras Mail*, 7 Nov. 1922.

[118] *Times of India*, 23 Nov. 1922.

[119] *Khilafat*, 15 Nov. 1922.

[120] See the proceedings of the meetings of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama at Delhi (12 Nov. 1922) and the CKC at Calcutta (21 Nov. 1922) in *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 Nov. 1922; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1717, 24 Nov. 1922, IOI&R, Reading Papers.

[121] See *Khilafat*, 16 and 25 Nov. 1922; and IOI&R, L/P&S/10/895, file 3822/1923. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 970, 2 Dec. 1922, IOI&R, Reading Papers.

[122] See editorial of *Khilafat*, 13 Dec. 1922.

[123] See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 971, 4 Dec. 1922, IOI&R, Reading Papers.

from the *khutba* and reference made to his title only, i.e. *Khalifatu'l-Muslimin*.[124] Thus the Ankara decision was accepted in India as a *fait accompli* like in the rest of the Muslim world (except perhaps in the Hijaz, Syria and Iran) and, on 8 December 1922, the accession of the new caliph was formally celebrated with enthusiasm.[125] Political expediency had overcome religious objections—a gesture which no doubt won them the appreciation of the Turkish nationalists.[126]

The annual sessions of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama and the Khilafat Conference, which opened at Gaya on 24 and 27 December 1922, respectively, reflected the general Indian attitude. At the Jam'iyyat sessions, Habibur Rahman Ludhiyanawi of Deoband, in his presidential address, emphasized the services of the Turks to Islam and argued that they deserved recognition. He proposed that Mustafa Kemal be given the title of *Mujaddid-i Khilafat* for his efforts in maintaining the institution of the caliphate. He agreed that legally an errant caliph could be deposed but refused to accept that his authority could be curtailed or that the sultanate could be separated from the caliphate. And yet he accepted the appointment of the new caliph hoping that the knotty question of Islamic jurisprudence would soon be settled amicably in accordance with the requirements of the *shari'at*.[127] In its resolutions the Jam'iyyat refrained from giving any theological exposition of the issue and contented itself with affirming full confidence in Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara assembly. The Jam'iyyat also expressed the hope that in future 'along with safeguarding Turkey, Islam and Islamic nationalities from personal and bureaucratic rule, [they] would keep intact the real prestige and power of the Khalifa as enjoined by the *shar'iat*'.[128] The Khilafat Conference, too, closely followed the Jam'iyyat in recognizing 'sultan' Abdülmecid II as the new caliph and reiterated its previous stand of full confidence in Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara assembly. Dr Ansari, the president of the Khilafat sessions, maintained that by their action the Turks had turned the caliph into 'a constitutional sultan' which was strictly

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[124] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/895, files 3740, 3822 and 4013/1923.

[125] PRO, FO 371/9135 and 371/9136; and Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1717, 24 Nov. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[126] See Muazzam Ali's statement informing that he had received a telegram from Celaleddin Arif Bey expressing thanks for the Indian Muslim support. *Khilafat*, 10 Dec. 1922.

[127] Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, esp. 159–74. Also see NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.

[128] *Khilafat*, 31 Dec. 1922. Eng. tr. mine.

in accordance with the *shari'at*. If, however, this was inadmissible juridically the Muslims could get it rectified by settling the issue with the Turks.[129] The Khilafat Conference approved the new mode of choosing a caliph as very close to the religious and Islamic methods of election and, like the Jam'iyyat, bestowed on Kemal the titles of *Saifu'l-Islam* and *Mujaddid-i Khilafat* in recognition of his services.[130] The third Muslim organization, the All India Muslim League, which had decided not to hold its sessions at Gaya in an attempt to reassert its independence from the Congress, was too absorbed in its own affairs to express any opinion.[131] This was the first time since 1915 that the Muslim League had not held its sessions at the same place and on the same dates as the Congress.

In the midst of these devotional expressions there arrived, on 30 December, the news of the impasse at Lausanne. The negotiations between the Turks and the Allies, which had started on 20 November, were suddenly on the point of collapse. The news caused such consternation in the Khilafat camp that all other controversies were dropped and the leaders assembled to discuss some effective means of assisting the Turks. Several speakers delivered highly emotional speeches, warning the British government and demanding practical steps to demonstrate their sympathy for the Turkish cause.[132] Though Hindu and Sikh speakers assured the Muslims of their support and the Congress called for a united action, the excitement was not fully reciprocated by the non-Muslim leaders.[133] Opinion prevailed in the Congress circles that the victory of Mustafa Kemal had changed the entire perspective of the Khilafat question. Some of the Khilafat demands had already been fulfilled and the others would be realized by the time the Lausanne Conference had finished its deliberations.[134] The moderates of the National Liberal Federation, too, were of somewhat similar opinion. They held that the grounds for agitation against

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[129] NAI, Home Poll. 60/1923.

[130] See IOL&R, L/P&S/10/853, file 208/1923; and resolution no. 6 in *The Indian Annual Register, 1923*, i, 923–8.

[131] See Zahur Ahmad's circular dated 4 Dec. 1922. AFM/NAP, AIMLR, Council Meetings, 1921–22, file 126. It decided instead to meet at Lucknow in Mar.–Apr. 1923.

[132] *Hindu*, 4 Jan. 1923.

[133] Ibid.; and *Report of the Thirty-Seventh Indian National Congress held at Gaya on the 26th, 27th, 29th, 30th and 31st Dec., 1922* (Patna, 1923), 2–3.

[134] See C. R. Das's address in *Report of the Thirty-Seventh Indian National Congress*, 32–3.

the government, namely the Khilafat and the Punjab, were no longer valid. The first grievance had been removed by the Lausanne Conference and the second by the punishments meted out to the guilty officers. Moreover, the Khilafat movement now lacked justification as the Turkish nationalists had themselves clipped the wings of the caliphate. Therefore, the agitation must stop. Its continuance would only be pretence to defend the power and prestige of the Ankara government.[135]

The Khilafatists were obviously unwilling to accept these arguments and before the Khilafat Conference adjourned on 1 January 1923, a resolution was passed which stated:

> That in the event of war with Turkey due to the unjust attitude of the Allies, particularly [the] British, the Muslims of India would immediately launch civil disobedience with a programme which would include spreading their propaganda among the Police and Army, stoppage of fresh recruitment, refusal to subscribe to war loans, recruitment to the Angora legion, picketing of foreign cloth and liquor shops and preventing export of food grains.[136]

In order to give effect to this resolution, the working committee arranged the collection of one million rapees and enlistment of fifty thousand volunteers in the following manner:[137]

Province	Money [in Rs]	Men
Punjab	1,60,000	9,000
Bihar	75,000	6,000
Assam	10,000	1,000
Bombay Presidency	2,00,000	5,000
Berar	30,000	1,500
Delhi	20,000	1,500
Agra & Awadh	1,60,000	8,000
Bengal	1,50,000	10,000
Burma	75,000	Nil
CP	25,000	1,500
Madras Presidency	75,000	5,000
Ajmer	20,000	1,500
Totals:	10,00,000	50,000

[135] See Sir Maneckjee Dadabhoy's address as chairman of the reception committee at the fifth session of the All India Liberal Federation at Nagpur on 27 Dec. 1922. *Indian Annual Register, 1923*, i, 880 f.

[136] *Hindu*, 4 Jan. 1923.

[137] See SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/7, 17 Feb. 1923, para. 78.

But the more significant were the changes introduced in the constitution of the Khilafat organization. The one concerned the structure of the CKC. The membership of the Committee was increased from 200 to 250. This was in addition to the central president, the other central office bearers, and the president and the secretary from each of the provincial Khilafat committee, including that of Burma. The provincial committees were to elect the members of the CKC in accordance with a prescribed quota.[138] The other important changes were that the elected president of the annual Khilafat conference was to be the president of the CKC for the next twelve months. The number of secretaries was increased from four to six but the term of the office bearers was reduced to only one year. They were, however, declared eligible for reelection the following year.[139]

In spite of the enthusiasm created by the Gaya gatherings, it is doubtful whether, in the event of a war in the Near East, the Khilafatists would have been able to render any active assistance to Turkey. Indeed, the Khilafat movement had come to be confined to academic discussions and unproductive resolutions. A report from the Punjab stated that

> The people . . . appear, for the moment, to be tired of politics, and, in the absence of any unusual developments, it will be difficult for the agitators to revive the flagging interest. The paid political workers, of whom some 350 are known to be in the employ of the various Congress and Khilafat Committees, will make every effort to keep alive the agitation on which their livelihood depends; but there are indications that subscriptions are becoming more and more difficult to collect and that existing balance are being depleted. The non-co-operation movement has been still further weakened by the Congress split, and . . . [the] Khilafat agitation is quiescent.[140]

Evidently, energies were being frittered away in factionalism, particularly on the question of council entry. Nevertheless, the CKC, the Jam'iyyat and the Congress continued to treat the councils with contempt. The Jam'iyyat even vetoed the November compromise of its own executive and, on a resolution from Azad Subhani, reimposed a total ban on council entry.[141] This unbending attitude of the *'ulama*

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[138] See app. (a), below. There is a slight discrepancy in the number of provincial committees and their quota of members as available in the official CKC figures and those given in the Police Intelligence reports at n. 137.

[139] Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind, *Dastur-i asasi*, 2-4.

[140] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/2, 13 Jan. 1923, para. 14.

[141] *Bombay Chronicle*, 27 Dec. 1922; and *Pioneer*, 29 Dec. 1922. The compromise

forced out the 'pro-changers' and on New Year's Day 1923, they formed themselves into a Congress-Khilafat Swaraj Party—later called the Swaraj Party—though they did not dissociate themselves completely from the parent organizations.[142] C. R. Das was elected president, Motilal Nehru general secretary and Khaliquzzaman and T. A. K. Sherwani additional secretaries of the new party.[143]

The rise of the Swaraj party and its subsequent tug of war with the 'no-changers' complicated the situation still further. Jinnah, who had been trying to make a re-entry into the political arena, laid the blame for the sorry state of affairs on the government which, he thought, was deliberately disregarding the majority opinion for the sake of the moderate support.[144] He opened parleys with the Swarajists and participated in some of their meetings but the negotiations broke down when they refused to amend their creed as he wanted.[145] Jinnah now decided to mobilize the Muslim League though it was still in disarray and mostly dominated by the Khilafatists. An opportunity arose when the League held its fifteenth sessions at Lucknow from 31 March to 1 April 1923, under the presidency of G. M. Bhurgri. Jinnah introduced a resolution in the subjects committee which recommended entry into the councils and declared the attainment of dominion status as its goal. He and his party were well poised for a victory but the non-co-operators led by Ansari resorted to a stratagem. They called for the vote when most of the members of the committee were out for lunch and thus managed to defeat Jinnah's motion by a narrow margin of twelve votes to nine. The 'no-changers' scored a double when they disrupted the proceedings and secured an adjournment *sine die*.[146] Jinnah was disappointed but he could do nothing except bide his time. On the other side of the political spectrum, Abul Kalam Azad had been trying, since his release early in 1923, to bring about a settlement between the warring factions. But he, too, failed to make any headway.[147] In fact, during the entire

was not considered worth the trouble. See Maulana Habibur Rahman [Ludhiyanawi], *Khutba-i sadarat* (Gaya, 1923), 40 1.

[142] *Madras Mail*, 2 Jan. 1923. For the programme of the new party also see Parl. Papers, 1923, Cmd. 1961, *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1922 1923, Fifty-Eighth Number*, 290 1.

[143] Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 66.

[144] See Jinnah's letter to *Times of India*, 4 Jan. 1923.

[145] M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), *Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah: Speeches in the Legislative Assembly of India, 1924 1930* (Lahore, 1976), xi.

[146] Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, i, 572 3.

[147] *Hindu*, 8 Mar., 3 and 31 May and 12 and 19 July 1923; and *Indian Annual Register, 1923*, ii, 143 88.

first half of 1923, little attention was paid to the Khilafat issue. The movement remained at its lowest ebb. There were, of course, some half-hearted attempts to follow up the Gaya resolutions for the collection of one million rupees and recruitment of fifty thousand men for the volunteer corps, but there was no revival of an organized agitation. Meetings were few and ill attended. Fund raising activities also met with little success.[148] On top of it, an irreparable damage was done to the movement by the acute Hindu-Muslim disunity.

The Hindu-Muslim entente to which the political agitation owed much of its strength was essentially a combination of parties whose real aims were divergent. This unity had never been more than superficial and cracks had appeared even in the midst of the non-co-operation fervour in 1921. Causes such as the Hindu fears of an Afghan invasion and a possible Muslim domination, the Muslim apprehensions of Hindu predominance after the attainment of *swaraj*, the unfortunate Mappila outbreak of 1921, the ever-disputed question of cow-killing, clashes during the religious festivals and celebrations, playing of music before the mosques, all combined to widen the breach.[149] But it was the reaction, consequent upon the failure of the non-co-operation experiment, that really tore the communities apart. The religious overtones of the Khilafat movement and the policy of 'Hinduizing' the Congress espoused by Hindu leaders like Malaviya, Moonje, Shraddhanand, Lajpat Rai and others, had unwittingly laid the foundations of Hindu-Muslim discord. The Hindus and Muslims were united so long as their aims seemed attainable. But when the promised *swaraj* remained as distant as ever and the Khilafat issue unsolved, the entente broke down. The Hindus began to question the wisdom of supporting a professed religious movement[150] and the Muslims grumbled that they had made greater sacrifices without deriving any corresponding advantage.[151] The feeling of distrust spread. The Hindus resurrected the Mappila issue and complained

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[148] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 92 and 121, 6 and 22 Feb. 1923, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[149] 'Hindu-Muslim Split: Causes of Communal Bitterness', *Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 Apr. 1923; Sir Hugh McPherson, 'The Origin and Growth of Communal Antagonism, especially between Hindus and Muhammadans, and the Communal Award', in John Cumming (ed.), *Political India, 1832–1932* (London, 1932), 109–26; and D. Kaushik, *The Congress Ideology and Programme, 1920–1947* (Bombay, 1964), 285 304.

[150] This was evident as early as Sept. 1922, from the perfunctory Hindu participation in the Turkish victory celebrations. See above, 326.

[151] Hasrat Mohani was the more prominent among those holding such views. See *Englishman*, 10 and 14 Mar. 1922.

that the Muslim leaders had not expressed enough sympathy for the Hindu sufferers.[152] The Muslims attacked Hindu sincerity and the motives of their co-operation and alleged that they were out to destroy Islam in India.[153] Old fears re-appeared—the Hindus apprehending the increase in the Indian Muslim power and prestige as a result of Turkish victories,[154] and Muslims fearing that if they did not protect their communal and political rights against the Hindus they might be 'swept out of existence'.[155] The cow question attained prominence once again.[156]

The bitterness between the communities was further accentuated by disputes among Hindu and Muslim co-operators over 'the loaves and fishes of office'.[157] This was most acute in the Punjab. There the policy of the education minister, Fazl-i-Husain, regarding the redistribution of posts in local bodies and other spheres, aroused the bitterest opposition from urban Hindus—opposition which culminated in March 1923 in an unsuccessful censure motion against him in the council.[158] Other incidents, which would have passed unnoticed in normal times, enhanced common distrust. Mutual recriminations led to communal riots, some of them very serious, especially those in the Punjab and Bengal on the occasion of the Muharram mourning of 1922. The most terrible was the one that took place in Multan in the Punjab where arson and looting were accompanied by desecration of temples and mosques. The tension that was bitter in 1922

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[152] *Hindu*, 5 Jan. and 20 July 1922. Also see Malabar Hindu Sahaik Sabha, *Dastan-i zulm* (Amritsar, 1922); U. Balakrishna Nair, 'The Moplah Rebellion', *Indian Review* (Feb. 1922), 105–8; and *Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 June 1922. Also see app. (d), below.

[153] See Bashir Ahmad Khan's open letter to Ajmal Khan in *Civil and Military Gazette*, 27 Aug. 1922. Also see his letters in ibid., 27 July 1922, and 10 May 1923.

[154] This sentiment found expression at the time of the Near Eastern crisis of Sept. 1922, when war between Turkey and Britain seemed imminent. Dr H. S. Gour proposed to Reading that he could bring a deputation representing Hindu MLAs and the Hindus in general offering their services to the govt. if that be necessary. The Maharajas of Patiala and Holkar also volunteered their services to the viceroy. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 758, 22 Sept. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see the Maharaja of Patiala to Reading, Tel., 19 Sept. 1922, in ibid.

[155] See com. from a Muslim to *Paisa Akhbar*, 26 Mar. 1922.

[156] Ahmad bin Muhammad, *Gae ki qurbani aur Islam* (Delhi, 1922); H. A. Hamid, *Azad gao* (Jubbulpore, 1922); Abdul Hadi Muhammad Zahid, *'Adalat gaushiwala parastar* (Jubbulpore, 1922); and S. G. Krishnayya, 'The Sacred Cow's Importance in Indian Life', *Current History*, 24/5 (1926), 743–6.

[157] Parl. Papers, 1924, Cmd. 2311, *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1923–1924, Fifty-Ninth Number*, 248.

[158] Syed Nur Ahmad, *Mian Fazl-i Husain* (Lahore, [1936]), 80–1. Also see Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain*, 177–90.

increased to a lamentable extent in 1923. In March and April there were serious riots in Amritsar, Multan and some other places in the Punjab. These were followed by a further riot in the same province in May and another in Sind. The next two months witnessed riots in Muradabad and Meerut as well as in the Allahabad district of the UP, and a serious riot at Ajmer. Fanned by the vernacular press the communal hatred created by the riots spread over an area far more extensive than that involved in the actual outbreaks.[159] Additional provocation to heighten the tension was provided by the religious propagandists of both communities who, in their reforming zeal, surpassed the limits of moderation. Especially, bitterness was caused by the militant Sangathan movement of Dr Moonje, which aimed at binding together the Hindu community,[160] and the so-called Shuddhi movement of Shraddhanand, launched to reclaim to the Hindu fold certain communities which had passed to Islam.[161] The efforts of the Arya Smaj movement to convert Muslim Malkana Rajputs to Hinduism aroused a special indignation.[162] This led to the Muslims forming their counter organizations of Tanzim and Tabligh with Ghulam Bhik Nairang (1876–1952), a pleader from Ambala, playing a leading role.[163] Preachers of both religions then started to raise funds in the Punjab and the UP and elsewhere to combat each other.[164] Tension was accentuated still further by the emergence, after April 1921, of

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[159] Parl. Papers, 1924, Cmd. 2311, n. 119. Also see An Indian Mahomedan, *The Indian Moslems* (London, 1928), 185–7.

[160] An idea of the movement can be formed from Bhai Parmanand's book *Hindu Sangathan* (Lahore, 1936). Also see I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent* (The Hague, 1962), 280.

[161] Lajpat Rai, *The Arya Samaj* (London, 1915), 220–1; J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India* (New York, 1915), 323–4; Shraddhanand Sanyasi, *The So-Called Shuddhi Movement* (Delhi, 1923); and Ben Misra, 'Hindu and Moslem Renew Strife in India', *Current History*, 26 (1926), 78–82. The Shuddhi campaign was actively conducted near Agra and in the Punjab where Hindu 'missionaries' made efforts to convert various classes of Muslims to Arya tenets. See Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, 281.

[162] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/11–12, 17 and 24 Mar. 1923, paras. 119, 123, 131 and 135.

[163] For the aims and objects of the Tanzim see Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *Tanzim: Its Scope and Objects*, (Amritsar, 1925). For its Urdu tr. see *Khutba-i sadarat* (Amritsar, 1925). For an account of the Tabligh see Maulana M. Y. B. Raghib, *Khutba-i sadarat* (Badaun, 1925); and Ghulam Bhik Nairang to Sayyid Mumtaz Ali, 28 June 1926, *Nuqush*, 65 (1957), 407–8.

[164] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 285, 18 Apr. 1923, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, 281.

the Hindu Mahasabha, the militant communal organization with its emphasis on the culture of physical fitness.[165]

The growing Hindu-Muslim discord and the recurring communal riots set the nationalist leaders to find a way to resolve differences. An attempt in this direction was made in November 1922 when the CKC instructed its workers to take part in the nationalist activities of the Congress and pleaded with the latter body to advise its committees to help the Khilafatists.[166] Then, at Gaya in December 1922, Dr Ansari proposed the drawing up of a 'National Pact', defining *swaraj*, safeguarding the rights of the communities, and providing for a settlement of the questions leading to communal strife.[167] Ansari argued that real unity was impossible unless both communities decided to sort out their differences in a frank and liberal spirit.[168] The Gaya sessions failed to arrive at a definite decision but the leaders met again at Lahore in the middle of April 1923, and entrusted the question of a 'national pact' to a smaller committee, consisting of the presidents of the Congress, the CKC, the Muslim league, the Hindu Mahasabha and the SGPC of the Sikhs, with two members each from the three communities. Prominent among those appointed were Ajmal Khan, Abul Kalam Azad, Abdul Qadir, C. R. Das, Motilal Nehru and Sirdar Mehtab Singh.[169] But apart from this, no effective agreement was reached due to divergent interests and the talks lapsed into a stalemate. The situation remained one of extreme intercommunal hostility. In such a situation, the Congress, which claimed to represent the majority, appeared 'bereft of alternatives to resolve communal discord either at the élite or at the popular level'.[170]

No less important a factor contributing to the decline of the Khilafat movement was the dissensions within the Khilafat organizations. The most significant were the bickerings between the Ali brothers and Mushir Kidwai and between the former and Abul Kalam Azad. Kidwai was so annoyed at one stage that he bitterly

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[165] Though 'Hindu Sabhas' had been in existence since the 1890s, the 'All India Hindu Sabha' was founded in 1915. Later, in Apr. 1921, its name was changed to 'All India Hindu Mahasabha'. See N. N. Bannerjee's foreword to Indra Prakash, *Hindu Mahasabha, its Contribution to India's Politics* (New Delhi, 1966).

[166] *Khilafat*, 4 Dec. 1922.

[167] See Dr Ansari's presidential address at the Gaya Khilafat Conference on 27 Dec. 1922. *Hindu*, 4 Jan. 1923.

[168] Ibid.

[169] *Madras Mail*, 17 Apr. 1923.

[170] Anita Inder Singh, 'The Congress and the Hindu-Muslim Problem, 1920–1947', in D. A. Low (ed.), *The Indian National Congress: Centenary Hindsights* (Delhi, 1988), 191.

complained to Abdul Bari for the brothers' 'disgraceful' attitude towards him. He maintained that he had always tried to be decent and forgiving towards them but they had invariably made him the target of their rebuke.[171] Azad usually kept to himself but his battles were fought by his Punjabi friends who entered into a serious feud with the Ali brothers. Apart from personal recriminations among the Khilafatists, differences developed over non-co-operation and such other issues as the posture that the CKC should maintain towards the Congress. Those outside the fold of the CKC, on the other hand, were resentful of the pro-Gandhi utterances of some of the front rank Khilafatists made in the heat of the moment.[172] There was a lurking fear that the CKC was subordinating itself to the Congress. This question which came up for discussion time and again manifested itself in the frequent arguments that took place over issues like the Mappila 'revolt' and the cow killing.[173] Another deflection, as already seen, had occurred shortly after the publication of the Government of India's fateful dispatch of February 1922, when certain Khilafatists, notably Abdul Bari and Kidwai, had temporarily adopted a friendlier attitude towards the government.[174] The anti-Turk policy of the British government had, however, prevented any serious split among the leaders. No less instrumental in creating dissensions was the discovery that the various Khilafat funds, amounting to several hundred thousand rupees, had been mismanaged.

Allegations of misappropriation of the Khilafat funds had appeared as early as 1920 when Mohamed Ali was delayed from submitting the accounts of his delegation to Europe owing to his preoccupations and to the events that followed his arrest and imprisonment.[175] There was certainly no fraud or embezzlement even though the Ali brothers had been under considerable financial strain owing to the monetary loss of two and a half lakh of rupees that they had accumulated during their wartime internment. They had survived the crisis by selling their property bit by bit to maintain themselves and their families.[176] But the delay had created all sorts of misgivings

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[171] See Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 11 Aug. 1914 [*sic.* for 1922], *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 81–3. For the differences between the Ali brothers and Azad see Afzal Haq, *Tarikh-i Ahrar*, 2nd edn. (Lahore, 1968), 68–70.

[172] See ch. iv, 281.

[173] See procs. of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama at Lahore, Nov. 1921. *Hindu*, 24 Nov. 1921.

[174] Note by Shafi, 20 Apr. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[175] Khatri, *Hisabat wafd-i Khilafat*, 1–6 and 17–20.

[176] See Naeem Qureshi, 'The Ali brothers', 116.

providing an opportunity to their opponents to trump up charges against them and the CKC which increased in intensity the following year.[177] This prompted Abdul Bari to write to Shaukat Ali asking him to state the facts which the latter did immediately.[178] Mohamed Ali, on his part, dismissed these allegations as the work of his detractors whom he dubbed as the 'Punjabi *toli*' led by Abdul Qadir of Kasur. Indirectly, he was pointing the finger at Abul Kalam Azad who, though not a Punjabi, was very close to the Kasuris.[179] All through 1921, the Punjab attracted much attention owing to its handling of the Khilafat funds. Kitchlew, Agha Safdar and Malik Lal Khan came in for adverse criticism for receiving a monthly allowance from the funds. Similarly, Daud Ghaznawi was the target of suspicion for allegedly embezzling funds. Shaukat Ali dashed to Amritsar and after verifying the accounts gave a clean bill to the Punjab leader.[180] This did not end the matter there as differences over money matters were reported from as distant a region as Malabar.[181] By early 1922, it was clear that out of the three funds instituted by the CKC, subscriptions to the Khilafat Fund had faltered so much that there was not money even to run the organization.[182] A sum of rupees one lakh was borrowed from the Smyrna Fund to make both ends meet. The provincial committees were also not faring better. The Punjab and the UP were in straits and money had to be re-appropriated from other heads to manage the day-today expenses in those provinces. Only the position of the Smyrna Fund was a bit better. After remitting £ 1,50,000 to Mustafa Kemal (usually through the Netherlands Trading Society of Amsterdam or the Imperial Ottoman Bank) it still showed a handsome balance of nearly rupees twenty lakhs in the kitty. On the last day of June 1922, the position of the collections since the funds were initiated, was something like this:[183]

[177] See Khalil-ud-din Hasan, *Taqrir-i nazm badih* (Pilibhit, 1921), 5.

[178] See Shaukat Ali to Abdul Bari, 29 Jan. 1921, denying the charges. *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 73.

[179] Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti, 'Maulana Muhiyu'd-Din Ahmad Kasuri', *al-Ma'arif* (Lahore), 26/7 (1993), esp. 65 ff. For Abdul Qadir Kasuri and Azad also see Miyan Amir-ud-din, *Yad-i ayyam* (Lahore, 1983), 27.

[180] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/6, 12 Feb. 1921, para. 206; 43/24, 25 June 1921, para. 1633; and 43/29, 30 July 1921, para. 1785.

[181] Collector's fortnightly report, first half of June 1921, cited in G. R. F. Tottenham, *The Mappila Rebellion, 1921 22* (Madras, 1922), 6.

[182] See Report by Col. Kaye, dated 24 May 1922. NAI, Home Poll., 741/1922.

[183] Ibid.

Title of Account	Collections [in Rs]	Balance [in Rs]
Khilafat Fund	19,60,278	72,796
Angora Fund	39,43,726	11,48,134
Smyrna Fund	11,96,238	1,16,291
Mappila Relief	1,30,632	13,595
Totals:	72,30,874	13,50,816

The expenditure up to that time was as follows:

Title of Account	Amount Remitted
Angora Fund	14,49,197
Smyrna Relief	6,05,447
Turkish Prisoners	35,575
Muhajirin	63,304
Mappila Relief	1,30,632
Aligarh University	1,45,806
National Education	46,984
Total:	23,72,313

These funds were over and above the items such as ornaments donated by some zealous women and clothes of all kinds in hundreds of thousands which were washed and pressed free of cost by a Bombay laundry and sent to Turkey.[184]

Matters came to a head in the summer of 1922 when rumours spread of serious defalcations in the Khilafat organizations. Between forty and fifty thousand rupees were reported to have been embezzled in the Punjab alone.[185] This prompted enquiries and when in July 1922, the working committee of the CKC learnt that a balance of over sixteen lakhs of rupees of the Angora Fund was still lying with Chotani whose firm acted as treasurer, it demanded that he remit ten lakhs of rupees immediately to Ankara.[186] But, even after repeated requests, Chotani did not comply with the demand. This prompted reprimands to Chotani from Ajmal Khan and Abdoola Haroon who

[184] Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali Jauhar aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970.
[185] See Report by Col. Kaye, dated 24 May 1922, NAI, Home Poll. 741/1922.
[186] *Hindu*, 12 July 1923. The statement refers to an earlier period.

also solicited Abdul Bari's intervention.[187] Chotani, however, was still evasive and in October 1922, in an attempt to assuage feelings which had excited public controversy, he issued a statement to the press denying allegations of misappropriation. He maintained that the Netherlands Trading Society of Amsterdam, the bank through which the money was remitted, had refused to accept further remittances on account of increasing difficulties being faced in sending money to Turkey where the situation was still unsettled.[188] But in spite of Chotani's denial, feelings against him ran exceedingly high. Mushir Kidwai strongly objected to the reappropriation of money earmarked for Ankara and Izmir, no matter how important the need.[189] Chotani responded by reassuring that the Angora Fund was safe with him. A sum of rupees one lakh had been borrowed to keep the CKC afloat and that amount would soon be refunded to its original account. He also promised to remit the remaining amount of money to Turkey the moment the situation had improved.[190] In another move, he issued a circular to all the Khilafat committees advising them not to reappropriate any money from the Angora Fund and asked them to send him the details of balance with them[191] In the meantime, the CKC, at its meeting at Delhi on 17 and 18 October 1922, constituted a five-member constitutional committee consisting of Rana Firoz Din (Punjab), Ghazi Abdul Rahman (1889–1976) (Punjab), Abdul Jabbar Khan (Sind), Dr Shaikh Muhammad Alam (1887–1947) (Punjab), and T. A. K. Sherwani (UP), to hold an enquiry and report on the status of various Khilafat funds.[192] The excitement at the meeting was further accentuated by the circulation of a poster published in Bombay which accused Khatri of using the Khilafat funds for 'the purpose of satisfying his unnatural practices'.[193] The meeting, however, approved the accounts of Mohamed Ali's delegation submitted by Sulaiman Nadwi in the absence of the former who was in jail.[194]

[187] See Abdoola Haroon to Abdul Bari, 19 Aug. 1922, *Nuqush*, 109, (1968), 111. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 756, Sept. 21 1922. IOL&R, Reading Papers.
[188] *Madras Mail*, 3 Oct. 1922.
[189] *Hindu*, 26 Oct. 1922.
[190] *Khilafat*, 8 Nov. 1922.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ref. in *Madras Mail*, 5 Apr. 1923. Also see SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/18, 5 May 1923, para. 186.
[193] Bamford, *Histories*, 208.
[194] See Jafri, *Sirat-i Muhammad 'Ali*, 303.

The constitutional committee conducted its investigations in Bombay from 24 October to 6 November 1922 but out of the original five only three members, Firoz Din, Ghazi Abdul Rahman and Dr Alam, actually participated in the proceedings. Then the committee retired to Delhi to draft the report. Abdul Jabbar Khan did not attend while Sayyid Muhammad Husain, a lawyer from Meerut (UP), was co-opted in place of Sherwani.[195] In the intervening period, it transpired that Chotani had diverted the balance of the Angora Fund to his private business in order to make good the serious losses his firm had suffered owing to his being deprived of all government contracts through official malevolance. The intention, it was maintained, was to return the money when the business was stable again. But this did not happen. The money was lost.[196] The working committee pressed Chotani to settle the matter. In January 1923, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Abul Kalam Azad and Dr Ansari met Chotani who admitted having diverted the money but promised to pay back from his sawmills. Upon this Umar Sobani was appointed to prepare estimates of Chotani's assets but differences arose over the valuation made by him. There ensued a protracted correspondence between the working committee and Chotani beginning in April 1923 when the CKC refused to accept the property in full payment of the money in question.[197] While this was being arranged, the CKC's position was rendered untenable by the mysterious publication in February 1923 of a funds 'enquiry committee' report purported to have been prepared by five of its senior members. It appeared first in the *Aligarh Gazette*, an anti-CKC journal, from where the government-sponsored Central Aman Sabha circulated it in the form of a pamphlet and then, a month later, the *Statesman* of Calcutta copied it with sensational headlines alleging gross mismanagement, extravagance and expenditure of huge amounts.[198]

The report was represented as 'an amazing story' of confusion and waste in every branch of the organization. It alleged that there was no limit fixed for expenses and no record of detailed accounts of expenditure maintained. The president and the secretaries spent

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[195] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/18, 5 May 1923, para. 186.

[196] Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970.

[197] NAI, Home Poll. 15/ii/1923 and 15/iii/1923.

[198] Central Aman Sabha, *Sentral Khilafat kameti ki pol* (Delhi, 1923); and *Statesman*, 17 Mar. 1923.

as much as they wished. The prodigality was such that thousands of rupees were caused to 'flow like water' without an account being rendered. Up to August 1922, as much as one and a half lakh was spent on propaganda—'a tangled skein'—which contained nearly Rs 50,000 on items 'on which no light can be thrown'. The report stated that in accordance with the decisions of the CKC the money in hand should have been deposited in a bank instead of keeping it with the treasurer. But this was not done. 'No estimate of expenditure or budget was ever prepared; neither was sanction ever obtained from the Working Committee, nor were any accounts of expenditure presented before it'. The expenditure on 'travelling allowances' up to October 1922, totalled Rs 35,149. The committee reported that when they called for the bills only three were produced 'after a good deal of search' and even these led to 'strange revelations'. Expenditure was shown under such items as *dhobi*, barber, medicine, telegrams, subsidy to persons, *bakshish* and motor hires.[199] Commenting, the report added:

> It so happens that the cloud of bounty bursts into rain on the land where the sun of *Khan-i-Khanan*'s generosity used to shine; the only difference is that the fund of the *Khan-i-Khanan* was derived from a wave of the sea of Muslim prosperity and ascendancy and he was its own master, while the money which was in the secretary's possession was, as to the best portion, money earned by the poor, helpless, penniless and indignant Mussalmans obtained by the blood of their liver, and the secretary was morally and legally responsible to keep a detailed account of every *cowry* of which he was only a trustee and not a master.[200]

To make the matter worse the *Statesman* advised a 'little gentle pressure' from 'the right quarters' to secure the honest accounting of these collections, including those of the Tilak Swaraj Fund'.[201]

The scandal was largely the result of bickerings among the Khilafatists blown out of proportions to get at the Ali brothers who were at the time in jail and in no position to defend themselves. Besides, as it turned out, the records of the CKC were maintained rather meticulously and were properly audited by Messrs S. Billimoria & Co., a reputable firm of chartered accountants of Bombay. The audited accounts along with the lists of donors, at least until the end

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[199] *Statesman*, 17 Mar. 1923.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Editorial in ibid.

of 1923, were regularly published each year.[202] Even then the scandal caused considerable stir in the country, especially in Bengal where Mujibur Rahman (1869–1940), the secretary of the provincial Khilafat committee, issued a hard hitting statement and threatened to sever his connection with the central organization unless a reasonable explanation was given.[203] The CKC had to make a feverish effort to retrieve its reputation. It immediately issued a denial that there had been any misuse of funds and claimed that the alleged report was never signed by all the members of the committee or it had ever been presented to the CKC. The report presented to the CKC was different from the one published in the press. The actual report was discussed at the Gaya Khilafat Conference where the office bearers had effectively repudiated the charges levelled against them.[204] On 2 April 1923, the CKC went into a closed-doors session at Lucknow which continued for hours together for two consecutive days. Amongst the leading Khilafatists who attended were Dr Ansari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Abul Kalam Azad, T. A. K. Sherwani, Azad Subhani and Khatri. It was reported that most of the members were of the opinion that though there had been some mismanagement of the funds and that expenses were incurred without an eye to economy, there was certainly no embezzlement of the accounts. There were, of course, suggestions from certain quarters to elect new office bearers but those were rejected out of hand lest they should be misconstrued as lack of confidence in the incumbent office bearers.[205] After the meeting, a letter signed by three members of the CKC, Firoz Din, Ghazi Abdul Rahman and Sayyid Muhammad Husain, was circulated which declared that the report published in the press was not the one they had submitted to the CKC.[206] Presumably, the original report had been scrapped and an innocuous one presented in order not to hurt the organization. One person who did not agree was Dr Alam and it was probably he who had passed on the withheld report to the press.[207] But the denial solved only part of the problem. The credibility of the Khilafat organization had yet to be restored. The Bengal

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[202] See Ali Afzal's circular letter dated 14 Jan. 1928 in *The Seventh Statement of Income and Expenditure of the Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay* (Bombay, [1928]), i.

[203] *Statesman*, 21 Mar. and 5 and 21 Apr. 1923.

[204] Ibid., 21 Mar. 1923.

[205] *Madras Mail*, 4 Apr. 1923; and *Pioneer*, 5 Apr. 1923.

[206] *Madras Mail*, 5 Apr. 1923; and SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/18, 5 May 1923, para. 186.

[207] SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/18, 5 May 1923, para. 186.

provincial Khilafat committee, in particular, was in no mood to forgive and forget though it agreed to listen to Dr Syed Mahmud who was arriving in Calcutta shortly.[208]

Dr Mahmud, accompanied by Shams-ud-din of the accounts department, reached Calcutta on 15 April, loaded with two big trunks full of account books, files and vouchers which were offered for scrutiny. The journalists and accountants who examined these records at the request of Mujibur Rahman found them completly in order.[209] The *Statesman* was thus left with no option but to acknowledge that the strictures passed by the authors of the report were not substantiated by the evidence.[210] Mujibur Rahman apologized and begged forgiveness. Dr Mahmud, on his part, blamed the unnamed sources for 'deliberately and maliciously' fabricating the episode to discredit the CKC.[211]

There remained, however, the question of Chotani and the money he owed to the CKC. When all efforts failed a committee of three with Sherwani, Omar Sobani and Abdul Qadir was appointed to consult the solicitors with a view to taking immediate legal proceedings against Chotani. Dr Mahmud, however, was in favour of giving him some more time and persuaded Syed Zahur Ahmad, who wanted an immediate action, to leave the matter to the sub-committee. But the problem was that Chotani offered only his sawmill at Sewry Bundar the value of which, in Omar Sobani's view, was far less than that claimed by him. Resultantly, feelings against Chotani ran high and Sherwani went to the extent of hiring the services of a former policeman to give notice to Chotani to clear the account or else face a criminal case in the Bombay courts.[212]

The saga of the Khilafat funds reached its climax when on 22 May, the working committee asked Chotani to mortgage his sawmills with stocks in part payment and to pay the balance from his other property. In the event of non-compliance, the committee threatened to take legal action. If on the other hand he agreed to abide by the

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[208] *Madras Mail*, 21 Apr. 1923.

[209] Ibid., 24 Apr. 1923. Refers to earlier events. Shams-ud-din was an employee of the office of the A-G, Bihar, who had resigned to take up a job with the CKC. See Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970.

[210] *Madras Mail*, 20 Apr. 1923.

[211] Ibid., 21 Apr. 1923.

[212] Report dated 25 Apr. 1923, NAI, Home Poll. 15/ii/1923.

proposal he was to be given the option of redeeming his property on payment in cash within one year. When Chotani hesitated the working committee asked their solicitors to serve him with a legal notice. This had the desired effect and Chotani promptly offered Umar Sobani the deal agreeing to his valuation. The combined value of the deal being nearly what Chotani owed to the CKC, i.e. Rs 16,17,000, and with the assurances made by Sobani as to its worth, the working committee unanimously decided to accept the offer. A board of five persons (Omar Sobani, Muhammad Ali of Kasur, Moazzam Ali, Dr Anasri and Sherwani) was appointed to take possession and make proper arrangements for the disposal of the property and stocks and to deposit the money in the Imperial Bank in the name of the board. The board was asked to submit a monthly report of progress to the working committee.[213]

The drop-scene came on 27 May 1923 when Chotani arrived in the meeting of the working committee with his son and read out a written speech amidst emotional scenes 'with tears gushing out of eyes', reported a CID official.[214] He said that he was the one had who started the Khilafat committee four years ago with branches all over the country. He nourished the movement honestly and sincerely but since he was a human being he had his shortcomings. Now that he had given them whatever he owned he was left with nothing but his life which, too, he would sacrifice gladly for Islam. Chotani then offered his resignation from the presidentship of the CKC. Abdul Qadir and Muhammad Ali of Kasur, Dr Ansari, Moazzam Ali and Dr Mahmud made feeling speeches eulogizing Chotani's services and asked his forgiveness saying that whatever they had done was in obedience to their duty to the cause of Islam. Chotani thanked the speakers and said that the real cause of his ruin was Sir George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, who had exploited his official authority to get his monopoly of certain big contracts cancelled which used to bring him an annual income of between 12 to 16 lakh rupees. He further alleged that the police put pressure on his creditors to destroy his reputation systematically just because of his work for the Khilafat.[215] This was probably a correct explanation but some of

[213] Ibid., and report dated 27 May 1923, NAI, Home Poll. 15/iii/1923.
[214] Ibid.
[215] Ibid.

Chotani's own dealings had not been above board. One who had nurtured the Khilafat movement financially and otherwise with devotion and had rightfully earned the title of *Nasiru'l-Islam* blundered his way out of the Indian politics into oblivion. The real culprit was said to be his brother, Ahmad Miyan, who, being one of the treasurers of the CKC, had either lost the Khilafat money at the stock exchange or surrendered its control to the elder Chotani.[216] But whatever the truth, Chotani was a sad casualty of the Khilafat movement. Some believed that he had fallen a victim to the 'Rampuri party' led by Moazzam Ali and Sherwani who always wanted to get at Chotani and Khatri and in the end succeeded in hounding them out.[217] Subsequently, almost a pauper, Chotani moved to Medina where he died in 1932 in conditions of abject poverty.[218]

The effect of the scandal was that the recriminations among the Khilafatists increased manifold. The CKC had to face considerable difficulty in taking possession of the property from Chotani and later in managing it.[219] For the present, however, the matter was resolved more or less. Dr Ansari succeeded Chotani as the president of the CKC while Osman Sobani, Moazzam Ali, Dr Mahmud, Shaukat Ali, Dr Kitchlew and Yakub Hasan (still in jail) became secretaries and Omar Sobani was appointed one of the treasurers in place of Chotani's brother.[220] As to the money remitted to Ankara no exact figures are available. From the Turkish records, the figure of £ 106,400 is ascertainable for the period from 26 December 1921 to 12 August 1922. This was in addition to what Turkey had received during the period before this.[221] By October 1923, the figures grew to £ 329,774 of which £ 122,000 were sent to Mustafa Kemal directly. Besides, the Red Crescent Society received regular donations from India even after the collapse of the Khilafat movement. The last receipt (for £ 4131) on record in the Turkish Presidential Archives in Ankara is dated

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[216] Afzal Haq, *Tarikh-i Ahrar*, 68; and Ext., Bombay Abstract, no. 23, 9 June 1923, para. 1049, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/24, 23 June 1923, para. 237.

[217] Ext., Bombay Abstract, no. 24, 16 June 1923, para. 1095, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/26, 7 July 1923, para. 251.

[218] Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970.

[219] See ch. vi, 405–6.

[220] Ext., Bombay Abstract, no. 23, 9 June 1923, para. 1049, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/24, 23 June 1923, para. 237.

[221] See Öke, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 155–6, n. 8.

July 1929.[222] According to the CKC records the total remittances up to 1922 were £ 1,50,000.[223] However, according to Dr Riazul Hasan, who had worked in the finance department of the CKC and was conversant with its records, nearly Rs 56 lakh (5.6 million) had been collected up to 1924 out of which as much as 30 lakh (£ 300,000) were sent to Mustafa Kemal. The rest was spent on the movement within the country.[224] Perhaps the exact figures would never be known.

One thing is certain: the mismanagement plunged the CKC in disrepute. Mushir Kidwai, on whose suggestion the Khilafat committees and the Khilafat funds had been initiated, appealed for the abolition of both. He alleged that the funds and the organization were 'being exploited for personal and Party purposes, ignoring the vital interests of Islam'. In so far as the Khilafat was concerned it was 'safe in the hands of the militant Turks' and 'the Indian Muslims will do well now to turn their attention away from the Khilafat and Angora to their own home'.[225] By his criticism, however, Kidwai earned the ill will of the radicals who dubbed him as a 'disappointed and irresponsible individual with defective understanding and mean intellect'.[226] The Khilafatists were intent on continuing the movement on the secondary issue of the freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab*. Naturally, the CKC, which met at Bombay on 8 July 1923, condemned the treaty between Sharif Husain and the British as an insult to the Muslim world and voted for the continuance of the efforts to free the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* from non-Muslim domination.[227] But the proposed delegation to Sharif Husain, with a view to bringing the Arabs and the Turks closer together, was a non-starter. Abdul Bari, who was appointed the leader, hedged his consent with a number of conditions which were not easy to meet.[228] Other Khilafatists were angry at the distrust displayed towards them by the Ankara government.[229]

The net result of these events was that the Khilafat movement,

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[222] See Keskin, *Hindistan Müslümanlarının Milli Mücadelede Türkiye'ye Yardımları*, esp. 102–3 and app.

[223] Report by Col. Kaye, 24 May 1922, NAI, Home Poll., 741/1922.

[224] Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970.

[225] *Madras Mail*, 25 June 1923.

[226] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 578, 14 July 1923, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see Kidwai to Abdul Bari, 2 June 1922 [*sic* 1924], *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 89.

[227] NAI, Home Poll. 15/v/1923.

[228] See Abdul Bari to Iqbal Shaidai, 25 July 1923, NAP, Shaidai Papers.

[229] See e.g. Abdur Rahman Siddiqi to Iqbal Shaidai, 19 and 23 June 1923, in ibid.

which had already suffered considerably owing to the Hindu withdrawal and the communal tangle, received a serious blow. The CKC, and with it the provincial and local organizations, ceased to command public respect or even much attention. Subscriptions to the Khilafat funds fell considerably. Only the shadow of the Lausanne Conference, where the negotiations for a peace settlement were proceeding with alternate gusts of hope and despair,[230] and the lasting pan-Islamic fervour heightened by the adulation of Mustafa Kemal, prevented a collapse of the movement. The two and a half months' rupture between 4 February and 23 April 1923, was an anxious time for everyone. For Lord Curzon and Ismet Paşa the conference was a close duel. It was a very different experience from the peace conference that gave birth to the Treaty of Sèvres. Here the Turks sat at the table on a footing of equality with the Powers, negotiating the terms and not just receiving them without comment.[231] After much haggling, the main issues were either glossed over, side-tracked or postponed and the way was cleared for a final settlement.[232] For the Turks it had been a great victory; for the British, at least to Lloyd George, it was nothing but 'a rout'.[233] A rout or not, the peace terms, hammered out at Lausanne, had righted a great wrong. Rauf Bey, the prime minister of nationalist Turkey, reportedly admitted later that forty percent of the victory at Lausanne had been due to the pressure of the Khilafat movement.[234] But this exaggerated claim was probably intended to acknowledge Indian Muslim help as a friendly gesture.

Disillusionment led Muslims to look to different directions because the CKC's sphere of activity had shrunk considerably while the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama was reduced to a mere *fatwa*-churning society.

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[230] See Parl. Papers, 1923, Cmd. 1814, *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922–1923*; R. B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1914–1925* (London, 1927), 288–303; R. Davison, *Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne* (Princeton, 1953); B. C. Bush, *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontiers in West Asia. 1918–23* (New York, 1976); M. L. Dockrill and J. D. Goold, *Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conference, 1919 1923* (London, 1981), 236–52; and Ismet Inönü, 'Negotiation and National Interest', *Perspectives of Peace, 1910–1960* (London 1960), 135–49.

[231] Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, iii (London, 1928), 324.

[232] Mim Kamal Öke, 'The Lausanne Conference (1922–1923): Themes and Sources in the Archives of Great Britain', *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences*, 8/1–2 (1982), 4–15.

[233] He wrote: 'From Sèvres to Mudania was a retreat. From Mudania to Lausanne was a rout', see Lloyd George, *Truth About the Peace Treaties*, ii (London, 1928), 1316.

[234] Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur mister Gandhi', *Jang*, 26 Apr. 1980.

The Muslim League, as usual, was in the doldrums and the way things were moving in 1923 it was clear that disunity among Muslims was endemic.[235] But then the Congress, too, had split, one section completely going over to the militant Mahasabha whose communal activities were especially arousing resentment in the Punjab. There was a growing fear among the Muslims that the *swaraj* might ultimately turn for them into a Hindu Raj. It was not certain whether, as Sayyid Zahur Ahmad wondered, the solution lay in a concerted policy by all the three Muslim organizations under a single umbrella or some other alternative was to be worked out.[236]

In conclusion, it appears that the Bardoli fiasco, which ended the high spate of the movement in 1922, had no immediate effect in disenchanting the Muslims either with the Congress or the non-cooperation programme. Most of the Khilafatists had accepted the postponement of civil disobedience and the few sceptics were prevailed upon to tone down their opposition. The CKC and the Congress still professed to follow a joint course of action until *swaraj* was attained for the country. The possibility of a split came in March 1922, when the Government of India deliberately paraded its pro-Muslim feelings on the Turkish issue. But whatever advantages the government obtained by publishing the fateful despatch were negatived partly by the repression it unleashed in the summer of 1922 and partly by its refusal to listen to the saner advice of men like Jinnah who had dared to emphasize the necessity of giving due regard to the sentiments of the people.[237] Additional damage was caused by the imperial policy of intervention in the renewed Graeco-Turkish conflict which ruled out the chances of ending the movement. But though the Khilafatists were able to sustain some public enthusiasm, the movement had been gradually on the decline because of its own failings. The disorganized state of affairs following the arrest of some prominent leaders and the increasing squabbles among those still free, especially over the questions of council entry and civil

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[235] See Aqilur Rahman Nadwi, 'Musalmanan-i Hind ka nizam-i 'amal', memo dated 28 Mar. 1923, AFM, AIMLR, cix, 60–3.

[236] See Sayyid Zahur Ahmad's circular dated 4 July 1923 in ibid., 101 and 119.

[237] Peel, after his meeting with Jinnah in London in June 1923, told Reading that he was the 'only Indian I have yet met who really was disagreeable'. And Reading wrote back agreeing that Jinnah had 'an undercurrent of bitterness . . . behind [his] suave language'. See Peel to Reading, 12 June 1923; and Reading to Peel, 5 July 1923, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

disobedience, had obviated any possibility of rejuvenating the waning agitation. A crucial factor in the process of decline was the failure of the Khilafat-Congress leadership to give a vigorous lead to the followers when it was needed the most. Equally significant was the Ankara attitude towards the caliphate which, in spite of the Khilafatists' explanations, had dampened the Muslim enthusiasm. In these circumstances, the reappearance of communal disharmony and the dissensions within the Khilafat organization dealt a severe blow to the movement. But even then the agitation, though much reduced in intensity, lingered on with intermittent spells of activity whenever the government resorted to repression or the situation in the Near and the Middle East became provocative.

CHAPTER SIX

THE LAST PHASE

The Khilafat movement entered its final phase when on 24 July 1923, the treaty of peace between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Lausanne. By this treaty, Turkey retained Istanbul and Thrace up to the Meritza line with the control of the Straits, subject to certain restrictions. Capitulations were abolished, humiliating economic clauses modified and obligations in regard to the Ottoman loans were also waived. The disputed question of Mosul was left to separate negotiations between Turkey and Britain. Though Turkey had lost its vast empire in Europe and Asia and had compromised its jurisdiction in certain political, legislative and administrative matters, yet by this treaty it had managed to emerge again as the chief power in the Near East. And more surprisingly, even after losing so much, it still somehow was able to retain, under article 27, the 'spiritual attributions' of its religious authorities in the territories detached from it.[1] This was reminiscent of a similar clause in the Treaty of Küchük Kaynarca some hundred and fifty years ago. What mattered in the present treaty was that peace had finally been re-established between Turkey and its adversaries and official relations resumed. The Republic of Turkey took its rightful place in the comity of nations.

The conclusion of the peace treaty brought a genuine exhilaration to Muslim India. On 26 July 1923, corresponding with *'Idu'l-azha*, the occasion was celebrated enthusiastically all over the country as the victory of Turkish arms. Despite the strained relations between Hindus and Muslims, the leaders managed to whip up a reasonable fraternization. The Sikhs also joined the Khilafatists in force, especially in the Punjab where the Akali movement was in full swing. There were flag bearing processions, illuminations, displays of fireworks and special prayers in mosques, *gurdwaras* and temples. Resolutions were passed at public meetings congratulating the caliph and Mustafa Kemal, and reiterating the demand for the freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-*

[1] For details of the Treaty of Lausanne see Parl. Papers, 1923, Cmd. 1928, xxv. 533.

'Arab from non-Muslim control and, on the Indian front, the need for a united struggle for the attainment of *swaraj*.[2]

But in spite of the enthusiasm, the Treaty of Lausanne was a turning point in the Khilafat movement. It marked the beginning of the end of the Indian Muslim agitation against the British until the abolition of the caliphate by Ankara in March 1924 took the wind out of its sails. On 26 July 1923, Reading wrote to Peel:

> I have a feeling of profound satisfaction that we have at last made the peace which will enable us to recover the lost ground with the Mahomedans in India, and, indeed, elsewhere. . . . Now I believe that among the vast majority there will be a desire once more to associate themselves with the Government, to seek their protection and give them support. . . . From purely Indian considerations, I have no hesitation in saying that the peace will assure us of the support of all but the extremists among the 60 or 70 million Mahomedans in India and will help materially to strengthen the British position in India.[3]

Reading's observations were oracular. Influential sections of Indian Muslims were indeed inclined to accept the peace treaty as the final solution of the Turkish problem. They were grateful to the Government of India for placing the Indian Muslims' views before the British government and bringing the Turkish peace negotiations to a successful conclusion. On 26 July 1923, a delegation of twenty-five Muslim members of the Indian legislature, including Abul Kasem, Syed Reza Ali and Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, waited upon the viceroy at Simla to express the community's gratitude. Similarly, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Ali Nawaz Khan (1884–1935) of Khairpur and some more members of the Indian legislative assembly,[4] conveyed their appreciation and satisfaction to Reading. The Aga Khan in a statement emphasized the desire of the Allies to establish friendly relations with the Islamic countries and urged the Indian Muslims to help the new state of Turkey to prosper.[5] The Indian Muslim communities in Rangoon, Durban and throughout South, East and Central Africa also

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[2] *Times of India*, 27 and 28 July 1923; and SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/30, 4 Aug. 1923, para. 279.

[3] Reading to Peel, 26 July 1923, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[4] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/855, file 3162/1923; Nizam to Reading, Tel. 4 Aug. 1923; Mir to Reading, Tel. 11 July 1923, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 27 July 1925, iii, part 7, 5037–8.

[5] *Madras Mail*, 28 July 1923. He followed it up with an advice to the British govt. that they should adopt a policy of friendship towards the Muslim world. The Aga Khan, 'The New Moslem World', *Edinburgh Review*, 238/486 (1923), 230–6.

gratefully received the peace treaty.[6] The only question about which Muslims were still concerned was the freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* from non-Muslim control, but its solution was considered simply a question of time.[7] The continuance of the agitation, therefore, seemed to them totally absurd. After the treaty they were also less inclined to join the Hindus against the British.[8] On the whole the tendency of the Muslims was to range themselves more and more on the side of the government.[9]

With the majority of the Muslims gradually becoming disinterested in the Khilafat movement, the Khilafat leaders found that the ground was slipping from under their feet. But even then they were determined not to make peace with the government for they believed that the treaty had solved the Turkish problem only partially. Until the complete freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* was secured and *swaraj* for India attained the agitation must continue.[10] Therefore, they desperately groped at the cognate issues of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* and Palestine to rouse Muslim feelings.[11] The problems facing the Khilafatists, however, were enormous. The faction-ridden Khilafat organization, like the disorganized Congress, was struggling to preserve unity in its ranks. Though the CKC still paid lip-service to the Gandhian brand of non-violent non-co-operation, the Khilafat movement had come to be the concern mainly of the Muslims. Because of this the Khilafat work had suffered a set-back. Some of the notable Khilafatists like the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad and Dr Kitchlew were still in jail. Others like Ajmal Khan, T. A. K. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman were mostly interested in the politics of the newly established Swaraj Party. Still others had either dissociated themselves from the organization or were thinking of leaving it. The Khilafat funds were almost non-existent, and the salaries of the Khilafat workers had not been paid for months. There was little co-ordination between the CKC and its subordinate branches. However, as Shaukat Ali later recalled,

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[6] *Times of India*, 28 July 1923. Also see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/855, files 3015/1923 and 3280/1923.

[7] See the address presented to the Viceroy by the Muslim members of the Indian legislature on 26 July 1923, in *Times of India*, 27 July 1923.

[8] See Reading to Peel, 30 Aug. 1923, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[9] Ibid.

[10] See the manifesto issued in the middle of July 1923, under the signatures of about 150 Hindu-Muslim leaders in *Madras Mail*, 19 July 1923.

[11] Ibid.

'the bonds [had though] loosened . . . the links yet remained'.[12] A semblance of unity was somehow preserved as both the central body and its branches were still in existence.

In August 1923, when Mohamed Ali was released at Jhansi on earning remission of his sentence, it fell to him to grapple with the problem of reorganization as Shaukat Ali was still in jail.[13] The difficulty was that those Khilafatists who had joined the Swaraj Party, far from dissociating themselves from it, were determined to carry out their plan of council entry.[14] This was being done in open defiance of the *fatwa* of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama and the accepted policy of the CKC. Mohamed Ali regarded this as a betrayal of the cause, especially in view of the religious obligations imposed by the Jam'iyyat's *fatwa*.[15] But in order to maintain unity he glossed over their action. In the middle of September 1923, supported by Abul Kalam Azad (president of the session), Dr Ansari, Dr Mahmud and Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohamed Ali played a leading part in bringing about the Delhi Congress compromise which he regarded as 'a necessary evil'.[16] This compromise allowed such Congressmen, as had no religious or conscientious objections, to stand as candidates or to exercise their right of voting.[17] For this, Mohamed Ali was subjected to considerable abuse by supporters of the Gandhian policies who accused him of surrendering to the Das camp at the eleventh hour.[18] But Mohamed Ali was only trying to avoid a split which now seemed inevitable. Among the Khilafatists some of the *'ulama*—Abdul Bari, Sulaiman Nadwi and Husain Ahmad Madani—had been themselves trying to secure a revision of the Jam'iyyat's *fatwa* against council entry.[19] But the Jam'iyyat, instead of taking a prompt decision, referred the matter to a sub-committee for further investigation[20] and it had to wait

[12] *The Indian Annual Register, 1923*, ii (ed.), H. M. Mitra (Calcutta, 1924), 170.

[13] *The Times*, 30 Aug. 1923; and Mohamed Ali to Jawaharlal Nehru, [? Sept.] 1923, Shahjahanpuri, *Maktubat*, 178 9.

[14] This reverses the arguments of Mahomedan, *The Indian Moslems*, 183-4.

[15] Mohamed Ali to Kitchlew, 30 Sept. 1923, encl. A. Langley to Sir Malcolm Hailey, 26 Mar. 1925, IOL&R, Haley Papers; and *Hindu*, 20 Sept. 1923.

[16] For the Delhi Congress (15 19 Sept.) see Micheal Brecher, *Nehru* (London, 1959), 88; Mohamed Ali to Kitchlew, 30 Sept. 1923; and Ext., Delhi Abstract, 22 Sept. 1923, para. 247, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/39, 6 Oct. 1923, para. 340.

[17] *Hindu*, 20 Sept. 1923.

[18] *Times of India*, 20 Sept. 1923.

[19] See ch. v, 324 5.

[20] *Madras Mail*, 24 Sept. 1923. Also see *Pioneer*, 26 Sept. 1923.

another three years before it finally released the Muslims from the obligation of the *muttafiqa fatwa*.[21] In the meantime, the working committee of the Jam'iyyat, meeting at Delhi on 8 November 1923, decided that though the *fatwa* stood unabrogated the *'ulama* would not enforce any of its items.[22] This, however, did not deter the Swarajist-Khilafatists from contesting elections and consequently a good number was returned to the councils.[23] In these desperate conditions, there was hardly any hope for reorganizing the Khilafat work and, despite Shaukat Ali's pleadings for 'a clear and forward and brave policy', the matter had to be shelved until the December 1923 Khilafat conference at Coconada.[24] In the meantime, the Khilafatists were confronted with fresh complications.

When in November 1922, the Turkish nationalists had separated the caliphate from the sultanate, the Indian Khilafatists had expediently accepted the *fait accompli*.[25] Muffled protests both in Turkey and India had since been ignored.[26] But one step led to another. On 29 October 1923, Turkey, striding along the path of new nationalism, declared itself a republic with Mustafa Kemal as president and Ismet Paşa as prime minister. This resulted in the loss by the caliph of all his secular powers and administrative functions, rendering his status completely anomalous. To ward off a possible scandal, the nationalists had to relocate the caliph from Istanbul to Broussa or Konia away from the atmosphere of intrigue, but the latter refused and threatened to resign. Protests from the Muslim world followed.

[21] The Jam'iyyat did not modify its stance until Sept. 1926, when it finally exempted Muslims from the obligations of the *muttafiqa fatwa*. See Miyan, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama kya hae?*, ii 127–30. Also see below, 403.

[22] Ext., Delhi Abstract, 10 Nov. 1923, para. 281, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/46, 1 Dec. 1923, para. 385.

[23] Parl. Papers, 1924, Cmd. 2154, *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1923*. In the central legislature alone the Swaraj Party won 42 out of 101 elective seats. See Kanji Dwarkadas, *India's Fight for Freedom, 1913–1937* (Bombay, 1966), 273.

[24] Shaukat Ali to Jawaharlal Nehru, 29 Nov. 1923, in Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, 32. In Nov. 1923, Malik Lal Khan informed the CKC that there was no hope of raising any more funds from the Punjab. SB, Punjab, 22 Nov. 1923, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/45, 24 Nov. 1923, para. 379.

[25] See ch. v, 332 ff.

[26] In Turkey, they were Şukri Efendi and the conservatives and in India, Ameer Ali and Sir Abbas Ali Baig. See Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 55–6; Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, 290; Ameer Ali, 'The Caliphate and the Islamic Renaissance', *Edinburgh Review*, 237/483 (1923), 195; and Sir Abbas Ali Baig, 'Peace with Turkey in its Relation to Anglo-Muslim Goodwill and the Khilafat', *Asiatic Review*, 19/60 (1923), 586.

The Egyptians and the Palestinians, in particular, warned Kemal of the dangerous consequences of his policy.[27] But in India the momentous decision at first attracted little notice and the Khilafatists continued to press for the restoration of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* to Turkey even though the Turkish nationalists had renounced all claims to *'Republica Moslemica'*. Moreover, the Khilafatists were not prepared to distress Ankara, particularly when the question of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* was still unsettled. They had supported the nationalists so consistently that open rupture with them would have looked embarrassing. This, however, did not deter Turkey's well-wishers, who had been following the events in that country with growing apprehension, from speaking out their minds. The Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were among such people. On 24 November 1923, they addressed from London a joint letter to Ismet Paşa, pointing out the disturbing effects that 'the uncertain position of the Caliph-Imam' was having on the vast Muslim population. They entreated with the Turks that they should reconsider their decision with regard to the caliph and maintain 'the religious and moral solidarity of Islam' by re-establishing the powers of the Sunni caliphate-imamate.[28]

The letter to Ismet Paşa was dispatched by registered post nearly a week before its copies were sent to the Istanbul press. But since in those days the mail took almost a week longer to reach Anatolia compared with the capital and the process of translation was also slower in government offices than in the newspaper bureaus the letter appeared in the Istanbul press on 5 December 1923, before it could be placed on Ismet Paşa's table in Ankara.[29] The manner of publication and the mystery that surrounded it alarmed and provoked the Ankara government. Already overwhelmed by protests from home and abroad, the nationalists were taken aback and took the letter as part of a sinister British-instigated conspiracy against them.[30] On 8 December, the GNA was convened in a secret session where speakers like Ismet Paşa, Hüseyin Rauf Bey and Yusuf Akçora Bey condemned the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali as 'heretics of heretics' and pawns in

[27] NAI, 1924, Home Poll. file 209/1924.

[28] *The Times*, 14 Dec. 1923.

[29] See Ameer Ali's letter to ibid., 15 Dec. 1923; and Henderson to Curzon, no. 827, 12 Dec. 1923, PRO, FO 371/9133. Toynbee gives a slightly different version. According to him, owing to an oversight by the Aga Khan's secretary, the original letter and its copies were dispatched to Turkey simultaneously. See his *Survey, 1925*, i, 58, n.

[30] Henderson to Curzon, no. 827, PRO, FO 371/9133.

the hands of the British and a 'counter-revolutionary court' was constituted to deal with the reported 'intrigues'.[31] Consequently, some prominent journalists—Hüseyin Cahid of the *Tanin*, Velid Ebüzziya of the *Tevhid-i Efkyar* and Ahmed Cevdet of the *Iqdam*—were arrested along with Lutfi Fikri, a reputable lawyer-politician, and Ekram Bey, second military ADC to the caliph.[32]

Though in the public trial which began on 15 December, the journalists were acquitted and only Fikri Bey got penal servitude,[33] the nationalists fully exploited the incident to throttle the opposition in Istanbul. There is no doubt that the caliph had become a rallying-point for the conservative elements in Turkey but the nationalists deliberately painted an innocuous letter as a sinister plot with the British as its instigators.[34] Of course, the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were pro-British and had helped the Empire in its hour of trial during the war but they were no Allied stooges. In fact, they were genuinely concerned about Turkey's welfare and in this connection had rendered useful services behind scenes.[35] At least Ismet Paşa could not plead ignorance of this. But a mixture of suspicion and expediency made the nationalists to ignore this fact and, without any regret, scarred a lasting friendship.[36] The Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were naturally appalled by the insinuation that being Shi'as, they had little competence to discuss matters concerning the Sunnis and that they were 'the real criminals' of the conspiracy.[37]

[31] TBMM, Gizli Celse Zabitlari, iv, 315-25, cited in Öke, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 167 ff.

[32] Ibid. Also see *The Times*, 10 Dec. 1923; and Henderson to Curzon, no. 848, 19 Dec. 1923, PRO, FO 371/9133.

[33] See Henderson to Curzon, no. 12, 2 Jan. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10171.

[34] The authors emphatically denied 'any wish on their part to interfere in the politics of Turkey, or to have any association with any of her parties or factions', or that any British intrigue was working behind the letter. See Ameer Ali's statement in *Pioneer*, 16 Jan. 1924. They were right. In fact the British Foreign Office had absolutely no knowledge of the letter and had to ask the India Office about its contents which, too, had no information to give apart from what had already been reported in the press. See FO to IO, no. E 11672/199/44, 12 Dec. 1923, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/895, file 4778/1923.

[35] Mushir Kidwai, who knew the story from inside, lauded the services of the Aga Khan to the cause of Turkey and Islam. See Kidwai to Shaikh Shaukat Ali, 7 June [?1922] AFM, AIML, Misc./Khilafat—i.

[36] Kemal Öke absolves Ismet Paşa of overplaying his card and unduly chastizes the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali for their supposed intrigue. See his *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 163 ff.

[37] See letters from Ameer Ali and the Aga Khan to *The Times*, 14 and 17 Dec. 1923; and 'The Memoirs of Rt. Hon'ble Syed Ameer Ali, *Islamic Culture*, 6 (Oct. 1932), 522.

The Indian Khilafatists were embarrassed by the incident but since they were intent on supporting Ankara whether or not the caliph's status was certain, they quickly disowned the action of the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali. On 18 December 1923, the Istanbul press published a telegram from the CKC which assured Mustafa Kemal of their devotion to the Turkish cause, acclaimed the establishment of the republic and denounced 'the senders of any messages in a contrary sense'.[38] Mustafa Kemal was naturally pleased and lost no time in thanking the Khilafatists for their good wishes adding that the publications tending to disapprove the Turkish republic were never considered in Turkey as representing views of the Indian Muslims and welcomed the news of the dispatch of a delegation to Ankara.[39] At the Khilafat conference which opened on 27 December 1923 at Coconada in South India, Shaukat Ali, the president, strongly condemned the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali allegedly for being out of touch with the Indian situation and reaffirmed confidence in Ankara. Shaukat Ali warned the Muslims that any slackening of the movement 'will prove our cowardice, fickleness and stupidity'; 'Our enemies will laugh at us'.[40] His brother, Mohamed Ali, took the opportunity to defend the retention of the Khilafat committees whose *raisin d'etre* after the Lausanne Treaty had been under public criticism for some time. He argued that the treaty had only given the Turks their 'swaraj'; it had not solved the *real* Khilafat issue which was the freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab*. Therefore, the need of the Khilafat organizations was greater than ever. He admitted that the Khilafat funds had not been well-managed but argued that the scandal should not deter Muslims from subscribing for a rightful cause. Mohamed Ali made a frantic appeal for the continuance of agitation until the Khilafatists had achieved their aims.[41] The Ali brothers literally steamrolled the proceedings. The conference laid down that the original Khilafat demands were four in number, namely complete freedom of the Turkish Empire; restitution of Thrace, Izmir and the coasts of Asia Minor; and freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab*. While the Treaty of

[38] See Henderson to Curzon, no. 848, 19 Dec. 1923, PRO, FO 371/9133.

[39] See Hayati, pte. sec. to Mustafa Kemal to CKC, Bombay, (?) Dec. 1923, in Şimşir, *Homage to . . . Ataturk*, 28, citing Turkish archives. The offer to receive a delegation and the promise of an Islamic congress were later withdrawn. See NAI, Home Poll. file 209/1924.

[40] *Indian Annual Register, 1923*, ii, 171.

[41] *Hindu*, 3 Jan. 1924. Also see *Hindu*, 10 Jan. 1924. Emphasis added.

Lausanne had decided the first three demands, the fourth, 'which from the religious point of view of the Mussalmans is the most important clause of the Khilafat demands', was still unresolved. Therefore, the conference, with the full support of the Jam'iyyat, 'in clear terms and for the last time', declared that unless the whole of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* was freed and was safe in the real sense, the Islamic world 'shall continue the struggle with all its might'.[42] A resolution embodying the future programme of the organization was passed. This involved entrusting the working committee with the job of reorganizing the Khilafat committees; appealing for funds; and overhauling the corps of Khilafat volunteers. Another resolution reiterated that the attainment of *swaraj* was 'not only a political and national but the foremost Islamic duty'.[43]

The apparent unanimity, however, could not hide the strong undercurrent of recriminations that existed among the Khilafatists. Shaukat Ali had to work hard to bridge the gulf but sometimes even he would despair as to how the warring factions could be brought together. To drive the workers together he adopted an 'iron hand' policy. At the Khilafat subjects committee meeting he allowed no discussion and frankly told those present that he wanted results and not empty talk. He even snubbed those young men, like Shoaib Qureshi, Khaliquzzaman and Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, who attempted to display a little independence.[44] But he and his brother had a difficult time in keeping their friends in check when they threatened to part company with the Hindus.[45] The Congress rejection of the 'National Pact' was having its toll on communal relations.[46] But it was the Turkish affairs which worried the Khilafatists more. The attitude of Mustafa Kemal towards the caliph was the cause of this anxiety. The caliph had sent a verbal message to Shaukat Ali through Abdur Rahman that he should do something to help him out. Ideally, the Ali brothers would have wished to see the caliph as a constitutional sultan with Kemal as the prime minister but they were careful not to express their views too openly lest this should annoy the president of the

[42] Ibid. The Jam'iyyat's sessions was inaugurated on 29 Dec. 1923 under Madani's chair. For his address see Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, 194–228, and for resolutions, 229–33.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Report by K. B. Tasadduq Hussain of the CID, dated 27 Dec. 1923, NAI, Home Poll., file 253/1924.

[45] Report by id., dated 31 Dec. 1923, in ibid., file 152/1924.

[46] Toosy, *My Reminiscences of Quaid-i-Azam*, 15.

Turkish republic. However, when they heard that the *'ulama* were thinking of moving a resolution disapproving Kemal's conduct in ill-treating the supporters of the caliph, Mohamed Ali took pains to kill it. He told them that the Reuters story was mere propaganda and they had better be careful.[47]

But before the Coconada Khilafat programme could be implemented the inevitable happened. When the republic was born the caliphate had lost its reason to exist.[48] And, indeed the Aga Khan-Ameer Ali letter of the preceding November had the unintended effect of precipitating the disappearance of the institution. In the context of Turkish national politics Kemal's *inkilap*, which aimed at establishing an independent modern nation-state, had made the caliph, as the representative of the traditional forces, a potential centre of reaction. Rauf's visit to the caliph in Istanbul was the last straw which compelled Kemal and Ismet to make the final move.[49] For Kemal the caliphate had definitely come to mean an 'anomalous and anachronistic' institution, in fact a perpetual nuisance and a constant danger to the Turkish republic. Turkey, he argued, was no longer in a position either to afford military adventures or to claim the power to defend the rest of Islam. Turkish nationalism and pan-Islam had become incompatible. The caliphate and religious institutions, therefore, must be dealt with in a radical manner.[50] By abolishing the caliphate the Ankara leaders also hoped to allay British suspicions of pan-Islam and thereby soften their attitude towards the question of Mosul.[51]

By February 1924, the Ankara leaders had indeed decided to abolish the caliphate and expel the imperial household from Turkey. The juridical sanction for this came from a document prepared in 1922 by a group of *'ulama* in the aftermath of the separation crisis. The argument in support of the abolition was not a matter of theology

[47] Report by K. B. Tasadduq Hussain of the CID, dated 28 Dec. 1923, NAI, Home Poll., file 15/IV/1923.

[48] D. A. Rustow thinks that the real turning point, 'the watershed between a religious past and a secular future', was the *Shaikhu'l-Islam*'s *fatwa* against the nationalists in 1920. See his 'Politics and Islam in Turkey' in Frye, *Islam and the West*, 77.

[49] Inalcik, 'The Caliphate and Atatürk's *Inkilap*', 362–3.

[50] Lindsay to MacDonald, no. 166, 27 Feb. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10217; *Daily Telegraph*, 4 Mar. 1924; and Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin, 1982), 54–5.

[51] This was confided by Ismet Paşa to the generals assembled in Izmir. See Lindsay to MacDonald, no. 166, 27 Feb. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10217.

but of law. Nor did it consider the caliphate essential to Islam.[52] Mustafa Kemal took into confidence the editors of several Turkish newspapers to prepare public opinion for the abolition in order perhaps to counter the 'war of pamphlets' which had been raging on the issue.[53] Then, accompanied by Ismet Paşa, he went to Izmir and held a conference with senior military commanders.[54] Having assured himself of his strength, Mustafa Kemal had long consultations with Mustafa Fevzi, the minister of religious affairs. On 2 March, the draft laws on the abolition of the caliphate were considered and endorsed by the Halk Firkasi, (Peoples Party) which was determined to go through with its professed philosophy of nationalism and secularism.[55] The bills, as approved by the party, were moved on 3 March 1924 in the assembly by Şeyh Saffet Bey. Several speakers from both sides of the political divide, notably Ekrem Bey, Zeki Bey, Halid Bey, Vasif Bey, Seyyid Bey and Ismet Paşa, took part in the heated debate. The scenes in the Assembly bordered on utter chaos recalling 'etchings of the French Revolution'.[56] The small opposition was shouted down and Kemal got his bills passed.[57] In its final form the law concerning the abolition of the caliphate and the banishment of the members of the Ottoman imperial family from Turkey, with its thirteen articles, was a compromise between the government proposal simply to declare the caliphal office abolished and the counter-proposals to declare it vested either in the assembly or in the presidency. The material clause concerning the abolition maintained that since the idea of the Khilafat was contained in the meaning and significance

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[52] Haim, 'The Abolition of the Caliphate and its aftermath', 210–18.

[53] S. A. Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (London, 1956), 136 ff.; and Öke, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 191–2.

[54] NAI, Home Poll., file 209/1924.

[55] For the aims and objects of the Halk Firkasi see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, 1952), 120.

[56] Lindsay to MacDonald, no. 188, 5 Mar. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10217. Said Bey, the minister of justice, maintained that the caliphate was an administrative and political problem and had no sanction in the Qur'an. See Lutfy Levonian, *The Turkish Press* (Athens, 1932), 22–5.

[57] 'At one moment', writes Kinross, 'During a brief suspension of the debate, orators were climbing on the chairs and tables in the lobbies, and shouting themselves hoarse for the expulsion of the Ottoman family; at another, turbaned *hojas* were running in and out of the Ghazi's room, declaring themselves ready to abolish the sacred Book itself rather than listen to the terrible pleas being made in the Chamber for the abolition of the religious instruction on which their power depended'. See Kinross, *Ataturk*, 385. The debate in the GNA can be followed in Öke, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 192–8.

of the words 'government' and 'republic' the institution was superfluous. The office of the caliph was, therefore, abolished and the caliph deposed.[58]

Within hours of the decision the caliph was asked to leave the country. In the small hours of 4 March, Abdülmecid II, tears in his eyes and accompanied by two wives, a son and a daughter, was first bundled off in a motorcar to the Chataldja and then placed on the fabled Orient Express which took him to Territet in Switzerland. The nationalists did everything in their power to humiliate and belittle the popular caliph. The passport was issued to him simply as 'Monsieur Abdul-Mejid fils d' Abdul Aziz' and the Italian embassy was informed that it was not a case for a diplomatic visa. They also took special measures to ensure the omission of his name from the Friday *khutba* and substituted it with a prayer for the republic. The nationalists then secured the expulsion of the rest of the imperial dynasty with the utmost harshness and efficiency.[59] Thus vanished suddenly from Turkey the great House of Osman which, lamented a Turkish journal, 'for many centuries had reigned in Turkey and had lifted the country to the height of those glories it once possessed'.[60] The abolition was accompanied by a series of other measures that put an end to the office of the *Shaikhu'l-Islam* and the commissariat of religious affairs, closed the traditional religious schools and colleges, and, a month later, abolished the special *shari'at* courts. These orders were duly confirmed in April 1924 in the new constitution which the GNA adopted.[61] It was the beginning of the decade of *Inkilap* which the nationalists had precipitated under Kemal against the religious establishment from outlawing the mystic orders (1925) to abrogating the provision which mentioned Islam as state religion (1928).[62] But it was the abolition that had deprived pan-Islam of its

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[58] See Lindsay's Tel. to Cairo, no. 9, 8 Mar. 1924, addressed to FO no. 49, PRO, FO 371/10217. For the text of the law see Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, app. ii, 572–5.

[59] See Lindsay to MacDonald, no. 224, 12 Mar. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10217; and *The Times*, 5 and 6 Mar. 1924. He was held up at the frontier by the Swiss authorities on grounds that the polygamous were not allowed into their country. However, after some delay, he was provisionally admitted, pending a later enquiry into his marital status. Kinross, *Ataturk*, 386.

[60] *Spresa Kombetare* (Scutari), 19 Mar. 1924. Ext. in PRO, FO 371/10218. What followed in Turkey in the domain of reforms can be studied in Leon Ostrorog, *The Angora Reform* (London, 1927), 70–9.

[61] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 260.

[62] The full sweep of the Kemalist reform can be followed in Enver Ziya Karal, 'The Principles of Kemalism', in Ali Kazancigil and Erghun Özbadun (eds.), *Atatürk:*

political and institutional support. From now on nationalism and secularism took precedence over classical forms in the process of political and socio-cultural change in modern Turkey.[63] The religious exegesis that the nationalists employed to explain away the abolition through Seyyid Bey, the minister of justice, was an after thought and perhaps as innovative as the arguments advanced at the time of the separation of the sultanate from the caliphate in 1922.[64] But this time, the situation became more complicated.

The nationalists' action had been only a step more drastic than the Italian treatment of the temporalities of the Vatican some sixty years earlier. But whereas in Italy the Pope had been able to retain the inviolability of his position even after losing temporal power,[65] in Turkey the caliph was not only deprived of his office but also sent packing on a one-way ticket to oblivion. The Indian reaction to changes in Turkey was strong and vociferous. The Indians were particularly stung by the Turkish affront in taking a decision without referring it to the collective will of the *daru'l-Islam*, thereby challenging the very ideal of the universal polity as an instrument of political solidarity.[66] But shock and grief were preceded by disbelief. Hardly any one was willing to accept that the caliphate had been done away with by the very people who had provided it its strength in the past. There were angry comments in the Indian press. The *Muslim Outlook* thought that it was just another ruse by the Reuters agency to malign the Turks.[67] The *Siyasat* blamed the Turks for unwittingly dividing the Muslim world.[68] The *Zamindar* maintained that the caliphate was an institution which could not be abolished.[69] The *Hamdam* of Lucknow thought that the Turks were entitled to choose their own government but they had no right to do away with the caliphate.[70] And

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Founder of a Modern State (London, 1981), 11–35; S. N. Eisenstadt, 'The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective', in ibid., 127–42; and Şerif Mardin, 'Religion and Secularism in Turkey', in ibid., 191–219. Also see Kenneth Cragg, *Counsels in Contemporary Islam* (Edinburgh, 1965), 142 ff.

[63] Mohammad Sadiq, 'The Turkish Revolution and the Abolition of the Caliphate', *International Studies* (New Delhi, 28/1 (1991), 26 ff.

[64] Ibid., 33 ff.

[65] In Sept. 1870, the Pope was deprived of his States and with them he lost his remaining political power. It was not until the Lateran Treaty of 1929 (renegotiated in 1983) that his temporal rights to the Vatican territory were restored.

[66] G. E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam* (Berkeley, 1962), 138.

[67] *Muslim Outlook*, 6 Mar. 1924, IOL&R, L/R/5/205.

[68] *Siyasat*, 8 Mar. 1924.

[69] *Zamindar*, 8 Mar. 1924.

[70] See IOL&R, L/R/5/98.

the *Madina* of Bijnor lamented that the Turks had destroyed their house with their own hands.[71] Syed Ameer Ali, who, with the Aga Khan, had started a hare in the first place, questioned the nationalists' power to abolish an office which was 'an integral part of the Sunni communion', especially when the sacramental oath of fealty had been offered to the incumbent.[72] And from Berlin, Abdul Jabbar Khairi, the Indian president of the pro-caliphate 'Islamische Gemeinde', condemned what he called the utterly 'anti-Islamic' and 'mischievous' action of the Kemalists.[73] Some like Sait Moosa and Abbas Ali Khan were angry that the Indian Muslims, who had made so many sacrifices for Turkey and had helped extract favourable terms at Lausanne, had been so ungratefully ignored.[74] Others asserted that the Indian Muslims had sympathized with Turkey because of their attachment to the caliph: the caliphate gone, they had now no interest left in Turkey.[75] The indignation was by no means limited to the politically-minded. Even the illiterate appeared to have been moved for it was the caliph in his temporal role that had appealed to them and they could not bear his disappearance. People were actually seen weeping.[76] The commonly-held view was that Ankara, or for that matter any other government, had no right or jurisdiction to abolish a religious institution which belonged to the entire Sunni world. The action was arbitrary, sacrilegious and *ultra vires* and one against which the Indian Muslims had every right to protest.[77] The anger against the Kemalists was so intense that the Turkish Red Crescent mission that had arrived in India to collect funds and take charge of the Chotani sawmills, thought it prudent to cut short its activities and return home.[78]

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[71] Ibid.

[72] *The Times*, 5 Mar. 1924; and *Moslem World*, 14 (1924), 409.

[73] Mohammed [Abdul] Jabbar Khairi, et al., *The Conspiracy of the Kemalists against Islam; The Real Significance of the Khalifate. Declaration of the Shura and Other Organised Bodies* (Berlin, 1924), 3-6 and 15. Jabbar Khairi and his brother Sattar Khairi, had earned Kemal's displeasure for expressing pro-caliph sentiments during their stay in Turkey. See K. K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*, i, 88.

[74] *Madras Mail*, 8 Mar. 1924.

[75] *Pioneer*, 13 Mar. 1924.

[76] Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 74.

[77] See the statements of Ameer Ali, Ghulam Husain Hidayatallah, and Ali Mohammad Dehlawi (1875-1952) in *The Times*, 5 Mar. 1924; *Times of India*, 10 Mar. 1924; and *Pioneer*, 14 Mar. 1924. Also see exts. from *Bombay Chronicle* and *Khilafat* in *Pioneer*, 6 and 9 Mar. 1924, and *Zamindar* in IOL&R, L/R/5/205.

[78] See Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970; and Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 63, n. 7; and IOL&R, L/R/5/98.

It is possible that the majority of the Indian Muslims did not comprehend the dynamics of change in post-war Turkey or correctly interpret the Kemalists' motives, about which the Turks themselves were not so sure,[79] but they were certainly not unaware of the power struggle that was going on between Ankara and Istanbul. At least from November 1922, they were fully aware of the conflict and understood the nature of influences working behind the abolition. As late as September/October 1923, Barrister Abdul Qayyum, for instance, had visited Istanbul and Ankara where he also called on Kemal and interviewed him. After spending a week in Cairo, he arrived in Bombay on 21 October fully cognizant of the situation.[80] Clearly, the Indian reaction to the events in Turkey was conditioned by historical experience and deeply-held religious and political assumptions. Any change, be it in the form of the abolition of the caliphate or the secularization of the state and society, was for them nothing short of an anathema. The nationalists appeared not only to be dividing the Muslim polity but also depriving Turkey of its spiritual greatness and prestige.[81] Its sequel was particularly disturbing to the Khilafatists who had to face the unpleasant dilemma of having either to disown the nationalists with whom they were in political sympathy, or renounce the caliph whose office they had defended year after year as sacred religious duty. Abul Kalam Azad called the abolition a great blunder and declared that the Turks alone were not competent to decide an issue which concerned the entire Muslim world.[82] Mohamed Ali refused to have any sympathy 'with such irreligious people as may want to break the ties of Islam . . . and hanker after Europe's recognition of their progressiveness'.[83] For him this incident could not have come at a worse moment because his daughter Amina was dying with tuberculosis and his brother Shaukat was bed ridden with typhoid and high temperature.[84] Among others Abdul Majid Daryabadi (1892–1977) came out to condemn Ankara for taking the

[79] Murray Titus, 'The Reaction of Moslem India to Western Islam' in J. R. Mott (ed.), *The Moslem World of To-day* (London, 1925), 101–2; and Restow, 'Politics and Islam in Turkey', 70 ff.

[80] SB, Punjab, 24 Nov. 1923, SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 45/46, 1 Dec. 1923, para. 385.

[81] See IOL&R, L/R/5/98.

[82] *Englishman*, 6 Mar. 1924.

[83] *Hindu*, 13 Mar. 1924.

[84] See Gandhi to Mohamed Ali, 5 Mar. 1924; and Ansari to Gandhi, Tel. 18 Mar. 1924, *Collected Works*, xxiii, 221 and 268, n. 2.

decision unilaterally.[85] Of course, some judicious men like Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad Khan did advise that the Ankara action was based on prudence and foresight,[86] but the CKC decided to join issue with the Turks. On 7 March, Shaukat Ali, defying his poor health, sent a cable to Mustafa Kemal begging him 'to do your utmost to uphold the Khilafat and Islam'.[87] But for Mustafa Kemal the caliphate had ceased to be a potent instrument of Turkish foreign policy. His reply was firm: the caliphate meant government which meant state. The existence of a separate caliphal office within the Turkish republic had proved disturbing to the external and internal interests of Turkey. Moreover, the original idea of the caliphate had fallen flat and, therefore, there was nothing contrary to Islam in the action taken. The real bond between Muslim nations lay in the significance of the Qur'anic verse *'innama'l mu'minuna ikhwa'* ('The Believers are but a single Brotherhood').[88]

Though Mustafa Kemal had made it sufficiently clear that the caliphal office had ceased to exist, the Khilafatists would not yield. On 9 March 1924, a special joint meeting of the working committees of the CKC and the Jam'iyyat was convened at Aligarh. It was decided that the presidents of the two organizations should jointly make another attempt to obtain the retention of the caliphate.[89] As a result, Shaukat Ali and Kifayatullah sent a telegram to Mustafa Kemal saying that the abolition 'would open the door to the mischievous ambitions of hosts of undeserving claimants' and begged the Turkish assembly to reconsider its decision and give an opportunity to an Indian delegation which desired to make fuller representation on the subject.[90] The telegram had implied that the Khilafatists would greatly welcome if Mustafa Kemal decided to assume the caliphate himself. But the latter had no such intention. To him the caliphal office had become useless and obsolete. Besides, their sacrifices notwithstanding, he could never digest the Indian participation in the last war against

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[85] *Khilafat*, 14 Mar. 1924.

[86] *Leader*, n.d., IOL&R, L/R/5/98. Also see *al-Khalil* and *Hind Jadid*, n.d., in ibid.; and M. S. Azim, *Kinayat* (Gorakhpur, 1924).

[87] *Pioneer*, 8 Mar. 1924.

[88] Ibid., 13 Mar. 1924. The Qur'anic verse is in xlix: 10. Later, when Rasih Bey of the Turkish Red Crescent delegation returned home from India and made a similar suggestion that Mustafa Kemal should accept the title, the latter found the idea repulsive and rejected it. See Mim Kemal Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri* (Ankara, 1988), 121–2. I owe this ref. to Azmi Özcan.

[89] Miyan, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama kya hai?*, ii, 94–5.

[90] *Pioneer*, 13 Mar. 1924.

Turkey. The Mustafa Saghir affair of 1921 must also have weighed heavily on his mind while dealing with the Indians.[91] The Khilafatists' position became untenable when critics like Fazlul Haq contended, indeed with no justification, that although they knew that Mustafa Kemal and his followers cared nothing for Islam, still they were continuing the Khilafat movement, 'an agitation hollow and unnecessary' with 'dishonest propaganda' against the British.[92] Some others thought that the event should 'serve as an eye-opener'.[93] But the Khilafatists, still under the illusion that things would settle ultimately their way, went for face-saving tactics.

On 12 March 1924, the CKC and the Jam'iyyat issued a joint statement which urged the Muslims to pursue the agitation with greater energy and determination rather than be upset by the abolition: 'for on the continuance of our efforts depends the realisation of national and Moslem hopes and aspirations'. The future course of action depended on their communications with Turkey and in the event of unsatisfactory result their first step would be to convene a general conference of the Muslim world at some suitable centre to discuss and find a solution.[94] An exchange of telegrams between the Ali brothers and the deposed caliph had already taken place—the brothers conveying personal devotion and allegiance and an assurance on behalf of Indian Muslims that they were determined to maintain the sacred caliphate, and the ex-caliph conveying his 'fatherly appreciation' of the co-operation of Indian Muslims in defence of the caliphate.[95] Now, Shaukat Ali, in spite of his serious illness and other family mishaps,[96] issued a circular that, pending a settlement with Ankara, Abdülmecid's name should continue to be mentioned in the Friday *khutba*.[97] Abdülmecid was also banking on the Indian support and the Turkish flag still fluttered atop his Territet hotel.[98] But the ex-caliph's appeal to the Muslim world that the Ankara decision was 'incompatible with the spirit of Islam' and, therefore, an

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[91] Atiqi, *Turkan-i Ahrar*, 65.
[92] *Pioneer*, 6 Mar. 1924.
[93] *Englishman*, 22 Mar. 1924.
[94] *Pioneer*, 14 Mar. 1924.
[95] Ibid., 8 and 13 Mar. 1924.
[96] At the time, his mother was also ill and Mohamed Ali's daughter Amina had just died after prolonged illness. See Mohamed Ali to Abdul Majid, 4 Apr. 1924, in Abdul Majid Daryabadi, *Khutut-i mashahir*, i, 282–7.
[97] *Pioneer*, 15 Mar. 1924.
[98] *Daily Telegraph*, 10 Mar. 1924; and *Pioneer*, 12 Mar. 1924.

inter-Islamic conference should decide the issue,[99] appears to have fallen flat, except in Egypt and India. The dejected ex-caliph had to spend the rest of his life on a small monthly allowance from the Nizam of Hyderabad, donations from Indian princes and magnates and funds from Ameer Ali's Red Crescent Society in London.[100]

Fresh complications arose, when towards the middle of March 1924, news arrived that King Husain of the Hijaz had proclaimed himself caliph. Husain, who never forgot the assurances of an Arab caliphate given him during the last war by British representatives,[101] had unsuccessfully tried his luck in the winter of 1922/23.[102] For some time nothing happened and he pretended to have withdrawn his candidature.[103] But then from September 1923, a secret campaign for his recognition as caliph had been launched in Trans-Jordania.[104] When in March 1924 the Turks abolished the caliphate, Husain could resist no more. Driven by his ambitious son, Abdullah, he at once manipulated a request from leading Arabs at Amman that he should accept the caliphate and then instructed Makkah to stage-manage a similar demand.[105] He accepted the position on 5 March and was officially proclaimed caliph on 11 March at Shuneh. He was recognized in Jeddah, Aleppo (despite the French opposition), Damascus and Beirut.[106] Husain, however, faced stubborn resistance even from those who had earlier supported him. Rashid Rida dubbed his actions as 'vile and despicable' and Shaikh Abd al-Aziz Tha'alibi

[99] *Pioneer*, 14 Mar. 1924.

[100] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/1111, file 2456/1924. Also see Ali Imam (1869–1932) to Ameer Ali, 22 June 1924, AFM, Ali Imam Papers. Later, the stipend was increased from £ 300 to £ 1,000 a month when matrimonial alliance was established between the Ottomans of Turkey and the Asifiyyas of Hyderabad. See below, n. 268.

[101] The assurances had come from Lord Kitchener in Oct. 1914, and from Sir. A. H. McMahon in 1915. The British, however, later withdrew from this stand. See IOL&R, L/P&S/18, B. 292. Also see Parl. Papers, 1938–39, Cmd. 5957.

[102] He had tried to persuade the ex-caliph to 'transfer' the caliphate to him but the latter's visit to Makkah proved a fiasco. See memo by E. G. F. Adam, 12 Jan. 1923, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/895, file 344/1923; and *Madras Mail*, 7 May 1923.

[103] See *Pioneer*, 9 Feb. 1924.

[104] *Daily Telegraph*, 7 Sept. 1923.

[105] Bullard (Jeddah) to MacDonald, no. 25, 10 Mar. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10218. For Abdullah's role in the game, see Chejne, 'Pan-Islamism and the Caliphate Controversy', 690–1.

[106] Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 64; *The Times*, 14 Mar. 1924; Bullard to MacDonald, Tel. no. 8 (R), 5 Mar. 1924; Russell (Alleppo) to MacDonald, Tel. no. 2, 11 Mar. 1924; HM's Consul (Damascus) to MacDonald, Tel. no. 2 (R), 7 Mar. 1924; and N. E. Satow (Beirut) to MacDonald, no. 32, 13 Mar. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10217.

(1874–1944) blocked his ambitions in the proceedings of the *mu'tamaru'l-hajj*.[107] More worrying to him was the opposition from Ibn Saud (1880–1953), the rising star of the Nejd, Imam Yahya (1867–1948) of the Yemen and King Fuad (r. 1920–36) of Egypt who disapproved his assumption and attributed it to British intrigues.[108] However, it was in India that it encountered the strongest disapprobation.

With few exceptions, the Indian Muslims condemned Husain's action and refused to accept his assumption of the caliphal office. A vast majority detested him for his alleged dependence on the British, his betrayal of Turkey in the war and his mismanagement of the hajj.[109] The press was unrelenting. Papers like *al-Barid*, the *Madina*, the *Haqiqat*, the *Awadh Akhbar*, and even the *Hamdam* were profuse with condemnation. The *Zamindar* went so far as to suggest that if Husain laid claim to the caliphate it would be lawful for Muslims to kill him.[110] Only a few prominent Indian Muslims, such as Abdul Bari and Kidwai, lent him support. Disgusted with the Ankara attitude towards the caliphate, Abdul Bari even sent a telegram to his old friend Husain, congratulating him on his assumption of the office of caliph, 'which office you so deservedly assumed'.[111] But this support did no good to the pretender and instead exacerbated feelings.[112]

In this confused situation when the special Khilafat Conference opened at Calcutta on 19 March 1924, opinion prevailed that the abolition of the caliphate did not in the least affect the Indian Muslims, whether judged by the canons of Islamic law or those of sound policy. Nevertheless, the majority agreed to find a solution in consultation with the Muslim world.[113] But Husain's assumption was acceptable to no one. He was 'a traitor to his predecessor and to the Defender of the Faithful', 'a friend of the British', and unfit for the high office.[114] Therefore, the agitation for the freedom of the

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[107] Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 81–4.

[108] Allenby to MacDonald, no. 64, 11 Mar. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10217; and Chejne, 'Pan-Islamism and the Caliphate Controversy', 691–2.

[109] IOL&R, L/P&S/10/1111, files 1919/1924 and 2150/1924.

[110] Ibid., file 1148/1924. Also see IOL&R, L/R/5/98; and L/R/5/205.

[111] M. H. Kidwai, 'The Khilafat Question', *Indian Review*, 25/3 (1924), 151–2; *Pioneer*, 12 Mar. 1924; Sardar Ali Sabiri, 'Maulana Qayyamu'd-Din 'Abdu'l-Bari Farangi Mahalli', *Jang* (Karachi), 19 Jan. 1971; and Abdul Bari to Husain, Tel. 13 Mar. 1924, encl. Abdullah to Chief British Rep., Amman, 15 Mar. 1924, L/P&S/10/1111, file 1951/1924.

[112] IOL&R, L/R/5/98 and 205.

[113] *Englishman*, 21 Mar. 1924; and Mohamed Ali's speech in *Pioneer*, 23 Mar. 1924.

[114] Ibid.

Jaziratu'l-'Arab from non-Muslim control was not only religiously essential but also nationally important in order to carry on the movement for *swaraj*, the best weapon for the Indian Muslims to secure the restoration of their holy land and to safeguard the caliphate.[115]

Thus it would be seen that from a subsidiary issue the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* had become the principal item of the Khilafat agenda. In his presidential address, Mohamed Ali clearly stated that the restoration of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* to Muslim control was a pre-requisite for the Khilafatists to make peace with the government. He did not see any basic contradiction in his stand and justified it thus:

> It may seem that we are more Arabian than the Arabs and more Turkish than the Turks, but if our Islamic obligations are understood, it will be apparent that all that we are is Moslems. As Moslems we who are not Arabs cannot let the Arabs hand over the dominions of the Island of Arabia to non-Moslems, and as Moslems we cannot countenance the section of Turkish nation disconnecting its national Government from the Khilafat.[116]

Despite the Khilafatists' insistence that both from the religious and political points of view the continuance of the caliphate was essential, there was no unanimity as to how this was to be achieved. Among the various suggestions, ranging from forcing Ankara for Abdülmecid's restoration to electing as caliph the Amir of Afghanistan or the Nizam of Hyderabad or even Mohamed Ali, the one for a world Muslim congress seemed to appeal to an overwhelming majority.[117] The daily *Khilafat* set the pace by calling for a concerted action on the part of the Muslims of the world.[118] The proposal received further urgency when on 25 March 1924, the *'ulama* of Egypt decided at a grand convention to convene an international conference in March 1925 at Cairo to designate a new caliph. The caliphal office was said to have fallen vacant owing to the innovative decision of the Turkish assembly and the impotence of Abdülmecid.[119] But behind the move was visible the ambitious figure of King Fuad of Egypt who aspired

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[115] Ibid.

[116] *Pioneer*, 21 Mar. 1924.

[117] Ibid., 13 Mar. 1924; Bombay Special, Mahableshwar, to Foreign, Simla, no. S.D.-485, 7 Apr. 1924, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/1111, file 2150/1924; *Siyasat*, 2 May 1924, IOL&R, L/R/5/205; and Barakatullah, *The Khilafet*, 12.

[118] *Khilafat*, 14 Mar. 1924.

[119] See Sheikh Hussein Waly, *Decision of the High Assembly of Ulemas of Egypt Concerning the Caliphate* (Cairo, 1924), *passim*.

to the position.[120] In the circumstances, the Khilafatists thought it imperative to press the dispatch of a delegation to Ankara to parley with the nationalists. The plan, however, was undermined by the Government of India and the India Office when they refused passports.[121] Even otherwise, a change had come about in the thinking of influential leaders, particularly Abul Kalam Azad. In a series of articles in the *Zamindar* he forcefully argued that the caliphate was just another name for government or state and whosoever was the head of the government was *ipso facto* the caliph of Islam.[122] In his view, the Turks had abolished only that office which they had mistakenly separated from the sultanate in November 1922. Since the caliphate and the presidency were merely two names of the same institution the president of the republic might as well be called the caliph.[123] Among other *'ulama*, Subhanullah of Gorakhpur and Fazlur Rahman of Patna also favoured offering the office of the caliph to Mustafa Kemal.[124] Some Muslim papers, such as the *Zamindar*, the *Ziafat Punch* and the *Muslim Outlook*, supported this contention[125] and even Mohamed Ali, after some shuffling, declared that he would not oppose Mustafa Kemal becoming caliph, should he so desire.[126] As against this, Barakatullah, the self-exiled pan-Islamic revolutionary, circulated his treatise, *The Khilafet*, to suggest that instead of thrusting the caliphal office on an unwilling Kemal, it should be offered to Shaikh Ahmad Sanusi with spiritual powers only because a caliph must 'shun politics like poison' and eschew interference in political affairs generally. In any case, no despotic king or autocratic priest should be allowed to take control of the people's lives. To replace the old system, he suggested a whole new set-up located either in Istanbul or Cairo, hoping that it would become fully representative and democratic in character.[127]

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[120] Elie Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915–1946', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, parts 3 4 (1963), 214–19.

[121] *Hamdam*, *Haqiqat* and *Leader*, n.d., IOL&R, L/R/5/98; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. 901, 110 and 230, 28 Nov. 1923, 5 Feb. and 14 Mar. 1924; and Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 250, 7 Mar. 1924, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 25 Mar. 1924, iv, part 2, 2212–15.

[122] *Zamindar*, 11 May 1924.

[123] Ibid., 14 May and 11 June 1924.

[124] See *Pioneer*, 19 Mar. 1924 and *Mansur*, n.d., L/R/5/98.

[125] See e.g. *Zamindar*, 8 Mar. 1924; *Ziafat Punch*, 11 Mar. 1924; and *Muslim Outlook*, 14 Mar. 1924, IOL&R, L/R/5/205.

[126] *Madras Mail*, 4 Sept. 1924. This refers to earlier events.

[127] Barakatullah, *The Khilafet*, esp. 12, 54–91.

The changing pattern of Indian perceptions found an even more unfettered articulation in the writings of the Muslim intellectuals like Mohammed Iqbal and Khuda Bakhsh. They both defended the action of the Turkish assembly and justified the abolition.[128] The former, in particular, was remarkably perceptive in his views. Already disenchanted with the Khilafatists, Iqbal pinned his hopes in a revitalized Turkey which had, in his opinion, not only 'shaken off its dogmatic slumber' but had also 'passed from the ideal to the real—a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral struggle'.[129] Turkey alone among all the Muslim countries, he maintained, had embarked 'on the way to creating new values'.[130] Therefore, the Turks were 'perfectly sound' in their view that the institution of the caliphate, as understood in the traditional juridical sense, was anachronistic and that an elected assembly, which was suited to the need of the time and was not incompatible with the spirit of Islam, should replace this institution.[131] This was not just a tame acceptance of the *fait accompli* nor an *apologia* but rather a pragmatic reconstruction of his own religious thought which happened to be compatible and even synonymous with those of the Kemalists. As such Iqbal's support of the liberal movement in Turkey was a natural response.[132] He even found room for the separation of the Church and the State in Islam.[133] It was much later that he began to feel uneasy with the hurried sweep of the Turkish reform and hoped that it was 'just a passing phase' and would soon be reversed.[134] From the point of view of the Indian Khilafatists it was certain that one great plank in the their programme had rotted away. The contemptuous indifference shown by the Turks had dampened their enthusiasm for Turkey. The agitation for the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* was just an alternative stratagem. Otherwise,

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[128] Titus, 'The Reaction of Moslem India to Western Islam', 98–99. The unpublished essay of Iqbal from which Titus quotes was later published from London in 1934 as *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. For the views of Khuda Bakhsh see M. L. Ferrar, 'India', in H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), *Whither Islam?* (London, 1932), 225.

[129] Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, rep. (Lahore, 1982), 162.

[130] Ibid., 162.

[131] Ibid., 157.

[132] Ibid., 153 4. Also see Shamloo (ed.), *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore, 1963), 63.

[133] Ibid., 153 4.

[134] See Iqbal to Masud Alam Nadwi, 25 Feb. 1936, in Ataullah, *Iqbalnama*, i, 406–7.

the Khilafat movement, which had been gradually on the decline since the Treaty of Lausanne, was lifeless. Kidwai's suggestion to disband the Khilafat committees was revived in certain quarters[135] and keenly encouraged by the Hindu press arguing that it would serve as an incentive for the Muslims to join the Congress and restore communal harmony.[136]

As in 1923, Mohamed Ali once again got up to defend the retention of the Khilafat committees as being far more necessary than ever. But his advocacy of a strong Khilafat organization met with little approval.[137] There were among Muslims some political pragmatists who honestly believed that India had nothing to do with the question of the caliphate and that in order to safeguard their political rights they must reorientate their national programme. But the difficulty of the situation was that the Muslim League, which in the past had fought for Muslim rights, was lying dormant, having been pushed into the background by the exuberance of the Khilafat movement. It had declined both in its prestige and importance. Its provincial branches were practically non-existent, its membership had dwindled and the attendance, even at the annual sessions, was usually meagre. Annual reports of the League from the year 1919 onward, speak of an utter lack of interest by party members. The declining interest is evident from the fact that out of the 1,093 members in 1922, only 23 had paid their annual subscription.[138] The following year, though the membership stood at 1,097, the subscriptions had declined to Rs 264 as against Rs 826 in 1922.[139] No wonder that as early as December 1921, Abbas Tyabji (1853–1936) had mooted a proposal at Ahmedabad that the League might be dissolved or merged with the Congress. It was, he said, 'detrimental to our national unity and religious creed' and the Muslims must trust their Hindu compatriots who had given them support in a religious matter.[140] The proposal was, of course, shot down immediately but it became the reason for not holding the next Muslim League session at Gaya where the

[135] See a correspondent's view in *Haqiqat*, n.d., IOL&R, L/R/5/98.
[136] *Pratap*, n.d., IOL&R, 205; and *Arya Varta*, n.d., IOL&R, 98.
[137] *Madras Mail*, 9 June 1924; and *Haqiqat*, n.d., IOL&R, L/R/5/98.
[138] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1922* (Lucknow, [1922]), 1–2.
[139] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1924* (Lucknow, [1924]), 2.
[140] *Bombay Chronicle*, 31 Dec. 1921; and *Hindu*, 5 Jan. 1922.

Congress, the CKC and the Jam'iyyat held their sessions. Syed Zahur Ahmad, the League secretary, exerted himself to free his party from the CKC-Congress hold but did not succeed.[141]

By early 1923, Jinnah had made up his mind to stage a comeback. He had left behind the unpleasant memories of the Nagpur session (1920) and had perhaps forgotten the invectives hurled at him at Akola railway station by Shaukat Ali's henchmen when he was returning home with his young wife, Ruttie (1900–29), who was quite distressed by the incident.[142] Jinnah knew when to make a tactical withdrawal but even during his three-year self-imposed retreat, he had not shut himself up completely. In fact, he would occasionally preside over a function or deliver a public lecture just to keep buoyant in the uncertain waters of Indian politics. His targets were non-co-operation and government policies, always pleading for Hindu-Muslim unity as the shortest route to *swaraj*. His pet theme, however, was the support of the council entry programme. He could easily have joined the Swaraj Party but with an eye to the all-India leadership he chose to use the reliable ladder of a Muslim political constituency and the Muslim League network.[143] In March 1923, at the several informal meetings that took place at the Aga Khan's residence in Bombay, it was agreed in principle that the Muslim League would be reorganized with a political programme acceptable to the whole community.[144] But when on 31 March, a League session was held at Lucknow, the Khilafatists managed to disrupt it. In fact, the proceedings did not go beyond the preliminary meeting and, on 1 April, the session was forced to adjourn *sine die*.[145] Jinnah could do nothing to prevent it from being battered but when the elections came in November 1923, he contested for the legislative assembly as an independent candidate from a Muslim constituency in Bombay and was returned unopposed.[146] By February 1924, after a brief interlude with the Nationalist Party, Jinnah was confident enough to begin

[141] See Syed Zahur Ahmad's circular letter to members of AIML Council, 4 Dec. 1922. NAP, Shamsul Hasan Collection.

[142] See Ruttie's letter to *Times of India*, 13 Jan. 1921. For more information on Ruttie Jinnah see Dwarkadas, *Ruttie Jinnah*, *passim*; Khwaja Razi Haidar, *Rattie Jinnah* (Karachi, 1995); Aqil Abbas Jafri, *Qua'id-i A'zam ki azdawaji zindagi* (Lahore, 1995); and Shagufta Yasmeen, *Ruttie Jinnah: Life and Love* (Islamabad, [1997]).

[143] See Riaz Ahmad, *Quaid-i-Azam's Role in South Asian Political Crisis, 1921–1924* (Rawalpindi, 1989), 25–42.

[144] *Madras Mail*, 10 Mar. 1923 and *Pioneer*, 4 Apr. 1923.

[145] Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, i, 572 3.

[146] M. H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, 98.

reasserting himself. On 27 February, he convened at Delhi a meeting of the Muslim members of the legislative assembly. Abul Kasem, Mushir Kidwai, Nawab Ismail Khan of Meerut and Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum were among those who attended. There he managed to obtain a consensus that as the League president, he should call a meeting of the council at an early date.[147] The idea was, as Jinnah later explained, to organize Muslims not for a particular question, such as the Khilafat, but with regard to the subjects relating to the internal politics of the country.[148] Consequently, on 15 and 16 March 1924, the Muslim League council met at Delhi under Jinnah's presidency. Mohamed Ali first tried to obtain a postponement[149] but when that failed he arrived in Delhi in full force to capture the League and impose his own programme on it. This, however, was successfully resisted. After a sharp argument with Jinnah, Mohamed Ali voluntarily withdrew from the meeting. The council then decided to hold a special session of the League at Lahore in May 1924, in continuation of the last session at Lucknow which had been adjourned *sine die*.[150] Thus the Muslim League, which had lived 'a sickly life' during the Khilafat movement, commented a political worker, 'received its cure and health' in Jinnah's house.[151]

Jinnah's return to politics and the revival of the Muslim League confronted the Khilafatists with the bitter reality of having either to surrender the leadership of the community or fight back. An effective come-back seemed difficult as the revival of the League had been generally well received and in certain quarters it was demanded that the Khilafat committees be abolished and their funds handed over to the Muslim League.[152] In desperation some Khilafatists alleged that the government had a hand in its resurrection. In a biting write-up in his *Siyasat*, Sayyid Habib Jalalpuri mocked at some Muslim barristers who, he said, had opened the office of the League 'to bring its dead body to life'.[153] The Khilafatists had realized that in order to survive they must reorientate the Khilafat organizations with

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[147] *Hindu*, 6 Mar. 1924.

[148] *Madras Mail*, 15 Mar. 1924.

[149] Mohamed Ali to Zahur Ahmad, Tel. 8 Mar. 1924, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, file 149/1924.

[150] *Times of India*, 17 Mar. 1924. Also see *Pioneer*, 19 Mar. 1924.

[151] Iqbal Shaidai, 'Mr M. A. Jinnah', transcript 'Radio Homala' Broadcast (Italy), 25 Apr. 1942, NAP, Shaidai Papers.

[152] See undated exts. from *Indian Daily Telegraph*, *Madina*, and *Hamdard* in IOL&R, L/R/5/98.

[153] *Siyasat*, 16 May 1924.

a new and more dynamic programme. A few days before the opening of the Lahore session of the Muslim League, Dr Kitchlew called upon the CKC and the Jam'iyyat to meet in a special session and decide on 'the advisability or otherwise of continuing without alteration the present programme of the Khilafat movement'. As a suitable basis for future work, Kitchlew again outlined his socio-economic Tanzim programme embracing the whole phase of the life of the community from volunteer corps to Muslim banks and co-operative societies.[154] And from Delhi, Asaf Ali suggested the advisability of consolidating different Muslim organizations in India with identical or reconcilable aims into one organic body. The idea was that all should work with the Congress for the speedy attainment of full dominion status.[155]

Hurriedly, about the middle of May 1924, a meeting of the working committee of the CKC was convened at Bombay to consider the future of the Khilafat organizations in India in the light of the new developments. The CKC unanimously agreed to extend the scope of the Khilafat organizations and to include all domestic issues in its province. The CKC and the Jam'iyyat were asked to meet at Delhi in the last week of June 1924 to thrash out the details.[156] At the conclusion of the meeting, Shaukat Ali, on 22 May 1924, issued a long statement which underlined a major change in the policy of the CKC. Of course, it still hoped to settle the Khilafat question in consonance with the exigencies of the Turkish situation and the *shari'at* but decided to continue its pressure on the government for the freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* from non-Muslim domination. The most important decision, however, was 'to ensure the free development and progress of the Muslim community in India itself'. This included attention to religious studies in order to bridge the gulf that separated the ordinary Muslims from the *'ulama* because Islam 'recognises no distinction between the laity and the clergy'; war against illiteracy with religious and secular education going hand in hand; reorganization of orphanages, especially for the Mappilas; eradication of social evils like mendicancy; organization of the *baitu'l-mal, zakat* and *auqaf*; purge of evils like use of intoxicants and prostitution; and reform to remove poverty. The Muslims were also to be taught 'to

[154] *Hindu*, 22 May 1924.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid., 29 May 1924.

take their proper share in public life and to accept readily and cheerfully their portion of sacrifices and responsibilities *as members of a composite nation struggling to be free*'.[157]

These antics did not deter the Muslim Leaguers. But an impression developed in certain quarters that it had no ideal to pursue and had only the interests of a small minority of the rich and western educated élite to cater for. The vast majority of the Muslims, it was believed, derived no benefit. Among such persons was Wahid Hossain of Bengal who protested to Zahur Ahmad that the safeguarding of mere communal interests was 'not an ideal, but a means to an end; even if it is an ideal, it is certainly not a very high one and has a very limited scope'. He went on to say:

> It is glibly argued that we are Moslems *first* and Indians next. Some assert that we are Indians first and Moslems next. Both these arguments are fallacious. We are both Indians and Moslems from the very moment of our birth till we breathe our last; unless in the meantime we change our domicile or faith. There is no first and second in point of time. It is simultaneous.... We should set ourselves to work with an open mind and wider out-look [*sic*] for the advancement of the country keeping a strict watch over our communal interest which should be protected if and when invaded, otherwise interest of both [the communities] is often the same.[158]

Here, people like Wahid Hossain were in unison with Jinnah who had all along been preaching a wider role for the Muslim League in domestic politics.

The Lahore session of the League, organized by the Punjab leader Fazl-i-Husain, was held on 24 and 25 May, under Jinnah's presidentship as Bhurgri, the president of the adjourned sessions, had died. A large number of Khilafatists and Congressmen attended, including Mohamed Ali, Asaf Ali, Kitchlew, Shoaib Qureshi, Moazzam Ali, Kidwai, Abdul Qadir of Kasur, Hans Raj, Dr Satyapal, Lala Goverdhan Das and Lala Duni Chand. In the very first speech of the session a proposal was mooted by Agha Safdar, the chairman of the reception committee, that the Muslim League and the CKC should be amalgamated.[159] Though the suggestion was not taken up, the

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[157] Ibid. Italics in the original.

[158] Letter dated 12 May 1924 in AFM/NAP, AIMLR, file 108, 119–24. This was in response to Syed Zahur Ahmad's circular, dated 28 Apr. 1924. See ibid., 30.

[159] *Times of India*, 26 May 1924.

tendency of the delegates generally was to divert attention to domestic issues. Jinnah, in his presidential address, agreed that the Khilafat question had become an 'amazingly complicated' issue but hoped that the contemplated world Muslim congress would find a solution. He appealed to his countrymen 'to unite and organise all the resources of our country for the attainment of our immediate goal—that is, freedom for India'. He held that the issues of paramount importance were Hindu-Muslim unity and the amendment of the constitution of the Government of India. But the objectives were to be achieved through the legislative assemblies and not by wrecking them.[160] The latest trend in Muslim political thinking was clearly exhibited in the League's resolutions: that communal representation in the legislatures and the elected bodies should be strictly on population basis; that 'the Muslim majority of population in the Punjab, Bengal and the Frontier Province should not be interfered with in any territorial redistribution'; and that the Frontier province should be placed 'in a position of equality' with the major provinces of India. The question of separate electorates was left open.[161] A committee of sixteen was appointed to frame and place before the next session a scheme of the constitution of the Government of India in consultation with the committees that might be appointed for the purpose by other political organizations. Another committee was appointed to confer with the working committee of the CKC to frame a scheme for organizing various public activities of the Muslim community.[162]

While reoganizing the Muslim League, it had been clearly stated that the object was to advance the *political aims* of the Muslims of India. The fifth resolution, as Zahur Ahmad explained, was especially intended 'to arrive at an understanding with the Central Khilafat Committee which had lately embraced all political questions within its sphere, in order to avoid a conflict with it'.[163] Similarly, the ninth resolution was meant 'to secure the old solidarity amongst the Mussalmans of India and promote healthy interchange of ideas and co-operation among Mussalmans of different shades of political thought

[160] Ibid.

[161] Ibid., 26 and 27 May 1924. Also see Sayyid Nur Ahmad, *Marshal la se marshal la tak* (Lahore, 1965), 40–7.

[162] *Hindu*, 29 May 1924.

[163] See Syed Zahur Ahmad's circular dated 20 Aug. 1924, AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1924* (Lucknow, [1924]), app. iii, 4.

so that they may be able to take their proper share of responsibility in the national struggle for progress and self-government'.[164] The revival of the Muslim League brought to the fore the fundamental differences between the two sections of the Muslim opinion—one represented by Mohammad Ali Jinnah believing in constitutional fight through the councils, the other represented by Mohamed Ali (Jauhar) preferring a policy of obstructionism.[165] These differences emerged not only in the conflict of personalities of the two Alis, but also in their struggle for Muslim leadership. Mohamed Ali often derided the League and its new leader, while Jinnah dubbed Mohamed Ali's organization unrepresentative though the Khilafat still commanded the respect of every Muslim.[166] The Khilafatists were indeed indignant at the prospect of the leadership slipping out of their hands. The *Zamindar* lamented that the League had relapsed into the hands of the 'loyalists' and after four years' struggle for freedom Muslims were again being asked to resort to obsolete constitutional methods.[167] The Khilafatists decided to do something at once.

A meeting of the CKC was convened at Delhi in the last week of June 1924 to sort out matters. The press was excluded but the intelligence reports of the proceedings of the working committee on 23 June and the subsequent deliberations of the full committee on 24 and 25 June reveal how deeply the Khilafatists were divided. This was especially evident from the acrimonious arguments between the Ali brothers and Kifayatullah and Husain Ahmad over the attitude to be adopted towards the Turks. The Ali brothers fretted and fumed at Mustafa Kemal—'that ungrateful atheist'—for ignoring the Indians and taking a step for which he had no juristic authority. They insisted that a delegation should be sent to Ankara to obtain from the Turks the reinstatement of Abdülmecid. Kifayatullah and Husain Ahmad opposed the proposal arguing that the Turkish statesmen knew their business better than the Indian Muslims who were thousands of miles away from the scene. The CKC also failed to agree about the proposed Muslim congress at Cairo. However, on a proposal from Azad,

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[164] Ibid., 4–5.

[165] See e.g. speeches of Jinnah and Mohamed Ali on 24 May in Bradlaugh Hall, Lahore. *Times of India*, 26 May 1924.

[166] See *Civil and Military Gazette*, 10 June 1924; *Bombay Chronicle*, 15 June 1924, *Madras Mail*, 16 June 1924; and *Pioneer*, 18 June 1924. This conflict became more pronounced in the 1924 ML session. See *Hindu*, 8, 1925.

[167] IOL&R, L/R/5/205.

it authorized Shaukat Ali to communicate with Egypt and other countries after the Ankara delegation had discussed the matter with the convenors in Cairo. The only point on which all seemed to agree was that Sharif Husain was unfit for the high office of the caliph and that he should voluntarily withdraw his claim.[168] Even more heatedly discussed was Dr Kitchlew's scheme for re-organizing the Muslim community. The debate centred on whether the CKC should take upon itself this task. Khaliquzzaman opposed the motion and instead advised capturing the Muslim League which, he argued, was more useful. Kitchlew accepted the force of the argument but insisted that his programme would not succeed unless the headquarters of the CKC were shifted from Bombay to Delhi and the Jami'a Milliyya was closed to make room for a training institute for workers and propagandists. Kitchlew argued that the Jami'a and the CKC had become white elephants consuming large funds, and since most Khilafat workers were from the Punjab and the UP, it would be appropriate if his proposal was accepted. Shaukat Ali opposed the idea saying that he had retrieved the CKC from the mess created by Chotani and that things were now back to normal. Besides, Bombay was a rich commercial city and this would save the CKC from any financial worries. Moreover, Bombay was the gateway to Makkah and the Middle East and it was better for an international organization like the CKC to remain in that city. Kitchlew was hoping that Ajmal Khan would come to his rescue but the latter consented to give Shaukat Ali three or four months to show results after which the matter would be reviewed again. As to the closure of the Jami'a, on Mohamed Ali's assurance that it was working successfully, the item was excluded from Kitchlew's programme.[169]

In retrospect, the Delhi session was a turning point in the history of the Khilafat organization. After long deliberations, the CKC decided to undertake the entire responsibility of re-organizing the political, social and economic life of the community by acquiring the services of full-time workers and corps of volunteers in every city. The scheme involved the holding of the *jum'a* and other congregational prayers; the opening of primary schools, night schools and technical and commercial colleges; supervision of the *waqf, sadaqa*

[168] Intelligence report by K. B. Tasadduq Hussain dated 1 July 1924, NAI, Home Poll. file 167/1924.

[169] Ibid.

and *zakat*, and proper management of the proceeds on such undertakings as training and education of Muslim orphans and help of the Muslim widows; and popularization of *khaddar*. For the material improvement of the community, the CKC considered it essential to establish Muslim co-operative credit societies and a Muslim bank for which purpose it invited the rulings of the experts in Islamic law whether such ventures were permissible under the *shari'at*.[170] To finance the project the CKC entrusted the raising of funds to the working committee. It was also authorized to establish liaison with the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama and the Muslim League and such other Muslim associations as it might choose. Another resolution expressed the CKC's determination to maintain the Jami'a Milliyya at Aligarh as a permanent university and to improve and enlarge it.[171]

The change in the CKC's strategy, based as it was on the premise that the Khilafat issue was no longer the focal point, encountered strong disapproval in some Muslim circles and active hostility from the Hindus who had been none too happy at the revival of the Muslim League either.[172] The Muslims thought that it would jeopardize the very existence of the Khilafat committees which needed to be strengthened.[173] The Hindus, especially those under Shraddhanand's spell, exhorted their co-religionists to sever connection with the Khilafat organizations completely as they had been specifically designed to obtain converts to Islam.[174] They hoped that Gandhi would emphatically protest against the new programme and the Hindu members of the CKC would resign *en bloc* unless it was scrapped.[175] The shift in the Khilafatists' policy, apart from their anxiety to retain the community's leadership, was the result of growing disillusionment with Hindu communalism. The militancy of the Shuddhi and Sangathan campaigns and the failure of the Congress leaders to condemn them

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[170] *Times of India*, 25 and 26 June 1924.

[171] Ibid., 26 June 1924; and Intelligence report by K. B. Tasadduq Hussain, dated 1 July 1924, NAI, Home Poll., file 167/1924. The original proposals also included the establishment of a library and a press, publication of an English and an Urdu newspaper from Delhi; appointment of whole time workers; establishment of a worker's home at Delhi; and organization of Muslims politically.

[172] Exts. from *Aaj* and *Leader* in IOL&R, L/R/5/98; and *Pratap*, 31 May 1924; and *Akasvani*, 15 June 1924, in L/R/5/205.

[173] *Haqiqat*, n.d., IOL&R, L/R/5/98.

[174] *Madras Mail*, 1 Nov. 1923.

[175] *Gayan Shakti*, n.d., IOL&R, L/R/5/98. Also see *Oudh Akhbar*, n.d.; and *Leader*, n.d., in ibid.

had disappointed the Muslim leaders generally.[176] In fact, relations between the two communities, badly strained in the first half of 1923, had now worsened to a lamentable extent. Riots and arson had taken the place of amity and goodwill. Unscrupulous journalism played on public hysteria and made it worse. The situation was so bad that Dr Ansari, in a letter to Gandhi, observed in disgust that 'Blind fanaticism and a reprehensible desire to run the other community down by every means has today become an essential part of the life of a vernacular paper of Northern India'.[177] The government tried to discourage communal polemics and took action against some of the journals,[178] but this had no effect. As time passed, riots increased in frequency and intensity. In July 1924, there were serious *'Idu'l-azha* riots in Delhi. In the same month there was another outbreak at Nagpur and in August at Panipat. Then there was a crop of riots at Lahore, Lucknow, Muradabad, Bhagalpur, Rurki, Agra, Hanpar, Jampur, Meerut, Ahmedabad, Pili Bhit, Shahjehanpur, Hardoi, Kalpi, Allahabad, Jhang, Gujrat and even at Gulburga in the Nizam's dominions. In September 1924, Governor Sir Frank Sly of the CP remarked to Reading:

> During my long service I have never known such acute tension of feeling between Hindus and Mahomedans . . . Each community feels that with the advance of responsible government, they can no longer rely on an impartial governing authority, but must each fight for their own interests.[179]

The leaders tried in vain to restrain the fanaticism of their co-religionists and a committee of three – Dr Ansari, Lajpat Rai and Sirdar Mehtab Singh – attempted to draft a 'National Pact'. But the document which it produced was only a tentative agreement seeking to safeguard the religious liberties of the communities and recommending arbitration in cases of discord.[180] Some of the vital questions splitting

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[176] I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi, 1965), 42; and A. A. Ravoof, *Meet Mr. Jinnah* (Madras, 1944), 88-9.

[177] *Young India, 1924–26* (Madras, 1927), 16.

[178] e.g. against *Guru Ganthal*, *Shaitan* and *Lahaul*. See IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1888, file 3393/1924; and Suppl. to IOL&R, L/R/5/205. To name a few polemics which appeared at this time: Mahasha Fazl Husain, *Aryan shuddhi ki haqiqat ya kaifiyyat ved* (Qadian, 1924); Mahasha Gian Indar [Sayyid Ubaidur Rahman Sufi], *Men ne Islam kyun chhora* (Delhi, 1925); and G. M. Dharampal, *Jar mar* (Lucknow, 1925).

[179] Sly to Reading, 19 Sept. 1924, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[180] For the text of the 'National Pact' see *Hindu*, 27 Dec. 1923.

the two communities, particularly that of the communal representation in local bodies and government service, remained unsolved. A more realistic attempt, towards which the CKC was much attracted, was C. R. Das's well-known 'Bengal Pact' that laid down specific proportional representation in all spheres for the two communities.[181] However, the pacts, particularly the latter, aroused strong hostility from the Hindus of all shades of opinion including the Congress,[182] and instead of improving the situation increased the communal bitterness.

The breaking-point in Hindu-Muslim relations, however, was the harrowing riot at Kohat in the Frontier which took place in September 1924 over the circulation by the Sanatan Dharam Sabha of an anti-Islamic polemic containing a particularly objectionable poem.[183] The magisterial enquiry by the government weighed heavily upon the Hindus.[184] Stung by the report, the Hindu press and leaders like Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and some members of the legislative assembly started a systematic campaign of representing the Hindus as the aggrieved party.[185] Attempts were also made by them to instigate the Kohat Hindus to reject any settlement.[186] Gandhi and Shaukat Ali also fell out with each other on the point as to which community was responsible for the riot.[187] Gone were the days when Gandhi was held in the highest esteem by Muslim leaders. Kohat led to a dramatic twenty-one day 'penance' fast by Gandhi, who had been released on medical grounds in February 1924, and to a 'unity conference'. But the conference, which took place at Delhi on 26 September 1924, achieved little.[188] Its resolutions remained a pious wish

[181] Parl. Papers, 1924, Cmd. 2311, *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1923–24, Fifty-Ninth Number*. For the text of the 'Bengal Pact' see *Indian Annual Register, 1923*, ii, 127–8.

[182] *Madras Mail*, 24 Dec. 1923; *Pioneer*, 21 Jan. 1924; *Report of the Thirty-Eighth Indian National Congress at Coconada on 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st December 1923, and 1st January 1924* (Coconada, 1924), 98–116; and S. Khuda Bukhsh, *Studies: Indian and Islamic* (London, 1927), 268–9.

[183] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1890 of 1924; and L/P&J/6/1892, file 4173/1924.

[184] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1894, file 4357/1924.

[185] See Lajpat Rai to Olivier 25 Sept. 1924, IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1890 of 1924. Also see Reading to Olivier, 25 Sept. 1924, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 15 Sept. 1924, iv, part 5, 3417–21.

[186] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 150-C, Dec. 20, 1924, IOL&R, Reading Papers. Also see Reading to Olivier, 14 Oct. 1924, in ibid.

[187] *Young India, 1924–26*, 182, n. Also see I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community*, 282; and Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal*, 326.

[188] For details of the conference see *Young India, 1924–26*, 138–73.

for, as soon as the conference adjourned, the old rivalry reappeared. Before Gandhi could end his fast, a serious riot took place at Allahabad, another at Jabbulpore and yet another at Madras.[189] Communal strife had now become a feature of Indian political life. The fine edifice of Hindu-Muslim unity which had so assiduously built up the Khilafat agitation into a mass all-India movement had crumbled down like a house of cards. The Khilafat movement, already affected by a series of internal and external events, was now wholly a Muslim concern. The Hindus, as a community, had long ceased to be a party to it. Gandhi's approach to the Hindu-Muslim question had also become enigmatic. On the one hand he would resort to a self-denying 'penance' fast, and on the other exhort his Hindu followers to shed their alleged cowardice against the Muslims. In his opinion the Hindu 'cowardice' and Muslim 'bullying' lay underneath the Hindu-Muslim tension.[190] His articles in the *Harijan*, advising the Hindus to learn the art of self-defence against the Muslims, were resented by the later.[191] In inter-communal relations Gandhi was certainly not the Gandhi of 1919–22. He had ceased to be an impartial leader of India.

With the Hindus standing aloof, the caliphate non-existent and the Turks determined upon a 'quasi-secularism',[192] the natural tendency of the CKC was to push through the programme of reorganization. But its progress was arrested when in autumn 1924, Ibn Saud, the dashing Sultan of Nejd and the leader of the Ikhwan, propelled by traditional animosity and rage over King Husain's assumption of the caliphate, invaded the Hijaz and expelled his old rival and adversary.[193] In his '*jihad*', Ibn Saud was encouraged a good deal by the Indian Khilafatists and he openly acknowledged it.[194]

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[189] *Daily Telegraph*, 9, 11 and 13 Oct. 1924.

[190] *Young India, 1924–26*, 26 and 176.

[191] Toosy, *My Reminiscences*, 15.

[192] In Fazlur Rahman's opinion the Turkish attitude in breaking with the traditional conception of a politico-religious state was not completely secular because in spite of the separation of the state from religion and the dethronement of the *shari'at*, Islam had remained the term of reference. See F. Rahman, 'Internal Religious Developments in the Present Century Islam', *Journal of World History*, 2/1 (1954), 876.

[193] The Ikhwan movement of Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud was an intensified form of 'Wahhabism' or the Muwahhidun teachings. The Ikhwan stood for the preservation of Islam in its original puritanical form and took the teachings of Islam quite literally. See G. Rentz, 'al-Ikhwan', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn., iii, 1064–8; H. St. John Philby, *The Heart of Arabia*, i (London, 1922), xvi–xvii; and De Lacy O'Leary, *Islam at the Cross-Roads* (London, 1923), 40–1.

[194] See *Daily Telegraph*, 22 Sept. and 12 Nov. 1924; and *Madras Mail*, 26 Nov. 1924.

The Indian encouragement came after he promised that he would keep the sanctity of the holy places inviolable.[195] At this crucial moment, the British, who were unhappy with Husain for not towing their line on Palestine, abandoned him.[196] In any case, Ibn Saud's success was instant. Husain, dejected by his defeat and bitter at the British for disowning him, abdicated on 3 October 1924 in favour of his eldest son Ali (1871–1935) and retired to Aqaba. But Ali was also unable to hold the Nejdis and just ten days later surrendered the city of Makkah. He continued to rule at Jeddah until the fall of Medina in December 1925, when he, too, abdicated the throne of the Hijaz and renounced the title to the caliphate and went to take up residence in Baghdad.[197] Ibn Saud's success changed the whole aspect of the caliphate question. The CKC, which was still struggling for the resuscitation of the institution, began to dream of establishing in the Hijaz a republic on the pattern of the early days of Islam.[198] Ibn Saud, pretending to agree with the Khilafatists, sustained and encouraged their optimism.[199] But, the Ikhwan iconoclasm and puritanical zeal led Ibn Saud to order the removal of all domed structures from the graves of Muslims held sacred by the generality of the Muslims. This affected seriously Ibn Saud's popularity in India and, despite his assurances, divided the Khilafatists into pro- and anti-Ibn Saud factions.[200]

It is difficult to classify these groups accurately since their religious orientations and political affiliations seemed to overlap. But generally speaking, the supporters and detractors of Ibn Saud, motivated as they were by divergent and apparently irreconcilable beliefs, aligned

[195] See Seth Abdoola Haroon, *Khutba-i sadarat* (Lucknow, [1927]), 12–13.

[196] Leslie McLoaghlin, *Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom* (Houndmills, 1993), 78.

[197] See Parl. Papers, 1924, *Hansard*, 177 H.C. Deb. 5.s., cols. 141–42; MacDonald to Bullard, Tel. no. 35 (R), 28 Sept. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10014; High Com., Iraq to Sec. of State Colonies, Tel. no 2113, 13 Oct. 1924, IOL&R, L/P&S/10/1124, file 4156/1924; A. L. Kirkbird's report in ibid., file 4549/1924; J. Benoist-Méchin, *Arabian Destiny* (London, 1957), 156–8; *Daily Telegraph*, 21 Dec. 1925 and 1 Jan. 1926; and Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 296–308.

[198] See CKC's cable to the Hijaz National Party, *Madras Mail*, 8 Sept. 1924. Also see Abdul Majid Daryabadi, *Muhammad 'Ali: zati da'iri ke chand waraq*, i (Azamgarh, 1954), 226; and Haroon, *Khutba-i sadarat*, 12–13.

[199] See app. B., encl. Bullard to MacDonald, no. 102, 20 Oct. 1924, PRO, FO 371/10015. Also see *Daily Telegraph*, 5 Nov. 1924; Abdul Ghaffar, *Hayat-i Ajmal*, 362–6; Daryabadi, *Muhammad 'Ali*, 227 and 326–8; and Haroon, *Khutba-i sadarat*, 10–12.

[200] So much so that Shaukat Ali had to ask Ibn Saud not to do anything to hurt Muslim feelings. See his tel. to Ibn Saud in *Bombay Chronicle*, 18 Sept. 1924.

themselves to the main opposing factions—the Ghair Muqallids and the Muqallids. Apart from the *'ulama* of the Ahl-i Hadis and those of the Nadwa, the pro-Ibn Saud group included such stalwarts as the Ali brothers, Abul Kalam Azad, Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Zafar Ali Khan, Dr Kitchlew, Sulaiman Nadwi, Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Ataullah, Daud Ghaznawi, and Habibur Rahman Ludhiyanawi.[201] Among the detractors of Ibn Saud the main attack was led by the *'ulama* of Farangi Mahal and Bareilly. They also included *sajjada nashins*, sufis and the Shi'as, who were opposed to the Ikhwan discipline and iconoclasm. Prominent among them were Shah Sulaiman Phulwari, Shah Muhammad Jafar, Shah Ghulam Husain, Hasan Nizami, Hasrat Mohani, Abdul Majid Badauni, Mushir Kidwai, Raja Ahmad Ali Khan (b. 1891) of Salimpur and Raja Nawab Ali Khan of Akbarpur.[202] The press took a leading part in the controversy, which developed into a bitter conflict. The antagonism between the two factions, the full force of which was exhibited in the next two years, reached such a pitch that both sides denounced each other as *kafirs* and renegades. Polemics and counter-polemics made their appearance in abundance and public meetings and processions were almost a daily occurrence. Former friends became irreconcilable opponents. A war of wits and pens between Mohamed Ali and Hasan Nizami surpassed limits of decency and became personal. Differences arose between Mohamed Ali and the Raja of Mahmudabad and other friends like Abdul Majid Badauni, Nisar Ahmad of Kanpur, Zafar Ali Khan and, most surprisingly, Abdul Bari, his religious preceptor. This was not all. A new organization, known as the Khuddam-i Haramain, sprang up under some dissident Khilafatists specifically to oppose the CKC's pro-Ibn Saud policy.[203] Iqbal rightly lamented that the influence of

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[201] The classification is based on various speeches, writings and statements of the leaders and sundry other sources mentioned hereafter.

[202] Ibid.

[203] See Daryabadi, *Muhammad 'Ali*, i, 228 322; Zafar Ali Khan, *Baharistan*, 518 and 524. Ashraf Ata, *Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan* (Lahore, n.d.), 193 200; Zulfikar, *Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan*, 421-60; Arshi Amritsari, 'Muhammad 'Ali ki nazar' in Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 51; Jafri Nadwi, 'Khuda bakhshe . . .', in *'Ali baradaran*, 44; and Haroon, *Khutba-i sadarat*, 13. To mention a few polemics: (pro-Ibn Saud): Arshi Amritsari, *Mazarat-i Hijaz* (Amritsar, 1925); (Abul Wafa) Sanaullah, *Mas'ala-i Hijaz par nazar* (Amritsar, 1925); id., *Sultan Ibn Saud, 'Ali baradaran aur mu'tamar-i Hijaz* (Amritsar, 1926); and M. Muhammad Ismail, *Ahlu'l-haq as-sarih wa afnau'l-batilu'l-qabih* (Bangalore, 1926); and (anti-Ibn Saud): Anjuman Hizbu'l-Hanaf, *Tarikh-i Najdiyya: ya'ni haqiqat-i Wahhabiyya*, (Lahore, 1924); Abdul Bari, *Mas'ala-i qubur wa qubbajat* (Farangi Mahal, 1925); S. Mahbub Husaini, *Fatawa-i 'ulama-i mu'minin wa Muslimin fi radd-i fatawa-i*

the professional *maulawis*, which had greatly diminished owing to Syed Ahmed Khan's movement, was once again ascendant thanks to the *fatwa*-seeking politics of the CKC.[204]

The CKC, though pro-Ibn Saud and anti-Husain, was nevertheless uneasy about the fratricidal war among Muslims and bloodshed in the most revered places of Islam, i.e. Makkah and Medina. Therefore, in the middle of December 1924, a delegation, consisting of Sulaiman Nadwi, Abdul Majid and Abdul Qadir of Kasur, was dispatched to the Hijaz to try to mediate between the belligerents.[205] The delegation reached Jeddah towards the end of the month and conferred with King Ali, the son and successor of Husain, who was still holding out at Jeddah and Medina, and corresponded with Ibn Saud. But it failed to effect a settlement.[206] The Belgaum Khilafat Conference, which had opened on 24 December 1924 under Dr Kitchlew's presidency, also preferred to leave the settlement of the caliphate question to a world Muslim congress.[207] For a few more years, the Indian Muslims remained absorbed in the Hijaz affair during which the CKC endeavoured to enhance Ibn Saud's popularity in India by organizing successful pilgrimages to Makkah. But feelings against the latter, especially among the Barelwis and the Ghair-Muqallids, had hardened so much that once in summer 1925 Shaukat Ali had to be rescued from an infuriated mob led by Chotani for applauding Ibn Saud as the champion of Islam.[208] In September 1925, an intelligence report from the Punjab indicated that 'the Pirs and the Mullas have definitely asserted their supremacy over the Khilafat-Wahhabi-Deobandi combination, which trinity is now indivisible'.[209] Ibn Saud's popularity suffered another blow when in November 1925, he entered into treaty relations with Britain which

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'ulama-i Ghair-Muqallidin wa Wahhabin (Bungalore, 1926); Maulana Nur-ud-din Ajmeri, *Pakki qabron aur qubbon ka jawaz* (Delhi, 1926); Sultan Mahmud, *Anwaru's-sultaniyya fi'l raddu'l-Wahhabiyya* (Bungalore, 1926); Jam'iyyat-i Markaziyya Khuddamu'l-Haramain, *Fatwa: Masa'la-i iltiwa-i hajj ke muta'alliq 'ulama-i kiram wa mujtahidin 'uzzam ka mudallal wa mabsut fatwa*, (Lucknow, 1927); and id., *Mas'ala-i Hijaz wa tahrik-i iltiwa-i hajj*, (Lucknow, 1927).

[204] See Iqbal to Akbar Shah Najibabadi, 12 Apr. 1925, quoted in Ikram, *Modern Muslim India*, 183.

[205] *Times of India*, 19 Dec. 1924.

[206] *The Times*, 10 Feb. 1925.

[207] *Hindu*, 1 Jan. 1925. Also see NAI, Home Poll., file 167/iii/1924.

[208] *Morning Advertiser*, 29 Aug. 1925, IOL&R L/P&S/10/1125, file 2984 [2938]/1924; and Daryabadi, *Muhammad 'Ali*, 240.

[209] DC, Lahore, to Chief Sec. to the Govt. of Punjab, 4 Sept. 1925, NAI, Home Poll. file 99/xiv/1925.

delimited the frontiers between Iraq and Trans-Jordania on the one hand and the Nejd on the other.[210] His Indian detractors, particularly Hasrat Mohani and Sayyid Habib Shah of the Khuddam al-Haramain, condemned him relentlessly.[211] And when in January 1926, Ibn Saud proclaimed himself king of the Hijaz, he lost Indian support still further and only die-hard sympathizers like Zafar Ali Khan remained unaffected.[212]

Nevertheless, when in summer 1926, two separate world Muslim congresses were held at Cairo and Makkah to settle the caliphate question, the CKC, in spite of its disapproval of the Wahhabi policies, accepted Ibn Saud's invitation and not that of the Cairo *'ulama*. The reason for their non-participation in the Egyptian congress was that they suspected, and with some justification, that the Cairo conference (13-22 May 1926), was meant to promote old King Fuad's candidature to the caliphal office. In fact, some of the most influential Egyptian *'ulama*, including the rector of the mosque-university al-Azhar, Abul Fazl al-Jizawi, and the president of the *shari'at* court, Mustafa al-Maraghi (1881-1945), were reported to be working for him. The Indians feared that a British vassal as the caliph of Islam might indirectly enhance Britain's 'power of mischief' in the Muslim world. On a cue from Dr Ansari and Ajmal Khan, who had visited Cairo in the summer of 1925 and had studied the situation firsthand, the CKC decided against participation. Even in Egypt, the opposition was quite strong. So much so that the caliphate question became the cause of friction between the Wafdist government of Saad Zaghlul (1857-1927) and the palace. Therefore, the actual proceedings of the congress were anticlimactic. Nothing substantive came out of the discussions and the delegates agreed to meet again in Cairo on some future date.[213] This saved the institution of the caliphate from becom-

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[210] For the Bahra and the Hadda Agreements (1 and 2 Nov. 1925) see Sir Gilbert Clayton, *An Arabian Diary* (ed.), R. O. Collins (Berkeley, 1969), 271 9. Also see 188, n. 31.

[211] See *Hindu*, 31 Dec. 1925.

[212] From Geneva, Barakatullah registered his dismay. See Barakatullah to Iqbal Shaidai, 3 Jan. 1926, NAP, Shaidai Papers. For Zafar Ali Khan see his, *Baharistan*, 273 5.

[213] See IOL&R, L/P&S/11/261, file P. 3125/1925; *The Times*, 5 Feb. and 14 May 1926; *Madras Mail*, 12 May 1926; *Hindu*, 20 May 1926; Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate', esp. 208-48; Achille Sékaly (ed.), *Le congrès du khalifat et le congrès du monde musulman* (Paris, 1926), 29 122; Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, 61; and Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 86 105. (Allama) Inyatullah Khan Mashriqi (1888-1963),

ing the preserve of hereditary rulers and a source of their legitimacy, as Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), the controversial theorist of al-Azhar, had feared a year earlier.[214] The Makkah conference, which opened on 6 June 1926, was attended by approximately seventy-five delegates representing Muslim communities in India, Russia, Java, Syria, Palestine, Nejd, the Hijaz, Asir, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Yemen. The CKC was represented by Sulaiman Nadwi (leader), the Ali brothers and Shoaib Qureshi. The Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama and the Ahl-i Hadis sent their separate delegates. But the Makkah conference was also a failure. Ibn Saud had cleverly excluded from the agenda any discussion of the Khilafat issue or even of international and Islamic politics. As expected, sharp controversies arose between the two opposing schools of thought and the Indians returned home disappointed and empty-handed.[215]

With the Khilafat issue already non-existent, the attitude of Ibn Saud only confounded the already confused situation. The Ali brothers, who had stood up for him at the risk of being dubbed 'Wahhabis', were now, after the Makkah moot, deadly against him. They became involved in a bitter conflict with the supporters of Ibn Saud, particularly Zafar Ali Khan who was alleged to have been receiving money from the latter.[216] Abdoola Haroon, the president of the CKC for 1927, defended the change of policy as being based on principles because, he reasoned, the Nejdi leader had gone back on his promises about the inviolability of the holy places.[217] One result of the lingering trouble in the Hijaz was that it enabled the Khilafatists to justify the retention of the Khilafat committees. But unfortunately, a tussle ensued as to who should control the central organization. Dr Kitchlew

later of the Khaksar fame, who attended the conference on his own, vehemently opposed King Fuad's designs. See his, *Khitab-i mu'tamar-i Khilafat* (Rawalpindi, [1931]), *passim*.

[214] For Abd al-Raziq, see Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, 148–9; and Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, 62–8.

[215] For details see Sékaly, *Le congrès du khalifat*, 125–219; Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, 'The Mecca Conference', *Contemporary Review*, 130/729 (1926), 304–11; *The Times*, 10 and 17 June 1926; Toynbee, *Survey, 1925*, i, 312; Sarwar, *Maulana Muhammad 'Ali*, 246–7; Sanaullah, *Sultan Ibn Saud*, 4; Miyan, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama kya hae?*, ii, 124; and Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 106–22.

[216] NAI, Home Poll. file 99/xiv/1925; Arshi Amritsari, 'Muhammad 'Ali ki nazar', in Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 51–2; Adil Abbasi, *Tahrik-i Khilafat*, 259–64; and Zulfikar, *Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan*, 421–60.

[217] Haroon, *Khutba-i sadarat*, 13–14.

and the powerful Punjab group consisting of Abdul Qadir, Mohyi-ud-din, Muhammad Ali (father and sons from Kasur), Zafar Ali Khan, Khwaja Abdur Rahman Ghazi and Daud Ghaznawi and enjoying the support of Abul Kalam Azad, Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan, wanted to shift the offices of the CKC to Delhi to bring it under the prying eyes of the north India Muslims. The Ali brothers, on the other hand, were intent on maintaining the status quo to save their sagging leadership.[218] In the end, they got their way and the CKC remained in Bombay and in their grip but owing to the political exigencies there was a definite shift towards domestic issues.[219] Even a pan-Islamic ideologue like Azad was convinced that the only way for the CKC to survive was to re-dedicate itself to educational, social and intellectual uplift of the Muslim community.[220] The problem, however, was that the decisions taken at the conferences and meetings remained largely unimplemented year after year and even when reiterated evoked no effective response. Additionally, the backstage wranglings among the leaders, which at first had remained hidden from public view, embarrassingly came out into the open. There was now a steady realization that the Khilafat movement was after all dead. A complete regression was only a question of time.

The situation in the country was also making a different demand. The balance of power after 1924 had shifted from the CKC to the Muslim League and the political struggle had moved from public platform to the legislative assemblies. It was, however, another matter that the programme chalked out at Lahore by the latter had failed to take effect.[221] By this time, the communal strife had spread over the whole spectrum of Indian political scene which pushed the constitutional issues to the fore, resulting in the Muddiman investigation of the scope for improvement within the existing Act.[222] Already,

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[218] NAI, Home Poll., file 167/iii/1924.

[219] Ibid.; *Hindu*, 1 Jan. 1925; and Abdul Halim Sharar, *Miyar-i zindagi* (Lucknow, 1926), 7–8.

[220] Azad, *Khutbat-i Azad*, 228–31. Ubaidullah Sindhi, sitting thousands of miles away, did not expect any major change in India because, in his view, the religious parties were devoid of taking a correct decision. See Sindhi to Shaidai, 25 Aug. [1925], NAP, Shaidai Papers.

[221] See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1926* (Delhi, [1926]), 3. Later, when Kitchlew succeeded Zahur Ahmad as the League sec., he immediately shifted the party offices from Lucknow to Delhi. See AFM/NAP, AIMLR, *Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the Year 1927* (Delhi, [1927]), 1.

[222] For the Muddiman investigations see Parl. Papers, 1925, Cmd. 2360, *Report*

the Khilafat Conference, meeting at Delhi in May 1926, had changed the Khilafat creed and entrusted the CKC with the trusteeship of all Muslim interests. The plea was that the Khilafat movement had worked for Islam abroad and now it must protect their religion within India, especially when threatened.[223] The new creed was designed to safeguard the religious, educational, social, economic and political interests of Indian Muslims. The conference directed the Khilafat committees to try and remove Hindu-Muslim tension and achieve an 'honourable compromise'. If efforts in that direction were to fail, they were then to do everything in their power, including the use of Khilafat volunteer corps, to protect Muslim interests. The committees were authorized to raise special funds and, if necessary, to apply for aid to the central and the provincial organizations. The latter were specifically advised to monitor the work of the subordinate committees and help them wherever possible.[224] The change in policy had been expected for a long time but it was made possible by the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama's decision in May 1926 to release the Muslims from the obligation of its *muttafiqa fatwa* on non-co-operation. The Jam'iyyat had done it not because the *fatwa* had become obsolete but for the simple reason that the circumstances were making a different demand.[225] This was a belated step but desirable nevertheless.

By early 1927, there was a visible thaw in the CKC's pan-Islamic fervour, though many Muslims continued to chase the romantic dream of reviving the caliphate, especially through the Indian branch of the Mu'tamar al-'Alam al-Islami which Ansari had introduced in the wake of the Makkah congress.[226] Born as a result of the efforts

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of the Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924. The members of the Committee were: Alexander Muddiman (chm.), Muhammad Shafi, Maharaja of Burdwan, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Arthur Froom, Sivaswami Iyer, H. Moncrieff Smith, M. A. Jinnah, R. R. Pranjpye and H. Tomkinson (sec.).

[223] See Sulaiman Nadwi's presidential address in *Hindu*, 13 May 1926. For the growing antagonism between the Khilafatists and the Hindus also see Irwin to Birkenhead, 5 May 1926, IOL&R, Bikenhead Papers.

[224] See *Hindu*, 13 May 1926.

[225] The Jam'iyyat's decision came only after a sub-committee, appointed in Jan. 1925 with Kifayatullah, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Hussain Ahmad Madani, Abul Muhasin Muhammad Sajjad and Sanaullah as its members, had recommended the change. The working committee accepted the proposals in Delhi on 8 May 1926 and confirmed them on 22 Sept. 1926 in its second meeting. See Miyan, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama kya hae?*, ii, 127–30.

[226] *Khilafat*, 20 May 1927; and *Indian Quarterly Register, 1927*, i (ed.), N. N. Mitra (Calcutta, 1927), 423–4.

of a number of Muslim leaders of the world, the Mu'tamar was projected as a symbol of pan-Islam in place of the abolished caliphate, not as a parallel or antagonistic body to the CKC but rather as an Islamic buckle.[227] The Mu'tamar, however, was a slow-starter and did not make its mark until much later.[228] The accent was now on domestic issues, especially on reforming the religious, economic and educational condition of the Muslims.[229] This change in outlook was underscored by Abdoola Haroon when he said:

> Until today all efforts of the Khilafat Committee had been directed towards external Islamic issues. . . . Though this had not been without its advantages, we should now look after our own house [and see] what tumult is going on [around us]. I do not at all mean that we should withdraw completely from external matters. . . . But so long as we are subjugated and weak we can neither re-establish the caliphate nor obtain the freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab*. The independence of Muslim India means the freedom of Islam.[230]

In the pursuit of this ideal and on important issues of Muslim concern the majority of the Khilafatists, including the Ali brothers, found themselves on the same side as Jinnah. First they fell in line with him in formulating the March 1927 Delhi proposals[231] and later in boycotting the Simon (Statutory) Commission, from which the Indians had been excluded.[232] At the Lahore sessions of the Muslim League in December 1927, the Khilafatists had withdrawn from the proceedings and had even condemned Shafi and Iqbal as 'traitors' for

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[227] The moving spirits of this organization were the Ali brothers, Mufti Amin al-Huseini of Palestine, Muhammad Annat-Twahiri of al-Azhar, Rashid Rida of Syria, Sarwat Bey of Turkey and Shaikh Umar of Indonesia. For information on the Mu'tamar see *Brief History: Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami* (Karachi, n.d.); and *Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami: Brief History* (Karachi, [1988]).

[228] See below, 412.

[229] *Indian Quarterly Register, 1927*, ii, 331. A complete report of the CKC meeting of 14–17 May 1927 is available in *Khilafat*, 20 May 1927.

[230] Haroon, *Khutba-i sadarat*, 24. Eng. tr. mine.

[231] In essence, the proposals agreed to abolish separate electorates in response to Hindu overtures provided Muslim demand of one-third seats in the central legislature by a joint electorate was not disturbed; seats were reserved according to population in the Punjab and Bengal; Sind was constituted into a separate province; and reforms were introduced in the Frontier and Baluchistan on the same footing as any other province. See *Times of India*, 22 Mar. 1927.

[232] See the proceedings of the Khilafat Conference held at Madras in Dec. 1927, in *Indian Quarterly Register, 1927*, ii, 329–30. An account of the visit of the Simon Commission and its activities can be found in Edward Cadogan, *The India We Saw* (London, 1933), *passim*.

extending co-operation to the Simon Commission.[233] But the split in the League had ominous forebodings for the Khilafatists who were themselves disunited. A strong Punjab group consisting of Azad's friends from Kasur and Amritsar had revolted against the CKC. Their action was more an expression of dislike for the Ali brothers than a bid for leadership. They were critical of the way the affairs of the CKC were being run, alleging mismanagement of the Khilafat funds and resenting Shaukat Ali's 'autocratic' manner of dealing with issues.[234] The messy business of the Chotani sawmills was a particular irritant. Between 1923 and 1928, despite the good intentions of the board of management, it had accumulated a loss of over three lakh of rupees.[235] When the board tried to sell or rent it out on a fixed annual payment at the behest of the Turkish Red Crescent Society to whom the mills had been pledged,[236] it failed to attract a suitable buyer.[237] Even otherwise, the financial crisis was casting a long shadow.[238] The donations and subscriptions had tumbled to a minimum and the annual membership dues were in considerable arrears.[239] The cash balance available was only Rs 13,303-3-10 (1924

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[233] See SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 50/1-2, 7, 14 and 28 Jan. 1928, paras. 2a, 7c and 16b.

[234] See Abdur Rahman Ghazi to Haroon, 26 Apr., and 12 and 29 May 1927; Habibur Rahman, Fazl-i Haq and Taj-ud-din to Haroon, 28 Apr. 1927; Muhammad Irtiza to the editor *Khilafat*, 5 June 1927; and Shaikh Hussam-ud-din to Haroon, 23 Aug. 1927, AFM, Haroon Papers. Hussam-ud-din (1897-1967) was the sec. of the Punjab Khilafat Committee.

[235] See the statement of 'Profit and Loss' account of the Chotani sawmills for various dates from 1 June 1923 to Feb. 1928 in S. B. Billimoria & Co. to Hon. Sec., CKC, 14 Aug. 1925 and its encls., and several other similar statements in the Haroon Papers, esp. for Mar. 1928. The members of the board were Abdoola Haroon, Shafee Daoodi, Mohamed Ali, Muhammad Ali of Kasur, Ali Afzal and Shoaib Qureshi. See encl., Shoaib Qureshi to Abdoola Haroon, no. 126/7/2 dated 21 March 1927, Haroon Papers.

[236] Encl., Shoaib Qureshi to Abdoola Haroon, no. 126/7/2 dated 21 Mar. 1927, in ibid.

[237] See encls., Zahid Ali to [Haroon], 9 Mar. 1928, in ibid.

[238] The board, in the meanwhile, had a pragmatic change of heart and Shafee Daoodi and Ansari proposed that instead of handing over the mills to the Turks, the CKC should utilize the income for the welfare of the Muslims in India. They argued that the money should either be spent on an institution like the Jami'a Milliyya or used for the purchase of a building for the offices of the CKC as it had wasted as much as Rs 80,000 on rented accommodation. See the undated [Aug. 1928] circular to CKC members issued by Ansari and Shafee Daoodi in Haroon Papers.

[239] See an undated circular to the CKC members in Haroon Papers.

figures)[240] whereas the unrealized advances and loans to defaulters amounted to Rs 15,079 (1927 figures).[241] This was in addition to a sum of Rs 25,885 that could not be accounted for at all.[242] Of course, Shaukat Ali could still raise an odd sum through his 'begging' forays but the calumnies put the Ali brothers in a tight corner. They, in turn, condemned and ridiculed the 'Punjabi *toli*' as a bunch of 'irresponsible', 'self-appointed' leaders who, in collusion with a group of the Ahl-i Hadis and the like-minded people, were using the provincial committee not only to smear them personally but to bring the entire central organization in disrepute.[243] Neither side would relent. Being obdurate and impetuous by temperament, the Ali brothers denounced the entire Punjab Khilafat Committee though only a few of its members were actually opposed to them.[244] The Punjabis were no less belligerent and were itching to get at the 'Rampuris' without mercy.[245] Abdoola Haroon, the president of the CKC, tried to impose some sanity but was disgusted by the lack of tolerance and patience between the parties. Their animosity for each other was further tempered by differences over the Hijaz affair. 'Unless the one gives the other more than he deserves', he concluded, 'there is no satisfaction'.[246] To sort out matters, Haroon elicited Azad's good offices and visited Bombay personally as did Ismail Ghaznawi (d. 1960) but to no avail.[247] This inflexible attitude of the factions ultimately became the nemesis of the Khilafat Committee.

The incident that split the Khilafatists irrevocably was the Nehru Report of August 1928, which attempted to determine the principles of a constitution for India in answer to Birkenhead's challenge.[248]

[240] NAI, Home Poll. 167/iii/1924.

[241] See *The Seventh Statement of Income and expenditure of the Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay* (Bombay, [1928]), esp. 1–4, 12–13 and 15–18.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Shaukat Ali to Haroon, 8 May, 8 June, 26 and 28 July, 20 Oct. and 15 Nov. 1927, Haroon Papers. Also see Shaukat Ali to Shaikh Abdul Majid, 28 July 1927, in ibid.

[244] Afzal Haq, *Tarikh-i Ahrar*, 6.

[245] See above, 405.

[246] Haroon to Abdur Rahman Ghazi, 1 June 1927, AFM, Haroon Papers. Eng. tr. mine.

[247] Ibid.

[248] See the proceedings of the All Parties Conference at Lucknow (28 to 31 Aug. 1928) in *All Parties Conference 1928* (Allahabad, 1928), 164–5. Also see Jafri, 'Shaukat 'Ali . . .', 161–2. Muslim reaction to the Nehru Report can be followed in G. W. Chaudhri, 'The Nehru Report', *A History of the Freedom Movement*, iii, part 1 (Karachi, 1961), 276–301; Waheed Ahmad, *Road to Indian Freedom: The Formation of the Government*

On the question of the system of electorates and Muslim share in the Punjab and Bengal legislatures, a strong group consisting of Abul Kalam Azad, Dr Ansari, Akram Khan, Zafar Ali Khan, Abdul Qadir Kasuri and others was in favour of a compromise with the Congress. The Ali brothers-dominated CKC, however, opposed this line. Shoaib Qureshi, one of its secretaries and a member of the Nehru committee, had set the pace when he appended a note of dissent to the Report. In order to rally support, the CKC sent out an urgent call to its members to gather at Lucknow before the All Parties Conference and also invited the Muslim League and the Jam'iyyat to join in to resist the Nehru Report.[249] When the Khilafat Committee met as planned, Hasrat Mohani insisted that the Nehru Report conflicted with the Delhi proposals and it envisaged no safeguards to the minorities. Since the general opinion agreed with him, the CKC went ahead to draw up its own proposals: (i) reservation of seats for ten years; (ii) safeguards for religious interests; (iii) assurance against disabilities on religious grounds; (iv) full Muslim representation in services; and (v) maintenance of Muslim majorities in the Punjab and Bengal.[250] The working committee of the Jami'yyat also followed suit and rejected the Nehru Report for being too unfavourable to Muslim interests. The sub-committee which it appointed to review the matter confirmed this negative response on several counts.[251]

At the All Parties Conference on 28 August, the Muslim and Sikh opposition, especially on the questions of joint electorates and separation of Sind from Bombay, was side-tracked in private meetings with promises of adult suffrage and reconsideration of proportionate representation in ten years' time. The CKC agreed but Shaukat Ali and Hasrat Mohani were irked, particularly when the Punjab Khilafatists loudly proclaimed their support for the Nehru Report.[252] The CKC had hoped that the Nehru proposals would be amended to adjust to Muslim demands but when that did not happen at the All Parties Conference at Calcutta in December 1928, it formulated its demands afresh, vying for adequate share in the running of a free

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of India Act, 1935 (Lahore, 1982), 167–72; and Page, *Prelude to Partition*, 172 ff.

[249] See the circular under the signatures of Shaukat Ali, Shoaib Qureshi, Muhammad Irfan and Qamar Ahmad, dated 7 Aug. 1928 and its enc. AFM, Haroon Papers.

[250] Ext., UP Abstract, no. 35 dated 8 Sept. 1928, para. 705, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 36/50, 15 Sept. 1928, para. 162.

[251] Rozina, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind*, i, 484–500.

[252] Ext., UP Abstract, no. 35 dated 8 Sept. 1928, para. 705, in SBR, Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 36/50, 15 Sept. 1928, para. 162.

and self-governing India. Those who refused to fall in line were subjected to crude arm twisting. Mohamed Ali, who had recently returned from Europe, and Shafee Daoodi (1879–1946), the new face at the Khilafat establishment, together disrupted the proceedings of the Bengal Provincial Khilafat Committee for having emulated the Punjab in rebelling against the CKC. There was a show of force and a bit of rowdyism on both sides in which senior leaders were abused, pushed and bashed.[253] This was followed by the suspension of the provincial Khilafat committees of the Punjab, Bengal, Bihar and the Frontier.[254] The climax came when in the second session on the opening day of the Khilafat Conference on 24 December, the militants among the Punjabis took out knives and threatened Mohamed Ali of dire consequences. Ansari intervened and prevented an ugly scene from taking place but Abul Kalam Azad sat unconcerned and did nothing to restrain his friends from the Punjab.[255] The incident, though an outgrowth of acrimony between the Ali brothers and Azad and the Khilafat funds scandal, it caused a permanent split in the CKC. As many as forty-five members of the executive led by Ansari and including Abul Kalam Azad, Yakub Hasan, Dr Mahmud, Dr Kitchlew, Dr Alam, T. A. K. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman, who passionately supported the Nehru Report, dissociated themselves from the executive. The group, which included a solid block of 29 Punjabis who later emerged as the Ahrar Party, went ahead to nominate its own members to represent the CKC at the All Parties Convention then taking place at Calcutta. The CKC thus came to be divided into two parallel factions, each claiming to represent its real voice[256] A reconciliation was out of question as both sides took up unbending positions, accusing each other of demeaning behaviour and violence. Daud Ghaznawi and Zafar Ali Khan satirized the Ali brothers, dubbing the elder Ali as the *'papa-i Khilafat'* while Hasan Nizami called him 'Maulana *chanda*'.[257] For their part, the Ali brothers mocked

[253] *Zamindar*, 25 Dec. 1928. Also see Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims*, 208–9.

[254] *Indian Quarterly Register, 1928*, ii, 405 7; Ansari to Shaukat Ali, 14 May 1924, and Shaukat Ali to Ansari, 19 May 1929, in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *Muslims and the Congress* (Delhi, 1978), 64 71; Afzal Haq, *Tarikh-i Ahrar*, 69–70; and Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, 97. The Bengal Khilafat Committee had already broken down into a multitude of fighting factions, esp. after Azad had taken up residence in Delhi. See Bazlur Rehman Khan, *Politics of Bengal, 1927 1936* (Dhaka, 1987), 13.

[255] *Inqilab*, 29 Dec. 1928.

[256] *Indian Quarterly Register, 1928*, ii, 121–2 and 405 7.

[257] *Zamindar*, 27 Dec. 1928; Zafar Ali Khan, *Baharistan*, 365, 410–11 and 548;

Zafar Ali Khan and accused Azad of drinking wine at the expense of Motilal Nehru and Seth Birla.[258] Ansari and Shaukat Ali also fell out and became sworn political adversaries.[259]

If the Nehru Report split the CKC for ever, it also had the effect of unifying the various wings of the Muslim community. The Khilafat majority party led by Mohamed Ali closed its ranks with the conservative and constitutional schools of Muslim thought represented by Muhammad Shafi, A. K. Ghuznavi (1872–1939) and others. From Calcutta they rushed to Delhi to join the All Parties Muslim Conference under the Aga Khan and there, on 1 January 1929, Mohamed Ali, in collaboration with his former rival Shafi, moved the famous resolution formulating Muslim demands on India's future constitution in answer to the Nehru Report. The resolution urged a federal constitution with complete provincial autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent provinces.[260] This declaration is one of the most important and unanimous pronouncements by the Muslims on the constitutional problems and for a long time remained the axis of their demands. For a few more years after 1929, the Khilafat conferences continued to be held but they were no better than lifeless annual rituals. In fact, the disunited and disorganized Khilafatists withered and scattered into various groups. The nationalist Muslims—Dr Ansari, Azad, Dr Mahmud, Sherwani, Rafi Kidwai, Akram Khan, Dr Kitchlew, Dr Alam, Abdul Majid Khwaja, Mujibur Rahman, Syed Abdullah Barelwi (1891–1949) and Khaliquzzaman—formed themselves into a Nationalist Muslim Party, meeting as the All India Nationalist Muslim Conference. In their political outlook they subscribed,

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and Riazul Hasan, 'Maulana Muhammad 'Ali aur Khilafat fand', *Jang*, 25 Sept. 1970.

[258] Zafar Ali Khan, *Baharistan*, 413.

[259] 'Such a complete mental change has come over me', wrote Ansari to Shaukat Ali, 'that I do not think I shall ever be the same man that I was before'. On his part, Shaukat Ali blamed Ansari for 'all the mischief and trouble' and alleged that the whole drama had been staged by him to obtain support for Motilal Nehru and his report not realizing that the Congress had become just 'an adjunct of the Hindu Mahasabha'. Ansari to Shaukat Ali, 14 May 1929, in Mushirul Hassan, *Muslims and the Congress*, 64–7; and Shaukat Ali to Ansari, 19 May 1929, in ibid., 69–70.

[260] *Report of the All India Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 31st December 1928, and 1st January 1929* (Aligarh, n.d.); *The Main Resolutions of the All India Muslim Conference* (Patna, [1930]); and Parl. Papers, 1929–30, (170) 9, *Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1928–29, Sixty-Fourth Number*, 36 8. The CKC was represented, besides the Ali brothers, by Muhammad Irfan, Muhammad Usman, Moosa Khan Sherwani, Khwaja Iqbal Ansari, Khwaja Ayyub Ansari, Abdul Wahab Usmani and Gulsher Khan.

like the Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama, to the Congress scheme of a comprehensive and strong central government even at the cost of Muslim interests. Others like the Ali brothers, Shafee Daoodi, Hasrat Mohani and Azad Subhani, formed the All India Muslim Conference in association with the Muslim Leaguers. Yet others hovered uneasily between the Muslim League and the Congress or left politics altogether.[261]

During the 1930s the CKC slumped into inertia. As it was no longer a popular organization, there were not enough subscriptions even to keep it going. The publication of the daily *Khilafat* had also to be stopped. The old wizard Shaukat Ali, who was the binding link between different factions within the CKC on the one hand and between the CKC and its subordinate committees on the other, somehow continued to manage the affairs with the financial support from the Aga Khan and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy.[262] He had also to endure personal attacks from former friends and associates like Ali Bahadur Khan, Muin-ud-din Haris, Abdullah Barelwi, Abdullah Khan Kashmandi, Abdul Razzaq Malihabadi, and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar—who were all well-known journalists and used their skills to malign him.[263] The CKC's break with Gandhi was also complete. His moves were interpreted as akin to 'subjecting the minority community to the communalism of the majority community'.[264] When Gandhi launched his civil disobedience campaign in 1930, the CKC instantly rejected the call saying that the Muslims 'cannot imitate the throw of a gambler'.[265] The Ali brothers had reached the farthest most

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[261] For a study of the incoherent pattern of Muslim and Indian politics during the late 1920s and early 1930s, see *Indian Quarterly Register, 1929*, ii, 350–4; Jafri, 'Shaukat 'Ali . . .', 129–78; J. Coatman, *Years of Destiny* (London, 1932), *passim*; S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, 1926 1931* (Oxford, 1957), 16–53; S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims* (London, 1965), 58–9; R. J. Moore, 'The Making of India's Paper Federation, 1927 1935', in C. H. Philips and M. D. Wainwright (eds.), *The Partition of India* (London, 1970), 54–78; and Mushirul Hasan, *Muslims and the Congress*, xxviii ff.

[262] M. S. Shahid Farangi Mahalli, 'Khadam-i Ka'ba Maulana Shaukat 'Ali', Jafri, *'Ali baradaran*, 91. Also see Jafri, 'Shaukat 'Ali . . .', 136, 150 and 160. Suhrawardy had begun his political career in 1920 from the platform of the Khilafat committee in Bengal. See Muhammad Asif Ali Rizwi, 'Muttahidda Bengal ki siyasat men Husain Shahid Suhrwardi ka kirdar, 1920–1947', *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, 4/7 (1993), esp. 75. For Suhrawardy also see Muhammad H. R. Taluqdar (ed.), *Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy* (Dhaka, 1987), 9; and Begum Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, *Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy* (Karachi, 1991), 22 ff.

[263] Jafri, 'Shaukat 'Ali . . .', 139–40.

[264] See CKC's statement in *Civil and Military Gazette*, 5 Apr. 1930.

[265] Ibid.

point of their relations with Gandhi. 'We refuse to join Mr Gandhi', declared Mohamed Ali rather bluntly, 'because his movement is not a movement for the complete independence of India but for making the seventy millions of Indian Musalmans dependants of the Hindu Mahasabha'.[266] There was no meeting point left now. The Ali brothers also found it difficult to compromise their pan-Islamic ideal with the secular nationalistic pull in other Muslim lands.[267] In 1931, Shaukat Ali attempted to kick up some pan-Islamic dust by linking the ex-caliph Abdülmecid, then living in exile in Nice (France), with the Hyderabad princely family in a matrimonial alliance. He was able to bring this off in November 1931 when the Nizam's sons were married to the daughter and niece of the ex-caliph with whom he had been in constant devotional *liaison* as if the caliphate still existed.[268]

The alliance pleased the Indian Muslims but annoyed the Turks who feared that the phantom of the caliphate might be resurrected to proclaim Abdülmecid caliph at the forthcoming world Muslim congress at Jerusalem which Shaukat Ali and others were arranging towards the end of the year in concert with Mufti Amin al-Huseini (1893–1976) of Palestine.[269] Shaukat Ali's fascination for the ex-caliph

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[266] *Times of India*, 24 Apr. 1930, cited in Reginald Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833–1935* (Oxford, 1942), 111.

[267] See Mohamed Ali to Ghulam Bhik Nairang, n.d., *Nuqush*, lxv, (Nov. 1957), 362.

[268] Shaukat Ali played the Cupid when he visited Nice in 1930 and broached the subject with the ex-caliph, Abdülmecid, perhaps with the consent of the Nizam. In the fall of the following year, he returned to Nice with Sir Akbar Hydari (1896–1942) and Marmaduke Pickthal. The Deccan princes, the heir apparent Azam Jah and his younger brother Muazzam Jah, were also invited to France to meet the princesses, Durru Şehvar and Nilofar. By October 1931, everything was settled and the engagements announced. The *nikah* was solemnized on 12 November by the ex-caliph himself. The occasion was arranged to coincide with the Nizam's birthday which was an auspicious event in Hyderabad. Shaukat Ali's motives in arranging the marriages were purely pan-Islamic. He was deeply devoted to the Ottomans and had continued to consider Abdülmecid the rightful caliph. If the Nizam conferred on him a life gratuity of £ 200 per month it was purely on his own initiative and he did the same with the ex-caliph whose stipend was increased to £ 1,000 per month. Shaukat Ali also helped arrange the marriage of another Turkish princess, Salma, with Raja Sajid Husain, a *taluqdar* of Katwarah. See IOL&R, L/P&S/13/1207, coll. 22/3 and L/P&S/13/1212, coll. 22/6(1); Tahsin Suhrawardi, 'Turk shahzadiyan aur Dakkan ke shahzade', *Jang* (Rawalpindi), 11 and 12 Aug. 1964; Muhyi-ud-din Ghazi Ajmeri, "Allama Iqbal Bambai men' *Jang*, 21 Apr. 1968; Shafqat Rizwi, *Faizan-i Dakkan: Salatin-i Asifiyya ki 'ilmi wa adabi sarparasti* (Karachi, 1994), 186–7; Sir Muhammad Yamin Khan, *Nama-i a'mal*, i (Lahore, 1970), 794; and Jafri, 'Shaukat 'Ali . . .', 158 and 164–5.

[269] PRO, FO 371/15281–15284.

was so displeasing to Mustafa Kemal that when the former visited Turkey earlier that spring, the Turkish leader refused to see him,[270] as he had done to his brother Mohamed Ali in 1928 and to Ansari in 1925.[271] The Jerusalem Congress (7–17 December 1931), however, turned out to be a 'loud sounding nothing'. Impaired by internal rift and external animosity, the 145 luminaries who attended hurried to accommodate different viewpoints. The caliphate issue, along with other political matters, was not discussed at all. The Palestine issue topped the agenda for it was the main reason for which the conference had been convened.[272] The aim was to focus Muslim support on the issue and thus thwart the threatened establishment of a Jewish state there. The Palestine problem did attract considerable notice and publicity but in terms of concrete results the only enduring accomplishment of the Congress was the rejuvenation of the dormant Mu'tamar al-'Alam al-Islami with Jerusalem as its headquarters. The organization, however, became inactive and then withered at the outbreak of World War II. It was revived again in 1949 at Karachi by the Mufti and the Pakistani pan-Islamists A. B. A. Haleem (1897–1975) and Dr Inamullah Khan (1914–97) with the active support of Premier Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951) and his government.[273]

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[270] Ibid.

[271] Mohamed Ali visited Ankara on his way back from Europe but was disappointed with Mustafa Kemal's attitude. His interview with the ex-caliph Abdülmecid in Europe and promises of reinstatement held out to him, no matter how illusory, could not have gone well with Kemal Paşa. See Mohamed Ali to Shaukat Ali, n.d. [1929], *Nuqush*, lxv, (1957), 356; and NAI, Home Poll., file 99/xiv/1925. For Ansari see his letter to Muhammad Irfan from Lausanne, 5 July 1925, *Nuqush*, lxv, (Nov. 1957), 405; and Aybek, *Ap biti*, ii, 90 1.

[272] The Congress was presided over by the Mufti. The four deputies were: Mohammed Iqbal (India), Muhammad Zubara (Yemen), Mujtahid Zia-ud-din Tibatibai (Iran), and Muhammad Ali Alouba Paşa (Egypt). For details of the Congress see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/1314, file 1449/1931; and PRO, FO 371/15282, 15283 and 15284. Also see H. A. R. Gibb, 'The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931', in A. J. Toynbee's *Survey of International Affairs, 1934* (London, 1935), 99–109; J. Edwards, 'From Panarabism to Panislamism', *Contemporary Review*, 141/795, (1932), 350; Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 123–41; and Bashir M. Nafi, 'The General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem Reconsidered', *Muslim World*, 86/3–4 (1996), 243–72. Apart from the Turks, the Hijaz-Nejd government regarded the congress as obviously anti-Ibn Saud. Italy resented it because it might criticize her action in Tripoli and generate anti-Italian propaganda. Yugoslavia and Spain also viewed the congress with great misgivings. Similarly, the Zionist, who feared a mobilization of Muslim opinion against their cause, voiced strong opposition. See IOL&R. L/P&S/10/1314, file 1449/1931; and PRO, FO 371/15381.

[273] Tibatibai (Iran) was elected gen. sec., Alouba Paşa (Egypt) as treas., Riad al-Sulh (Lebanon) as asst. to gen. sec., and Said Shamil (Dagestan ASSR), Abd al-Aziz al-Tha'alibi (Tunisia), Amin al-Huseini (Palestine) and Nabih al-Azma (Syria)

In the wake of the Jerusalem Congress an attempt was made in 1932 to bring the CKC back to life. On the occasion of the Khilafat Conference at Ajmer, Shaikh Abdul Majid proposed a review of its constitution in order to reorganize the Khilafat committees.[274] Another conference was arranged at Bombay under the presidency of Syed Murtaza Bahadur which took stock of the situation.[275] The daily *Khilafat* was also revived with Rais Ahmad Jafri (1914–1968) as editor[276] but things had gone beyond repair. The disappearance from the scene of some of the main leaders who had nurtured the CKC also deeply affected the organization. Abdul Bari had died in January 1926 and Ajmal Khan in December 1927. Mohamed Ali breathed his last in January 1931 in London and was buried in Jerusalem in the compound of the Bait al-Maqdis. Dr Ansari, who had resigned from the CKC in May 1926, died of a heart attack in May 1936. The last Khilafat conference on record was the one held in Calcutta in January 1936 under the presidentship of Khawaja Habibullah, the Nawab Bahadur of Dhaka. But politically, the caliphate issue had ceased to attract any serious attention. The Khilafatists, like other Indian Muslims, had been oscillating, since 1928, between various parties and different demands ranging from complete independence to dominion status. And yet they saw no contradiction in being the members simultaneously of an Indian nation-state and the commonwealth of Islam[277] Shaukat Ali, now happily living with his new Yorkshire bride,[278] dragged the carcass of the Khilafat Committee for some years more till his death in November 1938, but the organization, which had a meteoric rise in the 1920s, disintegrated and disappeared. Only the Khilafat House in Bombay, behind the Omar (Sobani) Memorial Gate, survives to remind us of its tumultuous past.

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members of the executive com. For details see IOL&R, L/P&S/10/1314, file 1449/1931; *Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami*, [1]; *Brief History: Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami*, [1–2]; and Nafi, 'The General Islamic Congress of Jerusalem Reconsidered', 270–2.

[274] *Indian Annual Register, 1932*, ii, 334–6.

[275] See Yusufi, *Maulana Mohamed Ali*, 9–10.

[276] Jafri, 'Shaukat 'Ali . . .', 131.

[277] See *Presidential Address of the Hon'ble Captain Khawajah Habibullah, Nawab Bahadur of Dacca, Delivered at the Khilafat Conference Held at Calcutta, on the 4th January 1936*, [Calcutta, 1936], esp. 3–4.

[278] His first wife had died some eighteen years earlier. The new bride was an Englishwoman, a Ms Formsby, who had been earlier converted to Islam at Karachi. The *nikah* was performed by a *qazi* in the rooms above the CKC's offices in Bombay. A large crowd of Muslim volunteers had gathered outside the building at the time of the ceremony and the general attitude was reported to be one of disappointment at the marriage. See *The Times*, 22 Apr. 1932.

EPILOGUE

Pan-Islam in India was indeed the result of various socio-political factors interacting during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Religion, of course, was the binding link but it was ponderously cloaked in political dialectics to facilitate *ittihad* against the western military and cultural onslaught. By no means, however, it evoked a monolithic response. There were several variants and the Khilafat movement typically symbolized the Indian variant. Viewed in this context, the Indian Muslim involvement with Turkey and the Ottoman caliphate falls in place. With the sentimental adherence to the archaic fiction of a 'central' caliphate as a backdrop, the ferment of the 1920s also fits into the general pattern of earlier Islamic movements—from the Waliullahi revivalism in the eighteenth-century India to the Sarekat-Islam and the Muhammadiyya in the early twentieth-century Indonesia.[1] Originally, the Khilafat issue was raised by a small body of individuals known for their pan-Islamic sympathies. It was quickly seized by politicians of radical views with the avowed object of fighting the British rule in India. The delay by the Allies in settling a peace treaty with Turkey, caused as much by the rival claims to the fragments of the former Ottoman Empire as by the withdrawal of the United States from peace negotiations, gave the Khilafatists a godsent opportunity to build up widespread support in their favour. In these efforts, the Indian Muslim residents of Britain and their European Turcophile friends played an important part. With the entry of the *'ulama*, the movement acquired strength. Gandhi's participation widened its scope because it was through his influence that the Hindus were drawn into it. The non-co-operation experiment and the *hijrat* campaign witnessed a new phase of popular involvement in the political agitation. Never before since the fateful days of 1857

[1] The vast expanse in between was filled in by the followers of the Tariqa-i Muhammadiyya of Sayyid Ahmad, the Faraizis of Bengal, the 'Baghis' of the Revolt of 1857–8, the *mujahidin* of Sittana, the upsurges in the Central Asia (from the 1850s), the Sanusiyya of Libya (from 1881), the pan-Islamic activism of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (from the 1880s), and the Iranian movements of the 1890s. This is an extension of W. C. Smith's argument. See his *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton, 1957), 52.

had the Indians demonstrated such enthusiasm and capacity to suffer and sacrifice for their cause.

But in spite of its wide support and many-sided activities the Khilafat movement failed to achieve its objectives, i.e. the preservation of the Ottoman Empire along with its caliphate and the attainment of *swaraj* for India. Secret war time treaties, a strong anti-Turk bias of the Allied governments, and the inherent weaknesses of the complex movement itself, had combined to cause the disappearance of the illusive shadow that the Khilafatists had been chasing. On top of this, when the Turks abolished the anomalous institution of the caliphate in March 1924, the mirror reflecting their fantasy was completely shattered. In these circumstances, the tenuous Hindu-Muslim entente, which had been under considerable strain, broke down completely. Communal and political rivalries reappeared and the movement collapsed in due course.

Behind these apparently simple explanations, however, dwell issues of great complexity and significance. To begin with, the Khilafat movement, though born of pan-Islamic ideology, was not just 'an adventure in altruism' or merely 'the concomitant of romanticism', as some writers have suggested.[2] True, pan-Islam as an ideal had romantic attraction for many but the Indian Muslim involvement with the Ottomans had been both a psychological and a political compulsion. The dwindling fortunes of the later Mughals and the tragic enormity of the collapse had confronted them with the stark reality of political impotence. With the minority syndrome already working as an impelling force, the reaction triggered off a process which pushed the latent feelings of pan-Islam into nationalistic grooves. But what the Khilafatists were after was something more ambitious. They were pursuing the salvation of Muslim sovereignty and power abroad and with it the security of the Muslim community in India. This dual concern became obvious when the Muslim League, at its Delhi session in December 1918, expressed its 'unmitigated' fear at the adverse influence the collapse of the Muslim Powers would have on the political importance of the Muslim community in India.[3] It was to avert this situation that the Khilafatists claimed *status quo ante bellum* for Turkey and *swaraj* for India as their goals.

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[2] My view gives a different perspective than the arguments advanced by I. H. Qureshi (*The Muslim Community*, ch. xiii) and Moin Shakir (*Khilafat to Partition*, 64).

[3] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1584, file 2272/1919.

In order to provide a mass base to the agitation, the Khilafatists conceived their strategy within the parameters of religion. 'We can reach mob only through religion', Mohamed Ali is reported to have once remarked.[4] In composing the religious tune the *'ulama* played a significant role. Their doctrinal submission to the ideal of a 'universal' caliphate was passionately sincere and classical in tradition. But whereas the politicians had invoked religious symbols to 'reach mob', the motive force of the *'ulama*'s action intertwined the twin spheres of religion and politics. To say, as some do, that in their actions the Khilafatists were moved only by personal or political ambitions,[5] is too laden an approach. Basically, the British Indian *'ulama* were moved, as in the nineteenth century, by a threat to the nomocratic ideal of Islam and a challenge to their own power within this system. They had tried in 1917 to assert the role of the *shari'at* in the administrative activity of the government, but the attempt had been a failure.[6] This convinced the *'ulama* that if they were to save Islam (as they understood it) and salvage their position, they must share the political leadership of the community. This point was calculatedly expressed by Abdul Bari, to whom goes the credit of imparting religious colour to a political movement. He was enthusiastically supported by other *'ulama*, one of whom agreed with him that

> ... until the *'ulama* take the reins of politics in their own hands and cross their voices with those in authority, it will be difficult for them to establish their religious supremacy. Moreover, the fulfilment of their higher aims [i.e. the protection of Islam] will remain merely an empty dream.[7]

It was this motivation which had driven most of the *'ulama* to dream of an hierarchy of their own—a sort of a 'religious and jurisprudential imperium in imperio' under a *shaikhu'l-Islam* or *amir-i Hind* directly responsible to the Ottoman caliph;[8] it was the same motivation which

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[4] Mohamed Ali later denied this. See Sarwar, *Maulana Muhammad 'Ali*, 277.

[5] See Robinson, 'Professional Politicians in Muslim Politics', 372 ff.; and id., *Separatism*, 354.

[6] See ch. ii, 91.

[7] Abul Mahasin Muhammad Sajjad to Abdul Bari, 4 Dec. 1918, *Nuqush*, 109 (1968), 91. Eng. tr. mine.

[8] P. Hardy, 'The Ulama in British India', paper presented at the Centre of South Asian Studies, SOAS (London, July 1969). Also see his *Partners in Freedom and True Muslims* (Lund, 1971), 12–13; Ghaffar, *Asar-i Abu'l-Kalam Azad*, 67–8; and M. U. Haq, *Muslim Politics in Modern India*, 88–104.

led them to create a religio-political organization, called the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind, and to make common cause with the political élite. But though this concord between the *'ulama* and the politicians was formidable, it failed to rise above the immediate issues or to give a clear and definite lead to the Muslims of India. And yet, in spite of their failings and follies like *hijrat* and the funds scandal, the *'ulama* and the politicians together imparted to the Khilafat movement a dynamism that turned it into one of the most eventful episodes of Indian history.

The role of the Indian Muslim residents of Britain has never been properly appreciated or even assessed. The fact is that the Khilafat movement in its embryonic stage was nurtured by these very people. In the first place it was Mushir Kidwai who had urged Abdul Bari to action and had kept him informed of the trends of events in the European capitals. The Central Information Bureau and other Muslim organizations such as the London Muslim League, the two Islamic societies and even the Woking Mission of the Lahori Ahmadis, supported by the British Turcophiles, did the difficult job of high-lighting the Indian feelings on the Turkish issue. The secret and confidential files of the British Foreign Office and the India Office testify to the efforts made by these bodies and individuals in this connection. It was only after the tempo of the Khilafat movement became increasingly radical that the moderates among them, the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali in particular, began to take a cautious course.

As for the measure of support which the Khilafatists were able to win from the rest of the Muslim world there is no evidence of any overt expression. Indian pan-Islam seems to have been largely a one-way process. In any case, since the last war, the Arabs and the Turks had been concerned with their own immediate problems and could ill-afford to get involved in issues outside their immediate concern. Above all, the professed aims of the Khilafat movement were in direct contradiction of the nationalistic aspirations of the Arabs and the Turks. The latter, in particular, seemed to exploit the Indian agitation to their own advantage as an instrument of their foreign policy. So did the Afghans. Their attitude during the *hijrat* campaign is a good example of their real intentions. The Bolsheviks, too, exploited the Khilafatists though initially they themselves had invoked the Russian help for their grandiose anti-British scheme. At best the Bolshevik aid was illusory and the Khilafatists were unenamoured of any ideological trappings of communism, except perhaps a few like

Hasrat Mohani who sympathized with some of its aspects. Even those few that got to Russia during *hijrat* and renounced Islam to espouse the 'religion' of Karl Marx (1818–1883) were unable to influence the course of the Khilafat movement. The *émigré* communist party of India, which they established at Tashkent in October 1920, did not have any noticeable impact on what was going on in India.

A unique aspect of the Khilafat movement was that the minority community had launched its struggle without any commitment from the majority community. The process of co-operation between Hindus and Muslims was slow and it took almost a year before the Congress was finally persuaded to bless this collaboration. Gandhi, who had joined the movement at an early stage, was the key-man in this affair. However, the final Congress approval did not come until the Khilafatists had tacked the 'Punjab' issue with the Khilafat question and had promised to observe strict non-violence in the campaign. But quite apart from the 'Punjab' as a bait for Hindu co-operation, the Khilafat issue had come to acquire a wider significance. The Hindu leaders who collaborated with the Khilafatists in the struggle for *swaraj* were also moved by a desire to advance India's political interests. It was this synchronization of political interests that, more than anything else, tied the two communities together. In other words, it was a marriage of convenience and not a genuine *rapprochement*. Whatever the nature of the compromise, it drove the nationalist leadership to spurn the process of devolution under the British political system and to choose instead the path of non-co-operation. The moderates and the provincial leaders rushed to fill in the political void but the situation remained fluid until after the 1920s when the nationalists grudgingly decided to join the constitutional arrangement unfolded by the British.

Their efforts notwithstanding, the Khilafatists were unable to mobilize the whole of India. Apart from the elusive support of the masses, large and influential sections even among Muslims—including some *'ulama*—had kept themselves aloof or gave only verbal support. The *'ulama* of Bareilly never joined the movement and those of Deoband took almost a year to decide in its favour. Some like Muhammad Shafi, Fazl-i-Husain, Syed Reza Ali, the Raja of Mahmudabad and others, rejected extremism of any kind and wanted a 'reasonable' settlement of the Turkish question primarily through co-operation with the government. Some others again questioned the Khilafatists' intentions or had strong ideological differences. The Shi'as and the

Qadianis in particular questioned the Ottoman right to the caliphate. Yet others, like Khan Bahadur Nabi Bakhsh, not only opposed the movement but, with the help of some *maulawis*, also launched a counter campaign. The attitude of the Hindu-Muslim moderates and liberals was reflected even more clearly in their stance towards the methods employed by the Khilafatists in extracting concessions from the government. The particular subject of controversy was non-co-operation which they feared was too extreme a step. Mohammad Ali Jinnah's case is in point. His concern for Turkey was never in doubt but, both by temperament and by strategy, he was opposed to this 'unconstitutional' measure. For nearly three years, Jinnah remained behind scenes, doing his bit quietly, and returned to active politics only when the agitation began to subside. But then the 'extremists' themselves were not unanimous on the issue of non-co-operation, especially with regard to its extension to educational institutions, professions and councils. Even within the Khilafat organization a powerful group led by Chotani was constantly at loggerheads with the radicals. This cleavage was especially witnessed at the third Khilafat Conference in Bombay (February 1920) over the question of subversion in the army and still later, in the summer of that year, when the Khilafatists decided to push the non-co-operation scheme in all its four stages. As time passed, the differences widened and spread to such other issues as civil disobedience, council entry, and, more important, to the question of non-violence. The divisions among the leaders, in the end, adversely affected the course of the movement.

The Khilafatists also failed to influence the British policy. The British government of Lloyd George showed no compassion for the Indian Muslim case. The Khilafat movement was summarily rejected as a 'fictitious' agitation. But then the Turkish problem involved the clash of interests of the Allied Powers. It also had some inherent contradictions—the conflicting ambitions of the Turks, the Arabs and even the Greeks. On top of this, Lloyd George pursued his own anti-Turkish policies, constantly disregarding the Indian government and the India Office, overriding the Foreign Office, and ignoring the General Staff. No doubt, he allowed the Indian Muslims to represent their case to the peace conference and to himself but, in the final settlement with Turkey, the Muslim pressure had little effect. Even when the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, it was the Turkish arms rather than the Indian memorials that accomplished the feat. But this did not mean that

there was no concern in the official circles about the Indian Muslim attitude towards the Khilafat issue. In fact, the Muslim unrest was the chief worry of the Government of India and of the India Office. Therefore, in spite of the narrow grooves of the Imperial policy within which they had to manoeuvre, the India Office under Montagu (and later under Peel) and the Government of India under Chelmsford and Reading for reasons of expediency tried their best to exert sympathetic influence in any final settlement with Turkey. The same tactical reason moved them to adopt, as far as the agitation was concerned, a policy of non-interference where it was useful and a policy of repression where it was effective. The majority of the local governments would have preferred to use stronger measures and they often did so. But the Government of India, in search of uniform all-India policy and checked by its legal advisors, exercised a restraining influence on its satraps. However, where the provincial governments exceeded limits as in the Punjab in summer 1919 and in Bengal in winter 1921, it invariably upheld their actions, even if the measures employed had been unusually stringent.[9] The India Office exercised but an exiguous control over the policies of the Indian government. It generally did not criticize it either as going too far in the direction of non-interference, or as being unduly repressive.[10] But the important fact is that the Government of India managed to come out relatively unscathed from the six troubled years of the Khilafat movement. Long gone, however, were the days when the British used to believe that 'our military force is the exclusive tenure by which we hold the government'.[11] What sustained them in India now was a much broader based set-up than mere brute force originally conceived and enforced.

The last phase of the Khilafat movement was marred by scandals, political factionalism, personal squabbles and, worst of all, Hindu-Muslim dissensions. As the famous Turkish author Halidé Edib (1883–1964) points out, the Khilafat movement had 'two curiously contradictory results in India, that of uniting the Muslems and Hindus

[9] The policy pursued by the Govt. of India towards the Khilafat movement can best be followed from the instructions which it issued from time to time to the local govts. and more appropriately if they are studied in relation to the chronological background of the main stages of the movement they were defined to deal with. For details see IOI&R, I./P&J/6/1696, file 5273/1920.

[10] See ibid.

[11] These words of Henry Russell were quoted by Lord William Bentinck in his minute dated 13 Mar. 1835. See Philips, *Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck*, ii, 1448.

around a common activity; and that of dividing them'.[12] Human failings, diversity of interests, inability to sustain a common effort and above all a reaction consequent to the collapse of the non-co-operation experiment had ended an entente which rested on weak foundations. But contrary to popular misconception, the break-up was a slow process. Even the Mappila 'revolt' had no widespread communal repercussions. Nor did Gandhi's action to postpone the projected civil disobedience in February 1922, result in any immediate Hindu-Muslim parting. In fact, both the communities continued to profess and follow the same course for quite some time. It was towards the middle of 1922 that relations began to worsen. It took a full year before the gulf widened and yet another year before it finally became unbridgeable.

Another very important point which emerges is that the Khilafat movement did not end with the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, the natural culminating point of the Turkish crisis. On the contrary, the agitation continued on the secondary, and in fact flimsy, issue of the freedom of the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* from non-Muslim control. Even when the Turks abolished in March 1924 the caliphal office, 'the last visible symbol of an outworn power structure',[13] the movement, though greatly reduced in intensity, did not terminate. The Khilafatists simply would not accept the *fait accompli*. This naturally takes one back to the earlier contention that the defence of the Khilafat was only a façade. The real issue was the defence of the Muslim power abroad and with it the security of the Muslim position in India. But the Khilafatists were unable to face the reality that pan-Islam was only a mirage, a tenuous bond. A synthesis between pan-Islam and Indian nationalism for a better future in a multi-national state was something they could not work out. After the abolition of the caliphate, the Khilafatists did try to divert their attention from extra-territorial matters to domestic issues, but they had no solution for them. Besides, the Khilafat organization was now so faction-ridden that it had lost its credibility. The All India Muslim Conference and later the All India Muslim League under Jinnah seemed to be more suited to take up the challenges.

But in spite of the fact that the Khilafat movement was brought into play for specific objectives and that it failed to institutionalize

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[12] Edib, *Inside India*, 9–30.
[13] Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, 68.

itself as a permanent political party with a philosophy of its own—a recurring phenomenon among Muslims—it has left an indelible mark on the history of the Subcontinent. It was the first all-India agitation of the Indian Muslims with a central organization to guide its course. It transformed the psyche of the people, trained them in political agitation and made them conscious of their potentialities. It gave birth to new political alignments. Areas hitherto lagging in political experience, such as the Punjab, Sind and the Frontier, responded side by side with Bombay, Bengal and the UP which had well-established political traditions. It brought the Hindus and the Muslims on one platform for the first and the last time. It also produced a leadership which, though concerned with the immediate issues, was able, with varying fortunes, to sustain the agitation for more than six years. The anatomy of leadership would reveal the preponderance of urban middle class educated élite to almost the total exclusion of the landed aristocracy which reappeared only after the movement had failed and the Muslim League started to stage a come-back. At its zenith the Khilafat organization was more representative than either the Muslim League or the Congress and it acquired such importance and influence that at one stage even Dr Chaim Weizmann (1874–1952), the Zionist leader, was anxious to win its support in his relations with the Arabs on the question of Palestine.[14] The influence of the CKC, even at the fag end of the movement, was evident from the part it played in the 1924–25 internecine war in the Hijaz and the anxiety of Ibn Saud to please it.[15]

In the final analysis, one can say that the movement unwittingly bequeathed a pattern of politics with which the Muslims of India have been familiar ever since. Its most important feature was the massive scale on which religion was imported into politics. The enor-

[14] Years later, in Jan. 1931, Shaukat Ali disclosed to the British high com. in Palestine that during the Khilafat movement Dr Weizmann had sent his brother to India to see Mohamed Ali. Weizmann had made an offer to the effect that the Jews would agree to the Muslims having Jerusalem and a corridor from Jaffa to Jerusalem if the Indian Muslims would agree to the Jews having the rest of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and in fact, the whole of Arabia except the Hijaz and the Nejd. If such an agreement could have been made the Jews would have agreed to finance Turkey, which was then in great straits. Note of the interview dated 24 Jan. 1931, in IOI&R, L/P&S/10/1314, file 1449/1931.

[15] See Central Khilafat Committee, *Riport numa'indagan-i Majlis-i Khilafat-i Hind* (Bombay, [1926]).

mous response it evoked showed how potent the religious symbols could be in mobilizing popular support for political purposes. This enabled the Muslims later to strengthen the case for Muslim nationalism as distinct from Indian nationalism. Of course, pan-Islam was not forgotten as the sentiment continued to find expression in the writings, speeches and actions of various Muslim leaders. As late as 1937, Kidwai fancied that the Muslim states would prosper only through a pan-Islamic outlook with the caliphate as its rallying-point.[16] The Cambridge-based Pakistan National Movement of Choudhry Rahmat Ali (1897–1951) also aimed at uniting Muslim India ultimately with an undefined pan-Islamic 'Pakasia'.[17] The attempts to resurrect the caliphate, too, had some romantic appeal about them but unlike in Egypt, where the claim of young King Faruk (1936–52) attracted notice,[18] there were no such pretensions in India. The revived Muslim League under Jinnah, though it supported the Palestine issue and the Indonesian independence,[19] was concerned basically with domestic issues. After a few more years of experiments and frustrations, the Indian Muslims finally realized that the solution of their problem lay neither in narrow nationalism nor in doctrinaire 'universal' Islamism, but in some kind of an Islamic 'League of Nations'. 'It was within the concept of this multi-national neo-pan-Islamism', writes Aziz Ahmad (1913–1978), 'that Iqbal evolved the theory of Pakistan'.[20] The history of the idea of Pakistan, however, has had a chequered evolution and the role of the Muslim League is often overrated[21] but

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[16] See M. H. Kidwai, *Pan-Islamism and Bolshevism* (London, 1937), 88, 238–9.

[17] Choudhry Rahmat Ali, *The Millat and the Mission* (Cambridge, 1942), 1–18. Also see Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 169.

[18] Landau, *Politics of Pan-Islam*, 240–5. The charade lasted until the 1940s when the inauguration of the Arab League changed the slogan from pan-Islam to pan-Arab union. It was only then that 'the ambition of an Egyptian Caliphate died a most reluctant death'. See Kedourie, 'Egypt and the Caliphate', 242. Also see IOL&R, L/P&S/12/230, files PZ 2934/1937, PZ 3000/1937, PZ 2401/1938, PZ 2471/1938 and PZ 4483/1938.

[19] Atique Zafar Sheikh and Mohammad Riaz Malik (eds.), *Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim World* (Karachi, 1978), 1–155 and 181–213; Sirir Gupta, 'Islam as a Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Policy', in Donald E. Smith, *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton, 1966), 441–2, 446 and 448; and Sandeep Chawla, 'The Palestine Issue in Indian Politics in the 1920s', in Mushirul Hasan, *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends*, 43–58. But Chawla mistakenly believes that the Palestine question was a side issue (p. 44). In fact, Palestine was the core of the Khilafat agenda as it was part of the territories which the Indian Muslims wanted restored to the caliph's rule.

[20] Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism*, 140.

[21] K. K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan*, i, xiii, 184–327 and iii, 670–724.

no one can deny that the establishment of Pakistan was a remarkable feat in itself. Jinnah, of course, favoured a more modernist set-up for the new state—though not quite like the Turkish model of Atatürk whom he so admired[22]—but the *'ulama* and the traditionalists continued to demand an Islamic polity, reminiscent of the early caliphate.[23] The adoption of the Objectives Resolution in March 1949 and the occasional Islamic conferences since then depict an anxiety to co-ordinate pan-Islam.[24] Such activities when channelled through bodies like the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Motamar al-Alam al-Islami, have brought back the old western fears of Islam as a militant, expansionist and rabidly anti-Christian 'fundamentalist' combine.[25] But unlike the nineteenth century, this neo-pan-Islam does not aim at the union of the Muslim peoples under one central authority but rather seeks to ensure their participation in the international community. Turkey was able to absorb the idea of secular national-territorial identity under Kemal[26] but in Pakistan the national motives are still deeply imbedded in the basic contradiction between classical Islamism and modern nationalistic concepts which only mirror the unresolved conflicts that somehow defy prognosis.[27]

[22] For Jinnah's views and his concept of Pakistan as a state see the report filed by the BBC correspondent, Robert Stimson, 'Pakistan after the Death of Jinnah', in *The Listener*, 40/1033 (11 November 1948), 709–10; and Waheed-uz-Zaman, 'Quaid-i-Azam's Vision of Pakistan', in A. H. Dani (ed.), *Quaid-i-Azam and Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1981), esp. 238–9. For his adulation of Mustafa Kemal see, M. Naeem Qureshi, 'Muslims of British India and the Kemalist Reform in Turkey: Iqbal, Jinnah and Atatürk, 1924–1938', *Atatürk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi*, 12/35 (1996), esp. 385–6.

[23] The discussion can be followed in Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley, 1961), 70 ff.; and Freeland Abbott, *Islam and Pakistan* (Ithaca, 1968), 183 ff.

[24] The Objectives Resolution, originally designed to outline state policy, now forms part of the constitution. See Govt. of Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, 5/5 (1949), 65–102. The Islamic summit conferences are now a regular feature of the Islamic community.

[25] John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York, 1992), *passim*.

[26] Sadiq, 'The Turkish Revolution', esp. 26–39.

[27] See e.g. forum discussion in *Jang* (mag. sect.), 30 Sept.–6 Oct. 1988. Dr Israr Ahmad and Chaudhari Rahmat Ali are two of the most ardent proponents of the caliphal system, especially in Pakistan. See Israr Ahmad, *Khutbat-i Khilafat* (Lahore, 1996); and Chaudhari Rahmat Ali, *Khilafat: kyun aur kaise?* (Lahore, n.d.); id., *Daru'l-Islam* (Lahore, 1985); and id., *Khilafat: hamare jumla masa'il ka hal* (Lahore, 1991); and Markazi Tabligh Academy, Lahore, *Almi tahrik-i Khilafat* (Lahore, n.d.).

APPENDIX A

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDIAN KHILAFAT CONFERENCE*

Objectives

1. The objectives of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind shall be as follows:

(a) To maintain and promote the power and authority of the *Khilafat-i 'uzma.*
(b) To take such a decision about the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* and the holy places [of Islam] as shall be in conformity with the Islamic *shari'at.*
(c) To strive for the attainment of *swaraj* in India.

In pursuance of the above mentioned objectives:

(a) To make the Khilafat movement a success in India and the other countries.
(b) To establish brotherly relations with the Muslims of foreign countries.
(c) To promote understanding and unity with the non-Muslim communities of India.
(d) To remove mutual conflicts among the Muslims of the world.
(e) To make the non-co-operation movement a success, and to plan for the educational, cultural and social uplift of the Muslims.
(f) To help in the organization of workers' and peasants' parties, and to adopt such other measures as may be deemed necessary from time to time.

Sessions

2. With a view to considering the ways and means of achieving the afore-mentioned aims and objects, the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind shall hold an annual session, usually in the month of December, which shall be called the Khilafat Conference. The Central Khilafat Committee (Majlis-i Markaziyya Khilafat) shall determine venues and

* Eng. tr. mine. Some portions, however, have been adapted with amendments from K. K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement* (Karachi, 1972).

dates [for these sessions] about which mention will be found below. In addition to the annual session, the Central Khilafat Committee shall, either by its own decision or on the written demand of at least three provincial Khilafat committees, convene an extraordinary session of the Khilafat Conference at a suitable place. In case this is done on the demand of the provincial Khilafat committees, the period of at least one month must intervene between the decision and the session.

Central Khilafat Committee

3. The duties of adopting necessary measures for the realization of the objectives of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind and for executing the sanctioned plans shall be entrusted to a committee of the Jam'iyyat, called the Central Khilafat Committee (Majlis-i Markaziyya Hind).

4. The total strength of the Central Khilafat Committee shall be two hundred and fifty (250), not counting in this figure the central President, other central office-bearers, and one president and one secretary from each provincial Khilafat committee. The provincial Khilafat committee shall elect the members of the Central Khilafat Committee as follows:

NWFP	10	Madras	21
Punjab	30	Andhra	05
Delhi	03	Central Provinces	12
Agra	30	Berar	08
Awadh	10	Karnatak (Carnatic)	05
Bihar	15	Maharashtra	05
Bengal*	40	Bombay City	12
Assam	08	Gujarat & Kathiawar	09
Burma	05	Sind	13
Orissa	03	Rajputana, Mewar & Central India	06

* Note: Out of Bengal's forty seats ten (10) shall go to the Calcutta Khilafat Committee. In the Madras presidency, Kerala shall get five (5), Mysore and Bangalore two (2) each, and Madras fourteen (14).

5. Where a province does not have a provincial Khilafat committee, the Central Khilafat Committee from amongst its own elected members shall elect its members.

6. The provincial Khilafat committees shall, normally, hold these elections for the members of the Central Khilafat Committee in the

month of October, and shall communicate the results [to the central organization] in the first week of November.

7. The Central Khilafat Committee shall hold one meeting in the month of December during the session of the Khilafat Conference in which all office-bearers, except the president, shall be elected.

8. The elected president of the annual Khilafat Conference shall be the president of the Central Khilafat Committee for the next month [*sic* for year ?].

9. The office-bearers of the Central Khilafat Committee shall be as follows: one president, two vice-presidents, six secretaries, and one treasurer.

Note: One of these six secretaries shall be secretary finance.

10. The tenure of the members and office-bearers of the Central Khilafat Committee shall be one year. The tenure of members shall run from 20 December to 19 December [each year], and that of office-bearers from 1 January to 31 December. Office-bearers and members shall be eligible for re-election in the following year.

11. In case an office falls vacant in the course of the year, the Central Khilafat Committee shall elect one of its members to the vacant office for the remaining period of the tenure.

12. In case the seat of a member falls vacant in the course of the year, the relevant provincial Khilafat committee shall fill the vacancy by electing a new representative.

13. The Central Khilafat Committee shall, for the execution of its duties, make and adopt such rules and regulations as are not incompatible with this constitution, and shall meet from time to time in accordance with these rules and regulations.

14. The Central Khilafat Committee shall be convened in a special meeting if at least twenty-five of its members demand this in writing provided that a notice of at least two weeks is given for such a meeting.

15. The secretaries of the Central Khilafat Committee shall present before it, in the meeting held during the annual conference, the report and a statement of accounts relating to the year's work.

The Working Committee

16. (a) In its first meeting the Central Khilafat Committee shall appoint, from among its own membership, a working committee (*Karkun Kameti*) which shall be made up of all the office-bearers and eleven other members of the Central Khilafat Committee. (b). During the period between any two meetings of the Central Khilafat Committee, the Jam'iyyat-i 'Ama [working committee?] shall have all the rights of the Central Khilafat Committee. (c). The president of the Central Khilafat Committee shall also serve as president of the working committee.

Provincial Khilafat Committees

17. The following provinces shall have provincial Khilafat committees, whose offices shall be located at the places mentioned opposite the name of the province. In cases where the place of the central office is not determined or where the place named needs to be changed, a provincial Khilafat committee is authorized to make the required change with the consent of the Central Khilafat Committee:

Province	*Headquarter*	*Province*	*Headquarter*
1. NWFP	[Peshawar]	12. Bengal	Calcutta
2. Punjab	Lahore	13. Central Provinces	Nagpur
3. Agra	Aligarh	14. Gujarat Kathiawar	Ahmadnagar
4. Awadh	Lucknow	15. Maharashtra	-
5. Berar	Akola	16. Karnatak	Belgaum
6. Sind	Karachi	17. Madras Presidency	Madras
7. Bombay City	Bombay	18. Andhra	Coconada
8. Rajputana, Mewar & Central India	Ajmer	19. Burma	Rangoon
9. Delhi	Delhi	20. Assam	Sylhet
10. Bihar	Muzaffarpore	21. Kerala	Calicut
11. Orissa	Cuttack	22. Mysore	Bangalore

18. The Central Khilafat Committee shall have the authority to alter the area of jurisdiction of any province, but before doing so it must consult the provincial Khilafat committee.

19. Each provincial Khilafat committee shall consist of
    (i) elected representatives of district committees;
    (ii) a fixed number of the representatives of workers' and peasants' parties; and
    (iii) provided that the province deems it advisable, two members elected by the elected representatives of the district committees.

Election of these members shall be held every year in the month of October under the rules made by the provincial Khilafat committee.

20. Each provincial Khilafat committee shall establish Khilafat committees in the districts and in the mofussil lying within its jurisdiction, and shall make for the establishment and organization of such committees, such rules and regulations as are not incompatible with this constitution or with the rules and regulations adopted by the Central Khilafat Committee.

21. All provincial Khilafat committees shall be affiliated, and be subordinate, to the Central Khilafat Committee, and shall work in accordance with its directions.

22. The Khilafat committee of each province shall, for the execution of its duties, make and adopt such rules and bye-laws as are not incompatible with this constitution or with the rules of the Central Khilafat Committee, and shall send one copy of such rules and bye-laws to the Central Khilafat Committee for its information. In the same manner, the district committees and the mofussil committees shall, with the approval of the provincial Khilafat committee, make such bye-rules as are not incompatible with this constitution and with the rules of the provincial Khilafat committee and with those of the Central Khilafat Committee, and shall send one copy of these to the provincial Khilafat committee.

23. The Central Khilafat Committee shall have the authority to disaffiliate any subordinate committee for an infringement of the rules and regulations and to establish another committee in its place, provided that a two-thirds majority in a meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee carries such a decision. Like authority shall be vested in the provincial Khilafat committees to disaffiliate their subordinate committees, but it shall be required that they get prior approval from the Central Khilafat Committee.

Membership of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind

24. Every adult of sound mind, on accepting the aims and objects of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat and on paying the annual subscription of four annas, can become a member of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat. He shall be required to sign, or put his thumb impression, on a form carrying his acceptance of the aims and objects of the said Jam'iyyat.

Electors and Representatives of the Khilafat Conference

25. The provincial Khilafat committees shall elect the representatives who shall participate in the Khilafat Conference.

26. Any person who is not a member of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat, or who has defaulted in the payment of his subscription, shall not be eligible for election as representative.

27. The quota of representatives of a province shall be calculated by multiplying the number of its seats in the Central Khilafat Committee by the figure of fifteen. The provincial Khilafat committee shall distribute this number among the various districts and groups, and shall, for this purpose, make rules. The representatives to the Khilafat Conference shall be elected fifteen days before the date of the conference.

28. The provincial Khilafat committees must reserve a certain portion of the representatives for workers and peasants.

29. The provincial Khilafat committee shall give a certificate to each representative on the production of which, and on the payment of the fixed entrance fee, he shall be entitled to participate in the conference.

30. Only the elected representatives shall be entitled to take part and vote in the Khilafat Conference.

31. Besides the representatives, a certain number of visitors shall be allowed to attend the conference; the Reception Committee shall determine their number and entry fee.

32. The entrance fee for the representatives shall be determined by the Central Khilafat Committee.

The Reception Committee

33. With a view to making arrangements for the holding of an ordinary or extraordinary session of the Khilafat Conference, the provincial Khilafat committee of the province in which the session is to be held shall appoint a reception committee, such an appointment being made at least three months before the date of the session, if it is an ordinary session, and a reasonable time before the date of the session, if it is an extraordinary session.

34. The amount of subscription to be paid by the members of the reception committee shall be fixed by the provincial Khilafat committee.

35. The reception committee shall elect a chairman and other office-bearers from among its own membership.

36. The reception committee shall be entrusted with the task of collecting money to defray the expenses of the conference, of making all arrangements for the holding of the session and for the board and lodging of the guests. Within two months of the end of the session, the reception committee shall present to the provincial Khilafat committee an audited account of its income and expenditure and shall deposit the surplus, if any, with the provincial Khilafat committee.

Election of the President

37. The president of an ordinary session of the Khilafat Conference shall be elected by the Central Khilafat Committee in accordance with the majority opinion of the provincial Khilafat committees. In the month of September all provincial Khilafat committees shall send the name of the nominee to the Central Khilafat Committee. All the nominations thus received shall then be sent to the provincial Khilafat committees, and each provincial Khilafat committee shall recommend one name out of the list sent to it. The election of the president must be held in the first week of the month of October. The president of an extraordinary session shall be elected by the Central Khilafat Committee in its own meeting.

38. In case of the resignation, death, illness or incapacity of the elected president, the Central Khilafat Committee shall, by a majority vote of its members, elect a new president.

39. The president shall not be a resident of the province in which the session of the conference is to meet.

Subjects Selection Committee

40. For an ordinary or extraordinary session of the Khilafat Conference, the subjects selection committee shall be made up of the members of the Central Khilafat Committee. It shall have the authority to co-opt a maximum of ten members.

41. The subjects selection committee shall meet at least one day before the session of the conference in order to discuss all matters to be put before the conference and to make proposals on them. If need arises, the committee shall meet from time to time during the session of the conference. The elected president of the conference shall serve as president of this committee.

42. All proposals shall be placed before the subjects selection committee before being presented to the conference.

43. The committee shall discuss all such proposals as have been received from, or presented by, the secretaries of the Central Khilafat Committee, members of the Central Khilafat Committee, members of the provincial Khilafat committees and members of the reception committee. Other proposals, sent in by the representatives, can also be considered with the permission of the president. No person who is not a member of the subjects selection committee can speak [in the committee] without the permission of the president.

44. The president of the subjects selection committee has the authority to permit a person who is not a member of the committee to take part in the proceedings of the committee and to express his opinion on any matter which is under discussion in the committee.

45. No proposal or amendment which has been rejected by the subjects selection committee shall be put before the conference, unless the member who desires to present such a proposal or amendment has, during the meeting of the committee, given notice of his intention to do so to the president.

46. This constitution, with the exception of the aims and objects of the Jam'iyyat, can be amended, repealed, or added to by the Central Khilafat Committee by a two-thirds vote of the members present. The aims and objects can be amended, repealed, or added to by the conference by a two-thirds majority vote of the members present. All such changes shall be effected only after due notice through the agenda.

Supplementary Rules of the Central Khilafat Committee adopted by the Executive Committee (Jama'at-i 'Amila) at its Meeting in Bombay

1. The Central Khilafat Committee shall be bound by the laws and rules of the constitution of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat, and by its own supplementary rules.

2. The provincial Khilafat committees shall be bound by the laws of the constitution, the supplementary rules of the Central Khilafat Committee, and their own supplementary rules which shall not be incompatible with the constitution and with the supplementary rules of the Central Khilafat Committee.

3. The district and mofussil Khilafat committees shall be bound by the laws and rules of the constitution, the supplementary rules of the Central Khilafat Committee, the supplementary rules of the Khilafat Committee of their province, and their own supplementary rules which have been adopted with the approval of the provincial Khilafat committee and are not incompatible with the constitution, the Supplementary rules of the Central Khilafat Committee and the supplementary rules of the relevant provincial Khilafat committee.

4. Proposals approved by any of the Khilafat committees shall be deemed to form a part of its supplementary rules and, as long as these are not repealed or amended, shall be followed and observed by it and by its subordinate committees.

5. All elections to the membership of the Khilafat committees shall be conducted in conformity with the constitution of the Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind.

Meetings

6. The Central Khilafat Committee must meet at least once in a period of three months, but it can meet more often if conditions require this.

7. The meeting shall be convened by the president or by the secretary with intimation to the president.

8. As laid down in Article 14 of the constitution, if the secretaries received a written intimation for holding a meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee, it shall be their duty to convene a meeting within two weeks of the receipt of such a requisition.

9. The date, venue and agenda of every meeting must be sent to each member normally two weeks before the holding of the meeting. In special circumstances, it shall be considered sufficient notice if the date of the meeting is conveyed only to the provincial Khilafat committee and sent to the press for publication.

10. The quorum for the meetings of the Central Khilafat Committee shall be twenty-five, and meetings shall be postponed if this quorum is not available.

11. Besides the proposals appearing on the agenda, such others can also be considered [by the Central Khilafat Committee] as have been received in the central office one week before the meeting. In special

circumstances, proposals, which do not fall into either of the above categories, can also be presented with the permission of the president.

12. Every meeting shall be presided over by the president or, in his absence, by a person elected by a majority vote of the Committee.

13. Proposals shall be considered in the order in which they appear on the agenda; however, the president shall be entitled to change the order.

14. Each proposal and amendment must have one mover and one seconder.

15. Decisions shall be taken by [simple] majority vote. The president shall have only one, casting vote.

16. The president shall be entitled to call for all amendments within a specified time, and to adjourn the discussion on a proposal or amendment owing to its special importance and to name another hour for its consideration.

17. The president shall pronounce the decision on all points pertaining to the rules and laws.

18. The president shall keep the meeting in order, and shall be authorized to eject from the meeting any member who disobeys him.

19. Every member is entitled to move for the guillotine of debate. Such a motion shall be directly voted upon and, if it has the support of the majority, further discussion of the proposal shall be stopped.

20. The president shall, normally, take the vote by show of hands; but in important matters he may order a ballot.

21. The president is authorized to stop any discussion if, in his opinion, it tends to be personal in nature.

22. On the motion of a member that the meeting ought to be adjourned, proceedings shall stop and a vote shall be taken on the adjournment proposal. The decision shall be arrived at by [simple] majority. The mover of such a proposal may name any period of adjournment.

23. Every member is entitled, with the permission of the president, to speak in support of or in opposition to a proposal, and to place a time-limit for this purpose [*sic*].

24. The president is entitled to name his replacement for the duration of his temporary absence.

The Executive Committee

25. In accordance with the rules of the constitution, the executive committee shall consist of the office-bearers of the Central Khilafat Committee and eleven other persons elected in the session of the Central Khilafat Committee. The quorum of this committee shall be five.

26. The executive committee shall be governed in its proceedings by the same rules as obtained in the case of the Central Khilafat Committee.

27. The executive committee shall meet as and when required.

28. This committee shall act as the working committee of the Central Khilafat Committee, and shall carry out its task in accordance with Article 16 of the constitution.

29. The executive committee shall supervise organization and operation of all offices, and shall take such steps in pursuance of this as are not incompatible with the [Central Khilafat Committee] rules.

30. The [meetings of the] executive committee shall be [convened] by the president or two secretaries.

31. The executive committee shall approve the budget of the provinces.

32. The executive committee is authorized to draft, from time to time, supplementary rules for the organization and working of the different departments of the Central Khilafat Committee.

33. The executive committee shall receive and decide all appeals against the decisions and orders of the provincial Khilafat committees and those against the executive committee by the Central Khilafat Committee.

Rights and Duties of Office-Bearers

34. The president shall, normally, supervise all proceedings of the Central Khilafat Committee and of the provincial Khilafat committees.

35. The president of the conference shall be the president of the Central Khilafat Committee and the president of the executive committee.

36. (a) The duties to the secretaries shall be allotted by the executive committee. (b) It shall be the duty of the secretaries to present before the executive committee and the Central Khilafat Committee a three-monthly budget and income-expenditure account.

Funds: Income and Expenditure

37. All funds shall be deposited in the name of the Central Khilafat Committee in one or more banks named by the executive committee.

38. The treasurer may keep with him as petty cash of not more than rupees two thousand.

39. The fund shall be deposited either in a deposit account with limited duration or in a current account, as need be. The executive committee may authorize one or more office-bearers to draw the money.

40. The Khilafat funds shall be the responsibility of the executive committee.

41. With the exception of the sanctioned, specified expenses no money shall be spent without the approval of the executive committee.

42. In cases of urgency, the president may spend up to Rs 1,000 and a secretary up to Rs 500, provided that sanction for this is obtained from the executive committee in its first meeting [held after the money has been withdrawn].

[43. There is no Article of this number in the constitution.]

44. The Central Khilafat Committee alone shall be authorized to change or amend the budget.

45. Each provincial Khilafat committee shall present to the executive committee two half-yearly budgets in each year, and shall be entitled to spend the sanctioned amount from its income. The surplus, if any, shall be sent to the Central Khilafat Committee every month. No provincial Khilafat committee shall retain more than Rs 2,000 without the permission of the executive committee.

46. The provincial Khilafat committee budget shall contain, in addition to the expenses incurred by the office of the provincial committee, all the expenses incurred by the district and mofussil committees. The provincial Khilafat committee shall prepare its budget after taking into consideration the budgets of all the district and mofussil committees.

47. No district and mofussil committee shall retain more than Rs 200 without the approval of the provincial Khilafat committee and shall deposit [the rest of] the receipts with the provincial committee.

48. All receipts for the amounts received by the Central [Khilafat] Committee shall be issued by the financial secretary and the money received [from the subordinate committees] shall be deposited in a bank through the concerned secretary and accountant.

49. All expenditure in excess of Rs 500 must be approved by the president.

Appointment, Demotion, and Discharge of the Employees

50. The appointment, demotion, and discharge of the employees drawing a salary of less than Rs 50 shall be the purview of the secretary, subject to the approval of the president.

51. The appointment, demotion, and discharge of the employees drawing between Rs 50 and Rs 100 per month as salary shall be the purview of the president, subject to the approval of the working committee.

52. The appointment, demotion, and discharge of the employees with more than Rs 100 salary shall be with the president, subject to the approval of the working committee.

53. In cases of demotion and discharge by the secretary, the appeal shall be decided by the president [of the Central Khilafat Committee] and in case of the president, by the working committee.

Miscellaneous

54. The admission fee for the delegates to the Khilafat Conference shall be rupee five per person but none for the members of the working committee.

55. The honorary office-bearers and employees of the Central Khilafat Committee, when on tour for the Khilafat work, shall be entitled to disbursements at the following rates: (a) honorary office-bearers of the Central Khilafat Committee and members of the working committee shall be given a second class [railway] fare and other necessary expenses; if accompanied by a servant, they shall receive a third class fare with travelling and daily allowances; for 'Bi-Amman' and her secretary (if accompanying) shall be given a second class fare with necessary travelling expenses; and her maidservant shall receive a third class fare with daily allowance; (b) other workers of the central

organization whose salary is Rs 75 or above shall be entitled to an inter class fare and other necessary travelling and daily allowances; and those whose salary is less than Rs 75 shall receive a third class fare and travelling and daily allowances.

56. Disputes concerning elections to district and provincial committees shall be decided by the concerned provincial committees and those pertaining to the provincial committees by the working committee of the Central Khilafat Committee.

Secretary
Central Khilafat Committee, India

Source: Central Khilafat Committee, *Dastur-i asasi Jam'iyyat-i Khilafat-i Hind* (Bombay, 1923), IOL&R, Urdu D. 716.

APPENDIX B

MANIFESTO ON BEHALF OF THE ALL-INDIA KHILAFAT CONFERENCE

I—The Moslem Claim

The claim on behalf of Muhammadans of India in connection with the Turkish Peace Terms may be divided into two sections:

(1) regarding the Khilafat; and
(2) regarding what is called 'Jazirat-ul-Arab' and the Holy Places of Islam.

The claim regarding the Khilafat consists in leaving the Turkish Empire as it was at the time of the war, with such guarantee being taken by the League of Nations as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of Non-Moslem races living within the Turkish Empire, consistently with the dignity of a sovereign state.

The second section of the claim consists in the sovereignty over 'Jazira-tul-Arab', i.e. Arabia as defined by Moslem religious authorities, and the custody of Holy Places of Islam. Arabia as thus defined is bounded by the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates and the Tigris. The Holy Places include the three sacred Harams, namely, Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, and the Holy Shrines, namely, Najaf, Kerbela, Samarra, Kazimain and Baghdad. In reality this claim is included in the first, but it is distinguishable from it in that custody of the Holy Places has ever since the establishment of Islam been under the Khilafat and unlike the boundary of the latter, which has fluctuated from time to time, has never suffered any diminution whatsoever. This claim does not exclude genuine Arab self-Government, but it does exclude the present arrangement because those who know, understand the unreality behind it. The claim now said to be made by Sheriff Hussain and by Amir Feisul is inconsistent in fact with their acceptance of even the spiritual sovereignty of the Khalifa.

II—Argument

The claim is primarily based upon the religious requirements and the sentiments of the Muhammadans of India in common with those of Muhammadans all the world over, and is supported, so far as the Khilafat, the Harams and 'Jazira-tul-Arab' are concerned by testimony from the Quran, the traditions of the Prophet, and for the rest by other religious authority. It is further supported regarding the Holy Places by the deliberate declaration of the Government of India on behalf of His Majesty's Government as also the Governments of France and Russia of 2nd November 1914, which says: 'In view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey which to the regret of Great Britain had been brought about by the ill-advised, unprovoked and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, His Excellency the Viceroy is authorised by His Majesty's Government to make the following public announcement in regard to the Holy Places of Arabia including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the post [*sic*] of Jedda, in order there may be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's Government in this war in which no question of religious character is involved. These Holy Places and Jedda will be immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy Places and shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given them similar assurances'. The great regard paid in this declaration to the sentiments of His Majesty's most loyal Moslem subjects is especially noteworthy. On the 5th January 1918, Mr. Lloyd George, claiming to speak in the name of the whole Empire, made the following remarkable pronouncement: 'We are not fighting to deprive Turkey of Constantinople or the rich renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which were predominantly Turkish racially'. President Wilson's 12th point in his message to the Congress dated 8th January 1918 is in equally emphatic term, viz., that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities now under Turkish Rule should be assured security of life and autonomous developments.

Thus the reduction of the Muhammadan claim by hair's breadth will not only be a violation of the deepest religious feelings of the Muhammadans, but will also be a flagrant violation of the solemn

relevant declarations and pledges made or given by responsible Statesmen representing Allied and Associated Powers and given at a time when they were desirous of enlisting the support of the Muhammadan people and soldiery.

III—Consequences

It is necessary to state the likely consequences of a wrong decision on the part of the Imperial Government or the Allied and Associated Powers. The claim is supported by practically the whole of the Hindu population of India. It has assumed therefore an Indian National Status. The population of the British Empire is predominantly Hindu-Muhammadan, as will appear from the following figures:

Total population	435,000,000.
Hindus	243 millions.
Moslems	(In India) 72 millions and (outside India, but within the Empire) 30 millions.

The policy of the British Government has been definitely stated to be that of making India an equal partner. Recent events have awakened India to a sense of dignity. In these circumstances the British Empire as one consisting of free nationalities can only hold together by maintaining an attitude of absolute impartiality among the three chief communities—the Hindus, the Muhammadans and the Christians. It is therefore urged that the British Ministers are bound not merely to press the Muhammadan or rather the Indian claim before the Supreme Council but to make it their own. If, however, for any reason whatsoever they fail to do so and the Supreme Council also fails to perform the elementary duty of giving effect to the declarations that brought about an Armistice, it is futile to expect peace in India, and the Khilafat Conference will fail in its duty if it hesitated to warn His Majesty's Ministers that an affront put upon 7 crores of Muhammadans in India supported by 23 crores of Hindus and others will be incompatible [*sic*] with the expectation of blind loyalty. Beyond that, it is impossible for the conference to foresee the results. It may be added that even if the members of the Conference attempted seriously to pacify the Muhammadan mind, it is futile to expect that

they would succeed in healing the wound that would be made in the heart of Muhammadan India by the denial of justice and breach of pledges and matter of vital importance to that community.

Source: IOL&R, L/P&S/10/798, file 2591/1920.

APPENDIX C

THE *MUTTAFIQA FATWA* ON NON-CO-OPERATION

[The *fatwa* was presented at the Delhi sessions of the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind and later published in the *Zamindar* of Lahore (5 August 1921) under the signatures of Abul Muhasin Muhammad Sajjad, Nazim, Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama, Bihar. As is customary, the *fatwa* was set in a question-answer form.]

I—Questions

(1) What is the significance of co-operation and what sort of co-operation is forbidden and what sort of non-co-operation is advisable to practise under the Muhammadan law with the enemies of Islam? What are the injunctions of the *Shariat* in regard to the man who co-operates (with the enemies of Islam)?

(2) Is it co-operation to become members of the Councils of the Government of India, to practise as *vakils* and *mukhtars*, etc., to receive education or to have children educated in official or semi-official schools and colleges, to receive educational grants from the Government and to accept the posts of honorary magistrates and titles granted by the Government?

(3) Are military and civil posts under the Government which keep the administration firm and strong forbidden to Muhammadans in existing circumstances?

(4) Is the use of British goods which is a help to the British nation forbidden in present circumstances?

(5) Is social intercourse and the obtaining of help in any matter from a non-Muslim who is not resolved to show enmity to Muslims permitted by the *Shariat*?

(6) Is it allowed by the *Shariat* to accept the pious suggestion of a non-Muslim for the attainment of any religious object and to act upon it, which is apparently tantamount to following a non-Muslim?

II—Answers to the above questions

(1) The word co-operation is used to express friendship and mutual help in the Arabic language and the phraseology of the *Shariat*? [*sic*]

(2) The reply is in the affirmative, because evidently all these things create attachment with the Government.
(3) All services under the Government which help it are forbidden, especially police and military employment. This is the worst sin because one has to fire on one's Muslim brethren.
(4) Undoubtedly it is unlawful and forbidden to purchase goods from and sell to the enemies of Islam.
(5) Undoubtedly social intercourse and unity with a non-Muslim who is not hostile towards the Muslims is permitted by the *Shariat*.
(6) It is permitted to accept or to act on any pious suggestion of a non-Muslim which is not opposed to the injunctions of the *Shariat*.

Source: SBR, Appendix to Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, 43/38, 1 Oct. 1921.

APPENDIX D

THE MAPPILA 'REBELLION' OF 1921–22

The Malabar district in the Madras province of British India, since the very early days of the East India Company's rule, had been the storm-centre of recurring violent disturbances. Contemporary, as well as recent, writings on the Mappila outbreaks have given widely divergent interpretations on their ideology, causes and nature—from purely religious application to a simplistic Marxist interpretation.[1] The million odd Muslim Mappilas, who cultivated the land, were a hybrid race of Arab settlers and Dravidian women; though many of them were converted Cherumars and even Nayadis, the 'slave castes' of South India.[2] Being the oldest Muslim community in the Subcontinent (from around the seventh century) the Mappilas were imbued with a heightened sense of Islamic solidarity. The arrival of the Portuguese in the

[1] See, for instance, William Logan, *The Malabar Manual, 1887*, repr. as *Malabar*, i (Madras, 1951); P. Holland-Pryor (ed.), *Mappilas or Moplahs: Class Handbook for the Indian Army*, Government of Madras (Madras, 1904); C. A. Innes, *Madras District Gazetteers: Malabar and Anjengo* (Madras, 1915); G. R. F. Tottenham, *The Mappila Rebellion, 1921–22*, Government of Madras (Madras, 1922); John J. Banninga, 'The Moplah Rebellion of 1921', *Moslem World*, 13 (1923), 379–87; C. Gopalan Nair, *The Moplah Rebellion, 1921* (Calicut, 1923); R. H. Hitchcock, *A History of the Malabar Rebellion, 1921*, Government of Madras (Madras, 1925); E. M. S. Nambudiripad, *A Short History of the Peasant Movement in Kerala* (Bombay, 1943); id., *The National Question in Kerala* (Bombay, 1952); Kathleen Gough, 'Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India', *Pacific Affairs*, 16/4 (1968-69), 526–54; T. C. Varghese, *Agrarian Change and Economic Consequences: Land Tenures in Kerala, 1850–1960* (Bombay, 1970); Stephen F. Dale, *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar, 1498–1922* (Berkeley, 1980); id., 'The Mappilla Outbreaks: Ideology and Social Conflict in Nineteenth Century Kerala', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 35/1 (1975), 85–97; id., 'The Islamic Frontier in South West India: The Shahid as a Cultural Ideal Among the Mappillas of Malabar', *Modern Asian Studies*, 11/1 (1977), 41–55; Conrad Wood, 'Historical Background of the Moplah Rebellion: Outbreaks, 1836–1919', *Social Scientist*, iii (1974), 5–33; id., 'The First Moplah Rebellion against the British Rule in Malabar', *Modern Asian Studies*, 10/4 (1976), 543–56; Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., 'The Mappilla Rebellion, 1921: Peasant Revolt in Malabar', ibid., 11/1 (1977), 57–99; and Roland E. Miller, *Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends* (Madras, 1976), 146–53.

[2] In 1921, out of a total of 2,865,285 Muslims in Madras Presidency, 1,009,453 were Mappilas. See *Census of India, 1921*, 13, part 1, 64 and 160. For the history, origin and economic standing of the Mappilas, see Logan, *Malabar*, i, 190–9; and Edgar Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, iv (Madras, 1909), 455–501.

fifteenth century and the destruction caused by them turned the Mappilas extremely anti-European. It was the starting point of the Mappila's dwindling numbers, poverty, backwardness and insularity. They recovered in the eighteenth century under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan but the re-establishment of the economic hegemony of the Hindu landlords by the British successors widened the gulf between the communities. The revolts became practically endemic, particularly in the Ernad and the Walluvanad *taluqs* of south Malabar.[3] The Mappilas were, of course, 'frugal, industrious and enterprising'[4] but they were unusually poor and heavily bent under the arbitrary exactions of the Hindus Nambudri and Nair *janmis* and the oppressive government increases in the land tax. The woeful condition of the Mappila was no different from that of other cultivators throughout India, but in spite of the various investigative commissions during the nineteenth century nothing had been done to free him from an exacting system of land tenure.[5] The conditions in South Malabar, where the Mappila population was heavily concentrated, were particularly bad, and it was probably 'the most rack-rented country on the face of the earth'.[6] At the same time being a cultivator of land in private estates, the Mappila was not directly liable to such increases and had been forced into acquiescence by an enactment of the government.[7] The severity equally affected the Hindu *kanamdars* but the Mappila *verumpattomdars* were turbulent men of strong religious feelings with a firm, though somewhat distorted, conviction in the Islamic doctrine of *jihad*, which they invoked almost as a glorified ritual to obtain the signal honour of becoming a *shahid*.[8] Thus, the killing of a *janmi* who evicted them became a merited death and the fight against the infidel government

[3] Dale, *Islamic Society*, 33–62 and 79–85; Miller, *Mappila Muslims*, 60–94 and 100 ff.; and Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885–1947* (Delhi, 1989), 49.

[4] Parl. Papers, 1921, Cmd. 1552, sect. B., 38.

[5] For various inquires, see Hardgrave, 'The Mappilla Rebellion, 1921', 62–5.

[6] M. Moberly, *Report of the Settlement of Malabar District*, Government of Madras (Madras, 1900), 9.

[7] J. Dacosta, 'The Moplahs and the Land Tax in India', *India*, (June 1896), 169. For the Mappilas' relations with the landlords, see W. Logan, ed., *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Other Papers of Importance Relating to British Affairs in Malabar*, Government of Madras (Madras, 1891), 151; V. K. John, 'The Land System of Malabar', in T. K. G. Panikkar (ed.), *Malabar and its Folk*, 3rd ed. (Madras, n.d.), 252–64; and A. C. Mayer, *Land and Society in Malabar* (Bombay, 1952), *passim*.

[8] The subject has been dealt with at length by Dale in his above mentioned two articles.

which made those laws a religious virtue.[9] No wonder that during the British rule there had been as many as 35 serious Mappila outbreaks.[10] The outbreak of 1921–22 sustained this tradition of violence in Malabar with one crucial difference: this time it had also a political ideology and a formal organization.[11]

Malabar was though away from the centres of political activity in British India, it had, nevertheless, been susceptible to events in the rest of the country. At the end of World War I when Indian Muslims developed the Khilafat movement, the Mappilas, whose reverence for the sultan-caliph at Istanbul was well-known, were naturally drawn into the agitation. They were attracted to the Khilafat movement in April 1920 after a conference at Manjeri.[12] By June, a Khilafat committee had started directing the movement in Malabar and was followed by the establishment of similar committees throughout the district though many of them soon collapsed owing to financial difficulties.[13] By the following year, nearly 200 committees were working under both Muslim and Hindu leaders.[14] Then in September, Shaukat Ali, accompanied by Gandhi, descended on Malabar on a propaganda tour.[15] The Khilafat movement helped to improve Hindu-Muslim relations and restored unity in an area which had been notorious for communal hatred.[16] But *jihad* and *ahimsa* could hardly go together. The Khilafat-non-co-operation propaganda heightened the religious feelings of the Mappilas without imbibing in them the spirit of non-violence. And the Hindu non-co-operators had taken no less a leading part in inciting the Mappilas to take up arms against the British. Dressed as Mappilas, they went about addressing meetings and even making speeches in mosques.[17] Agrarian discontent and

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[9] Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, iv, 476. For the case of the Hindu tenant, see K. K. Nair, 'Malabar Land Tenure', *Madras Mail*, 10 Aug. 1922. The *janmi*'s case is given in K. M. Nayar, *Tenancy Agitation in Malabar* (Calicut, 1922).

[10] Details of some serious outbreaks are given in Government of Madras, *Correspondence on Moplah Outrages in Malabar for the year 1849–53* (Madras, 1863), *passim*; Holland-Pryor, *Mappilas or Moplahs*, 10–15; and Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, 471–80.

[11] Dale, 'The Mappilla Outbreaks', 97.

[12] Miller, *Mappila Muslims*, 131.

[13] Hardgrave, 'The Mappilla Rebellion, 1921', 67.

[14] Miller, *Mappila Muslims*, 132.

[15] Banninga, 'The Moplah Rebellion of 1921', 381.

[16] *West Coast Spectator*, 8 Feb. 1921, cited in Nair, *Moplah Rebellion*, 11.

[17] See the proceedings of the case against M. P. Narayana in *Madras Mail*, 28 July 1922. Also see 'Riport tahqiqat-i hawadis-i Malabar', in Miyan, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama kya hai?*, 168; and Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 206–329.

economic issues were exploited along with religious grievances: there was to be no private property in the new state, no expensive litigation, no costly government buildings and expensive machinery of administration. In fact the whole administrative system was to be changed in the light of the Qur'anic precepts.[18] By early 1921, the situation was extremely tense. So much so that Mappila volunteers defiantly drilled and paraded the streets in Turkish uniforms.[19]

Malabar being a 'danger spot', the local government became extremely apprehensive of the spread of the agitation. In February 1921, it imposed a ban on the Khilafat meetings in Ernad.[20] When the Madras Khilafat leader Yakub Hasan—'that d-d [damned] swine Yakub Hasan' as Lord Willingdon used to call him[21]—decided to defy the ban, the authorities reacted by arresting him along with some Mappila leaders.[22] The incident exasperated the Mappilas and every subsequent act of repression increased their fury. A number of minor clashes took place between the volunteers and the police in the first half of the year.[23] In midsummer came the fateful resolutions of the all-India Khilafat Conference at Karachi proposing the establishment of an Indian republic which gave the Mappilas the belief that the end of the British Raj was at hand.[24] Rumours also spread that Amir Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan was about to invade India and, with the aid of the Ali brothers and Gandhi, was going to establish a Khilafat Kingdom.[25] But the spark that kindled the flame was provided by the Hindu manager of Pukkottur estate who had some agrarian dispute with his tenant V. Mohammad, the secretary of the local Khilafat committee and a close friend of the influential sexagenarian Mappila leader and *'alim*, Ali Mussaliar (1861–1922). At the

[18] See the extracts from a speech of one of the Mappila leaders in Bamford, *Histories*, 175–6.

[19] Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 18–20. Also see Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel., no. 866, 5 Sept. 1921; and Willingdon to Reading, 18 Sept. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[20] Tottenham, *Mapilla Rebellion*, 4.

[21] Willingdon to Butler, 26 Aug. 1921, IOL&R, Butler Papers.

[22] Willingdon was prepared to take action against other Khilafat leaders also. 'If Mahomet or S[haukat] A[li] come down here', he wrote emphatically to Montagu, 'I shall have to do the same thing'. See Willingdon to Montagu, 16 Feb. 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[23] Willingdon to Montagu, 25 Feb. 1921, ibid. Also see Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 20–5.

[24] For the Karachi resolutions see *Hindu*, 14 July 1921.

[25] See *Council of States Debates, 1921*, ii, 92. Also see the public prosecutor's case in *West Coast Spectator*, 6 Oct. 1921, in Nair, *Moplah Rebellion*, 18–19.

manager's instance the police, on 31 July 1921, carried out a search of his premises on the alleged charge of housebreaking. The search of the Khilafat leader threatened to provoke a serious crisis but through the mediation of Kunhi Koya Tangal, the president of the Malappuram Khilafat Committee, the trouble was averted for the time being. Nevertheless, the government felt insulted and set in motion the Malabar Offensive Weapons Act and the Moplah Outrages Act of 1854. Consequently, on 20 August, Ali Mussaliar, against whom the authorities seemed to hold a grudge, and several other Mappila Khilafatists were arrested.[26]

The Tirurangadi arrests, coming as they did after prolonged and grave police provocations, let loose the pent-up Mappila feelings and sporadic violence broke out in the *taluq*s of Ernad, Walluvanad and Ponnani. The fury was first directed against the European and Indian officials and Hindu *janmi*s and money-lenders, whom they identified as the oppressors, and then turned on the Hindus in general as reprisals for betraying their cause and assisting the authorities in suppressing the 'rebellion'. Besides, the majority of the police force was Hindu and the oppression to which the Mappilas had been subjected naturally turned them against the policemen's Hindu co-religionists. In their enthusiasm, the Mappilas forcibly converted many Hindus to Islam, though no exact figure is available. Mappila loyalists of the government also became frequent targets. The rioters attacked the military and the police, burnt and looted government and private property, pillaged Manas and Kovilagams, destroyed revenue records and obstructed communications. They virtually brought the civil administration to a standstill and tried to find their solace in a 'Khilafat Kingdom' of their own with Khilafat tribunals to try the renegades. Streams of refugees poured into Calicut. The situation became even more serious when the disgruntled sepoys of the recently disbanded Mappila Regiment, which had seen service in Iraq, joined the 'rebels' and making use of their professional skill directed the raids and organized the retreats. As soon as they discovered that the government had increased their troops the Mappilas changed their tactics and resorted to a kind of guerrilla warfare which ideally suited the topography.[27]

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[26] Nair, *Moplah Rebellion*, 21–7; and Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 220.

[27] Parl. Papers, 1921. Cmd. 1552, sect. A., 4–37; Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 35–140; and Nair, *Moplah Rebellion*, 27–127. Also see Willingdon to Reading, 22 Aug. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers; Willingdon to Montagu, 9 Sept. 1921, IOL&R,

The 'rebellion' which moved well into 1922, was suppressed by military force under cover of martial law with the utmost severity.[28] Especially brutal was the transportation of Mappila prisoners in goods trains. On one occasion sixty-four out of one hundred died through asphyxiation, heat and exhaustion in an ill-ventilated 18 x 9 x 7 ½ feet wagon.[29] The Hindus rejoiced over the tragedy as 'a just retribution' for 'all the horrors' committed by the Mappilas,[30] but the indifference shown by the provincial administration in fixing the responsibility and punishing the guilty was more unfortunate. This was in spite of the revulsion with which the news had been received in Britain and the concern shown by Montagu.[31] The government later gave a paltry compensation of rupees three hundred to each of the families of the deceased prisoners.[32] In all, during the outbreak, 2,339 Mappilas were killed, 1,652 wounded, 5,955 captured and 39,348 surrendered to the military or to the police.[33] The number of prisoners in jails in April 1923, excluding a very large number which had been transported to the island of Andamans, was 7,900. Fines worth over a million rupees were imposed which, in majority of cases, the Mappilas failed to pay because of their abject poverty.[34] Military casualties were 24 killed and 103 wounded, and among the police 24 were killed and 29 wounded. The number of civilian population killed was estimated between 500 and 600.[35] The martial law remained in force for six months until the outbreak finally collapsed with the capture and execution, in January 1922, of the 'Khilafat King', Variankunnath

Montagu Papers; and *Madras Mail*, 14 and 22 July 1922. The number of Hindus forced to Islam as converts is not available though a Hindu source puts it at the incredible figure of 4,000. See K. G. Choudari, *The Indian Political Craze* (Bezwada, 1922), 37.

[28] See the report of the operations in Malabar by the C-in-C in *Madras Mail*, 23 Mar. 1923.

[29] IOL&R, L/P&J/6/1778, file 7247/1921; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 447, 29 May 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and *Madras Mail*, 15 Dec. 1922.

[30] Willingdon to Montagu, 29 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[31] Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. (P & P), 22 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers. For the train tragedy and its inquiry see Gov. of Madras to Viceroy, Tel. no. 1649, 21 Nov. 1921, in ibid.; Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tels. nos. nil, 1198, 83, 400 and 774, dated 24 Nov. and 7 Dec. 1921, 26 Jan., 8 and 29 May 1922, ibid.; Willingdon to Reading, 27 May 1922, ibid.; Sec. of State to Viceroy, Tel. no. 774, 29 June 1922, ibid.; and *Madras Mail*, 15 Dec. 1922.

[32] *Hindu*, 4 May 1922.

[33] *Legislative Assembly Debates, 1923*, iii, part 7, 4792.

[34] Nair, *Moplah Rebellion*, app. xi, 88. Also see *Madras Mail*, 6 Dec. 1922.

[35] Ibid., 58.

Kunhamath Haji—though the last of the leaders was not captured until towards the end of August 1922.[36]

As on previous occasions when there had been a Mappila outbreak, an attempt was made to present the 1921–22 incident as a violent expression of pure religious fanaticism; an organized Khilafat-Congress rebellion 'to upset the British Raj'; and essentially an anti-Hindu outbreak.[37] Agrarian discontent was simply dismissed as a myth.[38] A deeper acquaintance with the subject will, however, show that religion was only a channel through which the discontent found escape. The outbreak was neither premeditated nor even a rebellion. The Hindus had a large share in bringing about the disturbances and took an active part in looting and damaging property, particularly in the south eastern areas of Walluvanad, the *taluq* of Calicut and a few isolated places in Ernad.[39] One such Hindu, M. P. Narayana Menon, a Vakil of Angodipuram, who was later tried for his part in the outbreak, is reported to have declared at a meeting:

> The British Government is at an end, the British Government have no troops. If the Moplahs remain united they can easily overthrow the present Government and establish a Khilafat rule instead; all should be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the Khilafat cause.[40]

What is more important is that large sections of the Mappilas, especially in Mampad, Edvanna, Ponnani and Oorgaum, under the influence of their leading men and in the true Pukkoya Tangal tradition,[41] had remained strongly opposed to the outbreak.[42] Some of them well treated the captured British soldiers and set them free.[43] A Ponnani

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[36] For the court judgements against some Mappila leaders and their Hindu collaborators see Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 206 329.

[37] See *Madras Mail*, 22 and 30 Aug. 1921; *Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 Aug. 1921; *Englishman*, 24 and 26 Aug. 8 Sept. and 28 Oct. 1921; and *The Times*, 29 Aug. and 8 Sept. 1921. Also see *Legislative Assembly Debates, 1921*, ii, 131–55, and *Council of States Debates, 1921*, ii 88–110. For Willingdon's views see Willingdon to Reading, 13 Sept. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers; and Willingdon to Montagu, 28 Sept. 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.

[38] Banninga, 'The Moplah Rebellion of 1921', 380. Also see *Madras Mail*, 16 Nov. 1921.

[39] Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 3.

[40] *Madras Mail*, 28 July 1922.

[41] In the 1850s, the Tangal had issued a pamphlet strongly denouncing the outbreaks as opposed to true religion. See Innes, *Malabar*, 89.

[42] Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 16, 18 and 47. Also see *Madras Mail*, 27 July 1921; and *Pioneer* 29 Dec. 1921.

[43] See encls., Montagu to Reading, 3 Nov. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

Mussaliar even obliged the government by issuing a pamphlet, laced with verses from the Qur'an, advising Muslims to remain loyal to the British.[44] The Mappila policemen, too, had loyally stood by the government.[45]

The causes of the outbreak, in fact, were far deeper and predominantly agrarian though other factors had combined to make the conflagration. The pitiable condition of the poverty-stricken cultivator of south Malabar was a direct provocation in itself. Those among the British administrators who had realized the growing dangers of agrarian trouble in Malabar, William Logan in 1884 and C. A. Innes in 1913 for instance, had strongly urged the adoption of land reforms.[46] But nothing had been done to improve the situation. It is not surprising, therefore, that as late as 1919, disorders in Malabar were being sparked off by agrarian disputes.[47] The outbreak of 1921–22 was no exception. Here and there contemporary opinion almost shyly admitted that the convulsion was due to the agrarian grievances of the tenants against the *janmis*.[48] Even Reading, who believed that the Khilafat propaganda was the main cause of the 'rebellion', considered agrarian discontent as a 'predisposing factor' and opened correspondence with Willingdon to examine the question of tenancy law reform which he thought was desirable in the interest of the future peace of Malabar. 'We have in regard to Malabar', Reading wrote to Willingdon, 'to aim not merely the restoration of order but also at the conversion of the Moplahs into peaceful and loyal citizens, and it may be that agrarian reform would be a powerful influence in this direction'.[49] It is fair to argue that if the outbreak had not been agrarian in nature the Mappilas from the comparatively better off parts of Malabar would not have remained aloof or sided with the government.

But though the agrarian grievances were the underlying factor, other contributory causes had combined to produce the eruption: the perceived threat to Islam, inflammatory newspaper reports, provocation by government officials and police were all there but the

[44] Tottenham, *Mappila Rebellion*, 4.

[45] Hitchcock, *Malabar Rebellion*, 165–7.

[46] Dacosta, 'The Moplahs and the Land Tax in India', 170; and Reading to Willingdon, 26 May 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

[47] *Hindu*, 13 Feb. 1919.

[48] See *Legislative Assembly Debates, 1921*, ii, 133; *Council of States Debates, 1921*, ii, 92; *West Coast Spectator*, 9 Aug. 1921, in Nair, *Moplah Rebellion*, 36; and K. Menon's view in *Hindu*, 15 June 1922.

[49] Reading to Willingdon, 26 May 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.

Khilafat-non-co-operation movement acted as a catalyst. However, one very important factor, so far overlooked by writers on Malabar, was the neglect by the government of the Mappila country in the educational and socio-economic field. According to a leaflet issued by the Madras Publicity Board in 1921, as many as 945 out of each thousand Mappilas were illiterate.[50] The Mappila children were taught in special elementary schools which kept them isolated from other communities. The education they received was mostly religious and the *maulawis* who were engaged to teach them were themselves anti-British and thoroughly involved in the Khilafat movement. Before the outbreak these teachers were reported to have carried on a systematic anti-government campaign which explains how a large number of the Mappila youth joined the 'rebels'.[51] It is significant that wherever the government had undertaken any educational or socio-economic work for the amelioration of the Mappilas, as at Tanur, the latter had refrained from taking an organized or active part in the outbreak.[52]

The policy of the government makes an interesting study. The provincial administration of Governor Willingdon, by its O'Dwyerian 'ring fence' policy, had always sat tight even on legitimate political activity and had held the Khilafatists-non-co-operators at bay. Willingdon fervently believed that the trouble in Malabar was due to the Khilafat/non-co-operation propaganda.[53] Therefore, the policy of the local government had been to frighten the people by a rapid and drastic squashing of the rising.[54] The Government of India was sympathetic to the predicament of the Madras government and fully approved of the action taken as regards the introduction of *de facto* martial law[55] and in dealing with the 'extremist' leaders.[56] But since the memory of the Punjab disturbances of April 1919 had always haunted the Indian government,[57] it tried to keep the Madras government within bounds.[58] Even then the severity with which the army

[50] Parl. Papers, 1921, Cmd. 1552, sect. B., 38.
[51] *Madras Mail*, 26 July 1922.
[52] See the extract from the Administrative Report for 1921–22 by J. Hornell (Director of Fisheries) in *Madras Mail*, 7 Dec. 1922.
[53] Willingdon to Reading, 13 Sept. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.
[54] Willingdon to Montagu, 7 Sept. 1921, IOL&R, Montagu Papers.
[55] Viceroy to Gov. of Madras, Tel. no. 802, 24 Aug. 1921, IOL&R, Reading Papers.
[56] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 866, 6 Sept. 1921, in ibid.
[57] See e.g. Reading to Willingdon, 19 Sept. 1921, ibid.
[58] See e.g. Willingdon to Reading, 6 Sept. 1921, ibid.; Madras Gov.'s letter no.

and the police had dealt with the outbreak was much more than was called for. After the suppression of the outbreak, the provincial government made sure that the Khilafat-Congress leaders did not join the relief measures lest they should get the credit for peacefully ending the trouble. The government wished to show that it was only the long arm of the *sarkar* which could maintain peace in the country.[59] It also appears that the Madras government gave an exaggerated account of the destruction caused by the Mappilas. Otherwise, even in November 1912, a report indicated that 'cultivation proceeded everywhere and no land [was] lying waste'.[60] And in February 1922, it was reported that:

> In Ernad, which has suffered most, recent sales of markets and liquor shops attracted good competition and fetched good prices. There is heavy road traffic in arecanuts, ginger, coconuts, timber and even paddy; agricultural operations are in fair progress in many amsoms. . . . Prices are not unduly high.[61]

Another report for the same month stated that:

> Ploughing and sowing [is] in progress in most amsoms. Recent sales of tolls in Ernad and Walluvanad fetched 10 percent. above last year's prices.[62]

By the end of July 1922, the situation had improved considerably. Taken as a whole, the agricultural operations in Malabar had not suffered much. On the contrary, the area under cultivation in the three affected *taluq*s was slightly above the average for the corresponding period during the last five years. The prices of paddy and rice remained unchanged and had actually fallen in Walluvanad.[63] In short, contrary to popular belief, Malabar did not suffer a massive devastation, and even if it did the recovery was miraculous.

The effects of the Mappila revolt on the Khilafat movement, except perhaps in the areas directly involved in the outbreak, were not immediately discernible. No doubt, the tragedy seriously threatened Hindu-Muslim unity and for a time it looked as if the Hindus would

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M-217, 4 Jan. 1922, in Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 331, 30 Mar. 1922, ibid.

[59] See Viceroy to Sec. of State Tel. no. 886, 5 Sept. 1921, ibid.

[60] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 1088, 8 Nov. 1921, ibid.

[61] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. F-241/1, 22 Feb. 1922, ibid.

[62] Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. F-241, 27 Feb. 1922, ibid.

[63] *Madras Mail*, 8 Aug. 1922.

withdraw from the movement. A contemporary Hindu writer taunted that the outbreak was 'a standing and monumental illustration of the transient bubble of the Hindu-Muslim unity' which could burst 'by a puff of the mouth'.[64] But fortunately for the leaders, though the Hindus intensely resented the outbreak, the unity survived the strain put upon it. The incident remained an isolated event and evoked no immediate fanatical Hindu-Muslim convulsions in other parts of the country. Nor did it rupture immediately, as is often alleged,[65] the Hindu support for the Khilafat movement. The nationalist leaders, however, were hard put to appease the Hindu feelings. They treated the issue with the utmost delicacy, for any wrong move would have killed the non-co-operation experiment. Already in November 1921, the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind had declared that if the stories of the Mappila atrocities were proved correct then certainly their actions were reprovable.[66] In December 1921, at the Ahmedabad sessions of the Khilafat Conference, the Muslim League and the Congress, took extra care to cool down tempers and laid the entire blame for the outbreak at the door of the government.[67] Thus, Ajmal Khan, the president of the Khilafat conference and acting president of the Congress sessions, declared that their sympathies should be with all the sufferers, whether Hindus or Muslims, and sincerely regretted 'these deplorable incidents'.[68] Hasrat Mohani, the president of the League sessions maintained that where there was no British interference the Mappilas and their Hindu neighbours lived side by side in complete harmony.[69] Vallabhbhai Patel, the chairman of the Congress reception committee, in his speech almost pretended as if there had been no Mappila outbreak at all and declared unabashedly that the relations between Hindus and Muslims were not 'negatively friendly' but rather they had been 'actively working together for the advancement of the national cause'.[70] The resolutions passed at the sessions also reflected these attitudes. The Khilafat conference after sympathizing with the Mappila sufferers, condemned not only the

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[64] Choudari, *The Indian Political Craze*, 36–7.
[65] See e.g. G. T. Garrat, *An Indian Commentary* (London, 1928), 153.
[66] Miyan, *Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama kya hai?* ii, 46.
[67] *Pioneer*, 28 Dec. 1921; and *Report of the 36th Indian National Congress Ahmedabad, 1921*, 17.
[68] Ibid.
[69] AFM/NAP, AIMLR, xcvii.
[70] *Report of the 36th Indian National Congress*, 11.

government atrocities but also those Mappilas who had been responsible for forcible conversions.[71] The League expressed its regrets 'at the misconduct of Moplahs who may have caused any trouble to the Hindus without just cause'.[72] The Congress deplored 'the acts done by certain Moplahs by way of forcible conversions and destruction of life and property' but condemned the government for its treatment of Mappila prisoners as evidenced by the train tragedy as 'an act of inhumanity unheard of in modern times and unworthy of a Government that calls itself civilised'.[73] Even Gandhi tried to play down the incident and blamed the government for preventing the non-co-operators from spreading the spirit of non-violence in the region.[74]

Thus, the leaders were able to avert, at least for the time being, the break up of the Hindu-Muslim entente. The controversy was raked up only when, consequent to the Congress withdrawal from the projected civil disobedience at Bardoli, the whole complexion of the communal relationship underwent a change. The Hindus, particularly those of Malabar and the Punjab, began to allege that the Muslim leaders had uttered not a word of condemnation for the atrocities committed by the Mappilas.[75] Little did the Hindus appreciate the fact that the CKC, with the help of prominent *'ulama*, had been trying its best to alleviate the situation in Malabar.[76] Such insinuations only made matters worse and Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal had already begun to show restlessness at the appalling condition of the Mappilas who, according to a contemporary Hindu source, had suffered ten times more than the Hindus.[77] Consequently, the Muslim press also became active and blamed the Hindus for sowing the seeds of disunion.[78] The communal tension was such that the enquiry committees set up by the CKC, the Muslim League, the Jam'iyyat and the Congress made little headway. Even the monetary assistance to

[71] *Pioneer*, 30 Dec. 1921.
[72] AFM/NAP, AIML R, xcvii.
[73] *Report of the 36th Indian National Congress*, 48 and 114–15.
[74] *Collected Works*, xxi, 356.
[75] *Hindu*, 20 July 1922.
[76] See ibid., 9 Feb. 1922. The local govt. was itself anxious to obtain a *fatwa*, preferably from the *'ulama* of Makkah, to protect Hindus and others forcibly converted to Islam who might subsequently revert to their original faith. See Viceroy to Sec. of State, Tel. no. 203-S, 11 Feb. 1922, IOL&R, Reading Papers.
[77] *Hindu*, 6 Apr. 1922; and *Madras Mail*, 11 May 1923.
[78] *Hindu*, 20 July 1922.

the Mappila sufferers was far under a lakh of rupees.[79] Naturally, the provincial government was left free to manipulate the Malabar situation to its advantage. The result was that even when the wounds healed the scars remained visible.

[79] Between 1921 and 1927, the CKC spent just over Rs 77,000 on Mappila welfare. The actual amount collected for this purpose was only Rs 55,000. The remaining Rs 20,000 were diverted from the Khilafat Funds account. See Shaukat Ali to Abdoola Haroon, 13 Apr. 1927, AFM/NAP, Haroon Papers.

GLOSSARY

'adm-i ta'awun: to annul or rescind co-operation.

Ahl-i Hadis: in the sub-continent, the school of theology led by Siddiq Hasan Khan (d. 1890) and Sayyid Nazir Hasain (d. 1902) which professes to follow the Prophetic tradition in preference to the canonical interpretation of the four conventional schools of Islamic Jurisprudence, i.e. the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Hambali, and the Shafi'i.

Ahrar: the mainly Punjab-based political party which emerged in the wake of the Khilafat movement.

amir: leader; commander.

Amir-i Hind: the 'chief' or 'lord' of India; a title of the proposed religious dignitary.

amir-i jami'a: a vice-chancellor.

amsom(s): the smallest administrative subdivision in Malabar.

anjuman: a Muslim association.

auqaf: pl. of *waqf*, a charitable endowment.

bai'at: formal act of swearing allegiance; submission, homage, fealty; initiation as a disciple of a saint or a religious guide; to take the oath of allegiance.

baitu'l-mal: public treasury or exchequer.

Barelwi: The Barelwi school had come into being as a reaction to the revivalist strands in Arabia and India and in opposition to the successors of Shah Ismail and the *'ulama* at Deoband. Ahmad Raza Khan, following the Hanafi tradition of Shaikh Abdul Haq (1551–1642) of Delhi, laid stress on the need for *taqlid* as opposed to *ijtihad*.

bapu: 'father'; also a term of respect used for an elderly man among Hindus.

Bohra: the mainly Shi'a trading community of western India.

charkhas: pl. of *charkha*, a spinning wheel worked by hand.

chaukidar: a watchman, a police or customs peon.

chaukidari: a tax levied to defray the cost of a town or village watch; the fees or wages paid to the town or village watchman.

cherumar: a slave, an agrestic serf caste of Malabar.

crore: one hundred lakhs or ten million.

daru'l-harb: 'land of war'; country not under Islamic rule or law.

daru'l-Islam: 'land of peace'; country under Islamic rule or law; classically, a properly constituted or functioning Islamic state.

daru'l-'ulum: 'house of learning'; a Muslim establishment for higher learning.

darbar: court reception.

diwani: revenue department; revenue collection rights.

farman: an order, a command, a decree of ruler.

fatwa (pl. *fatawa*): a ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a *mufti* or a learned *'alim* or a body of *'ulama* (q.v.).

fez: a red, brimless felt hat with or without tassel worn in Turkey and Egypt.

fida'i: one who devotes himself or sacrifices himself for a cause, one who volunteers or risks his life in any perilous service.

fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence.

Ghair-Muqallid: a term commonly applied to the Ahl-i Hadis (q.v.) in the sub-continent.

gurdwara: a Sikh temple.

hadis: an account of what the Prophet Muhammad [*sal'am*] said, did, or tacitly approved.
hajj: annual pilgrimage to Makkah.
haram: forbidden by religion.
hartal: closure of shops and markets as a gesture of protest; strike.
hijrat (*hijra*, in Arabic): lit. to abandon, to break ties with someone, or to migrate; voluntary withdrawal on religious grounds from a *daru'l-harb* to a *daru'l-Islam*.
'Id: a Muslim festival, especially *'Idu'l-fitr*, celebrated to mark the end of the month of Ramazan, and *'Idu'l-azha*, to commemorate the sacrificial tradition of Prophet Ibrahim.
ijtihad: in Islamic jurisprudence, the use of individual reasoning.
Ikhwan: the brotherhood founded by Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, an intensified form of muwahhidun (q.v.).
'ilmu'l-jadal: religious disputation.
imam: a supreme leader of the Muslims; in Shi'a doctrine the hereditary claimant to the headship of the community through the Prophet's daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali.
inkilap: (*inqilab*, in Urdu), a revolution or a change, refers to Mustafa Kemal's radical reforms.
ishtirak-i 'amal: co-operation in governmental or professional activity.
jama'at: a party, a group, a community or an association.
jami'a: a university.
jam'iyyat: an association, or a body of people.
janmi: a landholder, the original owner or proprietor by hereditary right.
jihad: 'utmost endeavour', mainly used for taking up arms in a religious cause or in the defence of the *daru'l-Islam*; a holy war
jum'a: Friday, the day of congregational prayer for Muslims.
Jand-Allah: 'Army of God'; name given to the projected pan-Islamic 'army' in the 'Silk Letter Conspiracy'.
Ka'ba: the supreme Muslim shrine at Makkah, enclosing the famous black stone kissed by all pilgrims.
kafir: unbeliever, used for non-Muslims, esp. not the 'people of the Book'.
kanamdars: a holder of *kanam*, lit. possession or mortgage tenure in Malabar.
khaddar or *khaddi*: a kind of a coarse hand-spun and -woven cotton cloth.
khalifa: a successor, a vicegerent, or deputy; the caliph, the supreme head of the Muslim community, the *imam* (q.v.); as vicegerent of the Prophet he is vested with absolute authority in all matters of state, both civil and religious, as long as he rules in conformity with the laws of the Qur'an and *hadis* (q.v.).
Khalifatu'l-Muslimin: 'Caliph of the Muslims', a caliphal title.
Khilafat: the office of the *Khalifa* (q.v.), the caliphate.
khanqah: a tomb of a saint, an abode of a holy man.
khutba: public sermon, especially that delivered after the Friday or the *'Id* congregational prayers in which the ruler is prayed for. This constitutes a symbolic acknowledgement of the ruler's sovereignty.
kisan: a peasant, a cultivator.
Kisan sabha: an association of the cultivators.
lakh: one hundred thousand.
madrasa: same as *daru'l-'ulum* (q.v.) but means especially a collegiate mosque.
Mahdi: the Messiah of the Muslims whose reappearance is expected just prior to the end of the world.
Mappila: a Malyali Muslim.
Maratha: in a general sense, inhabitant of Maharashtra.
maulana: title applied to scholars of Islamic religious sciences.

maulavi: title applied to a Muslim scholar.
millat: a community, especially the religious community of Islam.
muhajirin: pl. of *muhajir*, one who performs *hijrat* (q.v.).
Mujaddid-i Khilafat: 'the renewer of the caliphate'; title given to Mustafa Kemal by the Indian Khilafatists.
mujahidin: pl. of *mujahid*, one who is engaged in *jihad* (q.v.).
mukhtiar: an agent, an attorney, as employed in legal affairs.
munazara: a religious disputation.
Muqallid: one deeming himself bound by the established doctrines of the four conventional schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
mu'tamar: congress, conference.
muttafiqa fatwa: 'unanimous decision', as the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama's *fatwa* on non-co-operation was known.
Muwahhidun: orthodox Sunnis of the Hambali school, the strictest and the least followed among the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. They regard the cults of saints and tombs and the interjection of the saints to intercede with God on behalf of the worshipper, as idolatrous. The muwahhidun were called wahhabis by the opponents of community after its founder Muhammad son of Abdul Wahhab (1703 87).
Nasir al-Islam: 'Helper of Islam'; title given to Chotani.
nawab: pl. of *na'ib*, deputy, vicegerent; a style assumed by the governors of the provinces in later Mughal period and continued by the British.
Nayar: term applied to a complex landed caste-group of Kerala.
nazim: an administrator, a director.
nazrana: a gift, a present, especially from an inferior to a superior; a contribution in excess of usual revenue; a payment levied on peasants in professed cases of emergency.
panchayat: an Indian court of arbitration consisting of five or more members.
pindal: marquee.
parsi: a Zoroastrian of Persian origin chiefly settled in western India.
pir: a sufi (q.v.) teacher, a spiritual guide or a religious preceptor.
pawindas: migratory Afghan tribesmen.
qafila: a caravan.
Qur'an: the revealed book of the Muslims. Its language is Arabic
Raj: sovereignty, rule, dominion; refers, in particular to the British rule in India.
Ramazan: the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar when Muslims fast and observe religious devotion.
sabha: an assembly.
sadqa: voluntary alms, alms properly dedicated to pious uses.
Saifu'l-Islam: 'Sword of Islam'; title given to Mustafa Kemal by the Khilafatists.
sajjada nashin: an incumbent of a religious endowment.
sal'am: a shortened version of 'peace be upon him' used in the Subcontinent.
sanad: a grant, a diploma, a charter, a patent.
Sangathan: 'binding together'; the movement to knit the Hindus into a strong community.
sarai: a building for the shelter and accommodation of travellers, an inn, a caravanserai.
sarkar: the state, govt., supreme authority.
satyagraha: 'soul-force', 'truth-force'; Gandhian passive resistance.
Seth: honorific title of a merchant, a banker, or a trader.
shahid: a martyr in the cause of religion fighting against unbelievers.
Shaikhu'l-Islam (*Şeyhulislam*, in Turkish): an honorific title of a jurist par excellence, applied especially to the Mufti of Istanbul, the chief religious dignitary and *fatwa*-giver of the Ottomans. In March 1924, the nationalists abolished the office along with the caliphate.

Shaikhu'l-Jami'a: a principal of an educational institution, a vice-chancellor.
shari'at (*shari'a*, in Arabic and *Şeriat*, in Turkish): holy law of Islam.
Shi'a: general name for the Muslims who regard Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, and his descendants as the only legitimate *imams* (q.v.) of the Muslim community after the Prophet.
Shuddhi: 'purification'; the name of the movement to reclaim Hindus from Islam.
sufi: a Muslim mystic.
Sunni: the Muslim who is held to be conforming to orthodoxy in Islamic beliefs and practices.
swadeshi: lit. 'of one's own country', the name given to the boycott of goods not made in India.
swaraj: self-rule, self-govt., independence.
takavi: advances or loans of money made to the cultivators at the time of sowing or in bad season or to enable them to extend their cultivation to be repaid when the crop is gathered.
takya: the abode of a *faqir* or saint.
taluq: a subdivision, in Bombay, of a district, in the UP, an estate.
taluqdar: officer in charge of a *taluq* (q.v.); the holder of a proprietary estate.
Tanzim: an organization; the name of the movement to organize Muslims in all aspects of life as a reaction against the Hindu movements of *Sangathan* and *Shuddhi* (q.v.).
tark-i muwalat: 'to withdraw co-operation'; Urdu (q.v.) equivalent of the term 'non-co-operation'.
tariqa: a *sufi* order.
thana: a police-station.
tilak: coloured mark on the forehead used by Hindus.
tonga: a horse-drawn carriage.
'ulama: pl. of *'alim*, a man of Islamic religious learning.
ummat (*umma*, in Arabic): Muslim community.
Urdu: language of Muslim India (today of Pakistan) formed by a mixture of Arabic, Persian and Turkish words, upon a base of Hindi and Sanskrit, written in Arabic characters.
vakil: an agent, a counsellor or a pleader in a court.
verumpattomdars: tenants-at-will.
waqf: a pious foundation.
zakat: alms, alms tax.
zamindar: landholder, paying revenue directly to the govt.
zimmi: protected non-Muslim subject of an Islamic state.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Abdul Bari, Maulana Qayyam-ud-din Mohammad: b. 1878; leading *pir* and pan-Islamist *'alim* from Farangi Mahal, Lucknow; son of Maulawi Abdul Wahab, Shaikh of Farangi Mahal; educ., Farangi Mahal and the Hijaz, where he developed friendship with Husain ibn Ali, later Sharif of Makkah and King of the Hijaz; travelled extensively in the Ottoman Empire before returning to India in 1908; same year founded the Madrassa Nizamiyya, Farangi Mahal; pres., Majlis-i Muidu'l-Islam, Lucknow, 1910; came under the influence of Mushir Kidwai, 1912; pres., Anjuman-i Khuddam-i-Ka'ba, 1913; involved in the Kanpur Mosque affair, 1913; took leading part in organizing the Lucknow Muslim Conference and the Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind, 1919; founder member, CKC, 1919 26; opposed *hijrat* to Afghanistan, 1920; mellowed towards the Govt. of India after Reading's fateful telegram to Montagu, requesting leniency towards Turkey, 1922; supported Husain's assumption of the caliphate, 1924; opposed Ibn Saud during the Hijaz crisis, 1924 26; d. 1926. Special Branch Police (SBP) description (1921): 'Age 40 years; average height; strong build; fair complexion; thick beard; wears spectacles. . . . Fanatical leader of the Khilafat agitation.'

Abdul Ghaffar, Qazi Muhammad: b. 1888; journalist and politician from Moradabad (UP); son of Khan Bahadur Qazi Abrar Ahmad, deputy magistrate; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; for some time in govt. service; resigned to join Mohamed Ali's *Hamdard*; founded *Jamhur* (Calcutta), and after its suppression, *Subah* (Delhi), and later, *Payam* (Hyderabad); gen.-sec., AIML, 1918; editor, *Akhuwwat*, 1919; sec. to Chotani during his visit to Britain with the non-official Khilafat delegation, 1921; spec. rep. of CKC to Ismet Pasha in Switzerland to plead for restoration of the caliph's temporal power, 1922; d. 1955. SBP description (1921): 'Age between 31 years (1918); height 5 feet 6 inches or 5 feet 7 inches; thin build; fair complexion; round face; large eyes; high forehead; beard cut in French fashion; wears pince-nez'.

Abdul Ghafur, Maulawi: pan-Islamist *'alim* and Khilafat worker from Peshawar (NWFP); son of Hafiz Kamal Din of Mohalla Kaki Khel, Peshawar city; sec., Khilafat com., Peshawar. SBP description (1921): 'wheat complexion; medium height; strong build; grey, long beard; age 50 60 years.'

Abdul Majid, Shaikh: b. 1889; political worker and journalist from Hyderabad, Sind; offspring of Hindu parents (father, Lila Ram) of Thatta, Sind, but converted to Islam in youth; educ., D. J. S. College, Karachi; editor of G. M. Bhurgri's *al-Amin*; sec., Sind Khilafat Committee; member, CKC; d. 1978. SBP description (1921): 'Age 33; height 5 feet 6 inches; slim build; French beard; oval face; wheat complexion; wears spectacles and Anwar cap'.

(The) Aga Khan, Aga Sultan Sir Mohamed Shah: b. 1877; 3rd head of the Nazari Isma'ili sect of Shi'a Muslims; succeeded his father, 1885; educ., privately; member, legislative council, 1902 4; led Muslim (Simla) deputation to Lord Minto, 1906; pres., AIML, 1906 13; granted salute of 11 guns in recognition of loyal services during World War I; pleaded Indian Muslim case *re* Khilafat before the Council of Four at Paris, 1919; opposed the non-co-operation experiment; member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; d. 1957.

Agha Safdar, Muhammad Safdar Khan *alias*: advocate and pan-Islamic political leader from Sialkot, Punjab; son of Akbar Khan, Pathan; d. 1935. SBP description (1921): 'age 35 years; height 5 feet 7 inches; stout build; fair complexion; trimmed beard and moustache; dresses in *khaddar*.'

Ahmad, Shaikh Zahur: barrister and politician from Allahabad; founder member, AIML; joint sec., London Muslim League, 1908; member, AIML Council, from 1910; member, CKC, 1919–28; member, Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry com., 1922; spied for the govt. on the activities of the CKC and the Jam'iyyat as a paid agent of the CID.

Ahmad, Syed Zahur: lawyer and politician from Lucknow; educ., Muir Central College, Allahabad; founder member, AIML; member and sec., AIML Council, 1919–26; member, CKC, 1919–28; pres., Khilafat com., Lucknow, 1925; d. 1942.

Ali, Maulawi Muhammad: b. 1874; Punjabi *'alim*, journalist and head of the Lahori faction of the Ahmadiyya movement; educ., Kapurthala, Govt. College, Lahore (MA, 1895) and Law College, Lahore (1897); taught at Islamia College, Lahore, 1897; same year accepted Ahmadiyya doctrine; taught at Oriental College, Lahore, 1897–1900; editor, *Review of Religions* (Qadian), 1902; left Qadian over the question of succession and the doctrinal issue of finality of the prophethood of Muhammad (*sal'am*), 1914; same year took up residence at Lahore and, in association with Khwaja Kamal-ud-din and Dr Yaqub Beg, formed a new organization under the name of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at-i Islam with himself as the pres.; supported the Khilafat movement, d. 1951.

Ali, Moazzam: barrister and politician from Rampur; brother-in-law of the Ali brothers; educ., Rampur, MAO College, Aligarh, and London; set up legal practise in Patna and then shifted to Moradabad, 1920; took leading part in the Khilafat movement and resigned practice, 1920; succeeded Shaukat Ali as sec., CKC, after the latter's arrest, 1921; member, AICC; member, Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry com., 1922.

Ali, Mohamed: b. 1878; leading pan-Islamist journalist and politician from Rampur and younger brother of Shaukat Ali; son of Abdul Ali Khan; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and Lincoln College, Oxford; graduated, 1902; chief education officer, Rampur, 1902–4; founder member, AIML; started *Comrade* from Calcutta, 1911; followed it up by an Urdu newspaper *Hamdard*, 1913; took part in the Kanpur Mosque affair and led a two-member delegation to London, 1913; interned for pro-Turkish activities, 1915–1919; member, CKC, 1919–28; led the Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920; interned for the famous Karachi resolutions, 1921–3; pres., INC, 1923; delegate of the CKC to World Muslim Congress, Makkah, 1926; participated in first R'TC, 1930–1; d. 1931.

Ali, Mohammad Asaf: b. 1888; Delhi barrister and politician; son of Ahsan Ali Shaikh of Nawabpur, dist. Bijnor; educ., Stephen's College, Delhi, and Lincoln's Inn, London; called to the Bar, 1912; took leading part in the Khilafat movement, gave up legal practice and went to prison; travelled extensively in Europe; d. 1953. SBP description (1919): 'Fair complexion; round face; small moustaches; medium height; slight build; wears spectacles and European clothes; age about 30 years'.

Ali, Shaukat: b. 1873; pan-Islamist journalist and politician from Rampur and elder brother of Mohamed Ali; son of Abdul Ali Khan; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; sub-deputy opium agent in opium dept. till 1912; founder member, AIML; helped found Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba, 1913; interned with Mohamed Ali, 1915–19; hon. sec., pres., CKC, with two interruptions, 1923–38; delegate of the CKC to World Muslim Congress, Makkah, 1926; d. 1938.

Ali, (Sir) Syed Reza: b. 1880; Moradabadi Shi'a lawyer and politician; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; started legal practice in Moradabad, 1908; MLC, UP, 1912–20; moved to Allahabad to practise at high court, 1916; took part in the Khilafat movement but opposed non-co-operation; became independent in politics, 1920; MCS, 1921–6; headed two deputations of non-official Muslim MLAs to the viceroy in connection with the Turkish peace terms, 1922, and 1923; pres. AIML, Bombay session, 1924; d. 1949.

Ameer Ali, Syed: b. 1849, Calcutta barrister and judge; educ., Hoogley College,

Calcutta, and Inner Temple, London; called to Bar, 1873; Lecturer on Mahomedan Law at the Presidency College, Calcutta, 1873 8; magistrate and chief magistrate, Calcutta, 1878 81; MLC, Bengal, 1878 83; MILC, 1883–5; judge of high court of judicature at Fort William in Bengal, 1890 1904; settled in Britain, 1904; helped found London ML, 1908; member, judicial com. of the privy council, 1909 28; published extensively on Islam and Islamic history; d. 1928.

Amroti, Maulana Sayyid Taj Mahmud: pan-Islamist *'alim* from Sukkur, Sind; d. 1929. SBP description (1921): 'Age about 65; height 5 feet 10 inches; dark complexion; wrinkled face; dyes beard and moustache red; decrepit and walks with a stoop.'

Ansari, Dr Mukhatar Ahmad: b. 1880; leading medical practitioner and politician from Ghazipur settled in Delhi; educ., Muir Central College, Allahabad, Edinburgh and London; after graduating in medicine, admitted as a resident medical officer at Charing Cross Hospital and as house surgeon to Lock Hospital; returned to India, 1911; became intimate with Ajmal Khan and the Ali brothers at Delhi; led Red Crescent medical mission to Turkey, 1912–13; member, AIML council; founder and pres., Home Rule League, Delhi, 1917; chm. reception com., AIML Delhi session, 1918; member, AICC for eight years from 1919; member, CKC, 1919 28; led Khilafat deputation to the viceroy, 1920; member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; pres., Khilafat conference, Gaya, 1922; d. 1936. SBP description (1921): 'Age about 42 years (1918); well built; thick grizzled moustache; wears gold-rimmed or rimless pince-nez; European clothes; with fez or hat.'

Azad, Maulana Feroz Bakht Muhyi-ud-Din Ahmad Abul Kalam: b. 1888; leading *'alim* and pan-Islamist journalist settled in Calcutta; was born of an Arab mother at Makkah where his father, Khair-ud-din of Delhi, had taken refuge after the Revolt of 1857; returned to India with his father, 1890; educ., Dars-i Nizamiyya, Calcutta, and Nadwatu'l-'Ulama, Lucknow; probably travelled to the Middle East, 1906 7; editor, *Vakil* (Amritsar), 1907; editor, *al-Nadwa* (Lucknow), 1911; started weekly *al-Hilal* (Calcutta), 1912; and on its suppression, *al-Balagh* (Calcutta), 1913; interned for pro-Turkish activities, 1916 20; member, CKC and Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama; issued a *fatwa* in support of the *hijrat*, 1920; member, non-co-operation com. of the CKC, 1920–1; interned, 1921 3; pres., INC, 1923; pres., CKC, 1925; supported Ibn Saud, 1924–6; published extensively on Islamic theology; d. 1958.

Azad Subhani, Maulana Abdul Kadir: b. 1882; pan-Islamist sufi *'alim* of Naqshbandiyya order and politician and head of Madrassa al-Haya, Kanpur; son of Murtaza Subhani of Ballia; came to notice in connection with the Kanpur Mosque affair, 1913; founder member, Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama; pres., UP Khilafat com, 1920; pressed for complete independence along with Hasrat Mohani, 1921; an exponent of 'no-change' policy, 1922 3; d. 1957. SBP description (1919): 'Age about 45 years (1918); height 5 feet 3 inches; slight; fair; deep-set eyes; pointed nose; wears spectacles; speaks slowly and is fond of quoting Persian couplets.'

Aziz Amritsari, Ghulam Muhammad *alias* **Aziz Hindi**: b. 1896; ex-commission agent, political worker and organizer of the campaign for *hijrat* to Afghanistan; son of Madho Kashmiri; convicted for life during Punjab disturbances, 1919; on release organized Khilafat workers' conference, Delhi, 1920; set up the central *hijrat* office at Delhi to promote the campaign; d. 1971. SBP description (1920): 'Age 30 years. Height 5' 9". Thin build. Wheat complexion. Long face. Sunken cheeks. Long thin nose.'

Badauni, Maulana Abdul Majid: b. 1887; prominent pan-Islamist *'alim* of madrassa Qadiriyya, Badaun (UP); came to limelight during the Kanpur Mosque affair; 1913; founder member, Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba; signed the *muttafiqa fatwa*,

1920; sec., UP *'ulama* conference, 1920; pres., propaganda sub-com., UP Khilafat com.; member, Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry com, 1922; d. 1931. SBP description (1921): 'Age 35 years (1918); height 5 feet 6 inches; stout build; wheat complexion; round face; small moustache; shaved beard.'

Baptista, Joseph: b. 1864; Home Ruler and Trade Union leader from Bombay; pres., Indian Home Rule League (founded by Tilak); went to Britain, 1907; later became engrossed in Labour questions; chm. reception com., AITUC, 1920; pres., Indian Seamen's Union, Bombay, 1923; represented Indian Labour at international Labour conference, Geneva, 1924; pres., Municipal corporation, Bombay, 1925; d. 1930.

Besant, (Mrs) Annie: b. 1847; British theosophist who lived and worked in India; hdqrs., Madras; pres., Theosophical Society and editor, *New India and Commonweal*; educ., privately in Britain, Germany and France; took honours in Botany at London University; joined the National Secular Society, 1874; worked on Free Thought and Radical Movements led by Charles Bradlaugh, MP, and for various other social and liberal societies, 1889; became a devoted pupil of Mme. Balavatsky; founded the Central Hindu College at Benares, 1898, and the Central Hindu Girls' College, Benares, 1904; helped found the Hindu University and was at its court, council and senate; closely associated with Jinnah in Home Rule League; d. 1933.

Bhopal, Nawab Sultan Jahan Begum, (The) Begum of: b. 1858; eighth in lineal descent from the famous Dost Mahomed Khan, founder of the dynasty, and third female ruler in succession to rule over the state; educ., privately; succeeded, 1901; received a salute of 21 guns within, and 19 guns outside the limits of her dominions; *purdah* observing but well travelled (India, Egypt and Europe); first chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1920; abdicated in favour of her only surviving son, Nawabzada Hamidullah Khan, 1926; d. 1930.

Bhurgri, Ghulam Muhammad: b. 1878; barrister and politician of a rich zamindar family settled in Sind from the Punjab (Bhur Garh in Dera Ghazi Khan); educ., Sind Madrassa, Karachi, MAO College, Aligarh, and London; called to Bar, 1908; set up practice in Hyderabad (Sind); MLC, Bombay, 1910–19; INC, 1917; member, AIML deputation to Britain *re* reforms and Khilafat, 1919; pres., Bombay session of the Khilafat conference, 1920; opposed non-co-operation and successfully contested elections of 1920; later resigned his seat in the council of state as a protest against the govt. policy with regard to the Khilafat question; pres., Lucknow session of the AIML, 1923; MLA, 1923–4; d. 1924.

'Bi Amman', Abadi Bano Begum: b. 1851; mother of the Ali brothers; nominally headed the campaign for the release of her sons, 1917–19; pulled in Gandhi to support the campaign, 1917; took part in the Khilafat movement and organized propaganda among women and raised subscriptions for the Khilafat fund; d. 1924.

Bikaner, Ganga Sing Bahadur, Maharaja of: b. 1880; educ., Mayo College, Ajmer; succeeded, 1887; assumed full ruling powers, 1898; military service and campaigns, 1900–14; World War I, 1914–15; one of the three reps. of India at the imperial war cabinet and conference, 1917; and one of the two reps. at the imperial cabinet and peace conference, 1919; d. 1943.

Butler, Sir (Spencer) Harcourt: b. 1869; gov. of UP; educ. Harrow, and Balliol College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1890; lt.-gov. of Burma, 1915–18; lt.-gov. of UP, 1918–21; gov., of UP, 1921–3; gov. of Burma, 1923–7; d. 1938.

Chelmsford, Frederic John Napier Thesiger, 3rd Baron and 1st Viscount: b. 1868; viceroy of India; educ., Winchester, and Magdalen College, Oxford; called to Bar, 1893; gov. of Queensland, 1905–9; gov. of New South Wales, 1909–13; viceroy of India, 1916–21; first lord of admiralty, 1924; d. 1933.

Chotani, Seth Mian Muhammad Hajee Jan Muhammad: b. 1883; millionaire

timber merchant and pan-Islamist from Bombay; head office in Padoni (Bombay) and branches in Poone, Karachi, Nowshera, Lahore, Belgaum, Calcutta and Ernakulum; rendered signal service to the Allies during World War I by his gift of millions of tons of timber and contributions to war effort; closely associated with Abdul Bari through his (Chotani's) *pir* Sayyid Ibrahim Saif-ud-din, a friend of the former; helped to establish the Khilafat funds; pres., CKC, 1919–23; member, AICC, 1920–1; leader, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; pres., Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry com., 1922; resigned from the presidency of the CKC owing to the funds scandal, 1923, and retired to live a secluded life with virtually no money; last days spent in Medina; d. 1932.

Curzon of Kedleston, George Nathaniel Curzon, Ist Marquess: b. 1859; sec. of state for foreign affairs; educ., Eton, and Balliol College, Oxford; MP for Southport, 1886–98; under sec. of state for India, 1891–2; privy councillor, 1895; viceroy of India, 1899–1904; and sec. state for foreign affairs, 1919–24; negotiated the Treaties of Versailles (1919) and Lausanne (1923); d. 1925.

Daoodi, Maulawi Shafee: b. 1879; zamindar and lawyer form Patna; educ., Calcutta University; took part in the Khilafat movement and suspended legal practice in 1920; sentenced to one year, 1921; MLA 1924; pres., CKC, 1928; d. 1946.

Daryabadi, Maulana Abdul Majid: b. 1892; prominent *'alim* and journalist from Daryabad, dist. Barabanki in UP; educ., Canning College, Lucknow, MAO College, Aligarh, and St. Stephen's College, Delhi; worked in translation bureau, Osmania University, Hyderabad, 1913–18; fellow, Osmania University, 1919–23; member, CKC until 1928; was associated with *Hamdam* (Lucknow) and Mohamed Ali's *Hamdard*; editor, *Sidq* (Lucknow), an Urdu religious journal; d. 1977.

Das, Chitta Ranjan: b. 1870; Bengali lawyer and politician from Calcutta; barrister of Calcutta high court; entered politics, 1917; first opposed and then allied himself with Gandhi, 1920–2; pres., INC, 1921; leader of the 'pro-change' faction and formed, with Motilal Nehru, T. A. K. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman, the Swaraj Party, 1923; d. 1925.

Dwarkadas, Jamnadas: b. 1890; Liberal politician and Home Ruler of the Besant school from Bombay; educ., Bombay University; member, Bombay corporation, 1917–21; member, council of Indian Merchants' Chamber, 1918–25; pres., Bombay National Home Rule League; MLA.

Fazl-i-Husain, Mian (Sir): b. 1877; barrister and politician from Lahore; educ., Govt. College, Lahore, and Christ's College, Cambridge; called to Bar, Gray's Inn, 1901; practised law at Sialkot, 1901–5; moved to Lahore and practised at high court and chief court, 1905–20; minister of the Punjab govt. with short interruptions, 1921–30; d. 1936.

Fazlul Haq, Abdul Kasem: b. 1873; lawyer and politician from Barisal in Bengal; educ., Calcutta University; practised law for some years; govt. servant for seven years but resigned to resume practice; MLC, Bengal, 1913–20; pres., Bengal ML, 1916–21; gen.-sec., INC, 1918; pres., AIML Delhi session, 1918; opposed non-co-operation, 1920–2; minister of education, Bengal, 1924; d. 1962.

Gait, Sir Edward Albert: b. 1863; lt.-gov. of Bihar and Orissa; educ., University College, London; entered ICS, 1882; career in Assam and Bengal until appointed member, executive council, Bihar and Orissa, 1912–15; lt.-gov. of Bihar and Orissa, 1915–20; member, India council, 1922–7; d. 1950.

Gandhi, Mohands Karamchand: b. 1869; Gujarati Banya barrister, journalist and politician; editor, *Young India*; educ., Rajkot, Bhavagar and London; called to Bar, 1889; practised in South Africa for seventeen years; gave up practice to lead 'passive resistance' campaign on behalf of Indian settlers, 1908; returned to India, 1915; leading figure of INC till his assassination in 1948. SBP description (1921): 'Caste Bania; age 52; height 5 feet 5 inches; fair complexion; slight

build; his upper front teeth are artificial; shaves beard and head; has a small moustache; wears a white khadi cap, a shirt and a dhotar. Carries a haversack when travelling.'

Ghaznawi, Maulana Sayyid Daud: b. 1895; pan-Islamist *'alim* from Amritsar and an itinerant Khilafat propagandist; son of Abdul Jabbar, *imam* of the Ghaznawi Mosque, Katra Mahan Singh, Amritsar City (Punjab); though settled in Amritsar the family traced its origin to Ghazna in Afghanistan; educ., Madrasa Fatehpuri, Lucknow; sec., Khilafat committee, Amritsar, 1919; later, joined the Punjab Khilafat Committee at Lahore; d. 1963. SBP description (1921): 'wheat complexion; tall; pointed long nose; small eyes; flat cheeks; long face; age about 30 years.'

Grant, Sir (Alfred) Hamilton: B. 1872; chief com. of the Frontier; educ., Fettes College, Edinburgh, and Balliol College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1895; career in the Frontier until appointed foreign sec., Govt. of India, 1914–19; negotiated peace treaty with Afghanistan, 1919; chief com. of NWFP, 1919–21; d. 1937.

Hardinge of Penshurst, Charles Hardinge, Ist Baron: b. 1858; viceroy of India and later under sec. of state for foreign affairs; educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge; entered diplomatic service, 1880; ambassador at Petrograd, 1904–6; permanent under sec. of state for foreign affairs, 1906–10 and 1916–20; viceroy of India, 1910–16; British ambassador to Paris, 1920–3, d. 1944.

Haroon, Seth Haji (Sir) Abdoola: b. 1872; leading businessman and politician from Karachi; organized the Khilafat movement in Sind; made huge contributions to the Khilafat funds; pres., All India Muslim Conference; member, AIML council; president, CKC, 1927; d. 1942. SBP description (1921): 'Age about 45; height 5 feet 11 inches; face small and round; body large and ungainly; heavy moustaches; small clipped beard; fair complexion; noticeably high shoulders; has normally a discontented expression.'

Hasan, Yakub: b. 1875; journalist and politician from Madras; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; came to Madras from Bangalore in 1901; published an Urdu weekly journal *Qaumi Halchal* and an English weekly journal *Muslim Patriot* for few years; visited Europe, 1912; nominated member of Madras corporation for several years; member, AIML deputation to Britain *re* reforms and Khilafat, 1919; conducted Islamic Information Bureau and its journal, *Muslim Outlook* (London), along with Kidwai and Ispahani; returned to India, 1920; twice went to prison; d. 1940.

Hasan Imam, Syed: b. 1871; Bihari lawyer and politician; educ., Patna and England; called to Bar, Middle Temple, 1892; practised at Patna and Calcutta until 1911; judge of Calcutta high court, 1911–16; resumed practice at Patna; pres., INC, 1918; pres., All India Home Rule League; member, non-official Khilafat delegation to Britain, 1921; d. 1933.

Hasan Nizami, Khwaja Syed Muhammad Qasim Ali: b. 1878; *sajjada nashin*, sufi *pir* and journalist from Delhi; educ., privately at Delhi and Gangoh; became *pir* after *bai'at* with Pir Mihar Ali Shah, 1908; founded the journal *Nizamu'l-Masha'ikh*; travelled to the Middle East, 1911; took part in the Kanpur Mosque affair, 1913; went to Meerut and founded *Tauhid*, 1913; returned to Delhi after the suppression of his journal by the govt. but was kept under police surveillance, 1914–17; at first was pro-govt. but later took part in the Khilafat movement and the Hijaz affair, 1919–26; d. 1957.

Hasawi, Arif Husain: b. 1888; writer, journalist and political worker from Delhi and a protégé of Abdul Bari; son of Abdul Khaliq; original member of the Khilafat workers' association, 1920; convicted for various terms in 1920, 1921; and 1930; d. 1936. SBP description (1920): 'Age 35. Height 5' 6". Wheat complexion. Thin face, Sunken cheeks. Small clipped beard. Wears spectacles.... A violent speaker and writer.'

Hasrat Mohani, Syed Fazl-ul-Hasan: b. 1878; pan-Islamist journalist, poet and politician from Mohan, dist. Unao, UP; son of Azhar Husain; settled in Aligarh/Kanpur; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; founder and editor, Urdu weekly *Urdu-i Mu'alla*, 1903; interned for political activities, 1908–9 and 1916–19; closely associated with Abdul Bari who was his preceptor; member, CKC, 1919–28; member, non-co-operation com. of the CKC, 1920–2; pres., AIML, 1921; opposed CKC's pro-Ibn Saud policy, 1925–6; d. 1951. SBP description (1919): 'Age about 36 years (1918); medium height; stout build; wheat complexion; face pitted with small-pox. . . . Extremist journalist and agitator.'

Hossain, Syud: b. 1888; journalist and politician from Calcutta; the youngest son of Nawab Syed Mohammed of Dhaka and Calcutta; was on the staff of *Bombay Chronicle*, 1917–19; editor, *Independent* (Allahabad), 1919–21; reportedly married Motilal Nehru's daughter (Vijaya Lakshami) but was forced to divorce her at Gandhi s intervention; member, Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920; settled in the US and did not return to India until 1946; d. 1949.

Iqbal, Dr (Sir) Mohammed: b. 1876; poet-philosopher, barrister and politician settled in Lahore; educ., Govt. College, Lahore; Trinity College, Cambridge; and Munich University; joined staff of Oriental College, Lahore, 1904; qualified Bar from London; joined staff of Govt. College, Lahore; resigned to practice law at Lahore High Court; MLC, Punjab, 1926; d. 1938.

Irfan, Maulana Abul Muarif Muhammad: b. 1888; pan-Islamist *'alim* and Khilafat worker originally from Hazara; son of Mulla Jia Tanauli of Mansehra, district Hazara; member, CKC, for several years; came into prominence during *hijrat* of 1920; looked after the CKC office establishment in its later days; member, Khilafat delegation to the Hijaz, 1926; d. 1939. SBP description (1921): 'wheat complexion; long beard; medium build; height 5 feet 8½ inches; age 35–40 years. Wears spectacles.'

Ishaq, Maulawi Muhammad: b. 1888; pan-Islamist *'alim* and Khilafat worker from Havelian but settled in Mansehra; son of Muhammad Gul, Awan, of Havelian, district Hazara; d. 1962. SBP description (1921): 'wheat complexion; face slightly pock-pitted; strong build; fat; long beard, streaked with grey; front teeth protruding; uses snuff; height 5 feet 9 inches; age 50–55 years.'

Iyengar, S. Kasturi Ranga: b. 1859; journalist and politician from Madras; editor, *Hindu* (Madras) since 1905; educ., Presidency College, Madras; practised law at Coimbatore and at Madras, 1885–1905; member, AICC and pres., Madras provincial Congress com.; d. 1923.

Iyengar, S. Srinivasa: b. 1874; advocate from Madras; educ., Madras and Presidency College, Calcutta; member, Bar council, Madras, 1912–16; member, AICC; MLC, Madras; adv.-gen., 1916–20; d. 1941.

Jaffer, Khan Bahadur Sir Ebrahim Haroon: b. 1881; Memon landlord, businessman and politician from Poone; educ., Deccan College, Poone; pres. and trustee of various *anjumans*; special magistrate, 1906–18; organized Bombay Presidency Muslim League, 1908; MLC, Bombay, 1916–19; pres., All India Muslim Conference, Lucknow, 1919; MILC, 1919–20; MCS, 1921–5 and 1926–30; d. 1930.

Jan Muhammad, Haji: political worker and *hijrat* leader from Peshawar (NWFP); son of Abdul Razak of Mohalla Shahghazi Nazim, Peshawar; sec., Hijrat Committee, Peshawar; jailed in 1921 for default of furnishing security under FCR. SBP description (1921): 'wheat complexion; short; thin build; grey beard; age 50 years; usually suffers from eye trouble.'

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali: b. 1876; barrister and politician from Bombay; educ., Sind Madrasatul Islam and Mission School, Karachi, and Lincoln's Inn, London; called to Bar, 1896; practised first at Karachi and then enrolled as advocate at Bombay high court, 1897; MILC, 1910; joined AIML, 1913; principal nego-

tiator of Lucknow Pact with the Congress, 1916; pres., AIML, 1916, 1920 and 1934 48; pres., Home Rule League, Bombay, 1917–20; leader, AIML delegation to Britain *re* reforms and Khilafat, 1919; first gov.-gen. of Pakistan, 1947 48; d. 1948.

Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry: b. 1889; lawyer and politician from Lucknow; educ., Lucknow, and MAO College, Aligarh; came under the influence of the Ali brothers, 1909; member, Red Crescent medical mission to Turkey, 1912–13; took his law degree, 1916; started legal practice at Lucknow, 1917; member, AICC, 1917; joint sec. AIML, 1918; gave up legal practice, 1920; interned, 1921 2; re-joined AIML, 1924; d. 1973.

Khan, Ahmad Raza: b. 1856; head of the Bareilly School of *'ulama*; educ., privately; completed his studies, 1869; did *bai'at* at the hand of Shah Aal-i Rasul Marharwi, 1877; visited Makkah and other sanctuaries, 1878; a consistent theological opponent of Farangi Mahal and Deoband; criticised Abdul Bari for accepting govt. compromise on the Kanpur Mosque affair; opposed the Khilafat-non-co-operation movement and organized a conference of *'ulama* against it at Bareilly, 1921; his writings and *fatawa* are voluminous; d. 1921.

Khan, Hakim Ajmal: b. 1865; leading practitioner of *unani* system of medicine and pan-Islamic politician from Delhi; son of Mahmud Khan; educ., privately; founder member, AIML: helped strengthen political alignment between politicians and *'ulama*, 1906–19; pres., AIML, 1919; vice-pres., CKC, 1919–25; pres., INC, 1921; member, Congress and Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry coms., 1922; travelled to Europe, and Near and Middle East, 1925–6; d. 1927. SBP description (1921): 'Age 58; height 5 feet 5 inches; thin build; wheat complexion; long thin face; short beard; well bread appearance; somewhat untidy dress.'

Khan, Mirza Ali Mohammed: solicitor and pan-Islamist of Iranian Shi'a origin; mother tongue Farsi; served as Iranian consul for some time; sec., CKC, 1919–20; supported non-co-operation experiment; vice-chancellor, Bombay University; d. 1930.

Khan, Nawab Ismail: b. 1886; barrister and politician from Meerut but settled in Aligarh; favourite son of Nawab Ishaq Khan, sec., MAO College, Aligarh; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and London; organized Khilafat movement in UP; pres., UP Khilafat com.; member, CKC, 1919–28; member, Khilafat civil disobedience enquiry com., 1922; d. 1958.

Khan, Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad: b. 1867; Kakarzai Pathan barrister and politician settled in Aligarh; educ., MAO College, Aligarh, and Cambridge; called to Bar, 1893; started practice at Aligarh, 1894; joined staff of MAO College, Aligarh, 1897; founder member, AIML; MLC, UP, 1909–12; opposed the Lucknow Pact, 1916; pleaded Indian Muslim case on the Khilafat issue before the Council of Four, 1919; member, India council, 1917–24; vice-chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1923–7; d. 1930.

Khan, Zafar Ali: b. 1873; Punjabi journalist and politician; editor, *Zamindar* (Lahore); educ., Wazirabad, Patiala, and MAO College, Aligarh; for some time worked on the staff of *Times of India* (Bombay); afterwards served in Hyderabad state; visited Britain and Istanbul, 1913; interned in his native village, Karmabad, for pro-Turkish activities, 1914 19; revived *Zamindar*, Apr. 1920; supported the *hijrat* campaign, 1920; sentenced to five years' imprisonment for 'seditious' speeches, Nov. 1920; after release was involved in the Hijaz affair and Hindu-Muslim factionalism, 1925–7; d. 1956.

Khatri, Ahmed Haji Siddik: Khilafat leader and resident of Abdul Rehman Street, Bombay. SBP description (1921): 'Halai Memon; age about 38; strong build; wheat complexion; tall; shaven beard and big moustaches twisted upwards; wears Turkish cap and glasses. Occupation dyer.'

Kidwai (of Gadia), Mushir Hosain: b. 1878; zamindar, barrister and pan-Islamist politician from Barabanki (UP); educ., Lucknow and London; sec., Pan-Islamic Society of London, 1903–7; and later of the Central Islamic Society, 1907–20; awarded 'Usmaniyya' medal by Sultan Abdulhamid II for his services to pan-Islamic cause, 1906; closely associated with Abdul Bari through his (Kidwai's) *pir* Haji Waris Ali Shah, a friend of the former; helped establish Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i Ka'ba, 1913; conducted the Islamic Information Bureau and managed *Muslim Outlook* London); advised the establishment of the Khilafat committees and funds in India; returned to India but went back to Britain to join the Khilafat delegation, 1920; pres., Oudh Khilafat com. since 1920; called for the abolition of the Khilafat committees after the funds scandal, 1923; supported King Husain's claim to the caliphate, 1924; d. 1938. SBP description (1921): 'Age 48 years (1915); height 5 feet 7 inches; slight build; fair complexion; trims his beard in French fashion.'

Kifayatullah, Mufti: b. 1875; prominent Ahl-i Hadis *'alim* and head of Aminiyya Madrassa, Delhi; son of Inayatullah; the most learned local *'alim*; a friend of Mahmud Hasan and tutor of Ahmad Saeed; signed the *fatwa* against peace celebration, 1919; first pres. of Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind, 1919; took active part in the Khilafat movement as a leader and itinerant preacher and went to prison; d. 1952. SBP description (1923): 'Age 53; medium height; thin build; sallow complexion; long face.'

Kitchlew, Dr Saif-Ud-Din: b. 1884; barrister and politician from Amritsar; educ., India, Cambridge and Germany (Ph.D. Munster University, 1912); started legal practice at Rawalpindi, 1913; moved to Amritsar, 1915; took prominent part in 'Rowlatt' *satyagraha*, 1919; sentenced to life imprisonment by Martial Law Commission but released under amnesty, Dec. 1919; took leading part in the Khilafat movement and gave up practice, 1920; member, non-co-operation com. of the CKC, 1920–21; sentenced for supporting the Karachi resolutions, 1921–23; conducted the Tanzim campaign, 1924–27; d. 1963.

Lal Khan, Malik: b. 1889; pan-Islamist political worker; son of Malik Mast Ali Khan, originally from Mirjan village, Lala Musa, district Gujrat but settled in Gujranwala; sec., Punjab Khilafat Committee, 1919–20; d. 1976. SBP description (1921): 'Age about 36 years; sallow complexion; height 5 feet 7 inches; shifty eyes; wears a short beard and moustaches; looks from side to side while walking and talks slowly and distinctly.'

Llyod, Sir George Ambrose (later Ist Baron Lloyd of Dolobran): b. 1879; gov. of Bombay; educ., Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge; hon. attaché, Istanbul; served World War I, 1914–18 (Despatches six times); Conservative MP, 1910–18; gov. of Bombay, 1918–23; MP, 1924–25; d. 1941.

Lloyd George, David (later Ist Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor): b. 1863; prime minister of Britain; educ., Llanystumdwy Church School and privately; solicitor, 1884; Liberal MP, 1890–31; pres. of the board of trade, 1905–8; minister of munitions, 1915–16; sec. of state for war, 1916; prime minister, 1916–22; d. 1945.

Ludhiyanawi, Habibur Rahman: b. 1892; pan-Islamist Deobandi *'alim*; son of Muhammad Zakria of Ludhiana City (Punjab); principal of Deoband after Mahmud Hasan; d. 1956. SBP description (1921): 'fair complexion; strong build; height 5 feet 8 inches; age 28 years; black beard; small moustache; dresses in ordinary Indian style and wears a turban.'

Maclagan, Sir Edward Douglas: b. 1864; gov. of Punjab educ., Winchester, and New College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1885; sec. to Govt. of India, revenue and agriculture dept., 1910–14; and of educ. dept., 1915–18; lt.-gov. of Punjab, 1919–21; gov., 1921–4; d. 1952.

Madani, Maulana Husain Ahmad: b. 1879; Deobandi *'alim* and an associate of

Mahmud Hasan; educ., Deoband, 1891–9; joined its teaching staff on graduation; emigrated to Medina in the Hijaz and acquired Ottoman citizenship, 1902; joined Mahmud Hasan in his pan-Islamic schemes, 1915–16; arrested along with his leader and three other associates, 1916; interned at Malta by the British, 1917–20; prosecuted and imprisoned for supporting the Karachi resolutions, 1921–3; d. 1957. SBP description (1921): 'Born 1877; height 5 feet 6 inches; wheat complexion; round face; mole and a dark mark on forehead; wears spectacles.'

Mahmud Ahmad, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din: b. 1889; head of the Qadiani wing of the Ahmadiyya movement and son and second successor of its founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad; educ., Qadian; succeeded, 1914; disputed the Ottoman claim to the caliphate and opposed non-co-operation; d. 1965.

Mahmud Hasan, (Shaikhu'l-Hind) Maulana: b. 1851; leading pan-Islamist *'alim* and principal of the *daru'l-'ulum* Deoband; educ., Deoband; on graduation joined its teaching staff, 1873; became its principal, 1890; launched an unobtrusive anti-British pro-Turkish political activity, 1911; moved to the Hijaz with his associates to avoid arrest, 1915; arrested by Sharif Husain at the instance of the British, 1916; interned at Malta, 1917–20; returned to India, June 1920; joined the Khilafat movement and gave sanction to the non-co-operation experiment; d. Nov. 1920.

Mahmudabad: Sir Mohamed Ali Mohammad Khan, Raja (later Maharaja) of: b. 1877; rich Shi'a landlord and politician from Lucknow; educ., privately; entered politics, 1909; pres., AIML, 1913-18; home member, UP, 1920–3; first vice-chancellor, Muslim University, Aligarh, 1920–3; d. 1931.

Malaviya, Pandit Madan Mohan: b. 1861; Hindu lawyer and politician from UP with pronounced communal feelings; educ., Muir Central College, Allahabad; enrolled as *vakil* at Allahabad high court, 1892; MLC, UP, 1902–12; MILC, 1910–20; pres., INC, 1909, 1918 and 1932; MLA, 1924–30; pres., Hindu Mahasabha, 1923–5; d. 1946.

Malihabadi, Abdul Razzaq: b. 1875; a well-known pan-Islamist journalist; visited Egypt and Turkey, 1913–14 and during the war; edited the Urdu section of *Jihan-i Islam*, a trilingual propaganda journal published from Istanbul by the Turkish govt.; associated with pan-Islamist revolutionaries like Amir Shakib Arslan, Abdul Aziz Shawish, Mirza Abdul Qayyum, and the Khairi brothers (Abdul Sattar and Abdul Jabbar); captured by the Sharif's men but later released; was very close to Abul Kalam Azad; supported *hijrat*, 1920; d. 1959?

Mazhar-Ul-Haque: b. 1886; Bihari barrister and politician; called to the Bar, 1891; practised at Calcutta and Bankipore; founder member, AIML and its pres., 1915; organized Khilafat movement in Bihar, 1918–24; d. 1930.

Montagu, Edwin (Samuel): b. 1879; sec. of state for India; educ., Clifton, City of London School, and Trinity College, Cambridge; Liberal MP, 1906–22; parl. under sec. of state for India, 1910–14; financial sec. to treasury, 1914–16; minister of munitions, 1916; sec. of state for India, 1917–22; d. 1924.

Mujaddid, Pir Ghulam: b. 1881; sufi *pir* from Matiari, Hyderabad (Sind); son of Pir Abdul Halim Sirhindi; d. 1958. SBP description (1921): 'Age about 30; height 5 feet 7 inches; wheat complexion; medium build; keeps a beard; wears baggy trousers (Pathan fashion); wears a lungi; when speaking Urdu and Sindhi his accent is noticeably Afghan.'

Nadwi, Maulana Syed Sulaiman: b. 1884; pan-Islamist *'alim* and journalist from UP; educ., Phulwari, Madrassa Imdadiyya, Darbhanga, and Nadwatu'l-'Ulama, Lucknow; graduated, 1906; influenced by Shibli Nu'mani in his literary style and political ideas; edited *al-Nadwa*, 1912; founded Daru'l-Musannifin, Azamgarh, 1914; joined staff of Deccan College, Poone, 1915; member, Khilafat delegation to Europe, 1920; and of delegation to the Hijaz, 1924–5; d. 1953.

Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal: b. 1889; Allahabad barrister and son of Motilal Nehru; educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge; called to Bar, Inner Temple, 1912; advocate, Allahabad high court; sec. Home Rule League, Allahabad, 1918; member AICC from 1918; imprisoned on several occasions for political activities; first PM of independent India; d. 1964.

Nehru, Pandit Motilal: b. 1861; lawyer and politician from Allahabad and father of Jawaharlal Nehru; educ., Muir College, Allahabad; practised as *vakil*, 1883–95; enrolled as advocate, Allahabad high court, 1895; pres., INC, 1919 and 1928; suspended legal practice in pursuance of non-co-operation, 1920; imprisoned for six months, 1921–2; formed with C. R. Das the Swaraj Party, 1923; MLA, 1923–4; resumed legal practice, 1925; d. 1931.

Nizam of Hyderabad, Nawab Mir Sir Usman Ali Khan Bahadur: b. 1886; ruler of the Hyderabad State and one of the richest men of his time in the world; educ., privately; succeeded, 1911; granted titles of 'Faithful Ally of the British Government' and 'His Exalted Highness', 1918; chancellor of the Muslim University, Aligarh; d. 1967.

Nur Muhammad, Dr Shaikh: a medical practitioner and pan-Islamic politician from Fakir-jo-Pir, Hyderabad, Sind. SBP description (1920): 'Age about 24 (1920); tall; medium build; oblong face; bearded; wheat complexion; wears trousers and not the *salwar*; generally wears a black Anwar cap; speaks hastily.'

O'Dwyer, Sir Michael: b. 1864; lt.-gov. of the Punjab; educ., St. Stanislans College, Tullamore, and Balliol College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1885; career in northern and central India until appointed agent in central India, 1910–12; lt.-gov. of the Punjab, 1913–19; remebered chiefly for the Punjab excesses of 1919; d. 1940.

Pal, Bipin Chandra: b. 1858; Bengali journalist and politician and editor of *Bande Matram*; educ., Presidency College, Calcutta; joined Brahmo Samaj, 1877; and INC, 1886; imprisoned for 'sedition', 1911; opposed-supported-opposed the Khilafat movement and its non-co-operation experiment; d. 1932.

Patel, Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai: b. 1875; Patidar Gujarati lawyer and younger brother of Vithalbhai Patel; educ., Nadiad and Bardwan; called to Bar, Middle Temple, 1913; practised law at Allahabad; entered politics, 1916; Gandhi's confidant in Gujarat; d. 1950. SBP description (1921): 'Caste Lewa Patidar; age 44; height about 5 feet 5½ inches; medium build; wheat complexion; long moustache (getting grey); hair on both ears; generally wears a white khadi coat, a dhotar and a black merino cap. His eyelids have a swollen appearance.'

Patel, Vithalbhai Jhaverbhai: b. 1870; Gujarati barrister and elder brother of Vallabhbhai Patel; practised law at Bombay high court; MLC, Bombay, 1914; MLA, 1923; pres., legislative assembly, 1925–30; d. 1933. SBP description (1921): 'Age 60 years; height about 5 feet 5 inches; strong build; wears a short brown beard; dresses in a white shirt and dhotar and wears no head-dress.'

Peel, William Robert Wellesley Peel, 1st Earl and 2nd Viscount: b. 1867; sec. of state for India; educ., Harrow, and Balliol College, Oxford; called to Bar, Inner Temple, 1893; MP, 1900–12; under sec. of state for war, 1919–21; minister of transport (unpaid), 1921–2; sec. of state for India, 1922–4 and 1928–9; d. 1937.

Phulwari, Shah Muhammad Sulaiman: b. 1859; leading Qadariyya *pir* and pan-Islamist *'alim* from Phulwari and a close associate of Abdul Bari; educ., Farangi Mahal, Lucknow, and the Hijaz (1885–86), where famous Indian *émigré 'alim* Haji Imdadullah was one of his teachers; visited Iraq, 1920; took leading part in the Khilafat movement and non-co-operation; d. 1935.

Pickthall, Marmaduke William: b. 1875; English Muslim pan-Islamist; son of Rev. Charles Grayson Pickthall, Rector of Chillesford in Suffolk; educ., Harrow-Neuchatel studying French; unsuccessfully tried to get into the British foreign

office; travelled to Near and Middle East several times; conducted the Islamic Information Bureau with Kidwai and others until 1920; same year went to India to conduct propaganda at the invitation of the CKC; editor, *Bombay Chronicle*, 1920–4; entered Nizam's education service, 1925; managed *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad), 1926; d. 1939.

Qureshi, Muhammad Shoaib *alias* **Shaiban Mustafa Qureshi**: b. 1891; journalist and pan-Islamist politician from UP; son of Muhammad Mustafa Qureshi of Nanoo Police Station, Aligarh; educ., MAO College, Alighar, and Oxford; member, Red Crescent medical mission to Turkey, 1912–13; was a link between Abdul Bari and the Ali brothers during the latter's internment, 1915–19; took part in the Khilafat movement and went to prison, 1921; editor, *New Era* (Lucknow), and *Young India*; member, Khilafat delegation to the Hijaz, 1924–25; and to the World Muslim Congress, Makkah, 1926; d. 1962. SBP description (1919): 'Age about 38 years; height 5 feet 9 inches; strong build; sallow complexion; beard shaved; long moustache.... A pro-Turk [and] an intemperate speaker.'

Rahimtoola, Sir Ibrahim: b. 1862; Bombay businessman and politician; elected member of Bombay municipal corporation, 1892; became its pres., 1899; MLC, Bombay, 1899–1909; MILC, 1912; member, education and local self govt., 1918–23; pres., fiscal com., 1921–2; pres., legislative council, Bombay, 1923–28; d. 1942.

Rai, Lala Lajpat: b. 1865; Punjabi lawyer, Arya Smajist and politician; deported from India, 1907; returned to India, 1920; joined the non-co-operation campaign, 1920–2; pres., INC (special session), Sept. 1920; joined communal politics, 1923–8; d. 1928.

Rajagopalachari, C.: b. 1878; Tamil Brahmin lawyer and politician from Salem; educ., Central College, Bangalore, and Presidency College, Madras; participated in 'Rowlatt' *satyagraha*, 1919; sec. INC, 1920; and later member of its working com.; led the 'no-change' faction in support of Gandhian policy, 1923–6; d. 1972.

Reading, Rufus Daniel Isaacs, 1st Marquess of: b. 1860; viceroy of India; educ., University College, London, and Brussels and Hanover; Bencher of Middle Temple, 1904; MP, 1904–13; solicitor-gen., 1910; attorney-gen., 1910–13; lord chief justice of England, 1913–21; special envoy to Washington, 1917; and ambassador to Washington, 1918–19; viceroy of India, 1921–6; d. 1935.

Ronaldshay, Lawrence John Lumley Dundas, Lord (later 2nd Marquess of Zetland): b. 1876; gov. of Bengal; educ., Harrow, and Trinity College, Cambridge; extensive travels in the East, 1898–1907; MP, 1907–16; gov. of Bengal, 1917–22; d. 1961.

Saeed, Maulana Ahmad: b. 1886; Delhi pan-Islamic *'alim* and *nazim* of the Deoband seminary; son of Nawab Mirza; educ., Madrasa Aminiyya, Delhi; member, Anjuman Khuddam-i Ka'ba, 1913; prominent in Delhi riots, 1919; head of anti-peace celebrations movement, 1919; *nazim*, Jam'iyyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind, 1919 onward; founder, Khilafat workers' association, 1920; convicted for one year, 1921; opposed the Nehru Report, 1928; d. 1959. SBP description (1919): 'Fair complexion; tall and stout; clipped beard; large and piercing eyes; prominent cheek bones; generally wears angrakha; age about 40 years.... A pupil of Maulvi Kifayatullah of Delhi. Threw in his lot with the Muslim League party in 1918.... He is a fanatic and dangerous on account of his eloquence'.

Sanaullah Amritsari, Maulana Abdul Wafa: b. 1868; leading Ahl-i Hadis *'alim* from the Punjab and a pupil of Mahmud Hasan; son of Muhammad Khizarjoo, Kashmiri, of Katra Sant Singh, Amritsar city; educ., Deoband and Madrassa Faiz-i 'Am, Kanpur; graduated, 1892; founder and editor, *Ahl-i Hadis* (Amritsar), 1903; member, CKC, 1919–28; founder member, Jam'iyatu'l-'Ulama-i Hind;

and its pres. at the Calcutta session, 1925; migrated to Gujranwala (Pakistan), 1947, and moved to Sargodha, 1948; d. 1948. SBP description (1921): 'wheat complexion; long face; long beard; long hair on head; tall well built; age about 50 years.'

Sastri, V. S. Srinivasa: b. 1869; Madras politician; educ., Govt. College, Kumbakonam; joined Servants of India Society, Poone, 1907; MLC, Madras, 1913; MILC, 1916–20; elected to the council of state, 1920; opposed non-co-operation; d. 1946.

Shafi, Khan Bahadur (Sir) Muhammad: b. 1869; Lahore barrister and politician; educ., Govt. College, Lahore, and Middle Temple, London; called to Bar, 1892; practised law at Allahabad and Lahore high court; pres., AIML, 1913 and 1927; MLC, Punjab, and MILC, 1909–19; educ. member, viceroy's executive council, 1919–22; vice-pres. of the council, 1922–4; law member, 1923–4; pro-chancellor, Delhi University, 1922–5; d. 1932.

Shah, Pir Mahbub: leading *pir* of Sind and Khilafat leader; son of Pir Rashid-ud-din Shah of Dero Mohbat, dist. Hyderabad (Sind); supported the *hijrat* movement, 1920. SBP description (1921): 'Age 41; height 5 feet 6 inches; strong build; dark complexion; face pitted with small-pox marks; wears a beard; fierce-looking.'

Sherwani, Tassadduq Ahmad Khan: b. 1884; leading barrister and politician from Aligarh; came from the Bilona branch of the Sherwani Pathan family; educ., Aligarh and Cambridge, where he was a contemporary of Jawaharlal Nehru; a close friend of Ansari and Mohamed Ali; took part in Aligarh College and Home Rule League movements; member, UP Congress and AICC, 1919; councillor, AIML; member, CKC, 1919–28; gave up practice in pursuance of non-co-operation, 1920; courted imprisonment, 1921; member, Khilafat cd enquiry com., 1922; founder member and additional sec., Swaraj Party, 1923; d. 1935.

Siddiqui (Sindhi), Abdur Rahman: b. 1887; journalist and politician originally from Surat but became known as Sindhi because he stayed in Hyderabad (Sind) with his uncle in his early days; later spent his life-time in Calcutta and Delhi; educ., MAO College, Aligarh; member, Red Crescent medical mission to Turkey, 1912–13; member, AIML council from 1907; sub-editor, *Comrade*, editorial board, *New Era* (Lucknow), 1916–17; and *Muslim Outlook* (London), 1920–1; special rep., CKC to Ismet Pasha to plead for the restoration of the caliph's temporal power, 1922; involved in business in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s; gov. of East Pakistan, 1953; remained a bachelor all his life; d. 1953.

Sindhi, Maulana Ubaidullah: b. 1872; prominent *'alim* associate of Mahmud Hasan and *émigré* pan-Islamist revolutionary; born to Sikh parents he became a Muslim in 1887; educ., Deoband; worked for Jam'iyatu'l-Ansar of Mahmud Hasan; left Deoband for Delhi to start Nazaratu'l-Ma'arif with Ajmal Khan and Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, 1912; *hijrat* to Kabul, 1915; 'Silk Letter Conspiracy', 1916; member, Kabul Hijrat Com., 1920; left Kabul for Moscow, 1922; reached Turkey, 1923; visited Makkah, 1926; allowed to return to India, 1937; d. 1944.

Sinha of Raipur, Sir Satyendra Prassano Sinha, 1st Baron: b. 1864; educ., Presidency College, Calcutta; called to Bar, Lincoln's Inn, 1886; standing counsel, Govt. of India, 1903; advocate-gen., Bengal, 1907–9 and 1915–17; India's rep. in imperial war conference, 1917; member, war cabinet, 1918; under sec. of state for India, 1919–20; gov. of Bihar and Orissa, 1920–1; d. 1928.

Sly, Sir Frank George: b. 1866; gov. of CP; educ., Balliol College, Oxford; entered ICS, 1885; career in various capacities until appointed chief com. of CP, 1920; gov. of CP, 1921–5; d. 1928.

Sobani, Omar: a Halai Memon pan-Islamist and a well-known businessman; originally from Calcutta but settled in Bombay on Queen's road; member CKC,

1919 26; helped the Khilafat movement financially; suffered heavy losses in business deals, 1922; d. 1926. SBP description (1923): 'age 40; thin build; wheat complexion; clean shaven; oval face; wears glasses; medium height.' The Umar Gate of the Khilafat House in Bombay was erected in 1929 in his memory.

Sobani, Osman: Bombay businessman and younger brother of Umar Sobani; like him settled in Bombay on Queen's road; member, CKC, 1919–32; appointed to the board of management of Chotani sawmills after the funds scandal. SBP description (1923): 'age 28; medium height; medium build; wheat complexion; clean shaven; oval face.'

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar: b. 1856; leading Brahmin journalist and politician from Poone; opposed govt. intervention in Hindu social practices; leader of extreme wing of INC; jailed for 'sedition', 1897–8 and 1908–14; supported war effort, 1914; rejoined INC after exclusion by moderates, 1916; d. 1920.

Vincent, Sir William Henry Hoare: b. 1866; home member, Govt. of India; educ., Christ College, Brecon, and Trinity College, Dublin; entered ICS, 1887; served in various executive and judicial capacities until appointed member of viceroy's council, 1917; vice-pres. of the council, 1921; member, India council, 1923 31; d. 1941.

Willingdon, Freeman Freeman-Thomas, Ist Marquess of: b. 1866; gov. of Madras; educ., Eton, and Trinity College, Cambridge; Liberal MP, 1900–6; lord of treasury, 1905–12; gov. of Bombay, 1913–19; gov. of Madras, 1919–24; India's delegate at the assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1924; gov.-gen. of Canada, 1926 31; viceroy of India, 1931–6; d. 1941.

Zafar-ul-Mulk, Ishaq Ali Alawi *alias*: journalist and politician from the UP; took part in the Khilafat movement and supported non-co-operation; founder, Awadh Khilafat Committee, managed or edited several journals, including *Haqiqat* and *an-Nazar* (Lucknow), 1919; d. 1947. SBP description (1921): 'Age 36 years (1920); height 5 feet 8 inches; thin; long face; fair complexion; pointed nose; beard. . . . Commandant of Oudh Khilafat workers under Hasrat Mohani.'

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(d) Miscellaneous letters and papers at the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

(e) Zafar Hasan Aybek's letter to the author, dated 26 Dec. 1967.

(f) Rushbrook William's letter to the author, dated 11 Oct. 1968.

(iv) *Interviews:*

(a) Interview with the late Malik Lal Khan (1889–1976), ex-Sec., Punjab Khilafat Committee, at Lahore in September 1966.

(b) Interview with Maulana Jamal Mian (b. 1920) the only son of Abdul Bari, at London in August 1969.

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